Though mumbo jumbo to some, it can further be noted that base natures of people are (overly) selfish and elevated natures of people are (relatively speaking) selfless. This singular geometric point example is, in so many other words, a perfectly selfless being: the pinnacle of elevated nature as viewed from within space and time. — javra
I'm not sure; you'd have to unpack that [we inherently (by virtue of our genes) value life]. — Noble Dust
Now to what renunciation actually meant in the context of the cultures that practiced it. In ancient India, where Buddhism originated, there had always been a 'culture of renunciation', whereby individuals leave home and village life for life in the forests as 'sanyasi', or renunciates. The Buddha was an example of the 'forest-dwelling recluse' and is often described as such in the early Buddhist scriptures. The aim of the renunciate life was to escape from endless re-birth in the 'wheel of birth and death' (samsara or maya) and realise the state known as mokṣa (Hinduism) or Nirvāṇa (Buddhism). — Wayfarer
if you really think through the philosophical implications of evolutionary theory there is no over-arching raison d'être for human existence. — Wayfarer
So Dawkins, here, actually grasps the futility and uselessness of his 'selfish gene' metaphor as a guiding philosophy, and seems to pine for something else - namely, 'pure and disinterested altruism'. But he has spent the whole latter part of his career bollocking religion, which is supposed to embody that very quality! — Wayfarer
So where he thinks the wellsprings of 'pure and disinterested altruism' might actually be sought, I have no idea - maybe through science, although he ought to know that science is primarily concerned with quantitative analysis and measurement, and not with compassion or altruism. — Wayfarer
you're not buying Sam Harris's take on human values and science? — praxis
The inner void is constitutive of desire - it is desire. Desire just is the inner void trying to affirm itself - make itself actual - and failing to do so. Desire in this conception is not conceived with reference to any external or internal OBJECT. Rather it is conceived only with reference to itself. That is why, according to Spinoza for example, or Nietzsche, will-to-power or the conatus is the essence of man. This vain striving to no end - striving for its own sake. — Agustino
Here you illustrate that you're using a different conception of desire. — Agustino
You do realise that this is one of those 'first principles' which have to be seen, and cannot be deduced, right? If someone lacks the noetic insight into their own desire, then they cannot be 'reasoned to' it. It's disagreement over basic premises. Both Plato and Aristotle struggled with this problem of how to arrive at correct/true first premises.But that 'is only because you've made a false representation of desire, by separating it from the thing desired, when in reality desire does not exist without a thing desired. — Metaphysician Undercover
The more interesting thing to look at, is why does one end up believing such a true falsehood?But that 'is only because you've made a false representation of desire, by separating it from the thing desired, when in reality desire does not exist without a thing desired. So of course it's going to end up looking like a vain striving to no end, because it has been separated from its end in this description. But that's a false description — Metaphysician Undercover
I do tend to see desire as something produced in us - or aroused in us - by the object desired. But this is to give power at a distance as it were to the object desired. It is to accept some sort of teleology, where the object desired can orient my being towards it. Not many people today would be willing to accept that.We should dismiss yours and examine mine to see if perhaps it is right. If not, we should continue to seek a better one. — Metaphysician Undercover
You do realise that this is one of those 'first principles' which have to be seen, and cannot be deduced, right? If someone lacks the noetic insight into their own desire, then they cannot be 'reasoned to' it. It's disagreement over basic premises. Both Plato and Aristotle struggled with this problem of how to arrive at correct/true first premises. — Agustino
The more interesting thing to look at, is why does one end up believing such a true falsehood? — Agustino
do tend to see desire as something produced in us - or aroused in us - by the object desired. But this is to give power at a distance as it were to the object desired. It is to accept some sort of teleology, where the object desired can orient my being towards it. Not many people today would be willing to accept that. — Agustino
That depends what you mean by "inductive reason". Can you give an example of this, or explain it further?I believe that all premises must be reasoned, most come from inductive reason. If a "first principle" is not reasoned, then it is most likely random and unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wait. No, this isn't it. The "true falsehood" is the one that is actually believed in its meaning. It is the one that would prevent the person who believes it from seeing and apprehending reality as it is. It's not merely the acceptance of words whose meaning isn't fully grasped.That's what "true falsehood" is, contradiction, and the other description you provided involved contradictory premises. It's actually quite common for people to believe contradictory things. When we just accept the words without properly understanding what the words mean, we can have that problem. In other words, when we simply believe what has been said, without taken the time to properly understand it, we can believe contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree. Take the love of God - it is directed towards God. God is the final cause of the whole of creation, thus the whole of creation is "drawn" to God as it were.The "object" desired is always a state of being within the person who desires, so there is no such thing as the power of an external object causing the desire. — Metaphysician Undercover
Hoffman has responded to many of the objections raised against his earlier presentations in his latest book : The Case Against Reality. I recently posted a book review on my blog, that might help to clear-up some of the misunderstandings of his modern version of Platonic Idealism, and Kant's Transcendental Idealism . Unfortunately, the commentary in the review is based on my own unorthodox worldview, which some people have trouble grasping, because it looks at the world from a similar unconventional and unfamiliar perspective.I am having problems with what he is saying. — Floyd714
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.