Would Kant say there are two tables (one for each of us)? — frank
Surely the subject is what is touched/touched on, by the mind.I’ve been told it’s a guessing game - seems to be a recent trend on this site
Mww is right to distinguish between the thing in itself and noumena. — StreetlightX
The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same. — I like sushi
The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility.
— StreetlightX
It is, and he says so. He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. — I like sushi
phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. They are very important concepts in a negative sense. — David Mo
If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it.
— I like sushi
Both the quotes you provided didn't, but sure, perhaps somewhere so far unstated he did. — StreetlightX
it follows that it has to make sense to talk about what is not a phenomenon and what Kant calls the thing in-itself or 'noumena'." (My translation Spanish-English) — David Mo
So, yes, there will be two instances of “table” being cognized from one real physical object external to, and in common with, two people. — Mww
When you modify "object" with "physical" aren't you talking about a thing that is known apriori to have spacial extension? — frank
Within the confines of the present discussion, there is no such thing as a phenomenal physical object. A physical object is in space and time, has objective reality; a phenomenon is in a specific theoretical speculation, residing in the mind and having only objective validity. In the former, it is actual, in the latter it is merely justified. — Mww
For Kant, we need to give up on spacial and temporal extension for things-in-themselves. — frank
For Kant, these things are all representations. — frank
Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead). — Mww
Yes, representations for us. Couldn’t be any representations without something to represent. — Mww
Wiki and stanford or britannica ency. are all decent ways of finding items of interest though. — I like sushi
I really don't want to get into an argument about "what Kant said" because that's not really as interesting discussing philosophy. So it may be that we'll end up saying we have two different impressions of what Kant said? — frank
The problem is that people attribute to noumena some reality it doesn’t have, and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww
Don’t know how he could say so, given it would seem pretty hard to define a thing when we know absolutely nothing about it. The thing-in-itself is not defined by its relation to sensibility because it doesn’t relate to sensibility at all. The “thing” does, the “thing-in-itself” does not. — Mww
I would say that here are some obviously wrong interpretations of Kant. Go to the section on CPR that I recommended in my previous commentary and you will see why. — David Mo
Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead).
— Mww
I'm not sure what you mean. Could you say more? — frank
we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes. — frank
The black hole part is a representation. — frank
Which section? Schopenhauer believed Kant intentionally obscured his message to avoid being harassed by christians. I know Schopenhauer much more thoroughly than Kant, and I'm afraid I probably use his interpretation (right or wrong). — frank
I am sorry. I believed this advice was yours.I was advising against relying on secondhand material. I believe you posted a quote from wiki not me. — I like sushi
Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time). — I like sushi
The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible (it belongs to the order of the intelligible).
The thing in itself marks the limit of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. — StreetlightX
Noumena are "for-us", while things-in-themselves are indifferent to sensibility. — StreetlightX
What possible good is it to say that noumena are "for us"? In what way are they for us? Something unknown, whether in reference to our "understanding" or our "sensibilities" or our "capacities for knowledge" are still unknowns and unknowable. They're "intelligible" in the same way, therefore: as unknowns. But that seems to be the extent of it. — Xtrix
The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible — fdrake
it's generated through our faculties' limits — fdrake
he thing-in-itself is the name for being insofar as it is not conditioned by our faculties; it is that which exceeds the limitations of our faculties. — fdrake
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