Something I've long found interesting to contemplate and never come to an adequate resolution on is the relationship of love to fear and hate. I traditionally thought of hate as the opposite of love, such that when I first heard fear juxtaposed as its opposite, back before I studied any philosophy, I thought that sounded really weird. But after studying some philosophy and learning the Greek roots "phobia" and "philia", fear seemed like a natural opposite to love; but so did hate, still. I wondered, does that make hate a kind of fear, or vice versa? Are they maybe opposite love on orthogonal axes?

The conclusion I came to is that fear is a repulsive feeling (pushing away from something that seems bad) in relation to an object that is more powerful than yourself (so repelling it moves you away from it), while hate is the same kind of thing but in relation to an object that is less powerful than yourself (so repelling it moves it away from you). — Pfhorrest

I really like this and I feel you’re onto something, I too for a long time wondered whether the opposite of love was fear or hate. Love attracts while fear and hate repel. But then fear and hate can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The two can be mixed, it’s possible to both hate someone and fear what they may do to you. Hate is directed outwards (you want to push something away from you) while fear is directed inwards (you want to avoid what you fear).

I would say that’s the fundamental difference rather than a distinction between more powerful and less powerful. You may fear someone who is less powerful, for instance if you know they will hurt you not because they are more powerful than you, but because you don’t want to hurt them. Fear moves yourself away from others while hate pushes others away from you. Both move towards separation.

There is that which moves towards unity and happiness (love, understanding, compassion), and that which moves towards separation and suffering (fear/hate, ignorance, indifference).

That made me think that there should be something that bears the same relationship to love. Love is an attractive feeling (pulling toward something that seems good), but in relation to an object that is more powerful than yourself, or less? And either way, what is the other? One thing is wanting to go to someone or something else, the other is wanting to bring that thing or person to you. Are those both "love"? Are there terms to differentiate them? — Pfhorrest

Loving someone attracts you towards them, moves you towards them. But that doesn’t necessarily move them towards you, in order for them to move towards you they need to love you too.

To be clear on what we’re looking for:

Love: leads to move towards someone (opposite of Fear)
Fear: leads to move away from someone (opposite of Love)
Hate: leads to push someone away from us (opposite of ?)
? : leads to unite someone with us (opposite of Hate)

What is the opposite of hate? You mentioned tolerance, but tolerance is the opposite of intolerance which isn’t the same thing as hate. When we’re tolerant we aren’t actively looking to unite people. It’s possible to hate someone and still tolerate what they do, it’s simply that we force them to do it far away from us.

So what is the feeling which works towards bringing people together, towards uniting them? Don’t we call it love too? The love of the people. This isn’t the same love as the love that attracts us towards someone, but we call it the same. Is there another word that exists for it?

There are emotions that in English are labeled “love” which are selflessness-yearning or aspiring and there are emotions also termed “love” in English that are egotistic. The second is the easier type to demarcate: It is a strictly egocentric affinity wherein that which one loves is loved solely for its instrumental value, particularly, to oneself. Love of money is an example. When and if it is no longer useful to one’s literally selfish interests, it then loses all value relative to oneself. People can love other people in this same way; it is often enough associated with a sense of possessing an objectified other as one’s property. Much like a trophy, one here feels one can do as one pleases with the other, whose value is, again, solely instrumental to oneself. In contrast, selflessness-aspiring love is where, for example, one will willingly self-sacrifice for the other even without anybody else finding out about it - it’s not done for the egotistic reason of being praised as being a good boy/girl by others. Love of children tends to be, or at least is supposed to be, of this second generalized emotive form. At any rate, this second type of love wherein, for example, two hearts can be said to grow into one over an extended span of time (gaining common affinities, understanding of the world, etc.) is the more difficult to philosophically demarcate. This is in part because while it can be qualified as selflessness-aspiring, it yet consists of two or more (as can be exemplified by loving families) egos, each with its own egocentric needs and wants.

Despite the difficulties in finding accurate demarcation, the distinction between these two forms of emotion, both often termed “love”, seems to me rather evident. Covetousness to possess, be it money or some other person, is a bogus form of love; despite it being common enough to say that many people love money, I don’t know of any that would self-sacrifice for the well-being of the money they love. Whereas one would self-sacrifice for the well-being of kids, parents, friends, lovers, etc. if one happened to love them in non-bogus manners. As another example, when someone kills their partner upon finding that their partner no longer want to stay in the relationship, we sometimes term this “a crime of passion” but never “a crime of love”—I take it because it’s generally understood by non-psychopaths that if the first genuinely loved the second they would not have murdered the latter.

So, while I can’t speak for Wayfarer or for others that believe they get Wayfarer’s general comment of:

The point about love is that it has to be its own rationale - as soon as it serves something other than love, then it ain't love. — Wayfarer

... I do find that any emotion which could be termed “love” whose rationale is that of satisfying egocentric interests will be a false form of love, will be a perversion rather than the real thing. Love—be it for cats stuck in trees, for someone whom one also happens to have the hots for, or for humanity at large—will always open up one’s ego so that it in some way incorporates the egos of other, i.e. will make one more selfless than otherwise such that the other’s states of being become in some way incorporated into one’s own. Else expressed in terms others have mentioned, love unifies. One as a psyche does not unify with the money (nor with the ice-cream, etc.) one loves.

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This as background to the following:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why.

If not disagreed with, then this relevant question ensues: What rationale can the earnest human inclination to approach a state of selfless being hold other than the state of selfless being itself?

To say that the state of selfless being is instrumentally beneficial—hence, that it is not its own (inherent) rationale—is to make its benefit egocentric in some manner; this then thereby nullifies the reality of it being a selfless state of being whose proximity one as ego intends to approach or to maintain.

If not disagreed with, then this relevant question ensues: What rationale can the earnest human inclination to approach a state of selfless being hold other than the state of selfless being itself?

To say that the state of selfless being is instrumentally beneficial—hence, that it is not its own (inherent) rationale—is to make its benefit egocentric in some manner; this then thereby nullifies the reality of it being a selfless state of being whose proximity one as ego intends to approach or to maintain. — javra

I believe I understand your point. However, every ego is ego. In other words, everyone has one. It is inescapable in so far as we only have access to our own experience/consciousness and have to infer what others experience through analogy to our own. This will ultimately fail at least some of the time. To me, love is understanding and acceptance of another for their faults and virtues and striving not to control them. This is difficult when it comes to raising children, but children always grow into adults, and the adults they become happens regardless of parenting style or technique (largely).

Parents, teach your children well. Children, teach your parents well.

I believe I understand your point. However, every ego is ego. In other words, everyone has one. It is inescapable in so far as we only have access to our own experience/consciousness and have to infer what others experience through analogy to our own. — Noah Te Stroete

I in no way disagree with this. We often use absolutes in qualifying people, as in “that person is selfish” and “that person is selfless”. If a person, for one example, speaks at least one language, they then can’t be purely selfish—for they then hold some aptitude for integrating what goes on in the minds of other egos with their own (hope this shorthand argument is sufficient to make the point of there not being such a thing as absolute selfishness). Conversely, regardless of how selfless a person might be by comparison to others, by mere virtue of being a self separate from at least some other selves, they will hold some ego-centric interests that, for example, will conflict with those of some others—as you say, they thereby will yet hold some egocentricity due to being egos and, hence, will not be perfectly selfless.

I, though, am a non-physicalist and, as a pivotal part of what makes me so, I hold the belief in there being such a metaphysical given as an absolute state of selfless being. Not quite a Platonist notion of “the Good”, but to me close enough to warrant mention.

Didn’t, and don’t, intend for the discussion to get too metaphysical. I in part gave the post because I am genuinely curious to discover if there are meaningful disagreements with this:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why. — javra

Still, the question I posed to me seems to stand as a logical enigma, if nothing else. Selflessness cannot (it seems to me) have any other rationale than itself—otherwise it would be selfish interests rather than selfless interests. (BTW, this to me does not in any way contradict the Darwinian evolution of love as sentiment among more intelligent and social animals, with its culminating pinnacle being so far found in (some) humans.)

I seriously doubt it is possible for a self to be truly selfless. Unless, of course, you believe in Jesus Christ... but even his opponents find fault with him.

Even Mother Theresa was an attention seeker.

Wrong analogy. Its more along the lines of what Nirvana signifies to some: being in the form of awareness sans any selfhood and, by entailment, any otherness. And yes, while heretical of me to say so, the Buddha as person was an ego and thus less than truly selfless, obviously. Same goes for your example of JC. Seems like the topic is changing from that of how love is defined.

Take an anthropological position for a moment. Consider that each individual has their own notion of moral value. It is exactly that value that they do use to justify actions.

Your statement

Passing moral judgement doesn't make it justified.

is your assertion that your moral judgement (specifically as to what is and is not justified) supersedes the subject of your statement.

Now you are not incorrect in that as long as you understand that you're talking about justification to you according to your moral sense. Indeed your moral judgement is the only one you have available and you should use it by the very definition of "should".

But be aware also that other agents out there are likewise judging and justifying their (and my) actions according to their own moral sense and adjudicating what is and is not justified thereby.

This is our state from the start. We become civilized as we integrate into our individual ethos the realization of our social selves. That striving directly toward our goals and judgement of what is good will lead us into conflict. We come to understand that through compromise and cooperation we can ... well you can fill in the rest.

BTW It also sounds like you are conflating moral judgement with moral condemnation. That judgement can likewise be praise. But your point is well taken IMNSHO with regard to the precepts not themselves being judgements but rather statements of values which must be interpreted and applied to specific actions and choices. And they too must be judged as to their worth to those who consider whether to adopt or reject them.

The self annihilating suicide could be considered as such [selfless, I mean]. But you say "truly" rather when I think you mean "purely". I would like to start another thread relating to this but I've been a bit hyperactive on that front and will wait a bit lest the forum members get sick of me.

Here is more of my pomposity regarding love.

Again adopting the position of moral agnosticism or rather moral anarchy, wherein each individual has his own moral sense. Take a simplistic example that, for the most part, the majority of living individuals are likely to each have a moral sense that their own individual annihilation would be a bad thing. From an evolutionary perspective this seems a good bet.

As such we should each according to that ethic cooperate to disincentivize killing for personal gain. As a purely pragmatic cooperative agreement we would establish customs to deal with occurrences of homicide. We may even adopt a public assertion of absolute moral judgement even though at its root it there is no external source of this value beyond the beliefs and judgements of the individuals in that society (according to my premise).

So this is, to my thinking, how we generate public statements of formally objective moral values.

But I bring up this example mainly for context. For the less universally held values we can distinguish others we run into along our winding road of existence who more or less share our common values and are more or less capable to cooperate with us to achieve said values. That recognition of kinship of values beyond any arbitrary but objective circumstances leads us to value them in and of themselves. That to me is the root of love in the form of agape.

But I would also argue that the strongest common ethic among us is that moral value of life and procreation. It is bred into us. Or rather it is the fundamental evolutionary function of our moral consciousness. As such our strongest love is directed toward the mate with whom we can promote our own shared values and our prosperity through shared risk and shared labor. Ultimately it is our means to generate new life and new moral actors in the world through procreation and nurturing of our progeny. This gives a form of immortality to our moral will. We instill in our children those values we would see actualized beyond our lifespan.

So the statements "you ought to do...", and "you ought not do...", which are constitutive of ethical principles, are not expressions of moral judgements? Ethical principles are not expressions of moral judgements? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Ethical principles are an attempt to guide morality, to ensure one’s behaviour will be judged ‘morally good’. It’s a common misunderstanding of ethical principles that they provide a reason to judge and condemn other people by how we perceive their thinking as well as their actions.

I can see now why you include thinking as subject to moral judgement - when thinking is perceived as a conscious and deliberate act, then it too is guided by ethical principles. When we are aware of how we think and how we can adjust our thinking, then we can apply these principles to our thoughts as well as our actions to ensure our words and our behaviour will be judged as ‘morally good’.

But the aim of ethical principles is preceptive - they instruct us to predict, evaluate and alter the motives or internal causal conditions of our thoughts BEFORE we think or act. When we don’t believe we have this capacity, when we consider certain thoughts to be indicative of a predetermined or ‘fixed will’, then there is no distinction made between an action, a thought and the person who thinks. So these principles are used to judge and condemn (or praise) people by their thoughts and actions.

For “honour your mother and father”, for instance, to be a moral judgement in itself, not only does it assert that they OUGHT to honour them, but it also assumes that to honour them is GOOD and to fail at it is BAD, regardless of intention. So if we observe or predict behaviour or thinking that doesn’t demonstrate honour for one’s mother and father, then do we judge the behaviour, the lack of honour or thinking in the person, or do we judge the person who would fail to honour? It’s not so clear, is it?

If, however, the precept “honour your mother and father” is an expression of ethical principle and NOT a moral judgement, then it is the specific behaviour that fails to honour when judged against this principle, and the person is empowered to change or correct the failed behaviour without being defined or condemned by judgement.

The ridiculousness of the Ten Commandments as ‘moral judgement’ is even demonstrated by Jesus, who says that ‘if your eye causes you to sin’ then you should ‘cut it out’ rather than be condemned for ‘adultery’. He upholds them as ethical principles, but challenges the interpretation of them by the Pharisees as judgements in themselves.

The Ten Commandments as stated are expressions of ethical principles. Moral judgements (eg. that a particular behaviour is ‘good’ or ‘bad’) are evaluations of behaviour according to ethical principles.

but I've been a bit hyperactive on that front and will wait a bit lest the forum members get sick of me. — jambaugh

I wouldn’t worry too much about it. They got sick of me a long time ago. Lol

But I would also argue that the strongest common ethic among us is that moral value of life and procreation. It is bred into us. Or rather it is the fundamental evolutionary function of our moral consciousness. As such our strongest love is directed toward the mate with whom we can promote our own shared values and our prosperity through shared risk and shared labor. Ultimately it is our means to generate new life and new moral actors in the world through procreation and nurturing of our progeny. This gives a form of immortality to our moral will. We instill in our children those values we would see actualized beyond our lifespan. — jambaugh

This is still a limited view of love, and a limited view of our capacity as humans. It can be equally applied, without much adjustment, to pretty much any social animal. Humans, however, have a capacity to love in such a way that we would freely give up this life that we value out of fear, or the chance at procreation, to relate to a much broader sense of existence than the next generation. This is the foundation of religious thought, philosophy and science: to relate to the infinite universe as an integral participant.

Evolutionary function is far from fundamental. We are inspired by something more inherent than ‘survival value’ to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with the world around us. If not for fear, we would realise our capacity to love without limitations.

The self annihilating suicide could be considered as such [selfless, I mean]. — jambaugh

When would suicide (self-murder) be anything other than a selfish act? One seeks to escape pain, conceives of death as a perfect liberation from all pain via the actualization of non-being, and then kills oneself without any consideration for the repercussions this will hold for others. Sometimes suicide can be understandable; even then, it still remains a selfish act.

Of course a person jumping onto a grenade which others are standing near to is open to interpretation. But if the person jumps on the grenade out of concern, hence love, for others’ wellbeing, this it is then commonly deemed to be a selfless act and, hence, not a suicide. If, however, the person jumps on the grenade to ensure he/she will quickly die, this out of a want to die that is indifferent to the wellbeing of others, then his/her intentions would be at once both selfish and suicidal.

Self-sacrifice that is by default done out of love does not equate to suicide—but is in many ways the converse.

If, however, the precept “honour your mother and father” is an expression of ethical principle and NOT a moral judgement, then it is the specific behaviour that fails to honour when judged against this principle, and the person is empowered to change or correct the failed behaviour without being defined or condemned by judgement. — Possibility

An expression of an ethical principle is an expression of a moral judgement. So, if "honour your mother and father" is an expression of an ethical principle, it is also an expression of that very same moral judgement. You are only trying to create an unnecessary separation between a moral judgement and an ethical principle. If someone claims, or believes that such and such type of activity is good and desirable, and therefore ought to be established as an ethical principle, this is a moral judgement, plain and simple. A moral judgement is a judgement as to what is good or bad in human character. It is not necessarily a judgement of particular action, but mat also be a judgement of a general principle. If not, then what type of judgement is this, when we judge a general principle concerning goodness or badness of human acts??

The ridiculousness of the Ten Commandments as ‘moral judgement’ is even demonstrated by Jesus, who says that ‘if your eye causes you to sin’ then you should ‘cut it out’ rather than be condemned for ‘adultery’. He upholds them as ethical principles, but challenges the interpretation of them by the Pharisees as judgements in themselves. — Possibility

This actually exemplifies my point. A person, like Jesus or anyone else, might pass judgement on an established ethical principle, as to whether the principle is acceptable or not. This judgement would be a moral judgement. And since ethical principles are upheld by convention, agreement concerning such moral judgements, (the ethical principles) are simply an expression of consensus on moral judgements.

An expression of an ethical principle is an expression of a moral judgement. So, if "honour your mother and father" is an expression of an ethical principle, it is also an expression of that very same moral judgement. You are only trying to create an unnecessary separation between a moral judgement and an ethical principle. If someone claims, or believes that such and such type of activity is good and desirable, and therefore ought to be established as an ethical principle, this is a moral judgement, plain and simple. A moral judgement is a judgement as to what is good or bad in human character. It is not necessarily a judgement of particular action, but mat also be a judgement of a general principle. If not, then what type of judgement is this, when we judge a general principle concerning goodness or badness of human acts?? — Metaphysician Undercover

The definition of a ‘principle’: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning.

There are two different value structures interrelating here. One is linguistic: that grammar, syntax and semantics (as values) correlate to signify meaning. There is no judgement in the statement: “honour your mother and father” - nothing at all to say what is good or bad, per se. Any implication of judgement is assumed by an interpretation of the statement that derives meaning from its relation to a moral value system.

As an ethical principle, the statement “honour your mother and father” serves as a foundation for a moral system of evaluating behaviour. Judgement is implied or has meaning only by relation to a moral value system - without this relation, there is no judgement in the statement as such.

This is what I’m getting at. “Honour your mother and father” has meaning regardless of any moral value, as well as the capacity to guide behaviour to what is judged as ‘moral’ without the implication of moral judgement.

Moral judgement has nothing to do with character - it has to do with how we relate to a demonstration of character. Any judgement is a process of reducing the broad range of interrelated ‘value’ information available in human experience down to a single, subjective binary relation to an event.

What I’m saying is that there is so much more to the principle “honour your mother and father”, to human relations and to ‘love’ than a subjective binary relation to an event. By exploring the different ways we each reduce this interrelated value information, we get an idea of the irreducibility of human experience that renders ‘moral judgement’ an inaccurate and dangerously limited perspective of reality.

This actually exemplifies my point. A person, like Jesus or anyone else, might pass judgement on an established ethical principle, as to whether the principle is acceptable or not. This judgement would be a moral judgement. And since ethical principles are upheld by convention, agreement concerning such moral judgements, (the ethical principles) are simply an expression of consensus on moral judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure that it does. Jesus deliberately didn’t pass judgement on these ethical principles at all. He simply pointed out that these moral judgements by the Pharisees were incongruous with our own human experience.

I asserted that "Love is a moral judgement" which drew some responses. Let's hear some agreement/disagreement and alternative definitions if you would. — jambaugh

I think love is beyond good and evil. To say love is a moral judgment is to exclude, in my opinion, some individuals from love, based on them lacking/possessing moral qualities that either extinguish/evoke love. I don't think love is like that for love, in its most exalted form, the form that is true, is both infinite and unconditional. Being innfinite, it loves all; being unconditional it is beyond all judgment, moral or otherwise.

Love is wanting someone in your life for the long haul, and them feeling the same way about you. Period. End of story.

There is no judgement in the statement: “honour your mother and father” - nothing at all to say what is good or bad, per se. — Possibility

You cannot see that this is an "ought" statement, and is therefore the expression of a judgement? Any time I say "you ought to do..." I am expressing a judgement. The statement is saying that honouring your mother and father has been judged as good, therefore you ought to do it.

Perhaps you are interpreting it as a command instead of a statement of what one ought to do. Nevertheless, it is still the expression of a judgement. If I command you to do this, or not to do that, the statement is a representation of my will, what I want from you. This implies that to get what I want, you must act in such a way. So there is necessarily a judgement inherent within the expression, I want such and such, and to get that, you must act accordingly. Therefore I am telling you to fulfill my command. I have judged that this is necessary in order for me to get what I want., as explained above

As an ethical principle, the statement “honour your mother and father” serves as a foundation for a moral system of evaluating behaviour. Judgement is implied or has meaning only by relation to a moral value system - without this relation, there is no judgement in the statement as such. — Possibility

You are missing a crucial part of the picture.. A "moral value system", what I would call a "code of ethics" receives its meaning from moral judgements. Evaluating behaviour may be done relative to such a system, but we must account for the creation of the system as well. The system, or code of ethics, is created by moral judgements as well. So we have two types of moral judgements, those which create the value structure (general principles), and those judgements of individual human actions (particulars) as good or bad. Since the general principles are created from judgements of what is good and bad in human actions, character, or disposition, we cannot deny that these are moral judgements, as well as the judgements of particular human actions in relation to the code of ethics.

This is what I’m getting at. “Honour your mother and father” has meaning regardless of any moral value, as well as the capacity to guide behaviour to what is judged as ‘moral’ without the implication of moral judgement. — Possibility

Well, this is clearly false. "Meaning" implies what was meant by the author of the statement. "Honour your mother and father" has meaning either as what one ought to do, or as a command of what one must do. As such, the meaning exists relative to the end, what is desired by the author of the statement. Therefore there is necessarily a judgement on the part of the author, as to what is wanted from the audience, and this is a moral judgement. Without this judgement "honour your mother and father" would have some other meaning, as neither a statement of "ought" nor a command of what is requested, so the statement would loose the meaning which it has.

Moral judgement has nothing to do with character - it has to do with how we relate to a demonstration of character. — Possibility

This is clearly false as well. And I really shouldn't have to point this out to you. It makes me wonder about your education. First definition in my OED, moral: "concerned with goodness or badness of human character or behaviour, or with the distinction between right and wrong". I really don't know where you have derived such false ideas from.

By exploring the different ways we each reduce this interrelated value information, we get an idea of the irreducibility of human experience that renders ‘moral judgement’ an inaccurate and dangerously limited perspective of reality. — Possibility

The opposite to this is what is really the case. You have proposed a very dangerously limiting perspective of morality, which renders human experience as unintelligible.

Jesus deliberately didn’t pass judgement on these ethical principles at all. He simply pointed out that these moral judgements by the Pharisees were incongruous with our own human experience. — Possibility

That an ethical principle is incongruous with our experience, is a judgement. Check out what Jesus said about washing hands for instance. If you do not think that this is a passing of judgement on that ethical principle, then I think you are extremely confused.

I think love is beyond good and evil. To say love is a moral judgment is to exclude, in my opinion, some individuals from love, based on them lacking/possessing moral qualities that either extinguish/evoke love. I don't think love is like that for love, in its most exalted form, the form that is true, is both infinite and unconditional. Being infinite, it loves all; being unconditional it is beyond all judgment, moral or otherwise. — TheMadFool

You are speaking here of Love as an ideal. I am thinking of love as it is practiced by mortal individuals. The narcissist loves those who focus on them because their ethic is whatever promotes their self importance. That might be both friends and enemies. But it isn't infinite and it isn't beyond good and evil.

Let me add also that your description of love is love as you seek to practice it guided by your own ethic. If your description is honest then it would seem you are saying you exalt (figuratively) "Satan and all his works" since you withhold your moral judgement. More likely, I suppose, you see love applied only to the ideals of those individual to which they may be redeemed. But still that is a moral ideal. Or am I mischaracterizing your position?

A "moral value system", what I would call a "code of ethics" receives its meaning from moral judgements. Evaluating behaviour may be done relative to such a system, but we must account for the creation of the system as well. The system, or code of ethics, is created by moral judgements as well. So we have two types of moral judgements, those which create the value structure (general principles), and those judgements of individual human actions (particulars) as good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your first sentence here and in fact exclaim that it is a critical point. However I wouldn't classify it into types in this way. It is here that I see morality as transcendent (in the technical sense rather than mystical metaphysical sense), in that it is reflexive and able to build upon itself more than was there before.

I believe where love comes into play is when along the process of evolution our ancestors developed sufficient neuro-chemical complexity to experience anticipatory emotions such as hope and fear which anticipate, respectively, sensations of pleasure and pain. The sensations are a more direct "ethic" wired into our structure, the emotions provide a built in system of abstraction applying to what we anticipate as good or bad in this immediate sense. Then as we evolved more abstract learning and memory and time sense and we are able to recognize and empathize others of our kind (in the broad sense of other goal seeking agents) we learn to love those agents we identify as kith and kin.

With regard to types:
I would assert that our structure of moral principles are no different (in type) from our structure of causal principles and our world model. Once we act upon a value system we are already in a hypothetical mode. We are extrapolating the effects of our potential actions utilizing an object model of our environment and understanding of behavior utilizing rules of interaction. It is "principles" all the way down insofar as we treat it cognitively.

In other words our value structure is just like, and in fact a part of our reality structure, a dynamic growing system which we continuously update as we experience our environment and categorize into people and things.

Even what we think of as "(particulars)" are abstracted to a sufficient degree that we can't easily categorize them as distinct from generalizations although we can probably order the degree of abstraction. I think you see this in its deficit in autistic children. They are less able to generalize across the changes in their environment. We do this even with what we consider concrete objects like the chair I'm sitting in. I still recognize it as the same chair from day to day even as the scuffs and stains increase and as it changes position and orientation from day today.

"Coincidentally I came across an old note to myself tonight about this very topic, and I think the conclusion I've now come to upon reading my old thoughts is that love and fear are opposite corners of a two-dimensional spectrum of emotions, while hate and tolerance are on the other pair of opposite corners. I already use such a spectrum in my philosophy book (why I'm digging through old notes to myself) in this diagram here:"

Doesnt that imply that you can love and hate something simultaneously? If so, you want at the same time to get closer and move away from it? Does that makes sense?

Thinking about it, i came to the impression that, instead of "hate" and "tolerance", maybe "activity" and "passivity" would better describe the horizontal corners of the diagram, since you can like something but not adopt any attittude towards it or like it and adopt attittudes about it. Same goes for fear, wich maybe could give the following perspective about a new definition of hate: hate is fear combined with activity.

When would suicide (self-murder) be anything other than a selfish act? One seeks to escape pain, conceives of death as a perfect liberation from all pain via the actualization of non-being, and then kills oneself without any consideration for the repercussions this will hold for others. Sometimes suicide can be understandable; even then, it still remains a selfish act. — javra

As you later qualified, we should consider cases, but here I would questions some of the nuances of the term "selfish". I agree it is selfish=not thinking of others but that is not the same as selfish=seeking one's own interest above others. I also don't think most suicides are directly escapes from pain per se. Rather they are acts of despair (which may well be induced by sustained pain).

But there is no denying that the suicide, the intentional premeditated suicide who has no belief that he is not actually going to die but rather "cross over into another existence" has placed the value of a future in which he exists below the value of a future where he is absent. Pure selflessness in the second sense. Indeed one often sees in last communications either assertions like "you'll be better off without me" or in the other extreme "life is evil and I'm going to take as many with me as possible when I go".

You are speaking here of Love as an ideal. I am thinking of love as it is practiced by mortal individuals. The narcissist loves those who focus on them because their ethic is whatever promotes their self importance. That might be both friends and enemies. But it isn't infinite and it isn't beyond good and evil. — jambaugh

Well, it's true that there's a gap between theory and practice - my description of what love is far removed from reality. Yet, aren't we all, all as in every single one of us, engaged in fierce battle against unforgiving nature?

Why do I say this?

Simply because, in spite of being part of nature, we humans have the ability not only, through reason, to know the facts of reality as in what is but also, through imagination, to realize what ought to be. Our imagination opens a window to another world - a world as it ought to be; like a poor man who gazes out of his window and envies the wealth of his rich neighbor, we imagine perfect worlds different to the one we actually live in. In these perfect worlds, all that exist in the actual world are themselves perfected: perfect husbands, perfect cars, perfect governments, and, relevant to this discussion, perfect love. My definition of love was an attempt to comprehend what love in a perfect world, the world we all imagine, would look like.

Contrast this imagined perfection to the world we actually live in; the actual world, at best is different, at worst is less (than ideal). The way the actual world is is presented to us as facts, truths, reality. Thus we find ourselves in a struggle: a struggle between imagined ideals and brute facts, between what ought to be and what is, between perfect selfless love and real narcissitic love.

What is apparent to me is that we seem to consider the actual world as a sculptor looks at a block of stone, material to work on with the imagined perfect world as the sculpture, the ultimate goal. We're not satisfied with what is and want to rework things so they may become what they ought to be. The same applies to love I guess: yes, love, actual love is narcissistic but we're dissatisfied with it and want to perfect it into what love ought to be, if that's possible.

believe where love comes into play is when along the process of evolution our ancestors developed sufficient neuro-chemical complexity to experience anticipatory emotions such as hope and fear which anticipate, respectively, sensations of pleasure and pain. The sensations are a more direct "ethic" wired into our structure, the emotions provide a built in system of abstraction applying to what we anticipate as good or bad in this immediate sense. Then as we evolved more abstract learning and memory and time sense and we are able to recognize and empathize others of our kind (in the broad sense of other goal seeking agents) we learn to love those agents we identify as kith and kin. — jambaugh

If I understand correctly, you are distinguishing here between the anticipation of sensations, and the sensations themselves. Where I have difficulty is that the sensations themselves are provided to us by our capacity to sense. The capacity to sense exists in an anticipatory relation to actually sensing. So the anticipation of sensation is prior to sensation in a more absolute way than you describe, and cannot develop from sensation. In this way we can see that sensation itself is formed and modified (evolves) through the influence of the anticipation of sensation rather than trying to understand such anticipation as having emerged from sensation. Our capacity to sense, and therefore also the sensations which we do have, have been shaped through evolution by our anticipation of good and bad. From this perspective, the direct ethic which is wired into our structure is the judgement of good and bad, and our systems for sensation have evolved under influence of this.

With regard to types:
I would assert that our structure of moral principles are no different (in type) from our structure of causal principles and our world model. Once we act upon a value system we are already in a hypothetical mode. We are extrapolating the effects of our potential actions utilizing an object model of our environment and understanding of behavior utilizing rules of interaction. It is "principles" all the way down insofar as we treat it cognitively.

In other words our value structure is just like, and in fact a part of our reality structure, a dynamic growing system which we continuously update as we experience our environment and categorize into people and things. — jambaugh

I agree with this completely, and that's why I was arguing against Possible's position which was an attempt to create a separation within the value structure. If you understand what I wrote above, you'll see that it is a perspective well suited to what you describe here. We might find that the "hypothetical mode" extends right to the most simple life forms. The actions of simple life forms are often represented as reactions to their environment. However, we might see that even simple life forms are presented with choices, and what appears like a reaction to the environment is actually a very basic form of choice, as to what is good.

So the capacity to "model our environment", and have "potential actions", requires that we have an underlying capacity to distinguish good. What appears to us as a "reaction" by a simple life form is really a judgement of good, a movement of choice by that living being. And so there are "principles all the way down" as even the simple life form acts on principle.

Even what we think of as "(particulars)" are abstracted to a sufficient degree that we can't easily categorize them as distinct from generalizations although we can probably order the degree of abstraction. I think you see this in its deficit in autistic children. They are less able to generalize across the changes in their environment. We do this even with what we consider concrete objects like the chair I'm sitting in. I still recognize it as the same chair from day to day even as the scuffs and stains increase and as it changes position and orientation from day today. — jambaugh

I believe that understanding of "the particular" is what emerges, and develops through evolution. To see something as a particular requires that we individuate that thing, distinguish it from its environment. This probably develops from self-recognition, recognizing that oneself is a distinct individual. So we apprehend the individual being as an individual self, through understanding the principles described above, that one makes one's own choices of activity, and this separates one being from another, as a particular, individual self.

The being is as you say, in hypothetical mode, acting on principles all the way down to its very basic level of existence, but then this being comes to recognize that it is nothing other than an individual, a particular, which is carrying out those activities. So the assumption of a "particular" comes about as a sort of logical necessity. And, since it is demonstrability the case that existence of the particular, individual being, is a necessary requirement, as the specific creature which is operating through the use of the general principles, the particular is understood as more fundamental than the universal. With this recognition, and realization that the particular individual is the base, we develop a completely different approach to the nature of "love" and its importance. No longer can we assume love as basic, underlying our existences as beings, a thing or principle, which unites us all fundamentally, such that we might take love for granted. There is no such fundamental principle, only individuals, fundamentally, each developing one's own principles of action, from the bottom. Therefore we must see love as something which must be cultured and nurtured, developed, if we want such a unity amongst us.

Well, it's true that there's a gap between theory and practice - my description of what love is far removed from reality. — TheMadFool

This is a manifestation of the difference between the illusion that general principles, principles of ethics or whatever theoretical principles one wishes to follow (even mathematics), are fundamental features of reality, and the true reality, that individuals, particulars are the fundamental features of reality. Once we recognize that actions within the world are the true reality of the world, and there is a gap between practise (our actions in the world), and theory, which cannot be adequately closed, we can realize that the claimed reality of general principles is an illusion.

Activity-passivity is basically one of the dimensions of that spectrum, and hate and fear are on opposite ends of it, but the same end of the positivity-negativity dimension.

I didn't mean to suggest that you could love and hate at the same time, as on this account love is "active-positive" and hate is "active-negative" (while tolerance is "passive-positive" and fear is "passive-negative"). Though now that you bring up that possibility, that does seem to be a thing that happens in real life, as in for example anxious-ambivalent attachment. I don't really know how to account for that yet on this model.

Someone else upthread suggested that "tolerance" is not really the right word for the opposite of "hate", and your use of "passivity" for one end of the second dimension of the spectrum makes me reflect on that. I'm still not sure what the best word would be, but I'm thinking something in the direction of "acceptance" or "welcoming", but more positive than that: the feeling of passively waiting and hoping that something good comes to you, as opposed to actively going after it yourself, which I've labelled "love".

here I would questions some of the nuances of the term "selfish". I agree it is selfish=not thinking of others but that is not the same as selfish=seeking one's own interest above others. — jambaugh

Your statement is ambiguous, so I'll ask: How does this compare to the semantics of the term selfish as, for example, listed on Wiktionary?:

Selfish: 1) Holding one's own self-interest as the standard for decision making. 2) Having regard for oneself above others’ well-being. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/selfish

My basic claim is that (genuine, human) love is an un-selfish activity (this in degrees). But I don’t know how to go about things if we happen to disagree on the semantics of selfish. For instance:

But there is no denying that the suicide, the intentional premeditated suicide who has no belief that he is not actually going to die but rather "cross over into another existence" has placed the value of a future in which he exists below the value of a future where he is absent. Pure selflessness in the second sense. — jambaugh

Your presenting this to be "pure selflessness" is to me a nonsensical conclusion. For one issue, selflessness pertains to being, rather than to nonexistence and nonexistent givens - desiring to not be cannot of itself be a selfless desire, for selfless desires value the preservation and thriving of beings. As one example, a mass-murderer putting scores of people "out of their misery" by murdering them is not engaged in selfless love for these people, for their friends and family, nor for humanity at large (despite maybe being self-deluded into so believing). But I can see how this can quickly get bogged down in semantics and presumptions.

More philosophically asked, are you equating an idealized pure selfless being to nonexistence and, hence, to non-being? If so, how would this not be a logical contradiction: i.e., some given both is and is not at the same time and* in the same respect.

[* edit: this if the two underlined givens can in any way be deemed to be bound by time and, hence, temporal - here recognizing that at at least one level of contemplation, neither given can be deemed to be temporal]

There is often an implicit assumption in comparing egoistic vs altruistic orientations. That is that value is a zero sum game. This is partly because one adopts an objective model of value.

So the distinction I was trying to make was between the attitudes:
"I'll act towards my own prosperity, and it's no skin off my nose if others prosper, even if they have it better than me."
vs
"I'll take what I can get and pull down anyone else since where they prosper I lose something and where they are impoverished there's more available for me!"

As to the suicide (deluded into thinking there's a better afterlife) the motivation is selfish. The result is self destructive. The error is due to ignorance and leads the actor away from his goal.