Try to define "object". Now try to define "subject". — khaled

A useful first step,
1) Avoiding linguistic meanings, as instructed by the OP.
2) Dispensing with "objectivity" and "subjectivity" as "objective" and "subjective" condition, respectively.

I have:
1) Object: perceived particular.
2) Objective: perceptive.
3) Subject: cognised particular.
4) Subjective: cognisant.

So, subject/object: a convenient epistemological distinction and ontological unity (comprising awareness).

The issue is the terms have various applications in different fields of interest. We don’t perceive something ‘outside’ of us - the perceiving takes place internally.

As for ‘conscious’ it would be useful to distinguish between ‘conscious awareness’ and mere ‘consciousness’ (which ate technically different). There are many issues between/within fields of investigation that cause incredible confusion - often between/within cognitive neurosciences and psychology.

Philosophers have a terrible habit of conflating this confusion for the laymen.

That’s mistaken I believe. The ‘phenomenon’ is all there is for us - as opposed to the negative sense of noumenon. He is explicit enough about that I felt? — I like sushi

Yes. So what’s “mistaken” exactly? That Kant believed in an outside world? I’m not seeing your point.

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object).
— Xtrix

That’s mistaken I believe. The ‘phenomenon’ is all there is for us — I like sushi

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. The representations of objects as such are, first, appearances from sensation, and intuitions, from extant experience. Phenomena are “...undetermined objects of empirical intuition...”, thus not technically representations.
(There is a neo-Kantian, analytic argument** that phenomena indeed represent the synthesis of appearance with intuition, a systemic method Kant does use. But it is worthwhile to consider that Kant doesn’t so argue, because the phenomena to him is “undetermined”, and as such, would represent nothing. Also, Kant does not say objects represent something, but are themselves represented, so it is consistent for phenomena, as “undetermined objects”, not to represent anything.)

It is also mistaken to say “the phenomenon is all there is for us”, for such claim disallows the possibility for any and all pure a priori rational activity, or, that which occurs in us without any empirical intuition connected to it. This won’t matter to those who reject a priori knowledge, or synthetic a priori logical propositions in general***, Nevertheless, the domain here is “talking more about the Kantian variation”, so it would be better suited to follow Kant when looking at a Kantian variation.

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans.

**Strawson, 1966
***Hume, 1748; Quine, 1951

“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”

There is only phenomenal experience as that is all the experience there can be. Everything else is ‘empty’ or ‘blind’. The concept of ‘noumenon’ is deadly important so as not to fall down and never ending reiteration of rabbit holes.

A priori there is no experience (hence ‘a priori’). The ‘phenomenon’ is all we have.

So this is incorrect:

It is also mistaken to say “the phenomenon is all there is for us”, for such claim disallows the possibility for any and all pure a priori rational activity, or, that which occurs in us without any empirical intuition connected to it. — Mww

You cannot have ‘rational activity’ without experience - if you think that then I’m intrigued what you mean by ‘rational activity’ because clearly you mean something different to what I have in mind.

It is my conviction that pure mathematical construction enables us to discover the concepts and the laws connecting them which give us the key to the understanding of the phenomena of Nature. Experience can of course guide us in our choice of serviceable mathematical concepts; it cannot possibly be the source from which they are derived; experience of course remains the sole criterion of the serviceability of a mathematical construction for physics, but the truly creative principle resides in mathematics. — Einstein, A. (1933). On the Method of Theoretical Physics. Lecture delivered on 10 June 1933 at Oxford University.

The issue is the terms have various applications in different fields of interest. — I like sushi

This is a philosophy forum. Therefore, it is advisable to use words in the common philosophical sense. I have mentioned above the usual philosophical meanings. They are common in the history of philosophy, epistemology, anthropology, ontology, etc. I agree that in some cases further clarification may be necessary. Although this is not the same as arbitrarily creating personal meanings that only add confusion to confusion.

I would like you to clarify the distinction between "conscious awareness" and mere "consciousness" and why it is necessary. It sounds, but I do not see its direct relationship to the subject-object distinction.

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

Of course they are.

Phenomena are “...undetermined objects of empirical intuition...”, thus not technically representations. — Mww

The phenomenal world is the world of representations. All else is noumenonal, the thing in itself. This isn't that hard.

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

Of course they are. — Xtrix

Physicalist pap.

It's not physicalist. Read some Kant and get back to me.

Forget Kant and get back to me.

Physical reality can be grasped not by pure reason (as Kant has asserted), but by pure thought. — Einstein, A. (7 May 1952). Letter to Maurice Solovine

Kant was what was being discussed. Try to keep up. Go hero-worship somewhere else.

I'm not a Kantian nor do I advocate for Kant's philosophy. But let's at least understand what he was saying.

There is only phenomenal experience as that is all the experience there can be — I like sushi

This is correct, another way to say all experience is of phenomena. Good thing I didn’t say pure rational activity is an experience, and went so far as to say it cannot be.
——————

.....intuitions without concepts are blind.” — I like sushi

Also correct, which is the explanation for why phenomena are not representations. In context, intuitions will always be blind (undetermined objects) until a concept Is synthesized with them by understanding. Both together are the form of all cognitions a posteriori. It is of note that Kant doesn’t give a similar conjunction for conceptions alone, as in conceptions without something are.....something. This is because there are conceptions that have no intuition associated with them, re: space, time, the categories, which are relevant to the very possibility of human empirical cognition, or, experience.
—————-

You cannot have ‘rational activity’ without experience — I like sushi

Again, from the Kantian epistemological system, with which we....you and I....are currently involved, that is categorically false because I must have something clearly different in mind. A good example is right here on this thread, where the dissension between being and existence has run amok. A human cannot even begin to cognize the being of anything whatsoever, the objective reality of a particular, which translates into an experience, without first granting the existence of it a priori. And because there is no experience of “existence” in itself, but rather the existence of something, nor is there experience of any of the other pure categories, it is quite clear it is not only possible, but absolutely necessary, to indulge in rational activity without involving experience for it.

One would do well not to confuse rational activity with conscious thought. Mental machinations antecedent to judgement are rational activities, judgement and the consequences of it are conscious thought. And THAT is the primary ground for the notion of the subject/object dualism of the Kantian variety.

Kant was what was being discussed. — Xtrix

In terms of "the philosophical basis for modern science" (which was also being discussed) what has Kant contributed?

In terms of "the philosophical basis for modern science" (which was also being discussed) what has Kant contributed? — Galuchat

Now you're diverting. There's plenty that can be said about Kant's influence on modern science. But first one needs to understand Kant. Saying it's mere "physicalist pap" shows you're not worth having that discussion with, however.

but they are not phenomena.
— Mww

Of course they are. — Xtrix

Oh. Well.......can’t argue with that logic.
————————

The phenomenal world is the world of representations. — Xtrix

True, but that doesn’t say phenomena are representations. If it did, it would be tautological, re: the phenomenal world is the world of phenomena. Thus, to have meaning, either it is not the world of representations, or phenomena are not representations. Take your pick.
————————

All else is noumenonal, the thing in itself. This isn't that hard. — Xtrix

It isn’t that hard because it isn’t that correct.

True, but that doesn’t say phenomena are representations. If it did, it would be tautological, re: the phenomenal world is the world of phenomena. Thus, to have meaning, either it is not the world of representations, or phenomena are not representations. Take your pick. — Mww

In Kant, phenomena are only experienced through our representations. What is the object "beyond" our representations? The ding an sich, the noumenon. So yes, the world and the phenomena of the world are representations. Saying phenomena is something other than or different from our representations, which is what you're arguing, is to speak about the noumenon, which is unknowable in Kant. Phenomena that isn't representation and isn't noumenal is meaningless.

Subject is the referent of any activity related to consciousness and/or subconscious.
Object is what is outside the subject.
Some (few) philosophers identify it, but the distinction is clear at the analytical level. — David Mo

It would be more useful if you cleared this up. If you really wish to know the difference between what I said you can google it easily enough.

You seem to have said something that can be interpreted in different ways. Is “consciousness and/or subconscious” a subject or object? What is “outside” of what?

To translate what you wrote ... Subject is the term referred to that is of any activity related to consciousness and/or subconscious (which makes said consciousness and/or subconscious the ‘object’ or another ‘subject’ - let us assume the former given what follows)

Object is what is outside the subject (meaning the ... this doesn’t work unless you meant subject means object and object means subject - thus backing up the point made in the first place, which I assume yiu didn’t intend?)

Forget Kant and get back to me. — Galuchat

“...If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark....”

It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow.

Not to say you can’t forget Kant if you wish. Nobody cares one way or the other. Just don’t go along with ol’ Uncle Albert, without knowing the rest of the story.

Thanks for answering this question.

In Kant, phenomena are only experienced through our representations. — Xtrix

“....We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is experience...”

A speculative system has an sequential order for its logical constituents. If the order is wrong or misappropriated, the system is falsified. If your system says phenomena are experienced through representations, so be it. Just don’t call it the Kantian system.

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations.

If your system says phenomena are experienced through representations, so be it. Just don’t call it the Kantian system. — Mww

It's precisely the Kantian system. How else is phenomena experienced?

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations. — Mww

This is not Kant at all. Nor would he ever make any such claims. In that case the "real physical objects" would be the noumenon. If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations.

Again, this is introductory stuff. Not difficult. See the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Aesthetic.

Or, if you like, Schopenhauer puts it clearly:

"What is extended in space, and hence the objective, material world in general, exists as such simply and solely in our representation, and that it is false and indeed absurd to attribute to it, as such, an existence outside all representation and independent of the knowing subject, and so to assume a matter positively and absolutely existing in itself."

"What is extended in space, and hence the objective, material world in general, exists as such simply and solely in our representation, and that it is false and indeed absurd to attribute to it, as such, an existence outside all representation and independent of the knowing subject, and so to assume a matter positively and absolutely existing in itself." — Xtrix

But that assumes our representations are not based on something related existing outside and independent of the knowing subject. After-all, why do we have the representations we do have? It would be weird if time and space have no correlate outside of experience. How would the mind create them with no basis for a temporal and spatial existence?

If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations. — Xtrix

Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. But they are real physical objects nonetheless.
———————

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations.
— Mww

This is not Kant at all. Nor would he ever make any such claims. — Xtrix

Apparently, it is, and, apparently, he did. Ironically enough, from the very Aesthetic you so kindly suggested.

“...For, otherwise, we should require to affirm an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd...”

“...The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation (...) That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation.... (...) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori.... (...) By means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space.

I would say obvious to even the most casual observer, but apparently, it isn’t.
———————

Your Schopenhauer is pre-dated by:

“....Now, if it appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition....”
———————

this is introductory stuff. Not difficult. — Xtrix

Agreed. Makes me wonder why you’re having so much trouble with it.

But that assumes our representations are not based on something related existing outside and independent of the knowing subject. — Marchesk

No. That would be the thing-in-itself which we cannot know, since everything we can know are representations (from "sensibility" in space and time). Any story you make up about what the thing-in-itself itself comes from your experience of the world. Schopenhauer claims it's the "will," for example. To say it's "physical objects" or anything like that is already missing the point -- they too are representations.

Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. — Mww

Meaning the thing-in-itself, the noumenon. Yes, of course. Representations "for us" is redundant.

But they are real physical objects nonetheless. — Mww

What does the "they" refer to? The representations or the "object itself"?

The quotes you provide say exactly what I've said all along: phenomena and representation are the same thing, otherwise there would be no need for the idea of the thing in itself. Are you failing to grasp this or what? At this point I'm not sure what you're arguing, because you're making the case for me.

Your Schopenhauer is pre-dated by: — Mww

Yes, true...and?

Agreed. Makes me wonder why you’re having so much trouble with it. — Mww

Oh I see, it's in fact I who am having trouble. How Trumpian.

we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

How this got started.

If not phenomena, then what is phenomena? Something "undetermined." But not an unknown thing in itself. Something between that is undifferentiated but with which we have representations of (which is the thing in itself in Kant). Then I hear something about physical objects.

Your whole thesis is confused. The onus is on you to demonstrate where Kant says there's some other realm between the known and unknown where this phenomena supposedly lies (since it's not "representation" according to you, yet we can still talk about it). Maybe the Twilight Zone?

phenomena and representation are the same thing, otherwise there would be no need for the idea of the thing in itself. — Xtrix

No. Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things known to reason a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. Appearances and intuitions are representations of the faculty of sensibility; conceptions are the representations of the faculty of understanding. Phenomena are undetermined empirical objects of the faculty of imagination, internal to us, thus cannot be the same as the thing-in-itself, which is external to us.

And there is a need for the idea of the thing-in-itself, because our knowledge of things is predicated on their representation, or, how they appear to us, which is NOT the thing. Our method may not give a correct representation of the thing as it really is. We just don’t have any choice in the matter, so the critique is a method created to regulate reason within a certain set of criteria.

It’s all in The Book.

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. — Mww

Different qualifications of the "external object"? What does "different qualifications" mean? So phenomena and representation are different or not? If not, which is what you seemed to be saying, then how do they differ? If they're the same, then that's exactly what I said above.

Representations are general things known a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

This is completely wrong. Find me one supporting sentence from Kant that states this. The phenomena being "unknown particulars" is meaningless. If it's phenomena, it's representation.

Find your own.