I think I understand what your views are from reading the text, but the reasons why you hold them aren't very clear to me. Or maybe it's more that I disagree with the reasons, while still ending with more or less the same conclusions. What confuses me the most I guess is the way you seem to argue for epistemic claims and moral claims in the exact same way.

I object to that on the grounds that if it is true, then by its nature it cannot be known to be true, because to know it to be true we would need some means of objectively evaluating claims about what is real and what is moral, so as to justifiably rule all such claims to be false; but the inability to make such objective evaluations is precisely what such a nihilistic position claims. In the absence of such a means of objective evaluation, it nevertheless remains an open possibility that nothing is real, or that nothing is moral, but we could only every assume such an opinion as baselessly as nihilism would hold every other opinion to be held. In the strictest sense, I agree that there might not be any reality or any morality, but all we could do in that case is to either baselessly assume that there is not, and stop there, simply giving up any hope of ever finding out if we were wrong in that baseless assumption; or, instead, we could baselessly assume that there is something real and something moral — as there certainly inevitably seems to be, for even if you are a solipsist and egotist, some things will still look true or false to you and feel good or bad to you — and then proceed with the long hard work of figuring out what seems most likely to be real and moral, by attending closely and thoroughly to those seemings, those experiences. — Codex

The problem I have with this is that you seem to gloss over the difference between feeling and perception. I don't think we can feel what is morally true in that same way as we can see if something is true.

So what I think would be clarifying, is to know if you think truth-value applies to moral claims. And if so, why? Of course that would lead you down the rabbithole of what truth is, but that probably can't be helped.

Thanks for the feedback! At this point I am indeed treating both prescriptive and descriptive claims the same. In later essays I go into more detail on the differences between them and what different kinds of things make each of them true, but they are both treated as truth-apt enough, for exactly the reason you quote: if we don't know if any of them are true or not (because we don't even know if they are truth-apt), then our practical choices are to either carry on as though they are not, which is just to give up on trying to figure out what the answers are (in the case of prescriptive questions, that means figuring out what we ought to do), or to carry on as though some of them are, by trying to figure out which of them are.

The problem I have with this is that you seem to gloss over the difference between feeling and perception. I don't think we can feel what is morally true in that same way as we can see if something is true. — ChatteringMonkey

As already elaborated in the previous essay Against Transcendentalism, I pose hedonic experiences as the prescriptive equivalent of empirical experiences: we sort out what is good on the basis of what feels good hedonically (comparing what feels good to different people in different contexts to work out the full picture, not just what feels good to one person at one time), in the same way that we sort out what is true on the basis of what looks true (comparing what looks true to different people in different contexts to work out the full picture, not just what looks true to one person at one time).

I should maybe include a brief reminder of that in this essay too, especially since I am considering re-ordering these first four essays so that this one will be first and that one will be last.

(Because I think it might be better to start with attacking someone almost everyone is against, nihilism, rather than attacking something most people are for, fideism; also because anti-fideism and anti-nihlism are my core principles, so putting them first instead lays all the groundwork first before moving on to the consequences; and because the current last of these initial four essays, Against Cynicism, directly addresses a lot of the objections people usually raise in response to Against Fideism; and because Against Transcendentalism is kind of the most substantial of the topics, really getting into the practical "on what basis do we judge anything" aspect of things, after establishing in Against Nihilism that there are answers to be judged at all, in Against Fideism and Against Cynicism how to and not to sort through them).

I went to add something about that to the essay just now, and realized that the very next paragraph after the one you quoted contains something like that, and the paragraph after that ends with the rationale that I thought was contained in what you quote:

This is where I come very close to agreeing with idealism in both of the senses described above, in holding that experience is the ultimate arbiter of judgement on both reality and morality. But rather than the perceptions and desires that underlie those views, which can contradict from person to person because they are constructed in the different minds of different people, I propose instead attending to the more fundamental underlying experiences that give rise to those perceptions and desires, free from the interpretation of the mind undergoing them. In psychology a distinction is made between perceptions, which are interpreted by the mind, and sensations, which are the raw experiences that get interpreted into perceptions, things such as colors of light and pitches of sound, as opposed to images or words. I make a similar distinction between desires, being the things that are interpreted by the mind, and what I call appetites, which are the raw experiences underlying them, things such as the feeling of pain or hunger, as opposed to wanting to do or have something.

And then I propose the construction of models of reality and morality that are consistent with all such experiences. An old parable nicely illustrates the principle I mean to employ here, wherein three blind men each feel different parts of an elephant (the trunk, a leg, the tail), and each concludes that he is feeling something different (a snake, a tree, a rope). All three of them are wrong about what they perceive, but the truth of the matter, that they are feeling parts of an elephant, is consistent with what all three of them sense, even though the perceptions they draw from those sensations are mutually contradictory. I propose always proceeding on the assumption that some such model is possible to construct, even if we don't know what it will be just yet; that assumption being the same one described above, that there is something real, something moral, simply because to assume otherwise would just be to give up for no reason. There always remains the possibility that we will fail to construct such models that can consistently account for all experiences, but we can never be sure that we have conclusively failed, rather than having just not succeeded yet. The only choice is between continuing to try despite the possibility of maybe never succeeding, or giving up — embracing nihilism — and definitely never succeeding.

I realize now that a horizontal rule was placed between the wrong two paragraphs accidentally, interrupting the flow between the paragraph you quoted and those that followed after it. I've fixed that now.

I could understand that you don't ellaborate on the difference for brevity sake. But I think it's an important difference, as I try to get into my thread on secular morality, especially because of historical reasons…

Also I suspect that my views do differ quite a bit from yours on morality, because I don't think hedonic experiences necessarily play that large a part in the story. Well maybe they do at bottom, I'm not sure, but I certainly don't think morality is best described in terms of hedonic experiences… the social dimension is an important aspect that is missing it seems to me. Maybe it's a bit like talking about fluids in terms of individual moving particles, presumably you could do it if you have enough time and calculating capacity, but it's a lot better to talk about it in terms of fluid dynamics.

I do get into it later in the Codex, I’m just taking things one step at a time here. At this point I’m only arguing not to completely abandon even attempting to figure out an objective morality, and haven’t said much yet about how to go about doing that, but I will.

Also, while your fluid dynamics analogy seems alright to me and later essays will get more into the higher-level abstractions that are needed for practical use, I do wonder if perhaps you mean something different than I do by “hedonism”? Did you read the previous essay against transcendentalism where I explain what I don’t mean by that? It’s not egotism, or materialism, or rejecting more refined pleasures and the alleviation of more subtle pains through “spiritual” practices. It just means that the thing we ought to be concerned with when we’re caring for other people, as with ourselves, is that they’re flourishing rather than suffering.

Also, while your fluid dynamics analogy seems alright to me and later essays will get more into the higher-level abstractions that are needed for practical use, I do wonder if perhaps you mean something different than I do by “hedonism”? Did you read the previous essay against transcendentalism where I explain what I don’t mean by that? It’s not egotism, or materialism, or rejecting more refined pleasures and the alleviation of more subtle pains through “spiritual” practices. It just means that the thing we ought to be concerned with when we’re caring for other people, as with ourselves, is that they’re flourishing rather than suffering. — Pfhorrest

You're right, I did think hedonic experience was something else, more along the lines of wants or desire-satisfaction... But then I would disagree for other reasons :-). Flourishing is not the goal of morality I think. Well not the goal of morality that seeks to prescribe how to act in relation to other people. Maybe it can be the cornerstone of virtue-ethics or some sort of personal ethos, but I don't consider that to be morality propper, because it's not concerned in the first place with how to treat other people. I think morality has the far less lofty goal of keeping people from seriously harming eachother. We don't need to and can't be all friends, right. And so, an imperative to actively help eachother to flourish seems a bit to much to ask right now, for the moment I'd be content with a morality that allows us to life together without harming eachother.

Also, like I said in the other thread, I'm a social contractarian, I don't think constructing a morality from basic values like individual hedonic experiences, or from whatever value really, is the way to go. This is where the fluid analogy is still relevant I think.

Nihilism is the only hope humanity has for peace.

I think morality has the far less lofty goal of keeping people from seriously harming eachother. — ChatteringMonkey

That's still a hedonic criteron though, assuming by "harm" you mean something like "cause suffering".

I'm not saying that anyone has an obligation to positively generate flourishing, pleasure, etc (for themselves or for others), but that when we are judging something as good or bad, we do so on the basis of making people feel good or bad. You may not be obligated to give someone a back rub, but it's still a nice thing to do, right? We'd judge that action positively, even though we don't think it would be morally wrong in a blameworthy way to not do it. Why would we judge it positively? Well, because it made someone feel good. And punching random people on the streets is definitely morally forbidden, but by what criteria are we judging it to be so wrong? Well, that it hurt someone, inflicted suffering, made them feel bad.

There's lots and lots of details about the particulars of a complete moral system that I go into lots of detail about later. Hedonism is just the basic criterion to use for, essentially, "measuring" goodness and badness.

In any case, this is really more a topic for the earlier thread Against Transcendentailism. This essay against nihilism isn't arguing specifically for a hedonic morality, just some morality that isn't relative to what people subjectively intend or desire. I only mention appetites, and thus hedonism, in this essay to be clear that I'm not arguing against a view of morality (or reality) that's independent of experiences (like sensations and appetites), which are not irreconcilably subjective the way thoughts (like beliefs and intentions) and feelings (like perceptions and desires) are, even though they are subjective still in a different way.

Nihilism is the only hope humanity has for peace. — Pussycat

Would you care to elaborate, and possibly relate this to the essay under discussion?

but that when we are judging something as good or bad, we do so on the basis of making people feel good or bad. You may not be obligated to give someone a back rub, but it's still a nice thing to do, right? We'd judge that action positively, even though we don't think it would be morally wrong in a blameworthy way to not do it. Why would we judge it positively? Well, because it made someone feel good. And punching random people on the streets is definitely morally forbidden, but by what criteria are we judging it to be so wrong? Well, that it hurt someone, inflicted suffering, made them feel bad.

I feel like your position would be stronger if you said something like "the action is good because it is ultimately in pursuit of hedonic pleasure" as opposed to just focusing on the immediate effect of
whether it made someone feel good.

For instance, getting a flu shot or some other type of vaccine is obviously good but the immediate feeling is discomfort. Getting a shot is an unpleasant experience but ultimately it's for the better of humanity.

In the essay Against Transcendentalism previously discussed I do go into exactly that kind of detail:

It is of course possible that individual experiences like these might not tell the whole story: something that at first looks true might be false, something that at first feels good might be bad, and so on. But we add caveats and qualifications to the opinions we form by accounting for further experiences. For example, something may look like a fire from one perspective but not from another, if it turns out to be some kind of illusion; but it's by accounting more thoroughly for how things look in other contexts that we find that out. Likewise, getting burned may feel bad in the moment but might circumvent even greater pain later, if for example the burn is medically necessary to cauterize a wound; and it is likewise by accounting more thoroughly for how things feel in other contexts that we find out about that. Our concepts of what it means for things to be true or be good are grounded in these experiences of things seeming true or seeming good, merely accounting for all such experiences of things seeming some way; so for something to be called "good" or "bad" even though it doesn't hedonistically seem that way (to anyone, ever) is as indefensible as supernaturalist claims that something is "true" or "false" even though it being that way would have never have any impact on how the world seemed to anyone. — The Codex Quaerentis: Against Transcendentalism

So it would seem you agree with me, is that right? So then the action isn't determined to be good or bad simply because it makes an individual feel good or bad, but it's rather about the bigger picture then, right?

I think "the Good" is a tricky concept.

I think knowledge or direction is often good, even if it was acquired through painful means. I'd imagine someone could do something pretty malicious towards you, but weirdly in the end it could actually make you a stronger, better person. That wouldn't make their action good though.

I also consider justice part of "the good." Justice, in its truest sense, isn't about making people happy or ensuring that they thrive. Justice can actually hurt society sometimes.

I agree with this - it’s the main problem with seeking a more ‘objective’ sense of morality. That’s not to say that we’re unable to grasp the relativity of it - just not in the sense that we are inclined to perceive a dichotomous distinction between ‘the Good’ and ‘Evil’ - particularly in the sense that we must distance ourselves from accepting the existence of what is ‘not good’.

I’ve been discussing something similar at length with @TheMadFool here. There is a certain theological context to the discussion, but my view suggests only that a more objective sense of morality requires a conceptual perspective beyond the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ itself. This is a challenge we find most frightening, I think - but it’s one we are nevertheless capable of, if not without help/support.

It is a similar situation in relation to what we believe is true/false, logical/illogical, real/unreal, etc. By positing this possibility of an absolute conceptual perspective to relate to, we can make more objective sense of our subjective relation to each distinction. We must always be careful, however, not to devalue or dismiss the historical and non-human perspectives of the universe (however limited) towards these distinctions, if this ‘absolute’ perspective is to be considered an accurate one. I think we prefer to exclude uncertainty (to avoid the pain and humility of prediction error), but in doing so we limit our capacity to even approach an accurate concept of what is ‘real’ or ‘good’, for instance.

So it would seem you agree with me, is that right? So then the action isn't determined to be good or bad simply because it makes an individual feel good or bad, but it's rather about the bigger picture then, right? — BitconnectCarlos

The bigger picture of how good or bad everybody feels, yes.

I also consider justice part of "the good." Justice, in its truest sense, isn't about making people happy or ensuring that they thrive. Justice can actually hurt society sometimes. — BitconnectCarlos

I think the topic of justice is about the means, while the topic of morality is narrowly about the ends. I think they are analogous to the topics of reality and knowledge, respectively. And in later essays I go into much greater detail about the difference between them, and about the specifics of justice both of a personal and institutional character. I think the field that studies that is analogous to the field of epistemology, while what I’m discussing here is more analogous to ontology. Hedonism is just the criterion by which things are judged good, by which the objects of morality are assessed; the methods of pursuing them are something else I’ll get to later.

By positing this possibility of an absolute conceptual perspective to relate to, we can make more objective sense of our subjective relation to each distinction. — Possibility

I’m having a hard time following you, but this bit at least sound very similar to a point I make in this essay.

- Is it clear what my views are, and my reasons for holding them? (Even if you don't agree with those views or my reasons for holding them.) Especially if you're a complete novice to philosophy.
---IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL FROM WHERE I SIT
- Are any of these views new to you? Even if I attribute them to someone else, I'd like to know if you'd never heard of them before.
---NO IDEA; THEY MAY BE OR THEY MAY NOT BE
- Are any of the views that I did not attribute to someone else actually views someone else has held before? Maybe I know of them and just forgot to mention them, or maybe I genuinely thought it was a new idea of my own, either way I'd like to know.
---I DON'T KNOW
- If I did attribute a view to someone, or gave it a name, or otherwise made some factual claim about the history of philosophical thought, did I get any of that wrong?
---I AIN'T A JUDGE OF THAT
- If a view I espouse has been held by someone previously, can you think of any great quotes by them that really encapsulate the idea? I'd love to include such quotes, but I'm terrible at remembering verbatim text, so I don't have many quotes that come straight to my own mind.
---NO I CAN'T — Pfhorrest

Your essay was incredibly boring. I found it impossible to read, after the first few words of the beginning. It was so boring. It may be my ineptitude, not yours, but you failed to entice my interest to keep on reading.

It was boring and unreadable both by appearance and by content, as well as by literary style. There is no way I could help you edit it for mistakes or for improving the readability of it. Maybe there are others out there who can, but this is really not something I like to spend time with.

That's still a hedonic criteron though, assuming by "harm" you mean something like "cause suffering".

I'm not saying that anyone has an obligation to positively generate flourishing, pleasure, etc (for themselves or for others), but that when we are judging something as good or bad, we do so on the basis of making people feel good or bad. You may not be obligated to give someone a back rub, but it's still a nice thing to do, right? We'd judge that action positively, even though we don't think it would be morally wrong in a blameworthy way to not do it. Why would we judge it positively? Well, because it made someone feel good. And punching random people on the streets is definitely morally forbidden, but by what criteria are we judging it to be so wrong? Well, that it hurt someone, inflicted suffering, made them feel bad.

There's lots and lots of details about the particulars of a complete moral system that I go into lots of detail about later. Hedonism is just the basic criterion to use for, essentially, "measuring" goodness and badness. — Pfhorrest

Causing suffering is not the same as doing harm I'd say. And I wouldn't necessarily agree with feeling good or bad as the measure for morality. Harm in my view is more the flipside of flourishing, where one takes a larger picture into account, larger than mere good or bad feelings. But I think you agree with this...

In any case, this is really more a topic for the earlier thread Against Transcendentailism. This essay against nihilism isn't arguing specifically for a hedonic morality, just some morality that isn't relative to what people subjectively intend or desire. I only mention appetites, and thus hedonism, in this essay to be clear that I'm not arguing against a view of morality (or reality) that's independent of experiences (like sensations and appetites), which are not irreconcilably subjective the way thoughts (like beliefs and intentions) and feelings (like perceptions and desires) are, even though they are subjective still in a different way. — Pfhorrest

Agreed.

Ok, pfhorrest, I read partly through your essay. Out of respect for your intellect and for your what I'd call exemplary behaviour on the forums.

I refer to this part:

distinguish between a similar three different senses of metaphysical relativism, or relativism about what is real. One of those senses would hold only that (1) there do in fact exist differences of opinion about what is real; and with that I would agree, just as with descriptive moral relativism. Another sense would hold that (2) in such disagreements, nobody is any more right or wrong than anybody else; and with that I would disagree, just as with metaethical moral relativism. A third sense would hold that (3) because nobody is right or wrong, we ought to be tolerant of disagreements; and like with normative moral relativism, I would disagree with the premise of that, but largely agree with the conclusion: though it's possible that in disagreements about reality, someone is right and everyone else is wrong, we should generally be tolerant of such differences of opinion

I agree with your assessment of (1).

IN (2) I think you failed to distinguish between who is right and who is wrong in a sense of what we KNOW and what is true or real outside our knowledge. What we know, nobody is more wrong or more right than anyone else. What coincides with the truth, only one is right (potentially) and differing opinions are wrong, or else everyone is wrong. BECAUSE WE CAN'T trust our perceptions enough to detect reality, all bets are off.
(3) THEREFORE your own bias to not argue who is right and who is wrong is very correct, but ought not to be based on (whatever) but on the fact that basically we are, individually and collectively not a judge (due to our inherent disability) to come to a conclusion of any degree of certainty of who is right and who is wrong.

Both of these second types of relativism that I am against, for their being tantamount to metaphysical and moral nihilism respectively, hold that the closest thing possible to an opinion being objectively correct is its being the consensus opinion of some group collectively.
I am sorry, PFHorrest, but you are categorically and clearly wrong in your conclusion as the reason given to why you don't like the "second types of relativisms".

Both types say it is (1) impossible to get an objective opinion which is right.

You say this leads to (2) a group's consensus to accept what is right.

One does not follow from the other. 1 says the task is impossible. 2 inherently can't be conceived without accepting that the task is possible. Therefore 1 and 2 are not compatible; your rejecting the "second types of realitivism" is not based on logic. (If you stick to rejecting the "second types of relativism", I don't know what you base your rejection of it on.)

It (Berekeley's subjective realism) denies that there is any objective reality, holding that there are only subjective perceptions, with agreement between those perceptions the closest thing to objectivity possible.

It actually does not deny there is objective reality. It just does not deal with it. It avoids the quesion of objective reality altogether, but that does not mean it denies it.

Your second part is even worse: you call the subjective approaching the objective. However, if the objective is non-existent, which the denial itself claims, then who or what can approach it? It's absurd to claim that any approaching is possible.

So you first claimed something that Berkeley's subjective realism did not claim, then you contradicted yourself with this false claim in mind.

As you can see, PFHorrest, unfortunately I am not doing the homework assignment; I am not saying "I read this here, and it's the same, by this and this person", or "This was summarized thus: (...)".

But instead of the prescribed homework, I find faults in your reasoning.

I apologize for that. My excuse is that I have virtually no background in philosophy. The only reason I call myself a philosopher is that I can use logic, and I reason well. And outside this forum I have some original philosophical ideas that I am incapable to publish due to not having a Ph.D. in philosophy and academic or field-specific publishers don't publish works of dilettantes.

And while this (egotism and solipsism)is clearly still as tantamount to nihilism, in the sense I am against, as any of the more collectivist kinds of idealism or relativism, inasmuch as it (should be they: egotism and solipsism) denies the possibility of anybody in a disagreement being objectively correct

Well, there is a huge problem here that you created that renders your logic null and void: group opinions can be disagreed with, but when only one person is present, it can't have disagreement by a different person. The parallel does not work; you have failed in showing that egotism and solipsism produce nihilism. You rendered egotism and solipsism to be nihilism, by using a parallel, but the parallel is ill-gotten logically.

nihilism at its most extreme denies that anything is real or moral at all, that there is any such thing as reality or morality.

I don't know about morality, but nihilism can't claim that there is no reality. It can assert as a belief and a possibly (but not likely) valid belief that nothing real exists in reality; but reality is still a reality, even if it contains nothing. (Null set, as you have once in one of the threads so carefully and to yourself in frustration tried to explain to me, that null set can contain something if the thing is both something and its opposite, but only if the contained goods is a null set. Similarly, the set is reality and the contents, nothing. Still, the container, the set, is said to exist. Hence, nihilism does not deny reality, it just says it's a null set.)

In psychology a distinction is made between perceptions, which are interpreted by the mind, and sensations, which are the raw experiences that get interpreted into perceptions, things such as colors of light and pitches of sound, as opposed to images or words. I make a similar distinction between desires, being the things that are interpreted by the mind, and what I call appetites, which are the raw experiences underlying them, things such as the feeling of pain or hunger, as opposed to wanting to do or have something.

Finally a paragraph (segment) that makes sense, is a proposition, and has no contradictions; it is sensible, logical and reasonable.

Maslow described desires motivation, and the appetites, needs. "I am hungry" is a need or sensation or appetite, and "I want to eat" is a perception, or motivation, or desire.

"I want to own a motorcar and a house with a paid-off mortgage" is a desire, a motivation, a perception, and "I want wealth to sustain my life, and to elevate my social status so I can easily reproduce" is a need, an desire, and a perception.

So while your and Maslow's classification are similar, there are differences between the two which makes them relatively unique, and both valid.

There always remains the possibility that we will fail to construct such models that can consistently account for all experiences, but we can never be sure that we have conclusively failed, rather than having just not succeeded yet. The only choice is between continuing to try despite the possibility of maybe never succeeding, or giving up — embracing nihilism — and definitely never succeeding.

I don't like this as an argument for your proposition. It is an argument that is applicable to everything... it has no value therefore for the establishing of the truth or validity of anything specific.

Would you care to elaborate, and possibly relate this to the essay under discussion? — Pfhorrest

It's just seeing you write all these "against" essays, how many have you written so far, and how many more are there to write? You are like these warmongering "freedom fighters". Nihilism, on the other hand, is the most, if not the only, peaceful ideology, treating everything that has value of equal value, equal to zero, nihil, null. But of course it does not agree with warring human nature, and so it cannot be accepted, not on a wide scale at least.

On another note, you seem to be completely unaware of the so called fact/value distinction, treating, by analogy, matters of fact exactly the same as matters of value. You do this with no justification whatsoever.

I object to that on the grounds that if it is true, then by its nature it cannot be known to be true, because to know it to be true we would need some means of objectively evaluating claims about what is real and what is moral, so as to justifiably rule all such claims to be false; but the inability to make such objective evaluations is precisely what such a nihilistic position claims.
This I can't comment on because I can't understand it / can't follow it.

@god must be atheist Thank you for all the feedback despite how boring you found it, I'll have to reply to you in more detail later when I have some more time.

It's just seeing you write all these "against" essays, how many have you written so far, and how many more are there to write? You are like these warmongering "freedom fighters". Nihilism, on the other hand, is the most, if not the only, peaceful ideology, treating everything that has value of equal value, equal to zero, nihil, null. But of course it does not agree with warring human nature, and so it cannot be accepted, not on a wide scale at least. — Pussycat

I guess you missed the first thread in this series, the introduction page, which lays out the structure of the whole project. There are only four "against" essays just eliminating the broad kinds of views I don't support, and then seventeen more essays going into detail on what I do support out of the remaining possibilities.

And as you'll see in those later essays, I am totally a pacifist, and equating objecting to certain philosophical views with violence is pretty absurd.

On another note, you seem to be completely unaware of the so called fact/value distinction, treating, by analogy, matters of fact exactly the same as matters of value. You do this with no justification whatsoever. — Pussycat

I am very aware of it, and it forms a pivotal part of this entire project. Treating facts and values analogously is not treating them as the same kind of thing, and in the very next essay (Against Cynicism) I argue explicitly against treating them as the same kind of thing.

I guess you missed the first thread in this series, the introduction page, which lays out the structure of the whole project. There are only four "against" essays just eliminating the broad kinds of views I don't support, and then seventeen more essays going into detail on what I do support out of the remaining possibilities.

And as you'll see in those later essays, I am totally a pacifist, and equating objecting to certain philosophical views with violence is pretty absurd. — Pfhorrest

I think you misunderstood me, I wasn't saying that you are a violent person. I was referring to polemics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polemic

A polemic is contentious rhetoric that is intended to support a specific position by aggressive claims and undermining of the opposing position. Polemics are mostly seen in arguments about controversial topics. The practice of such argumentation is called polemics. A person who often writes polemics, or who speaks polemically, is called a polemicist. The word is derived from Ancient Greek πολεμικός (polemikos), meaning 'warlike, hostile',from πόλεμος (polemos), meaning 'war'.

It seems that for an idea to thrive, a sort of war is needed, in order to make way for its growth, development and living, a "Lebensraum", like there is not enough "space" for all ideas to coexist peacefully with each other. This is neither good or bad.

We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being through strife necessarily. — Heraclitus

A law, of sorts.

I am very aware of it, and it forms a pivotal part of this entire project. Treating facts and values analogously is not treating them as the same kind of thing, and in the very next essay (Against Cynicism) I argue explicitly against treating them as the same kind of thing. — Pfhorrest

Indeed. I read several of your essays, but it seems that I missed "Against Cynicism" where you say the above. So I take it back.

But instead of the prescribed homework, I find faults in your reasoning.

I apologize for that. — god must be atheist

No problem, I'm glad that you're even reading it at all, and seeing people try to argue against it does at least give me an idea of how well they understood what they're trying to argue against.

IN (2) I think you failed to distinguish between who is right and who is wrong in a sense of what we KNOW and what is true or real outside our knowledge. What we know, nobody is more wrong or more right than anyone else. What coincides with the truth, only one is right (potentially) and differing opinions are wrong, or else everyone is wrong. BECAUSE WE CAN'T trust our perceptions enough to detect reality, all bets are off. — god must be atheist

I'm having a tough time following you, but the question at hand here is entirely about whether there is any "truth outside our knowledge" to coincide with, as you put it. (I would say "opinion" rather than "knowledge", because "knowledge" implies truth while "opinion" does not). The second kind of relativism, that I am against, says "no, there isn't any truth outside our opinions to potentially coincide with; there's just our opinions".

Both types say it is (1) impossible to get an objective opinion which is right.

You say this leads to (2) a group's consensus to accept what is right. — god must be atheist

I don't say that a group's consensus actually is what's objectively right, but that it's "the closest thing possible" in the view of the kind of relativists I'm talking about. The point that a group's consensus opinion isn't actually any substitute for objective truth is exactly why I think relativism collapses to nihilism, despite what the relativists themselves claim.

It actually does not deny there is objective reality. It just does not deal with it. It avoids the quesion of objective reality altogether, but that does not mean it denies it. — god must be atheist

Can you cite something from Berkeley to support this? Because from what I recall about him he denies that there is anything besides our perceptions; he even calls his view "immaterialism", because it's more about attacking the idea of there being anything beyond our perceptible ideas (like material substance) than anything else.

Your second part is even worse: you call the subjective approaching the objective. However, if the objective is non-existent, which the denial itself claims, then who or what can approach it? It's absurd to claim that any approaching is possible. — god must be atheist

This is the same thing as with relativism above. I'm not saying that any kind of agreed-upon opinion or experience is moving closer and closer in its contents to the contents of objective reality, but that, in these relativist or subjectivist views, which claim that there is no objectivity, agreement or consensus is the closest substitute to objectivity that their view has.

Well, there is a huge problem here that you created that renders your logic null and void: group opinions can be disagreed with, but when only one person is present, it can't have disagreement by a different person. — god must be atheist

The egotist doesn't deny that other people exist, only that their opinions on what is good or bad are irrelevant. Two people who are both egotists thus will have no way of coming to agreement on what is good or bad, if their initial opinions should happen to disagree, because nothing the other person says is relevant.

You have more of a point about solipsists: if solipsism really is true, then there is only one person who exists, and so nobody else to disagreement. But nevertheless, other people seem to exist, so if you should find yourself a solipsist who thinks everybody else is a figment of your imagination, and you run into one of those figments of your imagination who claims that he is the only real person and you're a figment of his imagination, there's no way that argument is getting resolved: you're not going to be able to convince the figment of your imagination that he is a figment of your imagination, because so far as he's concerned you're just a figment of his imagination.

I don't know about morality, but nihilism can't claim that there is no reality. It can assert as a belief and a possibly (but not likely) valid belief that nothing real exists in reality; but reality is still a reality, even if it contains nothing. — god must be atheist

That's a plausible point, so I'll just remove the last part of that sentence, because I only meant that bit to be exactly synonymous with the previous part that's immune to that point: nothing is real, nothing is moral.

By positing this possibility of an absolute conceptual perspective to relate to, we can make more objective sense of our subjective relation to each distinction.

This isn't really how I approach philosophy at this time. And by what you're saying here I'm interpreting it as some sort of "absolute system" that one can always relate back to on these big questions (e.g. whether objective morality exists). I'm happy to discuss with you, but if this discussion is going to be "oh lets try to find this absolute framework" then I'm not interested. I also wasn't trying to attack Pfforest's objective morality either, I was just trying to refine his views to make them a little stronger.