Not at all. I've repeatedly acknowledged that noumena can be understood as things-in-themselves. Only that the converse does not hold in all cases. There is an asymmetry. — StreetlightX
Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix
Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us.
— Mww
Your argument is wrong. — David Mo
That is: the limitation set by the understanding on sensibility does not apply to things-in-themselves. Noumena are 'appearence-relative', and only appearence-relative. Things-in-themselves are not. — StreetlightX
Further down: "If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition" (B346, my emphasis) — StreetlightX
Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with. — Mww
All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience, — Mww
Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves.
— Xtrix
I just quoted Kant as saying that’s exactly what we do.
“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...” — Mww
Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us. — Mww
I can think swimming the English Channel, and it is experienceable, but the perception, the sensation and indeed the very phenomenon, are entirely absent. — Mww
Imagination is not an experience. Empirical cognition is. — Mww
And the band played on..... — Mww
"The concept of a noumenon, (...) as a thing in itself" (B310) — David Mo
Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix
Things, without respect to whatever they are in themselves, absolutely must conform to our necessary conditions of space and time, otherwise, we would never be affected by them. — Mww
Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things. — Mww
We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are. — Mww
I asked a similar question here.Can you, or anyone else, explain why Kant should be considered important for understanding QM or science generally? — Andrew M
It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow. — Mww
Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with.
— Mww
Then the stimuli would be the thing in itself, not representation. — Xtrix
All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience,
— Mww
Saying they're real physical objects and representation is the same thing. Of course they're representations. — Xtrix
you're arguing some kind of correspondence theory of truth. Again, that's not Kant. — Xtrix
I say we don't perceive objects in themselves (which is obvious), then you disagree and quote Kant and the first thing he says is "objects are quite unknown to us in themselves" — Xtrix
Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us.
— Mww
Sure. So you agree? — Xtrix
Reducing experience to "empirical" experience is pretty limiting, and not very clear. — Xtrix
The initial response was about my saying the subject/object variation I was thinking of was Kant's. — Xtrix
"Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances". (A288) — StreetlightX
According with your first quote, Kant says that intellect cannot understand the world from beyond phenomena. Therefore the attempts to give a content to this world (noumena) are empty. Nothing can be said of things in themselves other than they might exist."If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition" — StreetlightX
but that nevertheless seems to us to be a way in which the object exists in itself (noumenon), — StreetlightX
The quote does not demonstrate this at all. In fact it does not MENTION noumena, it mentions things in themselves as apart from our (limited) understanding. — Xtrix
Your first quotation says nothing of distinction noumenon — David Mo
Your comment has no sense: "limitations of understanding" — David Mo
Whether it is a mistake or not, what this sentence does is to equate the thing that exists in itself with the noumenon — David Mo
(with no implication of consciousness or subjectivity in either system) — Andrew M
Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things.
— Mww
This doesn't make any sense I'm afraid. The thing-in-itself is exactly what Kant, repeatedly, says is what cannot be known. — Xtrix
We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are.
— Mww
"Actually are" apart from our way of knowing them, which is spatial-temporal. There's nothing left over, hence why we cannot say anything about it. — Xtrix
Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat
Of COURSE the things-in-themselves are appearance-relative. How could it be otherwise? — Xtrix
But in terms of what they refer to, noumena (or better the noumenal) is thought as being appearance relative (insofar as it is the "limit" of appearance) whereas things in themselves are thought as being utterly independent of all appearance (and human thought, understanding and knowledge). — Janus
This is the closest anyone has come to providing an answer:
It is quite clear Kant thought science to be the direction metaphysics should follow, which is pure reason applied to something, not that pure reason should be the direction science should follow.
— Mww
I've not read anything in this thread since that comment which convinces me that Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat
And subjectivity does not only mean consciousness, but also relativity with respect to measurement, something that nobody or almost nobody denies in quantum mechanics: the collapse of the wave function. — David Mo
A subject is a being who has a unique consciousness and/or unique personal experiences, or an entity that has a relationship with another entity that exists outside itself (called an "object").
A subject is an observer and an object is a thing observed. This concept is especially important in Continental philosophy, where 'the subject' is a central term in debates over the nature of the self.[1] The nature of the subject is also central in debates over the nature of subjective experience within the Anglo-American tradition of analytical philosophy.
The sharp distinction between subject and object corresponds to the distinction, in the philosophy of René Descartes, between thought and extension. Descartes believed that thought (subjectivity) was the essence of the mind, and that extension (the occupation of space) was the essence of matter.[2] — Subject (philosophy)
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