Maybe this quote solve the problem of noumenon and thing in itself

“Noumena in a positive sense are simply noumena as Kant originally defined that notion in the A edition: objects of an intellectual (non-sensible) intuition. The negative concept of noumena, however, is simply the concept of objects that are not spatiotemporal (not objects of our sensible intuition, namely space and time). But then it follows that things in themselves are noumena in the negative sense, retrospectively clarifying the passage from the A edition quoted immediately above, where Kant seems to draw from the “Transcendental Aesthetic” the conclusion that there are noumena: the concept of appearance requires that something appears, and this must be a negative noumena”.

Stang, Nicholas F., "Kant’s Transcendental Idealism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/>.

Would Kant say there are two tables (one for each of us)? — frank

If there is one object affecting the sensibility of two similar rational agencies, all else being equal, each will cognize “table”, iff each have experience of tables such that their respective systems intuit, understand, and judge the object each one senses, such that each arrive at “table” without contradicting each other. So, yes, there will be two instances of “table” being cognized from one real physical object external to, and in common with, two people.

Tables are not that hard to cognize equally, but e.g., cloud shapes, a loud bang from around the corner, the meaning of the words to “Lucy In The Sky”.....not so easy. The reason the system is so complicated is to account for how it may be the case such agencies disagree on their judgements.

I’ve been told it’s a guessing game - seems to be a recent trend on this site

Surely the subject is what is touched/touched on, by the mind.
The object is what is touched/encounted by the body.

My body encounters numerous things which my mind has no knowledge of.

Mww is right to distinguish between the thing in itself and noumena. — StreetlightX

The problem is that people attribute to noumena some reality it doesn’t have, and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. We call the second planet from Sol “Venus”, but the second planet from the sun is only that because we think it that way. Just because we name things in accordance to the way our own nature requires that we think about them, gives us no right whatsoever to then claim the object absolutely cannot be anything else. The thing-in-itself is nothing but the allowance for our own error in reason. It allows for the perception by rationalities other than our own, who may not cognize “Venus” such that we would even know what they’re talking about.

We know dolphins communicate with each other, but we will never know if they see via phenomena or noumena.....because we only perceive via the former and never the latter. I think it quite absurd to think dolphins will cognize “fish” as an object with fins, lays eggs, has scales. The thing-in-itself, known to us as fish, will be a thing-in-itself known to dolphins as.....something else.

The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same. — I like sushi

No. They are used in conjunction with each other to show they should be treated the same way. Treating them the same way does not make them the same thing.

The final reduction concerning both of them, is the fact we attribute no schema whatsoever to either of them, the thing-in-itself because we don’t know what they would even be, the noumena because our rational apparatus simply won’t allow it.

Remember...all this arises from a speculative epistemological theory. The theory falsifies itself if it is claimed that phenomena perform a certain task, then noumena are incorporated, as some unknown something, to do the some unknown task. The theory destroys its own credibility.

Logically, also remember the human system, no matter what theory is used to describe it, operates on the principle of complementarity, insofar as for every up, there is a down, for every left there is a right, ad infinitum. Therefore, logically, for phenomena, it is logically possible for there to be conceived its complement. I mean, c’mon...the title of the chapter is “The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena”, and the ground is....logic!!!

Which may be the biggest stumbling block in Kantian metaphysics: not so much what noumena are supposed to be, but why did The Esteemed Professor even put those damn things in there in the first place!?!?!? They don’t do anything, they aren’t part of anything, and most of all, in a theory concerned with knowledge.....we don’t and can’t know a damned thing about them. Personally, because Kant knew Greek philosophy quite well....all academics did in those days......and had the utmost respect for Aristotle, obvious because all three Critiques are treatises in logic, he incorporated them as sort of a nod to him, because the Greeks gave great response to the notion of them. Same with the categories.

The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility.
— StreetlightX

It is, and he says so. He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. — I like sushi

Don’t know how he could say so, given it would seem pretty hard to define a thing when we know absolutely nothing about it. The thing-in-itself is not defined by its relation to sensibility because it doesn’t relate to sensibility at all. The “thing” does, the “thing-in-itself” does not.

In addition to what X said, CPR was written in response to Hume’s strict empiricism, which requires sensibility to talk about any proposition, which is the same as saying there is no such thing as a priori propositions, or that such things are silly and useless......slave of the passions and all that. Kant proved such things are indeed possible and very far from silly, thus permitting the notion that sensibility is necessarily required to talk of any proposition, to be false.

phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. They are very important concepts in a negative sense. — David Mo

You quoted me talking about noumena/thing-in-itself, but here you’re talking about phenomena and thing-in-itself.

Be that as it may, phenomena, while indeed very important, actually quite necessary, are in no way in any negative sense. Without phenomena, cognition is impossible. Without phenomena presented to understanding, there is nothing to cognize. There is no such thing as a negative phenomenon.

If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it.
— I like sushi

Both the quotes you provided didn't, but sure, perhaps somewhere so far unstated he did. — StreetlightX

He does put them side by side, at first glance, a confusing manner, such that it appears they are meant to be the same:

“....An undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that has been given, only, however, to thought in general—but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists...”

That, taken by itself, sends the pro-noumena folk into a epistemological frenzy, But the context, which is rather long and involved, puts “...thing-in-itself (noumena)...” on the equally footing of being not subjected to the categories. In effect, Kant is saying the thing-in-itself is not subjected to the categories...oh, and by the way...neither are noumena.

Again, they are not the same. Just treated by understanding the same way, meaning the categories cannot be thought as governing them as they necessarily must for all empirical cognitions, or, which is the same thing, experience.

it follows that it has to make sense to talk about what is not a phenomenon and what Kant calls the thing in-itself or 'noumena'." (My translation Spanish-English) — David Mo

This is correct. But one can see what Kant really meant to get across if we merely read it as, “...what Kant calls the thing-in-itself, or, what Kant calls the noumena...”. Then we see it does make sense to talk about either of them as distinguished from phenomena without saying they are therefore equal.

1.) Good;
2,) Better;
3.) Hmmmm.....maybe. Not sure.

Well-thought post. Thanks.

So, yes, there will be two instances of “table” being cognized from one real physical object external to, and in common with, two people. — Mww

When you modify "object" with "physical" aren't you talking about a thing that is known apriori to have spacial extension? And if not, how do you distinguish between real physical objects and phenomenal physical objects (in language)?

When you modify "object" with "physical" aren't you talking about a thing that is known apriori to have spacial extension? — frank

Yes, as opposed to objects of reason. Objects of reason are, for example, the categories, numbers, geometric figures. Things not naturally residing in Nature but are put there as products of human reason. Existence, causality, plurality.....pure, non-empirical conceptions like that.

Within the confines of the present discussion, there is no such thing as a phenomenal physical object. A physical object is in space and time, has objective reality; a phenomenon is in a specific theoretical speculation, residing in the mind and having only objective validity. In the former, it is actual, in the latter it is merely justified.

Within the confines of the present discussion, there is no such thing as a phenomenal physical object. A physical object is in space and time, has objective reality; a phenomenon is in a specific theoretical speculation, residing in the mind and having only objective validity. In the former, it is actual, in the latter it is merely justified. — Mww

Unless I'm mistaking you, I think this viewpoint is more indirect realism than it is Kant. Specifically, it's John Locke. For Kant, we need to give up on spacial and temporal extension for things-in-themselves. The things we call "physical" are representations, and it doesn't really mean much to say representations aren't real since anytime we talk about reality, that's what we're talking about: the earth, the moon, electromagnetic fields, black holes, etc. For Kant, these things are all representations.

I really don't want to get into an argument about "what Kant said" because that's not really as interesting discussing philosophy. So it may be that we'll end up saying we have two different impressions of what Kant said?

For Kant, we need to give up on spacial and temporal extension for things-in-themselves. — frank

Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead).
———————-

For Kant, these things are all representations. — frank

Yes, representations for us. Couldn’t be any representations without something to represent.
———————

I can leave Kant out of it. Everything I think will still be predicated on transcendental idealism nonetheless. With a smattering of Copenhagen and healthy contribution from relativity, of course.

Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead). — Mww

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you say more?

Yes, representations for us. Couldn’t be any representations without something to represent. — Mww

Per Kant, we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes. The black hole part is a representation. Are we on the same page?

Wiki and stanford or britannica ency. are all decent ways of finding items of interest though. — I like sushi

I don't think that's advisable. If you want to get an exact idea of what Kant thinks, go to the Cambridge University Press edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (available online in pdf format). In the section "The Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment (Analytic of Principles); Third Chapter:
On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena" (p. 354ss)
Here you will find a clear explanation of what a noumeon is, its identity with the thing in itself and its inaccessibility to human understanding.

I really don't want to get into an argument about "what Kant said" because that's not really as interesting discussing philosophy. So it may be that we'll end up saying we have two different impressions of what Kant said? — frank

I would say that here are some obviously wrong interpretations of Kant. Go to the section on CPR that I recommended in my previous commentary and you will see why.

The problem is that people attribute to noumena some reality it doesn’t have, and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww

That’s called naive realism. I’m not one of those.

It’s a tricky topic that deserves its own thread.

Don’t know how he could say so, given it would seem pretty hard to define a thing when we know absolutely nothing about it. The thing-in-itself is not defined by its relation to sensibility because it doesn’t relate to sensibility at all. The “thing” does, the “thing-in-itself” does not. — Mww

This is a another confusing point. The matter of the fact is Kant refers to some ‘thing in itself’ only because of pure intuition. Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time). The number one is only given as a concept via sensibility, without sensible experience of a multitude of differentiated items of experience there would be no ground for the number one; or rather numbers in general.

The leap is identical from the referent of ‘thing’ which we view as ‘phenomenon’ and delineate between said phenomenon as ‘cat’ rather than ‘dog’ or ‘table’ rather than ‘chair’. There is no ‘chair in and of itself’ and there is no ‘thing in and of itself’, there is phenomenon that is given through sensible experience due to limitation.

Kant went back and rewrote an entire section to help elucidate what he meant - although by doing so he likely fell prey to his previous warning of ‘in trying to be too precise the writer can fall into ambiguity’ (to roughly paraphrase!)

My point about the bit in bold is hard to grasp as we’re immediately doing precisely what Kant warns against - claiming there is a ‘unknown’ we can refer to sensibly. The point here is that we can set up this logical illusion of referring to some ‘unknowable’ and believe we have it nailed down and sewn up neat and tidy. The thrust of the point is we’re limited.

Noumenon is ONLY ever applicable in the negative sense and to talk of noumenon in the ‘positive’ sense (the thing in itself) is an illusion only which Kant willingly partakes in to reveal that the most obvious statement there could be, along the lines of ‘What we can in no way ever know never exists for us no matter how many times removed or distant - such a ‘thing’ is not a ‘thing’ at all. It is, in its nonsense, a concept that is pointing out a limitation,’ or simpler still, ‘We cannot know what we cannot know.’

The positive sense of noumenon (as uttered) is necessarily negative. By revealing nothing Kant reveals the lay of the land not some striving across empty oceans for lands that don’t exist (as he put in his rare analogy).

The relevance to the thread here is likely the miscasting of what can reasonably be called ‘outer’ that isn’t a merely anything but ‘inner’. The phenomenon is all, what more is expected of being other than felt experience? It appears we’re prone to projecting ourselves bidirectionally through time.

Again though, getting to grips with what is meant by ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ is a matter for discussion I’m willing to partake in in a separate thread.

This subject matter often turns into a big old mess as there is often a lack of willingness to appreciate different interpretations of Kant regardless of agreement. His work has remained fresh because of the divides in opinions about several areas of his work.

I would say that here are some obviously wrong interpretations of Kant. Go to the section on CPR that I recommended in my previous commentary and you will see why. — David Mo

Which section? Schopenhauer believed Kant intentionally obscured his message to avoid being harassed by christians. I know Schopenhauer much more thoroughly than Kant, and I'm afraid I probably use his interpretation (right or wrong).

Er ... I was advising against relying on secondhand material. I believe you posted a quote from wiki not me?

The source is always best, and even better if read without someone telling you what to think the first time round.

Editted: Sorry, it was wayfarer not you. Still, bizarre given that what I wrote ...

Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead).
— Mww

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you say more? — frank

Oh hell, I can always say more. A-hem......

There are basketballs out there, there are no basketballs in my head. Therefore it is absolutely impossible that the basketball I know, in whatever way, shape or form I know it, can be the basketball out there.
————-

we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes. — frank

Sure we do; in no other way can we cognize them, in order to talk about them. The images are indirect representations, therefore possibly false, but images nonetheless.

The black hole part is a representation. — frank

Yes, a representation of what mathematics predicts, and cosmology has shown evidence, comprised of the extant conceptions of black, hole, and all those swirling lights and stuff. But I get your point: we do not have a representation of black holes as physical objects given from appearance directly.

Which section? Schopenhauer believed Kant intentionally obscured his message to avoid being harassed by christians. I know Schopenhauer much more thoroughly than Kant, and I'm afraid I probably use his interpretation (right or wrong). — frank

I don't know what Schopenhauer was exactly referring to. But some basic things are clear and distinct. For example:

"'The transcendental use of a concept in any sort of principle consists in its being related to things in general and in themselves; its empirical use, however, in its being related merely to appearances, i.e., objects of a possible experience". (Op. Cit. p. 356).

It is clear, it is not?

NOTE: Kant is sometimes difficult to read, but we don't need exaggerate.

I was advising against relying on secondhand material. I believe you posted a quote from wiki not me. — I like sushi

I am sorry. I believed this advice was yours.
"Wiki and stanford or britannica ency. are all decent ways of finding items of interest though."

Then you will agree that the reference to Kant's work that I have given is the right one for engage a serious discussion:

"On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena".

Do you agree?

Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time). — I like sushi

Again, this is simply not true. Thought and knowledge are not the same for Kant. If there were, there could not be a critique of pure reason. There could not be transcendental illusions, and the whole point of the critique would be lost.

It was my quote ... it was massively taken out of context though.

Never said they were. Anyway, I’m outta here. It’s a bit like Groundhog Day for me when it comes to Kant :)

I may start something up elsewhere regarding what is meant by ‘transcendental’ one day.

I see from this discussion that apparently this point is more controversial than I realized. Nevertheless, if we all agree that both the noumenon and the thing-in-itself are unknowable, doesn't this make them essentially the same?

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible (it belongs to the order of the intelligible).
The thing in itself marks the limit of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. — StreetlightX

I don't understand "belongs to the order of the intelligible." Is this saying it's intelligible in some other way than the thing-in-itself?

Noumena are "for-us", while things-in-themselves are indifferent to sensibility. — StreetlightX

What possible good is it to say that noumena are "for us"? In what way are they for us? Something unknown, whether in reference to our "understanding" or our "sensibilities" or our "capacities for knowledge" are still unknowns and unknowable. They're "intelligible" in the same way, therefore: as unknowns. But that seems to be the extent of it.

Maybe you're right and there's a subtle difference here, but I'm not seeing it. And "cantankerous" as I'm accused of being, I'm actually really trying to see the point -- I have no stock in being right or wrong about this side discussion.

and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww

"Real" in what sense exactly? That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions?

That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way.

What possible good is it to say that noumena are "for us"? In what way are they for us? Something unknown, whether in reference to our "understanding" or our "sensibilities" or our "capacities for knowledge" are still unknowns and unknowable. They're "intelligible" in the same way, therefore: as unknowns. But that seems to be the extent of it. — Xtrix

In CoPR the noumenon's aligned with what we can experience. But what we can experience isn't coextensive with what is. The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible; the sensibility being a human faculty (or more precisely a faculty of the transcendental subject). The noumenon is the name for that which blocks the co-extension of our faculties (specifically sensible intiution) and being; it's generated through our faculties' limits, as a concept it's about our faculties (a for us). The thing-in-itself is the name for being insofar as it is not conditioned by our faculties; it is that which exceeds the limitations of our faculties. As a concept it's about that which exceeds the limitation of our faculties (it's not a for-us).

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible — fdrake

So does the thing-in-itself. Anything beyond space and time, the forms of sensibility, is unknown.

it's generated through our faculties' limits — fdrake

As is the thing-in-itself.

he thing-in-itself is the name for being insofar as it is not conditioned by our faculties; it is that which exceeds the limitations of our faculties. — fdrake

So the noumenon doesn't exceed our faculties? But the thing-in-itself does.
Both are unknowable, yet both are somehow different unknowable things.
One is a limit of sensibility and for us, the other is a limit of our faculties and outside us.

I just see no evidence for these positions whatsoever. I realize now it is held by quite a few people, but in my view it's a mistake. But at this point whatever the supposed difference is between noumenon and thing-in-itself, we can't say a word about either because they're beyond time and space, which is the basis for knowing anything at all. So, I guess, who cares?