No, he doesn't talk about that — Xtrix
... Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it is not limited by sensibility, but on the contrary, it limits sensibility, by calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena. In doing so, ti immediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself; it admits that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of an unknown something.
The understanding, accordingly, limits sensibility, but without expanding thereby its own sphere. By warning sensibility that it must never claim to apply to things in themselves, but only to appearances, it forms the thought of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object. This object is the cause of appearance (therefore not itself appearance) and cannot be thought as magnitude, or as reality, or as substance, etc. (because these concepts require sensible forms in which to determine an object). Of this object, therefore, it must always remain unknown whether it is to be found only within us, or also without us; and whether, if sensibility were removed, it would vanish or remain. If we wish to call this object noumenon, because the representation of it is not sensible, then we are at liberty to do so. But as we cannot apply to it any of the concepts of our understanding, such a representation remains empty for us, serving no purpose other than of indicating the limits of our sensible knowledge and of leaving at the same time an open space which we can fill neither through possible experience nor through the pure understanding.
... Thus there remains to us a mode of determining the object merely through thought; and although this mode of determining is a mere logical form without content, yet it seems to us to be a mode in which the object exists in itself (noumenon), without regard to the intuition which is restricted to our senses.
The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same. — I like sushi
Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it is not limited by sensibility, but on the contrary, it limits sensibility, by calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena.
The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility. — StreetlightX
He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. — I like sushi
he forms of sensibility are time and space. These are a priori. We can't experience anything at all except through these forms. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. — Xtrix
Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. And the thing-in-itself is not crucial, per se, to the Kantian epistemology; it is merely given ontologically as extant, therefore inescapable and irrelevant. I — Mww
Ridiculous or not, phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. — David Mo
he noumenon (the unknown) is "internal" because it's "cognitated" by the pure understanding. The thing in itself (the unknown) is "external" because it's an object of sensibility. — Xtrix
If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it. — I like sushi
I already pointed out that a subject has a mental life while an object doesn't. Aside from that what is the difference? — khaled
I think Special Relativity provides a useful model here. Things can have different properties in different reference frames (and one can translate between reference frames). But there is no absolute reference frame for how things "really" are. — Andrew M
Simply put, phenomenon is sensible experience and noumenon is not, and cannot, be experienced sensibly. The experience is given to us but the thing in itself isn’t and never can be - it is, as a phenomenal conception, useful as a realisation of limit (without which limit sensibility would be nought as if everything is sensible to us in full extension there is no ‘difference’ perceivable where there is no limit of experience). — I like sushi
calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena.
I think Special Relativity provides a useful model here. Things can have different properties in different reference frames (and one can translate between reference frames). But there is no absolute reference frame for how things "really" are. — Andrew M
Lmao they are opposites. — StreetlightX
The issue seems to be if we’re to only apply the term ‘noumenon’ in a negative sense — I like sushi
'In metaphysics, the noumenon (/ˈnuːmənɒn/, UK also /ˈnaʊ-/; from Greek: νούμενον) is a posited object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception. The term noumenon is generally used when contrasted with, or in relation to, the term phenomenon, which refers to anything that can be apprehended by or is an object of the senses. ...
The Greek word νοούμενoν nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word νοῦς noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind." A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought". ...
In Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways, perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of the various aspects of the universe, but cannot know these "things-in-themselves" (noumena) directly. Rather, we must infer the extent to which the human rational faculties can reach the object of "things-in-themselves" by our observations of the manifestations of those things that can be perceived via the physical senses, that is, of phenomena, and by ordering these perceptions in the mind infer the validity of our perceptions to the rational categories used to understand them in a rational system, this rational system (transcendental analytic), being the categories of the understanding as free from empirical contingency.
According to Kant, objects of which we are cognizant via the physical senses are merely representations of unknown somethings—what Kant refers to as the transcendental object—as interpreted through the a priori or categories of the understanding. These unknown somethings are manifested within the noumenon—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings via our physical senses are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself". — Wikipedia
if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
ou said phenomenon in your initial post. I corrected you, which you acceded to.
And in any case, the quote you provided in this post says nothing about the in itself. — StreetlightX
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