No, he doesn't talk about that — Xtrix

“...Suppose now, on the other hand, that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself...”

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations...”

“...Now although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized...”

How much more of your homework am I supposed to do? Even you should be able to deduce the thing-in-itself is eternal to us, whether or not Kant said so much in so many words.

You really have no clue. — Xtrix

HEY!! Use your own pejorative, dammit!!!

And don’t call me a joke. You already used that one, too

Imagine that you and I are assessing a table. Would Kant say there are two tables (one for each of us)?

Mww is right to distinguish between the thing in itself and noumena. The thing-in-itself are things apart from the conditions under which we can know anything about them. Noumena, by contrast, mark the limit of the sensibility. In other words, things-in-themselves are defined by having no relation to our capacity for knowledge, whereas noumena are defined only in relation to our capacity for knowledge ("The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment." (A255/B311)). Noumena are "for-us", while things-in-themselves are indifferent to sensibility. The distinction is slight and subtle, but it exists and is important to insist upon.

Wrong ... keep reading (A256/B311,B312) and (A289/B345) The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same.

Simply put, phenomenon is sensible experience and noumenon is not, and cannot, be experienced sensibly. The experience is given to us but the thing in itself isn’t and never can be - it is, as a phenomenal conception, useful as a realisation of limit (without which limit sensibility would be nought as if everything is sensible to us in full extension there is no ‘difference’ perceivable where there is no limit of experience).

Here are direct quotes respectively:

... Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it is not limited by sensibility, but on the contrary, it limits sensibility, by calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena. In doing so, ti immediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself; it admits that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of an unknown something.

And then ...

The understanding, accordingly, limits sensibility, but without expanding thereby its own sphere. By warning sensibility that it must never claim to apply to things in themselves, but only to appearances, it forms the thought of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object. This object is the cause of appearance (therefore not itself appearance) and cannot be thought as magnitude, or as reality, or as substance, etc. (because these concepts require sensible forms in which to determine an object). Of this object, therefore, it must always remain unknown whether it is to be found only within us, or also without us; and whether, if sensibility were removed, it would vanish or remain. If we wish to call this object noumenon, because the representation of it is not sensible, then we are at liberty to do so. But as we cannot apply to it any of the concepts of our understanding, such a representation remains empty for us, serving no purpose other than of indicating the limits of our sensible knowledge and of leaving at the same time an open space which we can fill neither through possible experience nor through the pure understanding.

... Thus there remains to us a mode of determining the object merely through thought; and although this mode of determining is a mere logical form without content, yet it seems to us to be a mode in which the object exists in itself (noumenon), without regard to the intuition which is restricted to our senses.

The cantankerous one is very much correct. That doesn’t stop them being a needless impolite and obnoxious person.

Note: It is worth stating that people still disagree in many areas regarding Kant’s work. I haven’t come across many that have bothered to read Kant cover to cover and fewer that care to agree about his points. I can certainly see how one could interpret what he says as stating a ‘subtle difference,’ but I’d feel overly generous doing so.

The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same. — I like sushi

Not at all. the point of using them alongside each other is to show how they stand with respect to each other. Your quote is exemplary:

Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it is not limited by sensibility, but on the contrary, it limits sensibility, by calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena.

Things in themselves are 'called' noumena by the understanding. But a nomination is not an equivalence. And insofar as noumena mark the limit of the sensible, it is as I said: that which is defined in relation to our capacity for knowledge. The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility. It's rather defined by it's total non-relation to it: it is indifferent to sensibility. Is it not the obverse of the sensible, the recto to its verso, as it were, as the noumenon is. It simply has nothing to do with it.

As for the second quote, the transcendental object is not the thing in itself, so the paragraph lends nothing to your interpretation. As Kant says, "This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sense data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought. Consequently it is not in itself an object of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general ... The sensibility (and its field, that of the appearances) is itself limited by the understanding in such fashion that it does not have to do with things in themselves but only with the mode in which, owing to our subjective constitution, they appear." (A251-252).

Recall that the 'object in general' is itself a conceptual form supplied by the understanding: "I conceive of the understanding as a special faculty and ascribe to it the concept of an object in general (a concept that even the clearest consciousness of our intutition would not at all disclose)." So it's no good confusing the thing-in-itself with the transcendental object.

--

It's worth connecting this to the overall theme of the thread: for Kant, subject and object are indeed correlates of each other, and one cannot think the one without the other. However, the very object-form or the form that is 'the object' is itself supplied by the subject, so 'objects' cannot be understood to mean 'things out there'. It is true that if there were no subjects, there would be no objects. But attests less to any kind of idealism ("it's all in my head") than to the fact the the world does not come pre-packed as objects to begin with. Hence the incredibly limited role that should be afforded to both by anyone who is not a Kantian.

I don’t agree at all.

The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility. — StreetlightX

It is, and he says so. He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. That’s the hard part to grasp.

I don’t think we’re going to agree here so I’ll just move on. It’s a tiring subject if we both think we’re correct.

He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. — I like sushi

Again, this is not true. Kant famously says that we can "think" the in itself, even as we cannot experience it - that is, even it if has no relation to the sensible: "Thus it does indeed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of experience. But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves".

In a footnote to this he further notes that sensibility does not act as a constraint on thought - only conceptual consistency does: "I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though I may not be able to answer for there being, in the sum of all possibilities, an object corresponding to it."(B xvii).

This all follows from that fact that the thing in itself is not an object of knowledge; hence, not defined in relation to sensibility; hence distinct from noumena. Not all thought is speculative - that is, knowledge oriented - in nature. Hence the critique of 'pure' reason.

like I said, we’re not going to agree - which is usually something that makes for a good discussion, but I’ve been down this road too many times already. I get far more from reading Kant directly than I do from wading through rigid misconceptions that general stop the flow of any given discussion not specifically about Kant.

It’s naive of the OP to assume everyone is going to come to agreement about Kant’s work. The reason it is still regarded today as one of the best philosophical works ever written is that it does throw up so much discussion a debate. I imagine we agree there at least :)

I can see why you think what you think. I just believe you’re wrong and I’m right. If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it. Personally I find the issue of framing the meaning of Transcendental as more problematic.

A thread on COPR would be a monster ... maybe it’s just too much to take on though (and pointless for anyone who hasn’t literally read it cover to cover and put hours of thought/study into it).

he forms of sensibility are time and space. These are a priori. We can't experience anything at all except through these forms. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. — Xtrix

Let me be precise about what you said. Space and time are a priori forms for sensitivity. Perceptions in our common language are formed in the conditions of space and time. This is studied in the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason. Causality, on the other hand, is an a priori form of physics. It is the condition for making empirical judgements. This is studied in the second part of the CPR.
Therefore, the phenomenon is what is perceived under the a priori conditions of space and time. Causality is not a phenomenon but a category of statements. Both are not objective but subjective although they are universal and necessary. Currently we would speak of "intersubjective". Everyone captures things under these conditions, but they are not properties of things in themselves, but fixed by our reason.

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. And the thing-in-itself is not crucial, per se, to the Kantian epistemology; it is merely given ontologically as extant, therefore inescapable and irrelevant. I — Mww

Ridiculous or not, phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. They are very important concepts in a negative sense. They are the unattainable horizon of human research. They provoke the metaphysical illusions of God, of the Universe, of the soul and so on.

Ridiculous or not, phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. — David Mo

Lmao they are opposites.

he noumenon (the unknown) is "internal" because it's "cognitated" by the pure understanding. The thing in itself (the unknown) is "external" because it's an object of sensibility. — Xtrix

This may be absurd, but it's the opposite of what Kant said. Noumenon and the thing itself cannot be known simply because they fall outside the human (a priori) conditions of knowledge.

If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it. — I like sushi

Both the quotes you provided didn't, but sure, perhaps somewhere so far unstated he did.

I already pointed out that a subject has a mental life while an object doesn't. Aside from that what is the difference? — khaled

This is like men and women. A small difference. Long live the small difference!

All joking aside, the only difference you've noticed involves a lot of other big ones.
Anyway, I was just arguing against the distinction. Someone, perhaps you, had claimed that there was none.

I think Special Relativity provides a useful model here. Things can have different properties in different reference frames (and one can translate between reference frames). But there is no absolute reference frame for how things "really" are. — Andrew M

The most spectacular reference is quantum mechanics, where the act of measuring creates the measured.

Kantian epistemology is very relevant to the current theory of science with only one important correction: what he believed were a priori conditions of any form of understanding (intellect) were in fact the conditions of Newtonian science. The same is true of Euclidean mathematics.

Simply put, phenomenon is sensible experience and noumenon is not, and cannot, be experienced sensibly. The experience is given to us but the thing in itself isn’t and never can be - it is, as a phenomenal conception, useful as a realisation of limit (without which limit sensibility would be nought as if everything is sensible to us in full extension there is no ‘difference’ perceivable where there is no limit of experience). — I like sushi

These are to ways of speak of the same thing. Ontologically and epistemologically. This is said in your quote: Thing in-itself=phenomenon

calling thing in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena.

Noumena =/= phenomena.

Noumena =/= phenomena. — StreetlightX

Sorry. My mistake. Noumena=things in-themselves.

I'm sorry I don't have the Critique of Pure Reason at home in English, but it's a major mistake to dissociate noumenon and thing in-itself in Kant. For example, one of Kant's reference manuals (Justus Hartnack: Kant's Theory of Knowledge) in its chapter 5 ("Phenomena and Noumena"):

"But from the fact that we call 'phenomena' what is sensed in space and time, it follows that it has to make sense to talk about what is not a phenomenon and what Kant calls the thing in-itself or 'noumena'." (My translation Spanish-English)

I think Special Relativity provides a useful model here. Things can have different properties in different reference frames (and one can translate between reference frames). But there is no absolute reference frame for how things "really" are. — Andrew M

But even in relativity, there is still an objective truth. Space and time may distort relative to an observer, but a spacetime interval is the same for all observers. Simultaneity may be relative to an observer, but cause and effect are still the same for all observers. And the impetus behind all of that, the speed of light is the same for all observers: all the things that are relative are reasoned to be so because they must be in order to account for the speed of light being an objective, non-relative value.

For analogy think of a geometric shape that is circular in profile along the X-axis, square in profile along the Y-axis, and triangular in profile along the Z-axis (so a cylinder with two very slanty ends). Three observers looking at it along those three axes would "disagree about its shape", and they would each be correct so far as the 2D profile of its shape goes, but nevertheless it still has one single objective 3D shape, of which each 2D view shows only part. Relativity is like that, but 3D-to-4D instead.

Lmao they are opposites. — StreetlightX

From CPR:
"it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word "appearance" must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition". (A251–2)

Where is the opposition? In itself and noumenon are the same: out of any form of sensibility or cognition.

You said phenomenon in your initial post. I corrected you, which you acceded to.

And in any case, the quote you provided in this post says nothing about the in itself.

It's really quite simple:

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible (it belongs to the order of the intelligible).

The thing in itself marks the limit of the conditions of possibility of knowledge.

The conditions of possibility of knowledge are not exhausted by sensibility ("intuitions without concepts are blind"!).

The noumenon =/= the thing in itself.

I think I see the problem.

The issue seems to be if we’re to only apply the term ‘noumenon’ in a negative sense (because it’s tangible), but at the heart of it the use of ‘noumenon’ is equivalent to ‘the thing in itself’ as neither are ‘objects of sensibility’ they’re only limiting factors of understanding (and necessarily limited).

The thing in itself is ‘positive noumenon’ - noumenon serves only in a negative sense, which is obvious enough given that we cannot know of anything beyond our sensible limits.

If we ask ourslves what is meant by ‘the thing in itself’ in a positive sense and in a negative (limiting sense) perhaps the similarity will become clear.

The subtler problem is addressing the concept of ‘noumenon’ as essentially unknowable as a known concept - that is where the seeming contrariness comes into play alongside the meaning of ‘transcendental’.

@Xtrix What does the OP have to say? Where are we to go from here? I still don’t quite grasp the intent of the OP regarding the direction this thread is meant to go?

The issue seems to be if we’re to only apply the term ‘noumenon’ in a negative sense — I like sushi

Which is exactly what Kant says must happen:

"That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense ... The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment ... It is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility". (B309/B311)

On the noumenal:

'In metaphysics, the noumenon (/ˈnuːmənɒn/, UK also /ˈnaʊ-/; from Greek: νούμενον) is a posited object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception. The term noumenon is generally used when contrasted with, or in relation to, the term phenomenon, which refers to anything that can be apprehended by or is an object of the senses. ...

The Greek word νοούμενoν nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν noeîn "to think, to mean", which in turn originates from the word νοῦς noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος nóos[a] "perception, understanding, mind." A rough equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the object of an act of thought". ...

In Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways, perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of the various aspects of the universe, but cannot know these "things-in-themselves" (noumena) directly. Rather, we must infer the extent to which the human rational faculties can reach the object of "things-in-themselves" by our observations of the manifestations of those things that can be perceived via the physical senses, that is, of phenomena, and by ordering these perceptions in the mind infer the validity of our perceptions to the rational categories used to understand them in a rational system, this rational system (transcendental analytic), being the categories of the understanding as free from empirical contingency.

According to Kant, objects of which we are cognizant via the physical senses are merely representations of unknown somethings—what Kant refers to as the transcendental object—as interpreted through the a priori or categories of the understanding. These unknown somethings are manifested within the noumenon—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings via our physical senses are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself". — Wikipedia

I actually think Kant's use of the term is rather confused. Early in his career he wrote a thesis on Plato's forms, but then later rejected the existence of forms. But it seems to me from the derivation of 'noumenal' as an 'object of thought' that it is rather close to the 'form' of the thing - that which makes a thing intelligible.

This is where I find hylomorphic dualism more credible. It sees matter as being basically unintelligible until it is 'impressed' with form (the analogy is, like a seal forms the wax.) But it's the form of a thing that makes it intelligible. So we sense the particular through the material senses, but we know the form intellectually:

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

from here.

I suspect that the resolution to this might be found in the writings of the analytical Thomists - who sought to reconcile Aquinas and Kant - but it's rather arcane and not especially accessible without knowledge of languages (especially French). Nevertheless I'm going to persist with it, I think perhaps via Karl Rahner and John Haldane.

In any case, I agree with the remark above, in that 'the thing in itself' is beyond our cognitive horizons, as our knowledge is limited to how it appears to us (which is the meaning of phenomena). I think a lot of trouble is caused by trying to second guess what this mysterious 'in itself' is, as if trying to peek behind the curtain. But that misses the point; knowledge is inherently limited or perspectival in some basic sense (although that doesn't mean that it's not empirically valid.)

ou said phenomenon in your initial post. I corrected you, which you acceded to.

And in any case, the quote you provided in this post says nothing about the in itself. — StreetlightX

Right. I've already rectified it.
Isn't calling the pruychos "bolontes" relating the pruychos to bolontes? Hmm. One of us has a problem with English and I'm afraid it's not me this time.

I wouldn’t waste time using any distilled secondhand summation of Kant’s work as a means of coming to anything conclusive.

The same can, and probably should, be said of other major philosophical works. In my experience many students of philosophy (who’ve actually attended university) tend to have to rely mostly on secondhand accounts as tackling the works in and of themselves - in completion - is simply not viable within a few given years of youth (and generally speaking most students of philosophy attending university tend to be too inexperienced in life to grasp the broader implications posed by people who’ve lived a full life).

Wiki and stanford or britannica ency. are all decent ways of finding items of interest though.

As an example I remember someone expressing their opinion about Nietzsche to me many years ago. I was very interested and asked what they would recommend I read first ... then they admitted they’d never actually read anything of his other than a couple of wiki entries and heard him mentioned here and there in other historical references.

The reason I read Kant was because someone online kept harping on about him saying I had no idea what I was talking about (not that I was talking about Kant), so I read COPR and then confronted his views about Kant and questioned them ... he then admitted he’d never actually read it at university and only covered it via other philosophical commentaries that summed up his ideas.

Such is realm of academic philosophy. A great deal of it is merely parroting what the tutor says, or doing scholarly work (the latter has value the former just distances the actual work from the reader).

It seems to me the case, that each notion, the sum of which is expressed both by the noumenal, and objects of experience as they are in themselves, serves to restrict the boundaries of sensibility, and by extension, what may be conceived in thought, without acceding to the conditions of blind conjecture. One could then set forth in argument, that their respective function, yields the same effect, and holds thusly, the same object upon which the former is impressed, as though to falsely lay claim to it, in each case, as its own. Yet, this fails to address the cause of those general contentions which have hitherto prevailed. It is inferred, then, that to garner sight of those truths which lie in wait, one must first descend toward greater depth, within the field of the abstract.

The world stands' as mere appearance within the faculties of the subject, one for whom thought is an active exercise in reflection, and despite being rendered perceptible with an almost faultless clarity, there is much of substance that remains absent within its whole, as we perceive it to be. This, is an unassailable truth of which we are ever-aware, that takes primacy in all matters of the experiential. That which persists beyond the farthest reach of all that can be apprehended, by means of the preceding instruments of cognition, may nonetheless reside within the mind in the form of its object, as it is truly, amongst itself, for no sake but its own, and that may furthermore be conceived in much the same way as described before, without facilitating any transition within the understanding of those in question, the subject(s), to a state at which there is exceeded all ability of the mind to attain clearness therefore, in regard to the object as appearance of whatsoever is considered.

Herein, one is forced to confront the difficulty in imparting richness to its form, to what is known only insofar as one speaks of it in the sense of the intangible; an idealized notion that can be held as existent, only to the extent that it conforms to one's chosen intuitions of the object to which it pertains, yet is itself wholly detached from the intuitive. When one provides even the faintest reference to the 'Noumenal', one is left only with the impression of it being hollow; a contrived husk that defies all aspects of the sensible; contrary to all that can be found, as predicated by experience, though a necessary element, through which thought must be granted on account of the faculties deriving their object, from a broad conception thereof, which manifests only by virtue of the immaterial. The Noumenal.

For those whose preference is conciseness, see the following;

1. The world is made intelligible by the faculties of the mind, wherefore phenomena contained within it are represented as mirrored object(s), which in each case, is based upon the particular correlate of that to which it relates, and corresponds, distinctly.

2. The truth of which, as it is independent of observance, remains a necessary unknown. Yet, this isn't to preclude the freedom bore by the subject, to conceive of such objects of the world, as they are, with respect to the prior constraint. One might therefore, draw upon the force of reason alone, to cogitate, as to the sight of the world, how it would otherwise appear, in a manner that isn't merely bound by our own portrayal thereof. The latter notion however, denotes the maximal degree to which sensuous impressions can prove worthwhile, or at all be deemed fundamental to one's analysis.

3. Noumena thus confer a depth of substance, and form, to what appears in the case of one's judgement, as object; providing a mould of the universal, which the particular is allowed to occupy, and within which it need only dwell, to at last become wholesome.