Secular morality

ChatteringMonkey

I felt the need to create this tread as a reaction or continuation to some of the recent discussion on morality, and specifically the anscombe thread.

So the problem secular morality faces, is, I think, that it is the successor of religious moralities where morality was founded in metaphysics, with God as the pinacle of that metaphysics. Every tradition not only had it's prescriptive rules, but also it 'discriptive' myth where the morality flowed from. Now this is important I think, not only did they say "you have to do this because God says so", they invariably embedded it in a story so people would buy into it more readily. So the purpose to all of this, is to give a morality authority. You need to follow it because it's true.

Now historically, christianity, with it's valuation of truthfullness, was involuntarily the germ from which the scientic method sprung. Faith in God wasn't enough anymore, God needed to be proven with reason, just to be sure. In came Hume who was fed up with spastic scolastic attempts to prove God, and he showed that ought didn't follow from is. (as an aside, he meant this only as a rebutal of direct logical deduction of ought from is, as rationalist were prone to do in his time. I don't think this implies that 'was is' can't have an effect on 'what should be').

So as scientific thinking progresses, what we end up with is a morality that had lost it's foundation. Kant, allegedly awoken from his slumber, thought he could step in and save to day by subsitituting God with pure reason. Apparently he was only half-awake though, as he didn't notice that God was indeed dead.

What this all means, I think, is that we need to bite the bullet, and reconcile with the fact that morality isn't and can't be true or false. Because what is even worse than a mere lack of Godly authority, is lying to people about the origins of morality and people finding out. And people will find out any new attempts at founding morality in made-up metaphysics because, by now, a scientific mindset is ingrained. But but... what are we to do then, we cannot accept the conclusion that anything goes. Surely relativism is even worse then lying to people? Well no, because if people find out, you end up not only with relativism, but with a relativism of the rebelious kind.

From an atheistic perspective one has to wonder how non-existing Gods managed to come up with reasonably functioning moralities through-out history. People did all of that even then, so surely it should be possible to do something like that now, content-wise. I'd argue we can do a lot better, because for the first time in history, we actually start to 'know' some things about the world. As to the question of how we are going to imbue those moralities with the necessary authority? Same as we allways did, we discuss these things with other people, come to some agreements and found institutions that can settle disputes if need be... this is basicly social contract-theory. The authority is in the morality being supported by the community.

And eventhough these are 'merely' created moralities, and so not true in any objective sense, I'm not all that worried of relativism. There's enough convergence in what people want - certainly now that we will have a progressively better understanding of humanity - that it will mostly end up in something that works fine if people are educated in and accustomed to the idea of it.

Sir2u

So the problem secular morality faces, is, I think, that it is the successor of religious moralities where morality was founded in metaphysics, with God as the pinacle of that metaphysics. Every tradition not only had it's prescriptive rules, but also it 'discriptive' myth where the morality flowed from. Now this is important I think, not only did they say "you have to do this because God says so", they invariably embedded it in a story so people would buy into it more readily. So the purpose to all of this, is to give a morality authority. You need to follow it because it's true. — ChatteringMonkey

https://wwnorton.com/books/The-Atheists-Guide-to-Reality/

Pfhorrest

What this all means, I think, is that we need to bite the bullet, and reconcile with the fact that morality isn't and can't be true or false. — ChatteringMonkey

That sounds like the thing that the logical positivists claimed was necessary, basically creating the field of meta-ethics in the process. There has been a lot of argument about it since and it's far from a settled matter. I think the author with the closest to the correct solution is R.M. Hare, with his universal prescriptivism.

I have my own take on a solution to the problem, which I outline in my philosophy book, as you've already seen the beginnings of, and commented on. I agree that moral propositions are not truth-apt in the same way as non-moral propositions are, because they are not trying to describe reality in the way that other propositions are, so to say they're "true" as in a correct description of reality or not is besides the point. But I hold they they can be "true" in a different sense, in that they are correct instances of a different kind of speech, trying to do something else: to prescribe morality. Like Hare, I think they are more like imperative sentences than like indicative sentences, but that imperatives can be judged superior or inferior to each other just like indicatives can. And with that difference in direction of fit established, I think morality can be sussed out in a way completely analogous to, but separate and distinct from, the way we suss out the truth of non-moral proposition.

I summarize up that analogy in part of one of the essays of my Codex Quaerentis, where I first summarize how the scientific method works:

When it comes to tackling questions about reality, pursuing knowledge, we should not take some census or survey of people's beliefs or perceptions, and either try to figure out how all those could all be held at once without conflict, or else (because that likely will not be possible) just declare that whatever the majority, or some privileged authority, believes or perceives is true. Instead, we should appeal to everyone's direct sensations or observations, free from any interpretation into perceptions or beliefs yet, and compare and contrast the empirical experiences of different people in different circumstances to come to a common ground on what experiences there are that need satisfying in order for a belief to be true. Then we should devise models, or theories, that purport to satisfy all those experiences, and test them against further experiences, rejecting those that fail to satisfy any of them, and selecting the simplest, most efficient of those that remain as what we tentatively hold to be true. This entire process should be carried out in an organized, collaborative, but intrinsically non-authoritarian academic structure. — The Codex Quarentis: A Note On Ethics

And then give the moral analogue of that:

When it comes to tackling questions about morality, pursuing justice, we should not take some census or survey of people's intentions or desires, and either try to figure out how all those could all be held at once without conflict, or else (because that likely will not be possible) just declare that whatever the majority, or some privileged authority, intends or desires is good. Instead, we should appeal to everyone's direct appetites, free from any interpretation into desires or intentions yet, and compare and contrast the hedonic experiences of different people in different circumstances to come to a common ground on what experiences there are that need satisfying in order for an intention to be good. Then we should devise models, or strategies, that purport to satisfy all those experiences, and test them against further experiences, rejecting those that fail to satisfy any of them, and selecting the simplest, most efficient of those that remain as what we tentatively hold to be good. This entire process should be carried out in an organized, collaborative, but intrinsically non-authoritarian political structure. — The Codex Quarentis: A Note On Ethics

In short: Descriptive claims about what is true or real are to be judged by appeal to empirical experiences, things that seem true, with a whole bunch of important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever looks true to me right now".

Likewise, prescriptive claims about what is good or moral are to be judged by appeal to hedonic experiences, things that seem good, with all the same important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever feels good to me right now".

Tzeentch

In short: Descriptive claims about what is true or real are to be judged by appeal to empirical experiences, things that seem true, with a whole bunch of important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever looks true to me right now".

Likewise, prescriptive claims about what is good or moral are to be judged by appeal to hedonic experiences, things that seem good, with all the same important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever feels good to me right now". — Pfhorrest

Thank you for the insightful comment.

Pfhorrest

↪Tzeentch

Thank you for letting me know you found it insightful. :smile:

god must be atheist

Everybody has their own theory about ethics, so why shouldn't I. But I can't write a book about it because that would need a lot of filler; I can write a passable essay about it, but nobody would publish it because I don't have a doctorate in philosophy.

so my theory (which I think is superior to all other current theories... but so are everyone else's in their creators' minds) will die with me.

NOS4A2

↪ChatteringMonkey

I prefer the notion of a genealogy of morals, that our morality develops over a long period of time through a process of trial and error. The wisdom of generations can better attest to the merits and faults of a particular ethics better than any number of philosophers or theologians or gods.

It’s a shame that primitive peoples injected supernatural decrees declaring this or that right and wrong, because such a flimsy metaphysics was doomed to bring doubt on the entire enterprise. Nonetheless those moralities still persist in our cultures and habits and will continue to do so long after we’ve passed. And who knows? Maybe in a distant future the genealogy will converge into one ethics with which everyone can agree.

ChatteringMonkey

↪Sir2u

Although an atheist, I don't think Alex Rosenberg is entirely up my ally, I think he's too reductionist.

ChatteringMonkey

↪Pfhorrest

That sounds like the thing that the logical positivists claimed was necessary, basically creating the field of meta-ethics in the process. — Pfhorrest

I haven't really read much of the logical positivist, but weren't they saying that moral claims are meaningless, not just that truth doesn't apply to them. To me that's an entirely different thing, I don't think moral claims are meaningless, I think they have meaning in moral communities.

In short: Descriptive claims about what is true or real are to be judged by appeal to empirical experiences, things that seem true, with a whole bunch of important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever looks true to me right now".

Likewise, prescriptive claims about what is good or moral are to be judged by appeal to hedonic experiences, things that seem good, with all the same important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever feels good to me right now". — Pfhorrest

Ok, I think I understand you position better now having read that. I do disagree though. Basically I'm a social contractarian. I think morals originate in communities where dialogue, negotiation and agreements etc... are a vital part of how morals come to be. I don't think this proces can be replicated entirely from a research desk. The role of the philosopher IMO shouldn't be to devise morality like a scientists develops scientific theories... I think the philosopher can play an important role in the proces though, by facilitating and elucidating the dialogue in a community. But so his interventions in that view would necessarily be more topical, rather than systematic and academic.

Echarmion

Ok, I think I understand you position better now having read that. I do disagree though. Basically I'm a social contractarian. I think morals originate in communities where dialogue, negotiation and agreements etc... are a vital part of how morals come to be. I don't think this proces can be replicated entirely from a research desk. The role of the philosopher IMO shouldn't be to devise morality like a scientists develops scientific theories... I think the philosopher can play an important role in the proces though, by facilitating and elucidating the dialogue in a community. But so his interventions in that view would necessarily be more topical, rather than systematic and academic. — ChatteringMonkey

Perhaps it's also important to bring up the distinction between morality and legality here. What you describe sounds more like democratic law-making than personal morality.

I think you're right though that a moral philosophy is not an entirely theoretical project. It does require engagement with the restrictions of actual reality, just like the scientific method does. Perhaps, as an analogy, we might say that the scientific method uses what we observe in the present to predict the future. A moral system would use what we observe in the present to prescribe a future.

alcontali

Now historically, christianity, with it's valuation of truthfullness, was involuntarily the germ from which the scientic method sprung. Faith in God wasn't enough anymore, God needed to be proven with reason, just to be sure. — ChatteringMonkey

In the meanwhile, we also came to understand that the basic rules in a formal system of rules cannot be justified from within the system. Any attempt to prove these basic rules from nothing at all, is just a futile exercise in infinite regress.

One never just proves a theorem. One proves a theorem from the basic rules.
It is not "proving" but "proving from".
Proving the basic rules from themselves, is obviously futile.

Furthermore, the scientific method does not apply whatsoever to formal systems. It is the axiomatic method that deals with them.

Therefore, we can only conclude that they wanted to use reason but did not understand the tool. That is the prime reason why their very poor results are so incredibly nonsensical.

tim wood

In short: Descriptive claims about what is true or real are to be judged by appeal to empirical experiences, things that seem true, with a whole bunch of important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever looks true to me right now".

Likewise, prescriptive claims about what is good or moral are to be judged by appeal to hedonic experiences, things that seem good, with all the same important details on the procedure of which to appeal to and how and by whom, not just "whatever feels good to me right now". — Pfhorrest

Empiricism and hedonism? You're joking, yes?

Qwex

I think the word morality is the centre of a grander concept, which should NOT be touched.

Icarus, he who flew too close to the Sun, is a good metaphor.

'What's good is...' assumes a long list that is tricky to define, requiring an apt tongue, not word.

Did we make a mistake by thinking our language can contain good?

Pfhorrest

I haven't really read much of the logical positivist, but weren't they saying that moral claims are meaningless, not just that truth doesn't apply to them. To me that's an entirely different thing, I don't think moral claims are meaningless, I think they have meaning in moral communities. — ChatteringMonkey

To the positivists "meaningless" and "not truth-apt" are basically the same thing, because their theory of meaning is basically entirely descriptivist (that's basically what "positivist" means; positive:normative::descriptive:prescriptive): the meaning of something lies in the empirical experience of the world that it tells you to expect, so something that is not trying to describe the world like that has no meaning, to them. (I disagree about that, to be clear, but I'm not sure you do).

Their various attempts at figuring out what moral claims are trying to do, if not making "meaningful" statements like that, include that they are references to the standards of moral communities.

Also, I don't see how you don't see your view like that as a form of relativism, since it sounds like you think different moral communities can come to different moral conclusions and they're all right within their communities (and, presumably, there's no sense in which they can be right or wrong between communities), which is just straightforward moral relativism.

I think morals originate in communities where dialogue, negotiation and agreements etc... are a vital part of how morals come to be. I don't think this proces can be replicated entirely from a research desk. The role of the philosopher IMO shouldn't be to devise morality like a scientists develops scientific theories... I think the philosopher can play an important role in the proces though, by facilitating and elucidating the dialogue in a community. — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not saying that philosophers should be devising morality like scientists devise scientific theories, and definitely not all alone from a research desk; but rather that the philosophical underpinning of how communities work out what is good is analogous to the philosophical underpinning of how communities work out what is true. I think that that work of figuring out what in particular is good is beyond the scope of philosophy: philosophy just provides a method by which to do so, like it provides the scientific method but doesn't actually do science. (I discuss this at length elsewhere in that essay I quoted from earlier). And science is a social endeavor too, comparing and contrasting different points of view: replication, making sure other people observe the same things in the same circumstances, is a very important part of the scientific method.

Perhaps, as an analogy, we might say that the scientific method uses what we observe in the present to predict the future. A moral system would use what we observe in the present to prescribe a future. — Echarmion

Exactly. (More or less).

Empiricism and hedonism? You're joking, yes? — tim wood

If there's a joke in there, I don't get it.

tim wood

Empiricism and hedonism? You're joking, yes?
— tim wood

If there's a joke in there, I don't get it. — Pfhorrest

Maybe I'm missing it. Are claims to be judged, or are the true, real, good, moral to be judged? What is being judged?

jorndoe

So the problem secular morality faces, is, I think, that it is the successor of religious moralities where morality was founded in metaphysics, with God as the pinacle of that metaphysics. Every tradition not only had it's prescriptive rules, but also it 'discriptive' myth where the morality flowed from. Now this is important I think, not only did they say "you have to do this because God says so", they invariably embedded it in a story so people would buy into it more readily. So the purpose to all of this, is to give a morality authority. You need to follow it because it's true. — ChatteringMonkey

If you can pass moral judgement on rules in scriptures, then they can't define morals.
Since you can, they don't.

Conversely, such rules may just have forced some societies into a kind of sufficiently stable social cohesion over time, that they became culturally embedded (at least in a conservative sense).
Could something analogous be said of biological evolution, if only to account for morality (not define)?

Many scriptural narratives and other writings mention the Golden Rule or similar in some form or other.
Seems there are some trends that many will recognize as "good rules of thumb".
Yet, such rules "set in stone" themselves, don't absolve anything; in any given situation you'd still have to personally decide if following them is the right thing to do.
Life (as an autonomous moral agent) ain't always easy...

Pfhorrest

Maybe I'm missing it. Are claims to be judged, or are the true, real, good, moral to be judged? What is being judged? — tim wood

Claims about what is true or real, good or moral; though that's pretty much the same thing as judging what actually is true or real, good or moral, inasmuch as a correct claim just states what is actually so.

tim wood

Claims about what is true or real, good or moral; though that's pretty much the same thing as judging what actually is true or real, good or moral, inasmuch as a correct claim just states what is actually so. — Pfhorrest

*sigh* And you know that the claim "just states what is actually so" how? C'mon, this is cereal box stuff! A hint: all facts are historical facts.

Pfhorrest

And you know that the claim "just states what is actually so" how? — tim wood

Because that's what it means for a claim to be correct?

all facts are historical facts. — tim wood

Elaborate?

tim wood

You claim the true and the real "are to be judged by appeal to empirical experience... [The] good or moral are to be judged by appeal to hedonic experiences."

Why experience over reason? Why touch/feel/pleasure?

The blind men and the elephant come to mind. And a psychopath probably has "hedonic" experiences.

Judging by any experience is after-the-fact. Do you have any way to judge before the fact?

Finally, one good sentence on each of true, real, good, moral. To the end of demonstrating you have some sense of what they are.

As to historicity, can you think of any fact that is not historically conditioned?

Pfhorrest

Why experience over reason? — tim wood

It's not one over the other. Experience is what to reason about.

The blind men and the elephant come to mind. — tim wood

I use exactly that analogy in the essay I linked earlier.... er sorry, confusing two different threads with ChatteringMonkey apparently, another essay related to the one I linked earlier:

This is where I come very close to agreeing with idealism in both of the senses described above, in holding that experience is the ultimate arbiter of judgement on both reality and morality. But rather than the perceptions and desires that underlie those views, which can contradict from person to person because they are constructed in the different minds of different people, I propose instead attending to the more fundamental underlying experiences that give rise to those perceptions and desires, free from the interpretation of the mind undergoing them. In psychology a distinction is made between perceptions, which are interpreted by the mind, and sensations, which are the raw experiences that get interpreted into perceptions, things such as colors of light and pitches of sound, as opposed to images or words. I make a similar distinction between desires, being the things that are interpreted by the mind, and what I call appetites, which are the raw experiences underlying them, things such as the feeling of pain or hunger, as opposed to wanting to do or have something.

And then I propose the construction of models of reality and morality that are consistent with all such experiences. An old parable nicely illustrates the principle I mean to employ here, wherein three blind men each feel different parts of an elephant (the trunk, a leg, the tail), and each concludes that he is feeling something different (a snake, a tree, a rope). All three of them are wrong about what they perceive, but the truth of the matter, that they are feeling parts of an elephant, is consistent with what all three of them sense, even though the perceptions they draw from those sensations are mutually contradictory. I propose always proceeding on the assumption that some such model is possible to construct, even if we don't know what it will be just yet; that assumption being the same one described above, that there is something real, something moral, simply because to assume otherwise would just be to give up for no reason. There always remains the possibility that we will fail to construct such models that can consistently account for all experiences, but we can never be sure that we have conclusively failed, rather than having just not succeeded yet. The only choice is between continuing to try despite the possibility of maybe never succeeding, or giving up — embracing nihilism — and definitely never succeeding. — The Codex Quaerentis: Against Nihilism

tim wood

I propose instead attending to the more fundamental underlying experiences that give rise to those perceptions and desires, free from the interpretation of the mind undergoing them. — The Codex Quaerentis: Against Nihilism

Oxymoron. No mind, no experience. Mind, then interpretation. You must know this. And you have not considered the historicity of fact(s), have you.

Model building is fine. But you're building without regard to sound engineering practices and principles.

Pfhorrest

Oxymoron. No mind, no experience. — tim wood

I didn't say free from mind, I said free from its interpretation. This is the basic distinction between polling people about what they believe, and appealing to observation.

And you have not considered the historicity of fact(s), have you. — tim wood

You have not explained what you mean by that yet.

tim wood

I said free from its interpretation. — Pfhorrest

Since perception is interpretation, it's to you to make clear how any observation can be clear of interpretation.

All facts are historical facts. To understand that, ask yourself what, exactly, a fact is. And if you disagree, try presenting one here that isn't. Btw, not my idea. My sympathy if it's not immediately obvious.

Possibility

I didn't say free from mind, I said free from its interpretation. This is the basic distinction between polling people about what they believe, and appealing to observation. — Pfhorrest

Personally, I think we need to take both into account in order to even approach the accuracy we’re looking for here. It is where observation differs from what most people believe (or vice versa) that we glimpse the possibility of new information or unrealised potential which may be examined free from interpretation by the mind. These are not facts, mind you - their relative uncertainty must be taken into account, and only by attempting to express these possibilities in relation to the information we already have can we make use of this new information to predict future interactions, and then summon the courage to ‘test’ our conceptual hypotheses - in conceptual discussions (what most people believe), and/or in determining and initiating action (observation).

Pfhorrest

Since perception is interpretation, it's to you to make clear how any observation can be clear of interpretation. — tim wood

I clearly distinguished between perception and sensation, which is not even my original distinction; I only extended it to normative experiences (appetites) and feelings (desires) by analogy.

All facts are historical facts. To understand that, ask yourself what, exactly, a fact is. And if you disagree, try presenting one here that isn't. Btw, not my idea. My sympathy if it's not immediately obvious. — tim wood

I can’t do the opposite of something if I don’t know what you mean by that something. I’m not just going to guess what you mean so you can tell me I’m wrong, and it’s not my job to make your attempts at communication clear for you. If you want to make a point, make it better.

tim wood

↪Pfhorrest

"[A] fact is a thing of the kind which it is the business of historians to ascertain. The word is sometimes [mis]used... as if it were a synonym for "truth".... It is a fact for the astronomer that at a certain time on a certain day a certain observer saw a transit of Venus taking place. If it is of any interest for this observer or anyone else to know subsequently that the transit took place then, the only way in which he can know it is by knowing the historical fact that it was observed; and historical facts are not apprehensible to our senses." An Essay on Metaphysics, R. G. Collingwood, 145.

The world of now is always instantly gone into the past, recoverable only as a matter of history. The expression, "all facts are historical facts," is a categorical proposition that means exactly what it says. I'm sorry that someone with your pretense to thought and thinking should refuse to do either!

Pfhorrest

↪tim wood

Thank you for finally explaining what you mean, but I’m still not seeing any bearing on the topic under discussion. If your point is that we can’t observe the past, I argue that the only notion we have of the past at all is its ongoing effect on the present, including the memories we presently have, the records that are presently available, and other evidence that still lingers in the present: all of which is accessible via experience of one kind or another.

god must be atheist

A lot of misunderstandings are going on in this thread, to validate one's stance of rejecting another's stance.

The one being rejected on grounds of misunderstanding now found himself in a position of going through endless excercises of having to defend his stance by explaining the misunderstandings by others.

This is not philosophy. This is kindergartenism. Philosophy would be to carefully read someone else's opinion and make correct inferences, instead of bombarding him with accusations of being wrong, only on the grounds of misreading or not understanding what he had written.

Carried to the extreme, the Misunderstood or Not-Read-Carefully-By-Others may one day throw his hands in the air and declare that he's had enough of kindergartenism, and simply leave the site.

I wish to avoid this, in the case of PFHorrest, who is currently one of the best thinkers on board. Guys, and ladies, let's not antagonize him. Please read what he writes carefully, and don't make him drown in your saliva by nailing him to things he did not say.

P.s. PFHorrest did not ask me to write this. I wrote this entirely out of my own volition. He may even enjoy educating the masses. I dunno. It sure bothers me, though, that this goes on all the time, all the time.

ChatteringMonkey

Also, I don't see how you don't see your view like that as a form of relativism, since it sounds like you think different moral communities can come to different moral conclusions and they're all right within their communities (and, presumably, there's no sense in which they can be right or wrong between communities), which is just straightforward moral relativism. — Pfhorrest

Sure, you can call it meta-ethical moral relativism if you want. That's not relativism on a non-meta level though, if you are part of one of those communities there's nothing relative about it. But isn't that what is actually going on? Different communities have different morals, so it certainly seems to be an accurate description. And furthermore I don't see how you can say one is wrong or right in some objective or universal sense, outside of their context. That is indeed the point where one has to bite the bullet. Absent any metaphysical foundation, there is no false or true to the matter. You can critique the moral system from within the system though, and try to change the tradition... but this is allways from a certain perspective, and not from some objective contextless point of view.

And more to the point of relativism. It seems to me, like I alluded to in the OP, that because one doesn't like the conclusion of relativism, one shouldn't accept the premisses that lead to relativism. But that's not a good argument, the premisses are true if the premisses are true.

And a last point about relativism, I don't understand why that conclusion should be so threatening in the first place. Different communities have different morals, yes, but because people on the whole want similar things, the differences generally needn't be that concerning.

This entire process should be carried out in an organized, collaborative, but intrinsically non-authoritarian political structure. — The Codex Quarentis: A Note On Ethics

As to the point about method, I missed the part where you refer to political structures for morality instead of academic structures. I guess we mostly agree on this point then.

Pfhorrest

He may even enjoy educating the masses. — god must be atheist

I do, though the futility of it does get annoying sometimes. My patience really depends on how much else is stressing me out in life. If I'm relaxed and having a good time otherwise, carrying on an intractable philosophical argument is a fun way to pass the time. I'm stressed the fuck out by other stuff in life, banging my head against the same wall over and over again can start to piss me off.

Thanks for the words of support, BTW. :-)

Sure, you can call it meta-ethical moral relativism if you want. That's not relativism on a non-meta level though, if you are part of one of those communities there's nothing relative about it. — ChatteringMonkey

I think you might be misreading the phrase "meta-ethical moral relativism". It's not a meta level of "ethical moral relativism"; it's moral relativism, in the sense that applies in the field of meta-ethics, as distinct from normative ethics or descriptive ethics. The descriptive sense just says "people disagree". The meta-ethical sense says "there is no correct way to adjudicate those disagreements". The normative sense says "therefore we morally ought to tolerate differences of behavior".

It sounds like you are asserting the meta-ethical sense of it here, but...

Different communities have different morals, so it certainly seems to be an accurate description — ChatteringMonkey

...this just sounds like the descriptive sense, which doesn't have to entail the meta-ethical sense.

And furthermore I don't see how you can say one is wrong or right in some objective or universal sense, outside of their context — ChatteringMonkey

What is it that makes one able to say anything is right or wrong in some objective or universal sense, not just moral claims?

I say it is the ability to replicate the experiences of things seeming that way, controlling for differences in subjects and contexts. Descriptive claims about reality can be objectively true or false, despite disagreements between people or communities about what is true or false (different religions make differing factual claims too, not just moral ones), because we can each look at the world and see that it looks the same way, in the same contexts, for similar people, etc. And then say that reality is however it needs to be to look true to those people in those contexts etc (as well as all the other ways it looks to other people in other contexts etc).

I say prescriptive claims about morality can be objectively "true or false" in a different sense, a non-descriptive sense (because they're not trying to describe at all), despite similar disagreements between people or communities about what is good or bad, because we can likewise verify that when a person of a certain kind stands in a certain context and experiences a certain phenomenon it seems good or bad to them, like it feels good or bad to them, it hurts or pleases them. And then say that morality is however it needs to be to feel good to those people in those contexts etc (as well as all the other ways it feels to other people in other contexts etc).

Secular morality

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