Heidegger's problem re technology and the way it obscures concernful relations with beings and in doing so obscures Being itself is interesting. His "solution" though is a mystical mix of nationalist nonsense, amateur linguistics, and an inability to divorce the question he had raised from his own limited cultural context, i.e. the idea that the German people through their language and its relationship to ancient Greek (which he saw as the primal language of philosophy through which Being was most directly disclosed) have a special role in reawakening Being. So, when he talks about a "god" saving us, I think it's along these lines, some sense of the spiritual with unfortunate resonances of blind ideological fervour of the kind he fell foul of with the Nazis.

Ok, so that's a thought.

Okay, cool. I'll riff on that a little.

Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy, because full disclosure exposes philosophic thinking to enframing. Heidegger's thought is a dead end however because it sees no way out for thinking. The "new" kind of thinking he proposes is too garbled; in flight from enframing, he runs straight into the abyss.

I think there is more to it than a vague spiritual sentiment, however. We are in a bind because enframing, as the ultimate practicality, cannot be argued with on pragmatic grounds. In no concrete situation will you ever be able to argue persuasively against enframing because enframing can always establish its superiority by pointing at the numbers. In the big picture this turns everything (including us) into standing-reserve, but that vague, metaphysical, wishy-washy fru-fru spiritual-sounding claptrap can never be convincingly employed against a concrete instance of Gestell. That only works when you can posit a hard ethical limit, and those are increasingly hard to come by. Nothing seems to serve that purpose, or at least, nothing that can stop overcome the present and lead us into a post-technological age.

f I put on my Heidegger hat, I say that we can only break enframing by means of a radical antihumanist shift. Only a God can save us, because only a God can subordinate mankind in the way necessary for an antihumanist (thus post-technological) turn in society to occur. We are not post-Gestell until we are posthumanist, and this cannot occur in terms of a philosophy that smuggles in the old enlightenment conceits - and this is precisely where most contemporary attempts fail.

Thought? — Pneumenon

What comes to my mind is that our crazy times make us nostalgic for a past we've only lived imaginatively. To what degree is the later Heidegger a newfangled romantic?

In contrast to the Rationalism and Classicism of the Enlightenment, Romanticism revived medievalism[7] and elements of art and narrative perceived as authentically medieval in an attempt to escape population growth, early urban sprawl, and industrialism. — link

To me a case could be made that only humanism could save us. And even then I can imagine wars between different flavors of global humanism.

And then there's the issue of whether we actually need saving. Do we hate our times or love them? Do we regret being born? Most of us can imagine a better world, of course. But what would saving be but some kind of end of history? Which would also be a kind of death.

Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that it is itself not technological — Pneumenon

This has nothing to do with enframing. Challenge forth is not a verb in English; Standing-reserve is an army term, there is no meaning to this expression in English outside of military use. Enframing is a way of revealing. And the function of that revelation is that it holds sway in the essence of modern technology. (What's the essence of modern technology? one must ask the author.) Then there is a reference by a pronoun (it) that has an undefined antecedent. What does Heidenegger mean? That "it" refers to Enframing, to revealing, to essence, to technology? Without any indication of which of these the "it" refers to, the sentence is meaningless. And no such indication is given.

So there are several meaningless neologisms, several semantic problems, and these render the entire paragraph completely non-sensical.

So there are several meaningless neologisms, several semantic problems, and these render the entire paragraph completely non-sensical. — god must be atheist

The prose is terrible, but this is clearer.

By tacitly approaching reality through the lenses of this Nietzschean ontotheology, we increasingly come to understand and so to treat all entities as intrinsically-meaningless “resources” (Bestand) standing by for efficient and flexible optimization. It is (to cut a long story short) this nihilistic technologization of reality that Heidegger’s later thinking is dedicated to finding a path beyond.[23] For Heidegger, true art opens just such a path, one that can guide us beyond enframing’s ontological “commandeering of everything into assured availability” (PLT 84/GA5 72), as we will see in section 3.

First, however, we need to understand how subjectivism leads beyond itself into enframing. Put simply, subjectivism becomes enframing when the subject objectifies itself—that is, when the human subject, seeking to master and control all aspects of its objective reality, turns that impulse to control the world of objects back onto itself. If we remember that modern subjectivism designates the human subject’s quest to achieve total control over all objective aspects of reality, then we can see that late-modern enframing emerges historically out of subjectivism as subjectivism increasingly transforms the human subject itself into just another object to be controlled. Enframing, we could say, is subjectivism squared (or subjectivism applied back to the subject). For, the subjectivist impulse to master reality redoubles itself in enframing, even though enframing’s objectification of the subject dissolves the very subject/object division that initially drove the subject’s relentless efforts to master the objective world standing over against it (Thomson 2005). Subjectivism “somersaults beyond itself” in our late-modern age of “enframing” because the impulse to control everything intensifies and accelerates even as it breaks free of its modern moorings and circles back on the subject itself, turning the human subject into just one more object to be mastered and controlled—until the modern subject becomes just another late-modern entity to be efficiently optimized along with everything else. We are thus moving from modern subjectivism to the late-modern enframing of reality insofar as we understand and relate to all things, ourselves included, as nothing but intrinsically-meaningless “resources” standing by for endless optimization. — link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger-aesthetics/#ModSubLatModEnfAes

Heidegger captures something about us, perhaps. Marx is probably helpful too. Our practical behavior is more abstract these days. Quality is quantified. Perhaps I make low-quality or ugly things because they sell when I'd prefer to make quality or beautiful things. Maybe our dreary practical situation is especially ugly in some way lately, but it's hard to imagine being saved entirely from unromantic compromise.

Heidegger reminds me of Wordsworth's famous sonnet.

Wordsworth gives a fatalistic view of the world, past and future. The words "late and soon" in the opening verse describe how the past and future are included in his characterization of mankind. The author knows the potential of humanity's "powers", but fears it is clouded by the mentality of "getting and spending." The "sordid boon" we have "given our hearts" is the materialistic progress of mankind. The detriment society has on the environment will proceed unchecked and relentless like the "winds that will be howling at all hours". The speaker complains that "the world" is too overwhelming for us to appreciate it, and that people are so concerned about time and money that they use up all their energy. These people want to accumulate material goods, so they see nothing in Nature that they can "own", and have sold their souls.[citation needed]

Unlike society, Wordsworth does not see nature as a commodity. The verse "Little we see in Nature that is ours", shows that coexisting is the relationship envisioned. We should be able to appreciate beautiful events like the moon shining over the ocean and the blowing of strong winds, but it is almost as if humans are on a different wavelength from Nature. The "little we see in Nature that is ours" exemplifies the removed sentiment man has for nature, being obsessed with materialism and other worldly objects. Wordsworth's Romanticism is best shown through his appreciation of nature in these lines and his woes for man and its opposition to nature. The relationship between Nature and man appears to be at the mercy of mankind because of the vulnerable way nature is described. The verse "This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon", gives the vision of a feminine creature opening herself to the heavens above. The phrase "sleeping flowers" might also describe how nature is being overrun unknowingly and is helpless.[citation needed]

The verse "I, standing on this pleasant lea, have glimpses that would make me less forlorn", reveals Wordsworth's perception of himself in society: a visionary romantic more in touch with nature than his contemporaries. — link

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Is_Too_Much_with_Us

Heidegger captures something about us, perhaps. Marx is probably helpful too. Our practical behavior is more abstract these days. Quality is quantified. Perhaps I make low-quality or ugly things because they sell when I'd prefer to make quality or beautiful things. Maybe our dreary practical situation is especially ugly in some way lately, but it's hard to imagine being saved entirely from unromantic compromise. — jjAmEs

It's true that there are plenty of sighing Romantics who would love to sit around and pine for ages past, and it's true that Heidegger has some of that tendency. But dismissing his observations on those grounds is falling prey exactly to his criticism. This isn't about reaching eco-utopia, it's about avoiding techno-dystopia, which is a real danger right now. If you don't believe me, look at how China is presently governed. Ask yourself what happens when we're basically data-cattle for social media and government.

I can understand the temptation to say, "Whatever, stop living in fairy land. The world has always been ugly and we've always had to scrape the muck off of our boots." The issue, however, is the social consequences of a culture that no longer has a reason to scrape the muck off of its boots; what argument can be mustered against e.g. dystopian governmental policy, if there is no transcendental 'why'? Refer to my first post.

This does not mean some final articulation where there can be no further analysis, a completed metaphysics of some kind.

But dismissing his observations on those grounds is falling prey exactly to his criticism. This isn't about reaching eco-utopia, it's about avoiding techno-dystopia, which is a real danger right now. If you don't believe me, look at how China is presently governed. Ask yourself what happens when we're basically data-cattle for social media and government. — Pneumenon

I respect what you say, and I don't dismiss his observations. I even try to live more in the direction of such values. I agree with Wordsworth and Heidegger, and yet I am also a greedy monkey who is happy to be well-fed in a little box with a woman and lots of words and pictures to keep me amused. Part of us objects to the process. Another part of us is hypnotized. Something like that. And it's hard to say which part is realer or more effective.

Shouldwe focus on which one is realer and more effective, or on which one is worthier or more meaningful?

For what it's worth, I am in much the same situation as you are. And while I do not think that the solution for me personally is the same as the solution for humanity, they must be at least related, because I am a human.

Heidegger points out, in a moment of self-awareness, that you cannot treat technology as devilish because doing so is essentially falling prey to technical thinking. The question is, what integrates the inner monkey with the inner monk?

Perhaps thinking is fundamentally technical. Heidegger can be read as analyzing a spiritual problem and finding that the only tool for the job is a new god, which is to say not yet in the toolbox. We just can't imagine what would save us. In that sense I agree with Heidegger.

But there's something abstract about this salvation. I have to switch into a world-historical mode to worry about it. Heidegger, like Nietzsche, just found it pretty natural to work in that mode. Heidegger was famous enough to make such self-importance plausible.

Heidegger's analysis is deeper than environmentalism perhaps, but from a PR angle he and his jargon are contaminated by right-wing politics. For me global humanism and environmentalism together are a natural fit, since individual nations don't seem likely to set aside technological competitiveness in the name of what's good for the species or the planet in the long run. I don't know if it will ever happen, but it seems obvious that at some point the species should have one government. What I expect in my lifetime is more of the same, though disaster on a scale that I've only read about in history books about does seem possible. (And for the individuals involved in 'little' disasters, those disasters are massive already. Which is just the gap between world-historical mode and living as an individual for whom a heart attack or a car accident might as well be the Gulf War.)

what integrates the inner monkey with the inner monk? — Pneumenon

:rofl: that's one for the ages.

If I put on my Heidegger hat, I say that we can only break enframing by means of a radical antihumanist shift. Only a God can save us, because only a God can subordinate mankind in the way necessary for an antihumanist (thus post-technological) turn in society to occur. We are not post-Gestell until we are posthumanist, and this cannot occur in terms of a philosophy that smuggles in the old enlightenment conceits - and this is precisely where most contemporary attempts fail. — Pneumenon

Another way forward might be to find an instability within the enframing concept that sees humans within nature, or as always already inhuman. Human mastery over nature, seeing it as instrumentalised for us, invites a reverse position where we're (1) nothing but one type of its instruments and (2) thus have a duty of care for that which we're coextensive with.

So, when he talks about a "god" saving us, I think it's along these lines, some sense of the spiritual with unfortunate resonances of blind ideological fervour of the kind he fell foul of with the Nazis. — Baden

Well, at least he speaks of needing a "god" to save us and not "the Fuhrer" doing so as he would have earlier, no doubt.

It's difficult to think of his Question Concerning Technology as anything more than a romantic reverie, isn't it? The "monstrous" nature of the hydro-electric plant, juxtaposed with the sentimental, even corny, image of the peasant lovingly placing seeds into nature's nuturing bosom; what else could it be? It isn't exactly a useful approach to the problems of technology, but then perhaps none is to be expected from someone who looks to a god, or leader, to solve problems.

Enframing is a way of seeing things that leads us to think about them technologically, and is the way of seeing things that Heidegger was still in thrall to in his early work. Being and Time was essentially an explication of how a philosopher thinks under the sway of Gestell, under enframing.

If I put on my Heidegger hat, I say that we can only break enframing by means of a radical antihumanist shift. — Pneumenon

I disagree. One can think of, "see," and one can think through, "see through." Seeing through can be the ultimately humanist vision. To see through requires an other to do the seeing through, and the unique vantage point of the other - unique with respect to the thing being thought, seen, through.

This thinking through commences (imho) with the change in the question of what something is or is for, to the question of what something is when it is functioning as the something that it supposedly is. This called the as-structure. And this quickly transforms to, "What does it mean to me, or how is it significant to me, when this (whatever it is) is functioning as (presumably) it is supposed to?"

An example from Heidegger is the ordinary hammer. There is what it is, a tool of a certain configuration. There is what it's for, to hammer on things. But neither of these in themselves even anticipate the universe of concerns opened up by asking what it means to have and be able to use a hammer. For example, no hammer ever built a house, except as it as used for that purpose by a person who intended it for that use. Indeed, the purposes of technology are fundamentally alien to the technology itself.

All of which is on the way of the return to the concerns of dasein, and their hows and whys.

Another way forward might be to find an instability within the enframing concept that sees humans within nature, or as always already inhuman. Human mastery over nature, seeing it as instrumentalised for us, invites a reverse position where we're (1) nothing but one type of its instruments and (2) thus have a duty of care for that which we're coextensive with. — fdrake

The whole thing seems to come around to a reassessment of priorities. I know I don't want techno-dystopia, and I know that certain human impulses lead directly to techno-dystopia, so I have to find a reason to keep not-wanting techno-dystopia besides the humanism that pushes us in that direction. A holism that includes us as part of nature is a step in that direction, but I sense something fundamental missing from this perspective. I suppose what I want is for our naturalness to coexist with our dignity, or at least not be at direct loggerheads with it.

Fantastic post! Thanks for clearing up that part of the problem space. I guess the question is, once we return to the concerns of dasein, what will we hope to have gained from our romantic excursion into Being?

I guess the question is, once we return to the concerns of dasein, what will we hope to have gained from our romantic excursion into Being? — Pneumenon

At the moment I do not even want to wiggle the doorknob on this. But soon enough I suspect I'll yield to the temptation.

Btw, any insight I have is got from my attempts to read Being and Time, and other Heidegger selections, and, and mainly, from A commentary on Being and Time, by Michael Gelvin. Almost cheap 2d hand, but readable and comprehensible and intended to be such. Imo a book of rare excellence and clarity.