'Common way of putting it 'where? Living creatures are defined as ‘beings’. It would incorrect to describe minerals or manufactured artefacts as 'beings' and if you described them as such, you'd be mistaken. They are ‘inanimate’ by definition. And I say the difference is more than semantic, that it's ontological, that it denotes a real difference.

I just don't know what phrase you would use to disagree with the thesis of atheism, while avoiding using the word "exists". — Pfhorrest

This whole issue is tied to that of the process of 'objectification'.

*

An atheist says “God does not exist.”

You agree, “Yep, God does not exist.”

“So you’re an atheist too then?” the atheist asks.

“No,” you say, “because unlike an atheist, I believe that ____________.”

Please fill in that blank, with something that no atheist is going to respond to with “But I believe that too.”

There's a book called The Case for God, Karen Armstrong, 2009. It's not a book of religious apologetics, but an essay in the history of ideas. She traces how from the early modern period, Christianity incorporated God into science, through the ideas of Newton, and others, for whom the 'regularity of the heavens bespoke God's handiwork'. But this had the unexpected consequence of more or less reducing what had been previously understood as the 'divine mystery' into simply another hypothesis; one which Simon LaPlace, and many others since, declared they 'have no need of'. But, she argues (at book length, and I can't possibly summarise it), that this omits the crucial element of religious consciousness, which is practical knowledge.

...myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play.

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.

(Review here.)

As it is, 'God' has now been reduced, mainly, to an intellectual abstraction, almost a term of ridicule in secular culture ('incoherent, incredible, even absurd'). It's a consequence of many centuries of history. When much younger, I had the idea that much of this was due to the formation of Christianity itself, which overly emphasized orthodoxy at the expense of attaining insight. This I attributed to the conflict between orthodoxy and gnosticism in the early Church; the upshot was strong emphasis on correct belief - something which wars were fought over for centuries in Europe. And the reaction against this became formative for the Enlightenment - the founding documents of the Royal Society specifically eschewed consideration of any of the metaphysical disputes that were prosecuted by the Churches. But amongst all this sturm und drang, something really fundamental became lost.

So you're saying that, to you at least, the difference between a theist and an atheist isn't what they believe, but that the theist does something that the atheist does? More like a swimmer vs a non-swimmer (who may believe all the same things, but do things differently), than say a flat-Earther vs a round-Earther (who may do all of the same things, but believe things differently)?

(FWIW, I did learn to swim in the abstract. I distinctly remember being in the back seat of the car on the way to the pool, lamenting on how I could never figure out how to do the normal overhand crawl method of proper swimming and could only doggie paddle, thinking about it, picturing myself doing it and trying to understand how the overhand crawl thing was supposed to work, and then having a "Eureka!" moment when it all made sense in my head. We got to the pool, and I dove right in and immediately tried applying that, successfully. A decade or more later, I also figured out the three-beat weave pattern of poi spinning, which had thus far eluded me, in the same way, just thinking through the motions in slow motion in my mind, and then applying them.)

Your own objective truth' is an oxymoron — Wayfarer

I'm only reiterating what you seem to have said. You avoided answering my questions and cherry-picked my post, so you're not clarifying.

It would incorrect to describe minerals or manufactured artefacts as 'beings' and if you described them as such, you'd be mistaken. They are ‘inanimate’ by definition. — Wayfarer

Why? Beings are made of inanimate matter. The only difference is the complexity with which some thing is affected by the environment and then reacts to the environment.

I can see why. But once you give him enough effort, it's very interesting. — Xtrix

I dont understand why people still resort to pointing to long-dead philosophers claims as if they'd say the same thing knowing what we know today. That's not interesting. What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits.

I doubt that very much. This conception is so prevalent in the west we take it as part of human nature, but there's no reason to assume it's universal. — Xtrix

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples. — Xtrix

If its everywhere, it universal. Objects appear in my visual field as an instinctive act - without any intent of objectifying anything. It isnt cultural. It is biological.

I'm not aware of any other culture that doesn't objectify something.

If there is at least one long-dead philosopher who would hold with his claims given what is known today, then if he was interesting then, he would seem to be just as interesting now. Why would such long-dead philosopher give a crap about the claims neuroscientists and biologist are beginning to make, when his philosophy is not affected by them?

Works just as well the other way around. If some guy doesn’t give a crap about what neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to claim, he Is perfectly justified in holding with the same claims long-dead philosophers put forth in their day.

Makes no difference to me personally, as a regular ol’ human being, that one part of my brain communicates with another such that I feel good or bad about something, or whatever else happens behind the curtain between my ears. Actually, I couldn’t possible care any less about it. That a certain neural pathway is triggered by a certain activation potential invokes not the slightest interest in me at all, when it occurs to me it’s time to go check the mailbox.

Just sayin’........

If there is at least one long-dead philosopher who would hold with his claims given what is known today, then if he was interesting then, he would seem to be just as interesting now. Why would such long-dead philosopher give a crap about the claims neuroscientists and biologist are beginning to make, when his philosophy is not affected by them? — Mww

But we can't know if they would say something differently. It would be more interesting to know what current philosophers think.

The fundamentally religious don't give a crap what scientists say either, but they are both talking about the same thing - how the universe and humans came to be. Philosophers of mind and knowledge are talking about the same thing neurologists are talking about so that is the reason they should both concern themselves of what each other are talking about. There must be a reason why you wouldn't because you should probably be knowledgable of what people who study the brain are saying when they can make predictions about what you experience when parts of the brain are abnormal.

Makes no difference to me personally, as a regular ol’ human being, that one part of my brain communicates with another such that I feel good or bad about something, or whatever else happens behind the curtain between my ears. Actually, I couldn’t possible care any less about it. That a certain neural pathway is triggered by a certain activation potential invokes not the slightest interest in me at all, when it occurs to me it’s time to go check the mailbox. — Mww

Of course you shouldn't be concerned about it normally. Only when discussing the mind-body relationship on a philosophy forum, or when you receive brain damage.

Science is not a study of the world as “separate from ourselves”. Science is as objective a method as we have ever had available to us. Anyone who attempts to conduct it subjectively is incorrect. Anyone who attempts to separate humans from nature is incorrect.

But we can't know if they would say something differently. — Harry Hindu

True enough, but irrelevant. Interest is judged by what is, not by what might not have been. It would be irrational to hold an interest in falsified theoretics of long-dead natural philosophers, but it isn’t irrational to hold an interest in theories metaphysicians create that empirical science cannot conclusively address. Don’t have to live and die by it to be interested in it.
—————

you should probably be knowledgable of what people who study the brain are saying when they can make predictions about what you experience when parts of the brain are abnormal. — Harry Hindu

There’s really no good reason to worry about what may never be the case, so it follows that there is no good reason I should be knowledgeable on predictions. Truthfully though, I hope they find a cure for Alzheimer’s before I catch it. Otherwise, I shall deteriorate predicated on the standard process of all biological creatures.
—————

discussing the mind-body relationship on a philosophy forum — Harry Hindu

Can that really correlate to the predictions of cognitive neuroscience, if that paradigm has to with physical mechanics, but philosophy has to do only with simple human rational capabilities?

Don’t get me wrong. Science in general is both fascinating and quite useful. But I, a stand-alone thinking subject, am more concerned with what my mind does for me directly, however abstract that may be, than I am with what my brain does for my indirectly.

Interest is judged by what is, not by what might not have been. It would be irrational to hold an interest in falsified theoretics of long-dead natural philosophers, but it isn’t irrational to hold an interest in theories metaphysicians create that empirical science cannot conclusively address. Don’t have to live and die by it to be interested in it. — Mww

Interest is determined by your goals. What is interesting depends on the present goal in the mind. The only interest in knowing about the claims of long-dead philosophers is to know how far we've come since.

Can that really correlate to the predictions of cognitive neuroscience, if that paradigm has to with physical mechanics, but philosophy has to do only with simple human rational capabilities?

Don’t get me wrong. Science in general is both fascinating and quite useful. But I, a stand-alone thinking subject, am more concerned with what my mind does for my directly, however abstract that may be, than I am with what my brain does for my indirectly. — Mww

Is it really indirect? How would you know? This seems to assume dualism.

Interest is determined by your goals. What is interesting depends on the present goal in the mind. The only interest in knowing about the claims of long-dead philosophers is to know how far we've come since. — Harry Hindu

The first may be true, but the second does not necessarily follow from it. If I don’t know the current state of philosophy, the reading of long-dead philosophers in order to be informed of it, isn’t going to work. Parsimony suggests I might just read long-dead philosophers merely to know what they thought, regardless of their relative antiquity.
—————-

I more than assume dualism; I advocate it.

But I think that the fact that we can't differentiate "beings" from "things" actually conceals a very profound philosophical truth. A chair is not a being, but a cow is a being. When Heidegger talked of 'forgetfulness of being', was he talking about forgetting his car keys? — Wayfarer

Of course a chair is a being. Heidegger's talk about forgetfulness of being is not about beings, but that on the basis of which beings "show up" for us at all -- namely, "being" (some like to capitalize this, but I don't).

Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that? — Wayfarer

To say any being is not a being is meaningless. An object is a being. A chair is a being. That building is a being. That piece of sand, Bach's fugues, mineral baths, and a trombone. All beings. Literally everything in the world has being. As I said above, to reserve the term "being" for "sentient being" is an extremely narrow and specialized usage.

I dont understand why people still resort to pointing to long-dead philosophers claims as if they'd say the same thing knowing what we know today. That's not interesting. What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

Neuroscientists and biologists all have philosophical beliefs guiding their research, and often follow dead-end paths because of holding bogus ones.

To wonder why we study thinkers of the past is kind of ridiculous.

If its everywhere, it universal. Objects appear in my visual field as an instinctive act - without any intent of objectifying anything. It isnt cultural. It is biological. — Harry Hindu

No, it isn't. To say every human being has perceptions is more accurate, but to say what they perceive are "objects" -- a concept with a long history -- is to mistake the current (Western) worldview with a universal. The Greeks didn't view the world this way, nor did the Christians. That's not to say they didn't perceive things -- of course they did. But they did not refer to things as "objects" in the sense we mean. So to argue the subject/object distinction is universal is a mistake.

What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

BTW -- no one is making claims about consciousness, because no one has told us what consciousness is. It would be like saying "neuroscientists are making claims about ectoplasm."

Oddly enough, when they even try to make a definition, they fall back on those long-dead philosophers you find so boring.

Of course a chair is a being — Xtrix

In English, the word ‘being’ applies to living creatures. Chairs and other object are artifacts, objects, tools, etc, but they’re not designated as ‘beings’. As I say, this is simple English albeit with philosophical implications.

Beings are made of inanimate matter. — Harry Hindu

Yet there’s a fundamental difference between a living being and the corpse it leaves after dying.

'Common way of putting it 'where? Living creatures are defined as ‘beings’. It would incorrect to describe minerals or manufactured artefacts as 'beings' and if you described them as such, you'd be mistaken. They are ‘inanimate’ by definition. And I say the difference is more than semantic, that it's ontological, that it denotes a real difference. — Wayfarer

Living creatures are defined as living beings. Minerals or artifacts are inanimate non-living beings and plants are usually taken to be living, but non-sentient, beings. So, you have it all wrong when it comes to common usage. When it comes to terminology it is always a semantic matter, but of course semantic distinctions do reflect ontological differences as they are conceived; between living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, sapient and non-sapient, and so on.

In English, the word ‘being’ applies to living creatures. Chairs and other object are artifacts, objects, tools, etc, but they’re not designated as ‘beings’. As I say, this is simple English albeit with philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

Can you please stop this. No one in philosophy limits the use of 'beings' to humans. This is just your idiosyncratic rubbish that no one but you spouts. It is misleading, off-topic, and you have been told this multiple times before. You are knowingly spreading misinformation. Stop.

In English, the word ‘being’ applies to living creatures. Chairs and other object are artifacts, objects, tools, etc, but they’re not designated as ‘beings’. As I say, this is simple English albeit with philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. The word "being" in English references "existence" as well, and not simply human or living existence. It's the present participle of "be." But this completely misses the point anyway. What I was talking about was in the context of ontology, not common usage.

It's heartening that I'm not the only one here scratching my head about this supposed difference between "being" and "existing".

Wayf, we all get that there's a difference between subjective and objective, first person and third person, and so on, but "being" and "existing" just aren't the words for that difference.

To be fair, the distinction between 'being' and 'existence' is a well founded one that has its roots in Aquinas and alot of medieval Christian philosophy, and still can be found in alot of contemporary philosophy. You can find a rough explanation of the distinction here: https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Being_and_Existence

Wayfarer's equation of being with the living however, is a different matter and largely unique to his own homebrewed idealism.

Thank you, that article is very helpful in translating this language. I hadn't connected Wayf's sense of "being" with "essence", and though I was aware of the distinction between "essence" and "existence" I hadn't connected those to the distinction between "possibility" and "actuality" (thinking of them more as "form" and "substance", and not understanding why existentialism made such a big deal out of what seemed such an obvious point about them, being unaware of Thomism making a big deal of the opposite thesis, since medieval philosophy is my greatest weakness). As I read further and further on in the history section of that I found ideas sounding less and less like incoherent nonsense, finally coinciding with my own views when we reach modal realism.

(I also disagree with the prevailing Analytic claim that "existence is just what the existential quantifier asserts", though that is only because I think there is sense to be made of non-descriptive sentences. For descriptive sentences, it does work out that way. I prefer to read the so-called "existential" quantifier as "for some" -- for some value of x, [some proposition regarding x] is true -- and if the proposition is describing the world, then that amounts to an existential claim, but it might be performing a different speech-act than description, in which case it might not be saying anything at all about what does or doesn't exist.)

(In my logic, the assertion of existence is instead performed by the operator that denotes a descriptive assertion, so instead of "a wise man exists" or "some man is wise", you would say something more like "there is some man being wise", where "being wise" is the idea predicated of some "man", and "there is" indicates that that idea is a description of reality, in contrast to something like "be there some man being wise", where "be there" instead is an imperative or exhortation calling for there to be a wise man, i.e. "there ought to be some wise man". And we might simply want to talk about the logical implications of the state of affairs of "some man being wise", and the relationship of that idea to others, without either describing or prescribing anything; e.g. we can talk about how "some man being wise" and "Socrates being a man" don't entail "Socrates being wise", without saying anything at all about the existence of Socrates, men, or wisdom).

No one in philosophy limits the use of 'beings' to humans. — StreetlightX

I never claimed this. I have said 'being' in the noun form refers to living creatures.

The word "being" in English references "existence" as well, — Xtrix

The noun form - as in ‘a being’ - is not used in relation to insentient objects, artefacts, tools, minerals, and so on; such things are never referred to as 'beings'. If you look up the definition of the noun form of 'a being' in any dictionary, you will find it applies to living creatures (and also to immaterial beings such as angels and spirits which you will presumably not believe in).

To be fair, the distinction between 'being' and 'existence' is a well founded one that has its roots in Aquinas and alot of medieval Christian philosophy, and still can be found in alot of contemporary philosophy. — StreetlightX

Thank you. The leading paragraph of that article is close to what I'm getting at:

Being and existence in philosophy are related and somewhat overlapping with respect to their meanings. Classical Greek had no independent word of "existence." The word "existence," as distinguished from the word "being," arose in the Middle Ages. Influenced by Islamic philosophy that recognized the contingency of the created world as compared with God the Creator, Christian philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas used the Latin word "existere" ("to exist" or "to appear") as distinct from "esse" ("to be") or "essentia" ("essence").

But this is also related to the question of why 'God' (or the absolute however conceived) does not exist. He is customarily beyond existence, not non-existent, but super-existent, or absolutely real, in a way that individual particulars/phenomena are not.

But with the 'flattening' of ontology that has developed as a consequence of modernity, that distinction is no longer intelligible - as we can see by the responses here to the idea.

No one in philosophy limits the use of 'beings' to humans. This is just your idiosyncratic rubbish that no one but you spouts. It is misleading, off-topic, and you have been told this multiple times before. You are knowingly spreading misinformation. Stop. — StreetlightX

This goes back to a point I have raised in the past about the etymological derivation of the term 'ontology'. I pointed out that, according to an online etymological dictionary, the word 'ontology' (which first appears in the early modern/late medieval period) was derived from the first-person participle of the Greek 'ouisia', 'to be'. And the first-person participle is 'I am'. So in some ways, the term 'ontology' applies to the 'discipline of the study of Being' in a manner that includes, or at least implies, the first person perspective. And I think that is crucial to understanding what 'ontology' really is about.

The 'hard problem of consciousness', on the one hand, or the phenomenological tradition, on the other, are areas of philosophy that are explicitly concerned with understanding the nature of lived experience from a first-person perspective. They both say that the attempt to account for the nature of experience in third-person terms is radically flawed. And why that is significant, is because of its difference to the attitude of naturalism or 'the objective sciences', which 'bracket out' any notion of the first-person perspective but claims to be able to fully account for it in the third-person terms of the objective sciences - which is the nub of the dispute between Chalmers and Dennett.

So I don't see how this amounts to 'disinformation', and I could also do with a little less vitriol from yourself, if you can manage.

...areas of philosophy that are explicitly concerned with understanding the nature of lived experience from a first-person perspective...say that the attempt to account for the nature of experience in third-person terms is radically flawed. — Wayfarer

If "the attempt to account for the nature of experience in third-person terms is radically flawed", empathy (understanding the thoughts and/or emotions of another person and/or social group) does not exist (which is obviously false).

And which branch of science is primarily concerned with empathy?