Not at all. I've repeatedly acknowledged that noumena can be understood as things-in-themselves. Only that the converse does not hold in all cases. There is an asymmetry. — StreetlightX

Clear enough. I just cannot for the life of me understand the justification for this. They can be understood as things in themselves, but they're NOT things in themselves? What's added or subtracted? You claim it's in relation to the subject, but I have said repeatedly you can make the exact same argument by substituting "thing-in-itself" for "noumenon" in that case, and it still works.

But even if your point is granted, and there is a difference -- it doesn't seem to illuminate Kant's argument in any way, it doesn't give us insight into human understanding, sensation, perception, our scope or limits...who cares? Earlier you said it's important to insist about this "subtle" distinction. Why?

Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix

This is a classic misunderstanding of thing-in-itself. “In-itself” is a knowledge claim, not a claim of condition. We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are. Things, without respect to whatever they are in themselves, absolutely must conform to our necessary conditions of space and time, otherwise, we would never be affected by them. Therefore, “things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal mode of experience)”, is a false conditional. Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things.

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us.
— Mww

Your argument is wrong. — David Mo

All of mine you quoted above is assembled from my quote below:

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...”
(B45)

Simple substitution, object in itself for thing in itself. It is done by the author repeatedly. Please show how my argument is wrong.

Thanks, and a tip of the pointy hat in your general direction. (Grin)

That is: the limitation set by the understanding on sensibility does not apply to things-in-themselves. Noumena are 'appearence-relative', and only appearence-relative. Things-in-themselves are not. — StreetlightX

The quote does not demonstrate this at all. In fact it does not MENTION noumena, it mentions things in themselves as apart from our (limited) understanding. Of COURSE the things-in-themselves are appearance-relative. How could it be otherwise?

Further down: "If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition" (B346, my emphasis) — StreetlightX

Again, substitute "thing-in-itself" in this and see if it works. I think it does, without any contradiction whatsoever.

Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with. — Mww

Then the stimuli would be the thing in itself, not representation.

All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience, — Mww

Saying they're real physical objects and representation is the same thing. Of course they're representations. If not, you're arguing some kind of correspondence theory of truth. Again, that's not Kant.

Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves.
— Xtrix

I just quoted Kant as saying that’s exactly what we do.
“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...” — Mww

I'm utterly baffled. I say we don't perceive objects in themselves (which is obvious), then you disagree and quote Kant and the first thing he says is "objects are quite unknown to us in themselves" and "mere representations of our sensibility," which is exactly what I said. What's the deal here?

Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us. — Mww

Sure. So you agree?

I can think swimming the English Channel, and it is experienceable, but the perception, the sensation and indeed the very phenomenon, are entirely absent. — Mww

Fair enough. Like I said earlier, I do consider thought to be phenomenal. It is true that Kant isn't the exemplar of clarity on this.

Imagination is not an experience. Empirical cognition is. — Mww

I just don't see this as true at all. Imagination is, of course, an experience. Reducing experience to "empirical" experience is pretty limiting, and not very clear. But I see now how you define the terms, and the source of misunderstanding in this conversation. So be it.

And the band played on..... — Mww

Yeah, I think we're getting into the weeds. The last thing I wanted to do was defend Kant in some way or other. I don't really care! The initial response was about my saying the subject/object variation I was thinking of was Kant's. But at this point, I'll concede it's not Kant's -- it's my interpretation of Kant. And could be completely wrong.

Maybe that'll stop the band?

"The concept of a noumenon, (...) as a thing in itself" (B310) — David Mo

Your (...) leaves out the most important part, that act having its own special name.

“.....giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in themselves...” (B310, 1985)
“....the concept of noumena, not to be thought as objects of the senses, but as a thing-in-itself...” (B310, 1929)

Your comment says what a noumenon is like, the author says how it should be treated. The two iterations are very far from being consistent with each other,

Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix

Things, without respect to whatever they are in themselves, absolutely must conform to our necessary conditions of space and time, otherwise, we would never be affected by them. — Mww

Sure.

Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things. — Mww

This doesn't make any sense I'm afraid. The thing-in-itself is exactly what Kant, repeatedly, says is what cannot be known. Why? Because we're bound by space and time. You seem to keep wanting to bring the thing-in-itself back into the spatial-temporal world somehow.

We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are. — Mww

"Actually are" apart from our way of knowing them, which is spatial-temporal. There's nothing left over, hence why we cannot say anything about it.

Can you, or anyone else, explain why Kant should be considered important for understanding QM or science generally? — Andrew M

I asked a similar question here.

This is the closest anyone has come to providing an answer:

It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow. — Mww

I've not read anything in this thread since that comment which convinces me that Kant has anything to do with Science generally. But there has been alot of entertaining chest thumping and ass covering.

Taking Kant's advice (per @Mww, above), let Metaphysics be informed by modern Psychology regarding the subject/object distinction/complementarity.

Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with.
— Mww

Then the stimuli would be the thing in itself, not representation. — Xtrix

Correct. We can shorten thing-in-itself to just object or thing, without changing anything but the words.
—————-

All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience,
— Mww

Saying they're real physical objects and representation is the same thing. Of course they're representations. — Xtrix

No. Things outside us are real physical objects that become represented in and by the system. They cannot be representations antecedent to the system that causes them.

Now, if you wish to call representations and objects the same thing, you certainly can. But can you say how the representations are determined, if they reside outside the mind, as objects reside outside the body? If you use the Kantian system, you end up with representations of representations, which is catastrophic to the system itself.
—————

you're arguing some kind of correspondence theory of truth. Again, that's not Kant. — Xtrix

I wouldn’t know, and really don’t care. Kant is concerned with knowledge, and says very little about truth qua truth in his knowledge thesis.
—————

I say we don't perceive objects in themselves (which is obvious), then you disagree and quote Kant and the first thing he says is "objects are quite unknown to us in themselves" — Xtrix

That was supposed to show perception of objects in themselves is actually true where you say it is false, and it is actually the case that knowledge of objects in themselves that is false.

Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us.
— Mww

Sure. So you agree? — Xtrix

Of course; I wrote it. You’re talking about perception of, I’m talking about knowledge of. You’re saying it’s obvious objects-in-themselves are not perceived when they actually are. Perception, and the faculty of sensibility cannot tell the difference between a thing and a thing in itself. There is no difference in the data received from a thing and the data received from that very same thing in itself. Which is probably why we just call it an object. Reconciles the whole mess.
——————

Reducing experience to "empirical" experience is pretty limiting, and not very clear. — Xtrix

The theory is touted by its author as being “...complete and self-contained, with nothing not of account...”. Best way to do that is keep everything in a place exactly created for it, so nothing overlaps and gets in the way. Commonly called self-contradiction. Experience is called one thing, in order to prevent it from being something the conditions for that one thing, simply won’t allow. So, yes, it is limited, intentionally.
—————

The initial response was about my saying the subject/object variation I was thinking of was Kant's. — Xtrix

It is. Or, it can be. Kant goes to great length to give a dissertation on logic and how logic is the form of all a priori cognitions of pure reason. And of course, all logical propositions are constructed on the subject/object dualism. We got side-tracked by the present discussion on different topics that don’t require a subject/object dualism for understanding them, but they would come into play when discussing what the subject himself is actually doing when he thinks, without getting as far as knowledge and experience, which is what phenomena/noumena and things in themselves are all about.

I’ll love weeds. Metaphysical weeds, not common garden variety weeds.

"Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances". (A288) — StreetlightX

Let's take it one step at a time:
Your first quotation says nothing of distinction noumenon- thing in itself. Only says that intellect is not appliable out of world of senses (phenomena-appearances).
"Noumena are 'appearence-relative', and only appearence-relative" is an invention of yours. Noumena is not even mentioned.

Second step

"If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition" — StreetlightX

According with your first quote, Kant says that intellect cannot understand the world from beyond phenomena. Therefore the attempts to give a content to this world (noumena) are empty. Nothing can be said of things in themselves other than they might exist.

Once again nothing is said of the difference between noumena and thing in itself.
Your comment has no sense: "limitations of understanding" es exactly what impede it to go beyond phenomena. What should not extend beyond sensitivity is not limits, but understanding. "Does not" is singular: it refers to understanding; not "the limits", plural. I'm sorry, but you misread that.

Third step.

but that nevertheless seems to us to be a way in which the object exists in itself (noumenon), — StreetlightX

Whether it is a mistake or not, what this sentence does is to equate the thing that exists in itself with the noumenon The error does not consist in this equality (expressed with the use of a parenthesis, which the parenthesis gives for a fact), but in the idea that the object of understanding, the thing in itself or noumenon can be considered without taking into account the kind of intuition that makes it accessible or not.

Summarizing: Your quotes have nothing to do with matching noumena-thing in itself. Only one mentions both like they are the same. Besides, they contain some reading mistakes.

I need to sleep but since both of you mentioned this:

The quote does not demonstrate this at all. In fact it does not MENTION noumena, it mentions things in themselves as apart from our (limited) understanding. — Xtrix

Your first quotation says nothing of distinction noumenon — David Mo

A quick response - anyone familiar with the subject would know immediately that the limitation set by the understanding is the noumenon, as is made clear by the preceding passage:

"The concept of the noumenon is, therefore, not the concept of an object, but is a problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our sensibility ... Understanding accordingly limits sensibility" (my bolding). This is obvious for anyone who understands that understanding = intelligibility = that to which the noumenal belongs = non-sensible intuition. As I already spelt out previously. Hence the 'accordingly' which refers to nothing else but the noumenon.

Edit:

Your comment has no sense: "limitations of understanding" — David Mo

This is easy enough to deal with too: the 'of' in 'limitations of understanding' is an objective, not subjective genitive: as in, the limitations set by understanding for the sensibility, i.e. noumena. Not 'limitations on the understanding'. You made the grammatical mistake, not me.

Edit2: actually why not the whole thing:

Whether it is a mistake or not, what this sentence does is to equate the thing that exists in itself with the noumenon — David Mo

It does - in order to dispel this equation as exactly the wrong thing to do.

(with no implication of consciousness or subjectivity in either system) — Andrew M

I said that the problem of subjectivity in measurements was raised, not that everyone had the same answer. And subjectivity does not only mean consciousness, but also relativity with respect to measurement, something that nobody or almost nobody denies in quantum mechanics: the collapse of the wave function.

Heisenberg deals with the subject especially in chapters 8 and 10 of the book you quote. His conclusion is not as emphatic as you seem to indicate with your quotation. Here is another one (the translation is mine):

"But atoms or elementary particles themselves are not
so real; they constitute a world of potentialities or
possibilities rather than one of things or facts". (Final lines of chapter 10).

Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things.
— Mww

This doesn't make any sense I'm afraid. The thing-in-itself is exactly what Kant, repeatedly, says is what cannot be known. — Xtrix

You continue to confuse, or equate, the knowledge of a thing with the existence of it. A thing to be known must exist, but a thing that exists may not be known. Things existing before knowing beings, are the very same things existing and known by humans. Merely adding thinking subjects to the total of reality makes no difference to the thing. The thing doesn’t give a hoot about humans, it will remain always just itself.
————

We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are.
— Mww

"Actually are" apart from our way of knowing them, which is spatial-temporal. There's nothing left over, hence why we cannot say anything about it. — Xtrix

The subtlety is.....our knowledge of a thing may be exactly what it is in itself. But without proof, which we don’t have and can’t get, because we have nothing with which to compare, we can’t know with apodeictic certainty. And we don’t have and can’t get proof because we don't know things, in themselves or otherwise, because we only know representations of things. It follows that our representations may perfectly exemplify things as they actually are in themselves, but once again, we can’t prove it.

All human empirical knowledge is grounded in the principle of induction. The more we know about a thing, the more conceptions we can logically understand as belonging to it, the closer we are to total knowledge of it, knowing exactly what that thing is. We cannot possibly have complete knowledge of some things (the quantum, the cosmological, because we have no idea what conceptions might even apply), which makes explicit the difference between what we do know and what there is to know, is exactly the same difference between the thing known and the thing in itself unknown.

The two iterations are very far from being consistent with each other, — Mww

That seems to be the case if you have not grasped the concept of problematic, which is essential to the understanding of the paragraph.

Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat

FYI, and of no particular import, Kant demonstrated the refutation of Newtonian absolute space and time (1786), advanced the first iteration of the nebula theory of star-generation (1755), the first iteration of plate tectonics (1756), the first to use “quantum” in its current meaning as “minimally discrete”. The absolute space thesis was metaphysical, having no mathematical proofs so not really science, the nebula essay inspired LaPlace and is still the core principle, the plate tectonics was way off-base, the point being he was the first to think what would eventually become current science.

Yeah.....just think of how many meanings can be changed merely by gutting a quotation.

Cheers.

These semantic games are tiresome. The thing in itself is beyond our knowledge, as I said before. The rest is irrelevant to me.

I’m unconvinced by your arguments- my reading is clearer, and every quote given so far either clearly agrees or can very easily be interpreted as much. Yours makes sense after much a linguistic gymnastic. Regardless, I’m sure you’ll simply claim the opposite- so be it. There’s no sense prolonging this discussion. I appreciate the effort.

Very clear. Almost my thoughts exactly.

Of COURSE the things-in-themselves are appearance-relative. How could it be otherwise? — Xtrix

Both noumena and things in themselves insofar as they are both considered as being thoughts are obviously "appearance relative". But in terms of what they refer to, noumena (or better the noumenal) is thought as being appearance relative (insofar as it is the "limit" of appearance) whereas things in themselves are thought as being utterly independent of all appearance (and human thought, understanding and knowledge). This is not a distinction without a difference, but a fundamental ontological distinction.

But in terms of what they refer to, noumena (or better the noumenal) is thought as being appearance relative (insofar as it is the "limit" of appearance) whereas things in themselves are thought as being utterly independent of all appearance (and human thought, understanding and knowledge). — Janus

"limit of appearance" is meaningless at this point. It can be repeated again and again, sure, but until it's explained it's just nonsense. I'm tired of pointing this out. Might as well say the noumenon is the limit in the Twilight Zone between appearance and thing-in-itself. Whatever the case may be, if there is a distinction it's so trivial it's a wonder we've spent so much time on it. According to Wikipedia there is debate about what it is in serious scholarship, so I suppose it doesn't make one dim to struggle with it. But I fail to see it. Simply declaring "it's the limit" or "the boundary" isn't saying anything at all. Nor has there been any definitive, clear textual evidence presented of anything remotely like this being said.

So far you just said:
Thing in itself = independent of appearance.
Noumenon = relative to appearance.

So both are at least contrasted with appearances in some way. Regardless, neither can be known, neither have properties of any kind, etc., but yet they're different. In what other way are they different than what's stated above? Can you give me anything else whatsoever?

You remove the subject, you remove both. Or you can say if you remove the subject, both still exist. But to say removing the subject and one stays around due to it's independence, but the other disappears because it's defined as the limit is just unnecessary. Just call the damn thing the limit of understanding in that case. Calling it a different word is an extra step.

Blahhh

This is the closest anyone has come to providing an answer:
It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow.
— Mww

I've not read anything in this thread since that comment which convinces me that Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat

In terms of Kant's philosophy, that's my conclusion as well (his specifically scientific contributions notwithstanding as Mww mentions).

And subjectivity does not only mean consciousness, but also relativity with respect to measurement, something that nobody or almost nobody denies in quantum mechanics: the collapse of the wave function. — David Mo

OK, but per consciousness, almost everybody in quantum mechanics denies that consciousness causes collapse.

Here are the definitions of subject and object that seem to best fit the OP's meaning:

A subject is a being who has a unique consciousness and/or unique personal experiences, or an entity that has a relationship with another entity that exists outside itself (called an "object").

A subject is an observer and an object is a thing observed. This concept is especially important in Continental philosophy, where 'the subject' is a central term in debates over the nature of the self.[1] The nature of the subject is also central in debates over the nature of subjective experience within the Anglo-American tradition of analytical philosophy.

The sharp distinction between subject and object corresponds to the distinction, in the philosophy of René Descartes, between thought and extension. Descartes believed that thought (subjectivity) was the essence of the mind, and that extension (the occupation of space) was the essence of matter.[2] — Subject (philosophy)

I've been arguing in this thread that relativity with respect to measurement is the natural framework here (I earlier mentioned Einstein's special theory of relativity). But that rejects subject/object dualism per the above definitions.

Here are the definitions of subject and object that seem to best fit the OP's meaning: — Andrew M

Can someone explain to me what "OP" stands for? Thanks.

Original post, or original poster. In this case, you. :-)

There are many devils in the details.

And also a lot of nonsense.

Thank you!

A late entry. I apologize if as a late-comer I'm just picking at scabs.

The question seems to be the status of Kant's noumena. Better to ask its function. What Kant is all about is reconciling, or accounting for, idealism on the one hand and realism on the other. More precisely (if "idealism" and "realism" aren't quite right), if it's all in our head, then we don't know the world, and if it's all "out there," then we never observe laws or causes. Apparently, as a then world-class scientist, he was satisfied with neither of these positions; and neither provided a ground for that knowledge that counts as scientific knowledge, the second thing he was all about.

Preliminary point: it's foolish to suppose that Kant didn't know what anything was because it was all noumena. He knew perfectly well, and he knew that he knew. But he called that kind of knowledge practical knowledge. And he knew perfectly well that this "classification" would not suffice as a ground for his scientific knowledge.

I imagine he recognized that everything that is known comes either from reason or the senses, his gift being able to give an account for their being necessarily combined. You think you see a tree. As a practical matter, of course you do! As a matter of science, all that you get is filtered through your senses, and the raw data of sensation, otherwise incomprehensible, interpreted and structured by reason.

But if you do not really have access to the tree, and if you understand Kant then you understand that you do not, then what can you call that thing that appears to be a tree and that your perception delivers to you as a tree? Kant called it a noumenon, creating, as it were, a demarcation between what can be known and how it can be known, and what cannot be known at all; in this his restricted sense of knowing.

Details and nuance omitted, but this is the substance of it.

Left is the question of Kant and modern science. For the purposes of modern science, Kant is usually ignored. But there's also an inclination to dismiss his thinking, and imo that's an error. What his thinking is about, is things that are perceived, or that reason gives us. Sub-atomic matter is never perceived. What is perceived is laboratory equipment. In itself that's not an issue, but what the equipment delivers is subject to the scientist's powers of reason - and all of that is in Kant's wheelhouse.

In lieu of agreeing on this whole noumenon/TIT stuff, it's perhaps worth drawing attention to one thing that often gets lost in modern appropriations of Kant's vocabulary: for Kant, the very form of the 'object' (the 'object-form') is itself supplied or imputed by the subject (or the faculty of understanding more specifically) onto the world (the-thing-in-itself). That is, the-thing-itself is so inaccessable to knowledge that we can't even say of it that it is an object, or that it has the form of an object. The world is not composed of objects! Instead, objects are strictly 'epistemological' posits, the form under which the world is grasped, which is itself provided by the transcendental subject. Another way to put this is that the object-form is ideal, and is nothing but a correlate of the subject.

I've always found this to be a far more interesting take on the subject/object dichotomy than the usual reading which substantializes the object (or ontologizes it) as something 'out there' and for which it is the role of the 'subject' to grasp or engage with.