You say empiricist and hedonist claims are how the true, the real, the good, and the moral (TRG&M) are to be judged. You also qualify "claims" as being (assuming they're not in themselves inaccurate) sufficient ground to determine the TRM&G.Thank you for finally explaining what you mean, but I’m still not seeing any bearing on the topic under discussion — Pfhorrest
Well put. Thanks for this. :clap:I think you might be misreading the phrase "meta-ethical moral relativism". It's not a meta level of "ethical moral relativism"; it's moral relativism, in the sense that applies in the field of meta-ethics, as distinct from normative ethics or descriptive ethics. The descriptive sense just says "people disagree". The meta-ethical sense says "there is no correct way to adjudicate those disagreements". The normative sense says "therefore we morally ought to tolerate differences of behavior". — Pfhorrest
You say empiricist and hedonist claims are how the true, the real, the good, and the moral (TRG&M) are to be judged. You also qualify "claims" as being (assuming they're not in themselves inaccurate) sufficient ground to determine the TRM&G. — tim wood
The question, it seems to me, is that if you're going to base such things as TRM&G on subjective judgments, how can you universalize them? — tim wood
What is it that makes one able to say anything is right or wrong in some objective or universal sense, not just moral claims?
I say it is the ability to replicate the experiences of things seeming that way, controlling for differences in subjects and contexts. Descriptive claims about reality can be objectively true or false, despite disagreements between people or communities about what is true or false (different religions make differing factual claims too, not just moral ones), because we can each look at the world and see that it looks the same way, in the same contexts, for similar people, etc. And then say that reality is however it needs to be to look true to those people in those contexts etc (as well as all the other ways it looks to other people in other contexts etc).
I say prescriptive claims about morality can be objectively "true or false" in a different sense, a non-descriptive sense (because they're not trying to describe at all), despite similar disagreements between people or communities about what is good or bad, because we can likewise verify that when a person of a certain kind stands in a certain context and experiences a certain phenomenon it seems good or bad to them, like it feels good or bad to them, it hurts or pleases them. And then say that morality is however it needs to be to feel good to those people in those contexts etc (as well as all the other ways it feels to other people in other contexts etc). — Pfhorrest
I think you might be misreading the phrase "meta-ethical moral relativism". It's not a meta level of "ethical moral relativism"; it's moral relativism, in the sense that applies in the field of meta-ethics, as distinct from normative ethics or descriptive ethics. The descriptive sense just says "people disagree". The meta-ethical sense says "there is no correct way to adjudicate those disagreements". The normative sense says "therefore we morally ought to tolerate differences of behavior".
It sounds like you are asserting the meta-ethical sense of it here, but...
Different communities have different morals, so it certainly seems to be an accurate description — ChatteringMonkey
...this just sounds like the descriptive sense, which doesn't have to entail the meta-ethical sense. — Pfhorrest
I say prescriptive claims about morality can be objectively "true or false" in a different sense, a non-descriptive sense (because they're not trying to describe at all), despite similar disagreements between people or communities about what is good or bad, because we can likewise verify that when a person of a certain kind stands in a certain context and experiences a certain phenomenon it seems good or bad to them, like it feels good or bad to them, it hurts or pleases them. And then say that morality is however it needs to be to feel good to those people in those contexts etc (as well as all the other ways it feels to other people in other contexts etc) — Pfhorrest
The way those disagreements get adjudicated is the group coming to an agreement, by whatever process that is. — ChatteringMonkey
But that doesn't entail the normative sense that we should tolerate differences in behaviour. — ChatteringMonkey
This sounds like a great idea in theory, but I don't think it would work all that well in practice. Do you see how many qualifiers you had to get in to make it work, i.e. 'a person of a certain kind', 'in a certain context', ' experiencing a certain phenomenon' etc... Who other than maybe a philosopher has the time and ability to work out an equation with that many variables while going about his day? Utilitarism and consequentialism have the same issues... — ChatteringMonkey
The question at hand here is exactly what the correct such process is. — Pfhorrest
Where are the boundaries between these groups? If my neighbor in contemporary California keeps a slave, do I and the rest of the neighborhood have the right to tell him he's not allowed to do that? If a whole state wants to allow slavery, do the rest of the states have a right to tell it that it's not allowed to do that? If another country has one caste that holds another caste in slavery, are other countries allowed to come in and tell them they're not allowed to do that? Would that be a righteous liberation of an oppressed people or an unjust invasion of a sovereign state? — Pfhorrest
I go into this in much more depth in my essay On Politics, Governance, and the Institutes of Justice, which may be more on the level of abstraction you're concerned with, but rests ultimately on the building blocks you're contesting here. — Pfhorrest
There is no 'correct' process. How would you determine if it's correct or not? — ChatteringMonkey
If freedom of speech is a right in California, then you have the right to tell them anything you want, barring the usual exceptions like inciting violence. You probably also have the right to critique the mores and laws of California... and to convince and seek support to change those laws if you don't agree with them. But there's no guarantee it will work. And if it doesn't work you can allways disregard the law or mores, at your own peril. — ChatteringMonkey
You get that I'm not talking about my literal right to say words to him, but about the morally compulsory force of those words, right? It feels like you're being intentionally obtuse here and not engaging honestly and charitably. — Pfhorrest
I'm stressed the fuck out by other stuff in life, banging my head against the same wall over and over again can start to piss me off. — Pfhorrest
So the problem secular morality faces, is, I think, that it is the successor of religious moralities where morality was founded in metaphysics, with God as the pinacle of that metaphysics. — ChatteringMonkey
So as scientific thinking progresses, what we end up with is a morality that had lost it's foundation — ChatteringMonkey
What this all means, I think, is that we need to bite the bullet, and reconcile with the fact that morality isn't and can't be true or false. — ChatteringMonkey
Same as we allways did, we discuss these things with other people, come to some agreements and found institutions that can settle disputes if need be... this is basicly social contract-theory. The authority is in the morality being supported by the community. — ChatteringMonkey
There's enough convergence in what people want - certainly now that we will have a progressively better understanding of humanity - that it will mostly end up in something that works fine if people are educated in and accustomed to the idea of it. — ChatteringMonkey
The great thing about morals derived from God or whoever is you can be certain they're right as long as you accept their supernatural source. — Txastopher
Secularist acts moral, you bet your sweet toosh that s/he is acting moral because s/he is moral. — god must be atheist
I don't think it's their supernatural quality that is the main spring in accepting religion-driven morals, but the (believed) absolute authority of the issuer of the moral creeds. — god must be atheist
That god has been successfully ejected from morality, to say nothing of the fact that god never really figured in it as explained above, doesn't imply that there are no moral truths. You mentioned convergence of moral values and that, to me, indicates a measure of objectivity to moral truths. — TheMadFool
No it doesn't. Even if every person where to think exactly the same about morality that wouldn't make morality objective. It's an objective fact that all people think the same in that case, but it's still something people think... so it doesn't get anymore 'subjective' than that. Words have meanings.
Morality is something we create, like language is, we do not observe or find morality or language like we find objective facts about the world. And so it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to use terms like true or correct or whatever equivalent.
This may not seem like it is that important, but I think it matters. The language we use will inform the way we think and talk to eachother about morality. If people use descriptively inaccurate words to begin with, I don't think much progress can be made. — ChatteringMonkey
The objectivity could be said to be in the deduction from subjective desires and preferences. The axioms in the system you describe would be subjective, which means the foundations of eveyr conclusion, thus moral idea, would be subjective also. The process of deriving a universal morality might have much that is objective in it. IOW if we generally agree we don't want children harmed, we can from that vague axiom derive logically certain conclusions (not that humans will ever agree on these but hypothetically). Still the axiom, hence the entire morality, has a subjective foundation and is subjective, if universal in this hypothesis.There is objectivity in the convergence of ethics. — TheMadFool
The objectivity could be said to be in the deduction from subjective desires and preferences — Coben
No, in reality even if we could agree on core values, how we see these playing out and prioritized are going to have individual and cultural differences. And the means itself will also have values in it. We want to all make kids safe. Peachy. Seems like a shared core value worldwide, except for certain people generally considered pariahs in most cultures. But then bang, the means of achieving that (let alone what that actually means) requires even more agreement on stuff that gut feelings and culture have their way with. And then how that core value is prioritized in relation to other core values, such as developing adults from children who are experts, or not undermining their strength and independence.And I don't even think it really works like that, simply deducing morality from desires or preferences in some kind straigtforward logical way. There's a lot more that goes into it. — ChatteringMonkey
Certainty is still the quality lacking in secular morals. — Txastopher
A secular system of morality as reliable as the physical sciences is possible. — Pfhorrest
Even if every person where to think exactly the same about morality that wouldn't make morality objective. It's an objective fact that all people think the same in that case, but it's still something people think... so it doesn't get anymore 'subjective' than that. Words have meanings.
Morality is something we create, like language is, we do not observe or find morality or language like we find objective facts about the world. And so it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to use terms like true or correct or whatever equivalent. — ChatteringMonkey
So yeah, what philosophers have been trying to do in ethics over the ages, seems pure hubris to me, and doomed to fail. — ChatteringMonkey
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