Perhaps you are suggesting that someone in Bob's position could never raise the child well? — ZhouBoTong
I would think we are impeaching the pres because his quid pro quo is illegal ...
Is this like advanced physics or something where there is no simplifying?...
... could a teenager embrace your philosophical views or does it require years of deep knowledge to adopt?
I conceive of "virtue" as being developed by judgments or conduct which strive to prevent mitigate or relieve as much foreseeable harm (i.e. personal pain/deprivation or social frustration/conflict) as possible. — 180 Proof
I like the sound of this...but then realized I am not exactly sure what that means (likely my fault ). I would think that one could make moral decisions in a prudential manner? Perhaps you are viewing moral decisions as more dogmatic or as a list of rules/maxims....that doesn't seem quite right. I think I will just wait for your explanation as my guesses are likely to do us both a disservice. — ZhouBoTong
Nice. I think it would take me 10 days to even write a script for a 30 minute video. And my neurosis would never allow to make a video without entirely planning every word I was going to say. I will try to check them out, but I am unlikely to vastly improve your "hits" as I generally prefer learning from text...those incredible astronomy shows on the science channel(s) and any of the "Planet Earth" style nature shows are the exception...If you can do philosophy with that sort of production value, I may end up a regular viewer :grin: In any case, it is a worthy endeavor. — ZhouBoTong
because this particular quid pro quo had violated the public trust — 180 Proof
Impeachment is a political 'checks and balances' proceeding and not a criminal prosecution; in other words, a constitutional officer (e.g. a president) can be impeached for lawful as well as unlawful conduct. — 180 Proof
What about
I conceive of "virtue" as being developed by judgments or conduct which strive to prevent mitigate or relieve as much foreseeable harm (i.e. personal pain/deprivation or social frustration/conflict) as possible.
— 180 Proof
is so difficult to grasp? — 180 Proof
Apparently we're both negative consequentalists; I take a further step by proposing that the goal of minimizing harm / conflict consists in the skills learned & habits formed by such judging or conduct.
Just as a healthcare provider learns skills & forms habits for diagnosing & providing care by reflectively doing both and thereby improving / developing by repetition over the course of her career, so too, I think, a moral agent improves / develops over the course of her moral life through moral exercise & experience (i.e. reflection). That's the "virtue" part you referred to previously which I reformulate as "agent-based".
In my understanding, a 'moral system' that doesn't - or is not (reflectively) designed to - improve / develop moral agency (i.e. skills & habits - what function do "virtues" serve if not these?) via moral practices (e.g. preventing, mitigating or relieving (increases in) harm) is inadequate (i.e. susceptible to being akratic), merely arbitrary, & undisciplined. — 180 Proof
Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. — TheHedoMinimalist
Most people mostly have selfish considerations when deciding whether or not to have children. This is true for both Pronatalists and Antinatalists. — TheHedoMinimalist
A prudential Antinatalist is kinda like a normal “child free” person who simply doesn’t want to have kids because they think it would be harmful to their own life interests. — TheHedoMinimalist
A moral Antinatalist is someone who thinks having children is bad mostly because it harms the child or other people in the world. — TheHedoMinimalist
I’m actually more interested in the selfish/prudential arguments for having children and against having children rather than the moral/selfless arguments(even though I made a thread on moral Antinatalism this time.). — TheHedoMinimalist
So basically, prudential decision theory is just the more selfish aspects of decision theory while morality is the more selfless aspect. I hope that made sense to you. — TheHedoMinimalist
I used to try to write a script and was over concerned with making minor mistakes. But, I realized that I’m actually about as good talking off the cuff as I am at writing a good script. I’m not the best writer but I tend to have pretty good improvisational public speaking skills. So, I just improvise my talks while occasionally pausing the recording to think. I don’t think it strongly impacts the quality of my videos but it greatly improves my productivity. I also save time by having my videos only include a slide that I made with the program Paint with the title of the video written on it. So, my videos definitely don’t have much production value. Oftentimes, I think the best way to create quality is with quantity. This is because a large number of videos created with minimum effort are often more likely to have a really interesting video in it than a small number of videos that are over-analyzed and over-produced. I suppose I’m more likely to say something stupid though. I had stopped even reviewing all of my own videos. But, I reviewed a couple and was satisfied with them. I also have a love for astronomy videos btw :smile: — TheHedoMinimalist
Fair enough, we can say that showing respect for other’s behavior is important. But, in the case of Bob, the consequence of his actions is REALLY good. — TheHedoMinimalist
I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do - and by how much - and when they don't. We have to trust our reason. — Bartricks
Reason makes it sound like there is a correct answer. — khaled
For an analogy: there is a correct answer to the question "what is Bartricks thinking right now". But I do not think we could formulate any rule about it - that is, that on a Thursday at 5pm Bartricks thinks about butter". — Bartricks
I don't rule it out, I'm just sceptical that there is any such rule. — Bartricks
Unfortunately for me, people's personal lives are very uninteresting to me — ZhouBoTong
I think most people that actually call themselves an anti-natalist would be in this category. — ZhouBoTong
Without children, life is easy and pleasant. I know all sorts of things that I enjoy doing and without kids, I can choose to do any of them, any time I want. — ZhouBoTong
I also have social inadequacies, so I struggle to treat humans differently based on who they are. A 7 year gets talked to just like a 47 year old. From that perspective, kids suck. They are dumb and have nothing interesting to say. — ZhouBoTong
Finally, IF I did have kids it would be all about molding them into some incredible figure...which seems borderline immoral. Worse than that, when the kid hits age twelve and says "screw you dad, I don't want your life", I can only agree that it is free to live its life any way it sees fit...but I am bored. I love you, I will support you, but leave me alone I am watching TV. — ZhouBoTong
Notice there is basically zero morality in the decision, and very few factors to analyze. I don't want kids BECAUSE I don't want kids (I think deciding whether or not to go to college actually is more complicated). There is an acknowledge that once I have them, I am morally obligated to treat them well...but I can just choose to not have them. — ZhouBoTong
Now I think our big difference is your faith in all of mankind to reach your level of moral reasoning. — ZhouBoTong
I would like to start by biting the bullets on the thought experiments that you had introduced to me. I actually think that it would be justified to subject Tom to a life of endless torture if it minimizes the combined suffering of — TheHedoMinimalist
So, how should we continue this discussion if I have different intuitions than you do? — TheHedoMinimalist
In my example what we can do is maximise happiness by torturing one person. And now it seems to many that this would not be justified, and it really doesn't matter the number of people whose happiness will be maximised. A thousand, a million, a billion - keep adding noughts, and it makes no difference. — Bartricks
The example shows that sometimes the numbers don't count and so figuring out what's right is not - or not necessarily - a simple matter of summing the good versus the bad outcomes. — Bartricks
So, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most people's intuitions - most people who think soberly about such matters, are capable of understanding, and who are not in the grips of a dogma - deliver the verdict that it would be wrong to torture one to maximise the happiness of the many.
That doesn't mean they're right. But it is very good evidence that they're correct. — Bartricks
But anyway, what you need to do is try and discredit the intuitions I am appealing to. Not all intuitions. That's silly. But the specific intuitions I am appealing to. It is not enough simply to say you don't share them. The majority do share them, and so unless you think your intuitions are special, you need to provide good reason to think their intuitions do not count (as opposed to just appealing to your own). — Bartricks
I think you need to have a deeper epistemic foundation that could demonstrate the reason why your intuitions about morality are more plausible than mine or anyone else’s — TheHedoMinimalist
Rather, I’m trying to argue that the intuitions about applied ethics cannot inform us about normative ethical questions. — TheHedoMinimalist
I think we are getting closer to it since this discussion is getting more Epistemic in nature. — TheHedoMinimalist
Do you think that the unpopularity of antinatalism could be used as an argument against Frank’s view that life contains more badness than goodness? — TheHedoMinimalist
I would like to point out that you also believe in many things that are counterintuitive to most people that you would regard as ”reasonable” — TheHedoMinimalist
For example, antinatalism is itself counterintuitive to most people. In fact, it is sometimes used in thought experiments to argue against other viewpoints. — TheHedoMinimalist
Frank makes an argument that life contains more badness than goodness and starts that argument by making an argument for Axiological Hedonism which states that the goodness of life should be defined only as the combined pleasure of life and the badness of life should be defined as the combined suffering. — TheHedoMinimalist
I think we can both agree that the unpopularity of Antinatalism doesn’t provide any evidence against it. — TheHedoMinimalist
But where is your argument? — Bartricks
My argument revolves around the notion that every possible normative aim has some probability of being a good normative aim, and some probability of being a neutral or bad normative aim. The task is to make a hypothesis on which normative aims are more likely to be good to focus on. I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. That is to say, normative aims which seem to have more non-arbitrary ways of figuring out how to formulate a basic hierarchy of outcomes in relation to the normative aim in question have better explanatory power and thus have a superiority as a theory. To give a concrete example, consider the normative aim of “minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings”. This is the normative aim which is pursued by Bob above any other normative aim. Does this normative aim have a high degree of comeasurability? To figure this out, we first need to figure out what we are comparing and measuring. In this case, we are measuring suffering. Suffering has some measurable properties like the intensity of the suffering, the frequency of the suffering, and the duration of the suffering. This means that it has some significant amount of comeasurability. Of course, we can never measure suffering precisely like we could with something simple like measuring the amount of water in a cup. But, we can formulate an elementary hierarchy of various actions which cause suffering by intuitively comparing the intensity of the suffering caused and the duration and frequency of the moments of suffering. So, there is some commeasurabilty and thus some non-arbitrary way of determining which actions are better at alleviating suffering and which action are better to avoid because they cause more suffering. On the other hand, let’s turn to the normative aim of “showing respect for others in one’s behavior”. Does this aim have a high degree of comeasurability? We first need to figure out what we are comparing or measuring. Well, it seems that we are comparing and measuring the wrongness of not showing respect for others in one’s behavior in various cases where the principle is violated. So, we would likely postulate that each action which violates the principle of showing respect has an intensity of violation, a duration of the violation, and the frequency of violation. This is the only way we could make valid intuitive judgements to distinguish cases of severe violations of the principle from the more mild violations. But, this is where problems arise for me. Does a case of violation of the principle really have an intensity of violation or a frequency of violation or a duration of violation? It’s certainly not as obvious as in the case of measuring suffering. I know from experience that some moments of suffering in my life are more intense than others. I also know that some moments of suffering last longer and some of my actions led to more frequent moments of suffering. Mental states seem to have measurable properties of this sort. On the other hand, it doesn’t appear that violations of a principle have an intensity that we can observe or a duration or a frequency. But, why do people believe that they have measurable properties then? Well, we usually measure the intensity of a principle violation by the intensity of the offense that we experience from thinking about the violation occurring. The mental state of being offended is comeasurable just like suffering is. This is a problematic comeasurability though. This is because we are not interested in measuring the offensiveness of a principle violation but rather the actual intensity of the violation. I imagine that you would think that Bob has wrongfully violated the principle of respecting others even if he lived in a world where no one would get offended at his principle violation. But, how could you determine the intensity of his principle violation without simply appealing to the intensity of the offensiveness that you experience from reading about Bob? I don’t have an answer to this problem and thus I’m inclined to be skeptical of your view. Without an ability to form even the most basic hierarchy of wrongness of cases in which the violation of the principle occurs, it seems like all claims of wrongness are simply arbitrary and have no normative significance. The explanatory difficulty of your view is just too great for me. Thus, I feel that the normative aim of minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings has a greater epistemic certainty of being a good normative aim to pursue. Though, I actually think there are even better normative aims to pursue but I won’t go into that. I apologize for the extreme wordiness and complexity of my comment but I have no simpler way of explaining my intuitions to you. — TheHedoMinimalist
Yes, I agree. That is, I agree that the intuitions of most people probably represent procreation to be morally okay. Now, I don't think those particular intuitions count for very much. But I accept that it is reasonable to appeal to them and I accept that I have the burden of proof on this issue, precisely becusae procreation appears morally okay to most people. — Bartricks
I would need to hear the argument. What's the argument? — Bartricks
Susie argues that the vast majority of reasonable people would be unwilling to accept such an implication and thus this is evidence against Frank’s viewpoint. — TheHedoMinimalist
I explained how the intuitions are widely shared. That's why they count. Not because they occur in my mind. But because they occur in my mind and are widely shared by others who reflect on the same cases. — Bartricks
Yes. Although you seem to be equating 'unpopular' with 'counterintuitive'. Antinatalism is counterintuitive. — Bartricks
I am an antinatalist on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence, not one. And although I accept that most people have rational intuitions that conflict with my antinatalist conclusion, I think those intuitions can be discredited. — Bartricks
Note too, antinatalism is not the view that life contains more bad than good. Some antinatalists may believe that. But it is not essential to the view and so you're attacking a straw man if you equate the two. — Bartricks
Yes. Moral questions have correct answers (the proposition "This act is morally right" is either true or false) . But I am sceptical that there are any moral rules.
This is what I think about psychological questions as well - there are correct answers to questions about what psychological state someone is in, but I do not think there are any rules about what psychological state person is in, only rough and ready generalizations.
The evidence that morality is like this is that it appears to be. Sometimes consequences matter, sometimes they don't. Sometimes numbers matter, sometimes they don't. That is, sometimes an act is right because it brings about more good than the alternative; but sometimes an act is right regardless of whether it brings about more good than the alternative. It all depends on the situation. — Bartricks
I’m actually more interested in prudential decision making than moral decision making. — TheHedoMinimalist
Well, I actually use somewhat unconventional definitions of terms “prudential” and “moral”. Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. — TheHedoMinimalist
In the room, a child is sitting. It could be a boy or a girl. It looks about six, but actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps it was born defective, or perhaps it has become imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect ... They all know it is there, all the people of Omelas. Some of them have come to see it, others are content merely to know it is there. They all know that it has to be there. Some of them understand why, and some do not, but they all understand that their happiness, the beauty of their city, the tenderness of their friendships, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skill of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery. — Ursula Le Guin, The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas (1973)
... if the hypothesis were offered of a world in which Messrs Fourier's and Bellamy's and Morris' utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture. — William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (1891)
Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature -- that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance -- and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? — Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880)
Though, can you make a stronger argument for why the ends do not justify the means for those who are not convinced of this principle?
— TheHedoMinimalist
I don't accept "ends justify means" arguments in ethics. Means and ends must be adjusted to one another so that the latter is not undermined or invalidated by the former while the former is calibrated to enact the latter. A version of reflective equilibrium.
Mathematically speaking, it’s intuitive to suppose that if someone prevents 5 lives from existing and causes only 1 to exist, then they made a better impact on the world than a “passive” antinatalist who simply doesn’t reproduce.
— TheHedoMinimalist
Atrocities are what "mathematically speaking" gets you ... — 180 Proof
I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. — TheHedoMinimalist
If I did not fulfill my burden of proof requirement, then what would I need to do to fulfill that requirement? — TheHedoMinimalist
I would like to point out that the intuitions that are commonly shared differ across different periods of time. In the past, people widely shared the intuition that homosexual sex was wrong. Today, much fewer people share that intuition. If you lived in the past, would it be your burden of proof to show that homosexual sex is not wrong? — TheHedoMinimalist
What is the difference between unpopular and counterintuitive regarding cases of applied ethics? — TheHedoMinimalist
How do you go about discrediting their intuitions then? — TheHedoMinimalist
Yes, moral intuitions have varied across different periods of time. That's the basis upon which I believe morality has varied over time. If 'acting in manner X' seemed wrong to most people in 1800, but seems right to most people now, then that's good evidence that it was wrong in 1800, but right today. — Bartricks
I appeal to their adaptive value. Humans who have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay will most likely procreate. That, I think, is the best explanation of why most humans have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay. — Bartricks
An intuition is a mental representation. But for something to be unpopular is simply for people to be adopting a negative attitude towards it. — Bartricks
I do not see any reason to think that's true. You're assuming from the get go that morality is 'measurable'. Why make that assumption? Is it a self-evident truth of reason? — Bartricks
When it comes to any normative theory, if it is to be defensible it needs to appeal to our moral intuitions and show how it respects and unifies a large number of them. But then - and here's the rub - there will (for there has always been to date) some that it cannot accommodate. Either at that point you dismiss those intuitions on the grounds that they do not fit with your favourite theory (in which case the theory has taken over from the evidence), or you accept that the theory is false (and to date the majority of moral philosophers have considered every proposed theory false, and false precisely because of a failure to accommodate important and clear moral intuitions). — Bartricks
If one accepts that the theory is false on the basis of moral intuitions, then we didn't need the theory. We can just follow our moral intuitions. Normative theories are, then, at best redundant, and at worst positively misleading (for there will always be some - often many - who are seduced by the theory and the desire for neatness and so start following it, rather than the evidence).
So, again, why not just follow the intuitions? Why decide in advance that morality is neat, predicable, and amendable to codification? Those assumptions seem explicable in terms of human psychology, but they do not seem to be ones for which any good evidence can be provided. — Bartricks
Ok. I'm just curious what basis you would have to disagree with someone on a moral question then. If there are no hard rules, only rough and ready generlizations then how can you tell someone "Murder is wrong" if they just disagree. What basis do you have to have an arugment upon — khaled
This seems to pose a contradiction to your argument though. This is because the view that something like slavery was permissible in 1800 but not permissible today is highly counterintuitive to the vast majority of people living in the 21st century. — TheHedoMinimalist
I would like to point out that a similar type of explanation could be given for the view that the torture of Tom is unjustified. In some countries like China, Colombia, and North Korea, most people would likely think that the torture of Tom is justified. — TheHedoMinimalist
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