I think that quite a few people are rather ad hoc motivated in seeing a general anti-realism as a support for their religious views/as a counter to what they take as attacks on those religious views sourced in realism. — Terrapin Station
Thus they arrive at their stupendous concept, "God." That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as the cause, as ens realissimum. Why did mankind have to take seriously the brain afflictions of sick web-spinners? — Nietzsche
But if I had to guess reasons for it, I'd guess a variety of them, including (a) that Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is typically one of the first things that philosophy students (whether "formal" or self-taught) read that has "mindfnck"/pre-philosophical-paradigm-breaking qualities, (b) that those pre-philosophical-paradigm-breaking qualities make it seductive to present general anti-realism as one's view on philosophy boards, (c) that one hasn't gotten far enough along in one's philosophizing that one realizes that there's no privileged epistemic basis for general anti-realism, and (d) I think that quite a few people are rather ad hoc motivated in seeing a general anti-realism as a support for their religious views/as a counter to what they take as attacks on those religious views sourced in realism. — Terrapin Station
I don't buy any of the following: that in lieu of realism/antirealism being a consequence of other views, it's typically just a nominal difference; that the non-nominal difference is not (an issue of engaging in) "actual ontology"/an issue of addressing what sort of thing we're talking about (a la "what it is") or the "nature of things"; or that a stance on realism/anti-realism amounts to "really arguing for" how that stance can account for (other) things. — Terrapin Station
So despite some pretending to be defenders of some long-lost ancient knowledge in the face of the onslaught of the Enlightenment, the concern with anti-realism is exactly co-extensive with it as sheer and utter reaction: it's only with the concern over absolute certainty does mysterianism and anti-realist sentiment gain any traction whatsoever, disfiguring the history of philosophy by transposing it's thoroughly modern concerns onto it and colouring it with a reactionary and regressive nostalgia that wishes for a time that never was. — StreetlightX
If one doesn't have an account of individuation or ontogenesis that couples with one's stance on anti/realism, frankly, one ought to count oneself out of the debate. — StreetlightX
Weren't there idealists and skeptics about the external world in ancient Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophy? — Marchesk
Yeah, that's not biased towards your own background, interests and stances. — Terrapin Station
What's the difference between realism and materialism, btw? — Mongrel
I believe that the difference comes down to one's notion of their place in the world. A realist sees him or herself as a (small) part of a wider existence. An idealist sees his or her own existence as primary. To the realist, we happen to the world. To the idealist, the world happens to us. — Real Gone Cat
Special Relativity is the one that does in absolute space. Kant beat Einstein to it (so did Leibniz, btw.. but that's beside the point.) — Mongrel
Historical revisionism does you no credit. And it is General relativity that curves space-time to the extent that triangle (self-evidently or not) do not in general have internal angles totaling 180degrees, as demonstrated by Gauss in 1820s.
Thus Idealism is refuted. — tom
What kind of thing is X such that it can even be spoken about in terms of an inside and an outside to begin with, or a beyond or not-beyond at all? — StreetlightX
I take it that on the account of realism, X is whatever makes up the world regardless of whether we know or perceive it. That could be ordinary objects, matter, information, math, some neutral stuff, whatever. But typically, it's the stuff of physics.
For idealism, it is either the various experiences we have (or any mind has), or the fundamental categories of thought for Kantians which structure or experiences, such as space and time. — Marchesk
Why are you conflating these things? — StreetlightX
Literally questions about what it is one is talking about when one takes a side either way. — StreetlightX
'Ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', specifically, from the first-person present participle of the verb 'to be' (i.e. 'I am'). — Wayfarer
Hell, read wikipedia — StreetlightX
The compound word ontology combines onto-, from the Greek ὄν, on (gen. ὄντος, ontos), i.e. "being; that which is", which is the present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, i.e. "to be, I am", and -λογία, -logia, i.e. "logical discourse". — Wikipedia
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