There are two distinct ideas that are often conflated in the literature.

* The video game argument. In the 70's we had Pong and now we have realtime networked shoot 'em ups; so in the future "a simulation will be indistinguishable from reality." But this assumes there is a mind doing the distinguishing. If you put a super duper VR headset on me and wire it up to a supercomputer, you could simulate a very convincing reality for me. But it would still be my mind doing the experiencing. We'd be back to Descartes' evil daemon. Even if you are fooling me, my mind exists.

So this idea doesn't explain the mind or even attempt to.

* The idea that the mind itself is a simulation. That a computer program could implement a mind. Now we're back to Searle's Chinese room. We have no evidence that a computer could implement a mind; only simulate an environment.

A lot of the AI hype that I read does not distinguish these two cases.

If the whole universe is a simulation, then it is being generated by consciousness, not by computers.
Any computers you could find in the universe would be part of the simulation.

It's easier if you consider that the whole universe is a dream.
That doesn't require any computers.

Even if there comes a scientific measure of consciousness, it won't eliminate the concern about an artificial subjective experience (what is it like to be something). There will always be doubt even if by a future consensus that doubt is a voice of a minority. You will never be other than yourself (unless by some metaphysical fancy, you already are).

That a computer program could implement a mind. Now we're back to Searle's Chinese room. We have no evidence that a computer could implement a mind; only simulate an environment.

Exactly, so I'm looking if there are any arguments claiming the opposite.

Exactly, so I'm looking if there are any arguments claiming the opposite. — Zelebg

Sure, everyone who disagrees with Searle about the Chinese room argument. Just Google Chinese room and half the links will be on one side and half on the other.

Chinese room is restricted by its setting, replies to it are lame. Many people believe consciousness can be simulated, so I am hoping to find something less senseless than “room is conscious”. It was also disappointing to hear Giulio Tononi (Integrated information theory), when asked about qualia, to say “that’s just how integrated information feels”.

I am hoping to find something less senseless than “room is conscious”. — Zelebg

I'm not an expert in these matters. Perhaps someone else can jump in.

This is a non-problem if you don't conceive of "qualia" as something that material things need to "produce", but just as an aspect of the being of all (material) things. To get something to have a human-like phenomenal experience, you just need to make it execute a human-like function. This has the weird-sounding implication that everything has some kind of phenomenal experience, but it's not so weird compared to the well-accepted fact that everything has some kind of function. What is the function of a rock? Not much to speak of, but a rock still does something in response to what is done to it. Why should it be so much weirder to say that the rock experiences what is done to it, than to say that it does something? We don't mean "does something" in the same robust and complex, willfull sense that a human does something; and we can mean "experiences" in a similarly non-robust, simple, non-conscious sense if we want, too, that is nevertheless still on the same continuum, of the same kind, as the robust, complex, conscience experience of humans.

This is a non-problem if you don't conceive of "qualia" as something that material things need to "produce", but just as an aspect of the being of all (material) things.

Yes, once you conclude no kind of mechanics could even begin to explain subjective experience, then panpsychism comes on top as the remaining alternative.

But then, if you look at all the processing for visual perception, for example, it not only reminds of algorithmic modularity, but is apparently necessary, for some reason.

So at the end panpsychism doesn’t explain anything, and the old questions kind of remain because it still needs to explain all the computing, not how to produce sentience per se, but how it all comes together, plus what brain processing has anything to do with it and why.


On the other hand, I see a way to argue for virtual, simulated mind and consciousness, but whether it will be deemed plausible depends more on the definition of the word “experience” than on the argument itself. In other words, if only we could define it, then we would be able to simulate it. Unless, of course, panpsychism or ghosts are real, in which case we might be able to emulate it.

To the extent that mechanics is necessary and sufficient for the explanation of a particular kind of subjective experience, simulating those mechanics will automatically simulate the experience, and there is no question left to answer.

Pretty much everyone seems to agree that the mechanics is necessary, and the question at hand is whether it is sufficient: is there something else besides mechanical behavior needed to account for experience? The eliminativist says "no", the behavior just is the experience; you seem to disagree with that, as do I. Many say "yes", it needs some special thing besides the mechanical stuff. The panpsychist like me says "yes", but it's nothing special or a different kind of stuff: it comes for free with the same stuff that does the behavior, but it is not identical to the behavior, but rather the flip side of the same thing the behavior is one side of: function.

we know of no way how could possibly something mechanical like computation ever produce something conceptual like imagination, intuition, feelings, and the rest of the mental content — Zelebg

In relation to this, I have often wondered whether it really does make any difference whether the 'states of energy / fields' that are making up the most elementary particles of the universe are in the end part of 'nature' or are part of a big 'machine'. Like the 0s and 1s are the fundamental states of our own primitive computers, so could the spins of quarks be fundamental states of a machine which is simulating the universe.
In other words, would you feel more at ease if consciousness arose not out of a simulation on a machine from another dimension, but out of 'natural' states of energy fluctuation, which via matter eventually created consciousness?

The panpsychist like me says "yes", but it's nothing special or a different kind of stuff: it comes for free with the same stuff that does the behavior, but it is not identical to the behavior, but rather the flip side of the same thing the behavior is one side of: function.

Experience is an event that leaves some kind of impression on the subject. If panpsychist wants to claim stones are sentient they should point out what particular kind of change in a stone could reflect impression of some event.

If they do, then they would end up describing some mechanics, leaving it unclear whether the dynamics of it by itself is sufficient. Panpsychists have a problem to justify their hypothesis is even necessary.

If they don’t, then the change caused by an event impression must be going on in some unknown substance or dimension, and if that is the belief it makes panpsychism equal with theological dualism.

If by "experience" you mean some kind of mechanical thing happening in the subject, as you seem to, then there is no question. Simulate the mechanical stuff and you simulate the "experience". But then by "experience" there you mean a kind of third-person-observable behavior. There is still the open question of whether the thing exhibiting that behavior also has a first-person experience (I lack another word to use for this).

The eliminativist says "no", nothing has first-person experience.

The dualist says yes only if there is some immaterial mind connected to the material thing (substance dualism), or if some immaterial mental properties are attached to the same thing as the material properties are attached to (property dualism).

The emergentist says yes if the matter is arranged just right, it starts having first-person experience, in a way that mean something more than that it starts exhibiting the behavior you seem to be talking about, which to me looks tantamount to some kind of dualism: some new, metaphysically weird thing starts happening to physical things that behave certain ways.

The panpsychist says yes, anything exhibiting that kind of mechanical behavior has the same kind of first-person experience as a human brain that exhibits that behavior does, because everything has some kind of first-person experience and that's completely trivial, what matters is the kind of experience, which varies right alongside the mechanical behavior.

The panpsychist, emergentist, and eliminativist all agree with each other, and disagree with the usual kinds of dualist, that anything that exhibits that mechanical behavior has the same kind of first-person experience.

The panpsychist and eliminativist agree with each other and disagree with the emergentist in that they say there is nothing metaphysically different between a human brain and a rock, all that's different is the physical stuff going on there.

The panpsychist and the eliminativist disagree about whether there is any first-person experience ever being had by anything ever: the eliminativist says no, and the panpsychist says yes.

So to disagree with the panpsychist, you have to either deny that you and I have any first-person experience, or else postulate that something metaphysically strange happens somewhere in the evolutionary chain from rocks to people. Panpsychism is just what you get when you say that nothing metaphysically weird is happening, the only difference between me and a rock is the stuff my brain does that rocks don't do, but yeah, I do actually have a first-person experience, I'm not a P-zombie (and therefore rocks must also have some kind of first-person experience, which differs from mine in the same way and for the same reason as my brain's behavior differs from the rock's behavior).

If by "experience" you mean some kind of mechanical thing happening in the subject, as you seem to, then there is no question.

Experience is an event that leaves some kind of impression on the subject. That is just English, very general metaphysical logic, does not imply mechanics nor physicalism, it only implies change. It should not be controversial, simply means if x remains identical after some event then x has not perceived that event. So, if we agree now, then my point still stands.

So to disagree with the panpsychist, you have to either deny that you and I have any first-person experience, or else postulate that something metaphysically strange happens somewhere in the evolutionary chain from rocks to people.

That is just about the only positive claim from panpsychism. It is generally not controversial, does not explain anything, does not make it testable, and it poses its own additional questions, so it has no value and there is no point in accepting it as such simple assertion.

The only pragmatic thing we can take from panpsychism is to be cautious about yet undiscovered or undiscoverable properties, substances, or dimensions, which brings me to my second point that panpsychism is no different than dualism, and this becomes clear as soon as you start unpacking what the proposal actually entails.

...
Something metaphysically strange did happen somewhere in the evolutionary chain from rocks to people, and that is self-replicating molecules, i.e. life. You can not really get the definition of “self” before that, naturally at least, so it is only logical to conclude sentience goes along, or is produced by, something at minimum living, that is animated, plastic and dynamic thing.

These same properties are also what enables the possibility of experience, and then such “self” having impression of an experience within itself is really a claim about 1st person subjective experience, so this actually answers the mystery, semantically at least, but that should perhaps be enough, or maybe the most we can expect.

Something metaphysically strange did happen somewhere in the evolutionary chain from rocks to people, and that is self-replicating molecules, i.e. life. — Zelebg

That is not metaphysically strange. That is a notable development in the physical behavior of stuff, sure, but there's nothing philosophically, ontologically, metaphysically weird about it: it's just molecules doing a neat new thing, but that thing is just a combination of things molecules were always perfectly capable of.

Likewise for "an event [to] leave[] some kind of impression on the subject". There's nothing metaphysically weird required for that. All kinds of ordinary physical processes record impressions of events in the objects that are subjected to them. Fossilized dinosaur footprints in mud are not metaphysically weird, but they're a literal impression of an event on the mud.

If all you're talking about when you talk about "experience" is something the brain does, then you're just talking about uncontroversial physical behavior. A dualist, eliminativist, emergentist, and panpsychist will all agree that yep, brains behave in that way. Where they disagree is on:

- whether anything that behaves that way has the same first-person experience (dualist says no, others say yes)
- whether anything can have any first-person experience at all (eliminativist says no, others say yes)
- whether having this metaphysical property(?) of a first-person experience in the first place depends upon behaving that way (emergentist says yes, others say no)

So panpsychism is the only position that says yes, anything that exhibits that same physical behavior has the same first-person experience; and yes, at least some things do have a first-person experience; and no, nothing is metaphysically special about things with that physical behavior in that regard.

how could you possibly simulate qualia in it — Zelebg

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now". — Wikipedia on qualia

No, I don't think qualia can be supported, since we can't simulate the stuff even without doing qualia.

So, no, flag the feature request as either WONTFIX or more elusively as NEXTVERSION.

(There will be no next version! Just like Windows 10 this version will be the "last version"! haha ah ;-)!)

Fossilized dinosaur footprints in mud are not metaphysically weird, but they're a literal impression of an event on the mud.

How do I know what I mean if I don’t see what I said, seems to me you might be wondering if I ever ask myself about what other people ought to do more often. I have to check now to see if we are speaking the same language...

1. subjective experience consists of "self" and "experience"
-- No? Then, what concepts do you think it consists of?

2. experience is a change some event impresses upon "self"
-- No? Then, what is your definition of “experience”?

3. self is autonomous entity capable of having own impressions
-- No? Then, what is your definition of “self”?

If we’re talking about functional definitions then those are roughly fine I guess, but then if were talking about functional definitions there’s no remaining question. If you simulate the function you’ve simulated the function. If you simulate what a brain does then you’ve simulated what a brain does, so if all you’re talking about is what brains do, there’s no question left. The question underlying qualia and phenomenal experience is whether or not just doing what brains do is enough to experience what humans experience, and why or why not.

Right now I’m not talking about simulation, but panpsychism. I’m trying to put forward the most general, metaphysical definition that everyone can agree on regardless of philosophical stance. It is not intended to describe function, but the bare concept. I’m simply asking what do you mean by the word “subjective” and “experience” when you say “subjective experience”.

the whole universe is being simulated in which we only exist virtually, is being accepted too easy considering that we know of no way how could possibly something mechanical like computation ever produce something conceptual like imagination, intuition, feelings, and the rest of the mental content. Or do we? — Zelebg

The notion that the universe is a simulation seems silly to me, but your fundamental issue seems to be with the nature of consciousness, and whether a human-like consciousness could possibly be constructed. I don't think sensory-input qualia are necessarily a problem: e.g. knowing redness entails experiencing redness in the way our sensory apparatus presents it. The REALLY hard problem is feelings (e.g. pain, desire). It's hard, and we aren't close to figuring it out, but that hardly seems like a good reason to jump to conclusions like panpsychism.

I don't think sensory-input qualia are necessarily a problem: e.g. knowing redness entails experiencing redness in the way our sensory apparatus presents it.

What do you mean?

The REALLY hard problem is feelings (e.g. pain, desire).

I don’t see much difference between external sensations and internal emotions, both feel like feelings. Cognition seems different, but on some basic level cognition too feels like a feeling. In other words, I think they are all hiding behind the same mystery.

It's hard, and we aren't close to figuring it out, but that hardly seems like a good reason to jump to conclusions like panpsychism.

What if I told you that feelings are a special kind of information or signal that carries its meaning within? Like a magical language no one has to learn, but is innately and universally “understood” by all the living. And so when you feel pain you know it means “bad” the moment you are 1st time aware of it, and when you perceive yellow or feel desire you know it’s “yellow” or “desire” even if no one knows what they mean or how to actually describe them.

What if I told you that feelings are a special kind of information or signal that carries its meaning within? Like a magical language no one has to learn, but is innately and universally “understood” by all the living. — Zelebg

Just jumping in to the thread, curious about this. Why the living? If consciousness (feelings, qualia, etc.) are information, then we already know that the substrate doesn't matter. There's a Youtube video of a logic gate made from dominos. That's in fact the argument of those who say we could "upload" our minds to computers, or that we ourselves are computers.

But you're saying that only the living get the privilege of experiencing experience. If I take the same program and put it in a computer, it executes but doesn't feel anything. But if I run it on a living thing with a sufficiently complex nervous system, then consciousness happens.

Is that a fair summary of your point of view? Do people think life is necessary for consciousness, or not? Must robots be condemned to be philosophical zombies? Or might my Roomba be ruminating?

If consciousness (feelings, qualia, etc.) are information, then we already know that the substrate doesn't matter.

Not “just information”, I said “special kind of information that carries meaning within”. Words are information, for example, but they do not contain meaning, so to understand them you need to learn them first.

It is not claim that consciousness is how computation feels like, nor that the substrate doesn't matter. I’m simply saying own sensations and emotions are information we understand without need to interpret or learn first in order to understand what they mean, and yet, interestingly, it is impossible to describe them in terms of how they actually feel.

Why the living?

Because of how I defined “experience” and “self” earlier, and because we do not know what that “special kind of information that carries meaning within” actually is, what it entails, or how it works.

Again, I am not promoting any philosophical view, just trying to make very general but meaningful statements that I think everyone can agree on, so we can talk about the same thing rather than talking past each other.

Again, I am not promoting any philosophical view, just trying to make very general but meaningful statements that I think everyone can agree on, so we can talk about the same thing rather than talking past each other. — Zelebg

Well I can't agree till I understand what you're saying. Why can't a computer, or an "information processing system," be conscious? We're information processing systems and we're conscious.

What if I told you that feelings are a special kind of information or signal that carries its meaning within? — Zelebg

Feelings aren't just information, they drive behavior. Information doesn't directly drive behavior; it only indirectly does so through the feeling-associations.

I don’t see much difference between external sensations and internal emotions, both feel like feelings. — Zelebg

We have the capacity to distinguish color, so each color is basically just information. Bits of information in our brains (including perceived colors) have associations to other information and to feelings (e.g. blueness might invoke a pleasureable feeling associated with experiencing a clear, blue sky).

Without feelings, there's just information storage. Feelings drive intentional behavior.

when you feel pain you know it means “bad” — Zelebg

When a nonhuman animal feels pain, it reacts behaviorally - just as we do. We humans also associate various words with that feeling ("bad", "hurts"), and are thusly able to communicate and reason about it- which can lead to more effective actions, but the feeling which drives us to do something is the same.

What is "meaning"? If we just consider information, then meaning just entails a dictionary - a word means its definition. Only when you add in the associated feelings do you get to the essence of meaning.

Well I can't agree till I understand what you're saying. Why can't a computer, or an "information processing system," be conscious? We're information processing systems and we're conscious.

That statement was not about simulation. I do not wish to argue that computers can not, instead I want to hear the best arguments how computers actually can simulate consciousness, and only if there is none on offer, then I might argue that point myself - that computers can simulate it.

Not “just information”, I said “special kind of information that carries meaning within”. Words are information, for example, but they do not contain meaning, so to understand them you need to learn them first. I’m simply saying own sensations and emotions are information we understand without need to interpret or learn first in order to understand what they mean