and it's my notion. It's about existence not subsistence(continued existence). — creativesoul

Let us assume for a moment that modal realism is true. Let us consider a possible world in which there are no humans, but chimpanzees have managed to construct what we would consider to be chairs. Do not chairs then exist in this possible world, even though there are no humans there?

Now let's agree that model realism is not true. Does this change the existential status of chairs should they have been constructed by chimpanzees and humans never existed?

I assert that rejecting modal realism does not change the existential status of chairs made by chimpanzees in an actual world that never had humans.

|>ouglas

Let me rephrase. Electromagnetic waves are not colors. These waves are converted to electrical impulses in the eye before going into the brain. But electrical impulses are also not colors, and yet we report to see colors. Therefore, the question is why, and the answer is either:

a. we actually see colors (colors exist)
b. we only think we see colors (colors do not exist) — Zelebg

To rephrase my original response, colors need photons. Differing frequencies of different photons produce a different "sensation" to the human eye. Perhaps a more fruitful endeavor would be to go on www.webmd.com and find out all of the different parts of the human eye and also find out how modern medicine interprets how the human mind works. The study of the human brain is still to some extent in it is infancy.

Just in case you didn't know when light hits an object, if the object is blue the yellow and green waves are absorbed by the the object, the blue waves actually bounce off the object and hit the human eye. Its a gigantic geometrical calculation done by the human brain. A blue paint on the outside of the object makes the object blue.

That is not it. I guess I failed to formulate the question properly.

The point is colors do not actually exist, and that is a fact in the sense that in the outside 3d person empirical reality there are only electric and magnetic fields, and they are transparent. There is no field of purple or substance of green. Therefore, we do not see colors, we "see" something else as colors. For example, colors could be mapped to magnetic density or electric voltage scales, or different orientation of molecules, or even symbols and numbers in some higher order representation mapping.

Yeah. I do not place much value upon logical possibility alone.

There are three completely distinct things here: (1) frequency, (2) spectral distribution, (3) color. — InPitzotl

Since what matters for detection is simply the raw number of photopsin events, and there's multiple ways of reaching that number, then we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting "numbers of events".
— InPitzotl

This bit leaves me a bit confused though. When you say that "we're not detecting (2)'s; we're detecting numbers of events" are you referring to us or the photoreceptors under consideration? — creativesoul

Sort of (changed from yes); I'm referring to the number of photopsin molecules (available for detection). (2) has a particular effect on our eyes. A different (2) could also have the same effect on our eyes. So call the former (2a), and the latter (2b). The effect is (3x); (2a) would have effect (3x), and (2b) would also have effect (3x). Since we can't distinguish (2a) from (2b), it doesn't make sense to say that we detect (2a). What we detect instead is (3x). 3x is "an equivalence class of spectra". 2a is just a member of that equivalence class. 2b is another member. — InPitzotl

I'm still struggling a little bit here, particularly when I perform a substitution of terms with your proposed referents/definitions for those.

You first said we're detecting the sheer number of events, and then you say we're detecting an equivalence class of spectra. Either the sheer number of photopsin events is equal to an equivalence class of spectra, or you've contradicted yourself.

Do you follow me here? I hope so, because this part is causing me to have a hard time understanding what it is that you're saying. Any help to clarify and/or reconcile this incoherence would be very much appreciated.

I guess to me, to say that something exists is merely saying that there is a predicate that when applied to everything yields some results. E.g.

The set of all chairs is the set of all x such that P(x), where P is a predicate that is true for chairs and false for non-chairs.

(Let's ignore, for the sake of argument, the x for which there is no fact of the matter about whether x is or is not a chair.)

Now the predicate P that picks out chairs is going to be something that's very complicated. But a predicate is like a number. The number three would exist, even if there were no intelligent beings to comprehend the number three. Likewise, the predicate P that picks out chairs exists, even if there were never any humans to breathe life into P.

|>ouglas

I'm still struggling a little bit here, particularly when I perform a substitution of terms with your proposed referents/definitions for those. — creativesoul

Okay, but I'm a bit confused why you're struggling:

Either the sheer number of photopsin events is equal to an equivalence class of spectra — creativesoul

The idea here is correct (though the phrasing's a bit strange; "equals" is a relation between two quantities; "equivalence classes" are things that can define an equality relation).

Think of this mathematically; here's a simplified model. Say we have 100,000 photopsin molecules around for a particular photoreceptor. About 20,000 isomerize... that is the "shere number"; 3x. That suggests there's about a 20% chance each would isomerize. 2a would cause that; so would 2b. So there's an equivalence class of spectral distributions defined in terms of this effect, and that's what we measure with this photoreceptor. That 20,000 number is all we get; that's the effect; it doesn't tell us which spectra, just which equivalence class the spectra falls into... the class of spectra that would have about a 20% chance of isomerizing each of our photopsin molecules.

With three photoreceptor types, we get three such numbers; 20,000 of these, 30,000 of those, 25,000 of the other. That gives us more information, but still, there's an equivalence class of spectra defined by what thing has a 20% of isomerizing the first, 30% of the second, and 25% of the third. (Note that percentages are artificial; they are ratios per-hundred. We've already got a t for the "per-t"; that's the number of each photopsin molecules total. The percentages just help to think of the canonical form of ratios like this). That's what color is.

I'm still struggling a little bit here, particularly when I perform a substitution of terms with your proposed referents/definitions for those.
— creativesoul
Okay, but I'm a bit confused why you're struggling: — InPitzotl

Please. I've given due attention, and I expect the same in return.

Attend to the explanation thereof. Every answer you need from me, at this time, is there. In short.. you're equivocating terms. When the light is shed on this... we further surmise that you've contradicted yourself.

Neither is acceptable.

I guess to me, to say that something exists is merely saying that there is a predicate that when applied to everything yields some results. — Douglas Alan

When I say that something exists, I am simply abbreviating. The long version is more like...

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them. Some things do not. Noting the difference between these sorts of things is pivotal to understanding what it is that we're discussing.

Some things existed prior to common language use. Predicates did not. Applying a predicate requires language use. Apple trees emerged onto the world stage long before humans developed the naming and descriptive practices that facilitate our ability to talk about the world and/or ourselves.

The sort of existence you've described here requires being part of language use. Some things owe their very existence to language use. Other things... not so much.

The set of all chairs is the set of all x such that P(x), where P is a predicate that is true for chairs and false for non-chairs. — Douglas Alan

Looks like predicate logic to me. I could be dead wrong. I do not place an excessive amount of value upon either logic(classical) or predicate logic. To be perfectly honest, I temper the confidence I have in all logic by keeping the following fact in mind...

All logical notation is existentially dependent upon something to account for, and/or take an account of. All notation is existentially dependent upon common language use. All logical notation is existentially dependent upon common language use.

Predicate logic, when used as too strict a guideline for everyday thought and belief, places a linguistic boundary around that which is not linguistic.

Human thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to the very first logical notation. That which exists in it's entirety prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Rudimentary level human thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon logical notion.

Logic is the result of thinking about pre-existing thought and belief. Such thought and belief does not consist of logic. Rather, it's quite the other way 'round.

...we measure with this photoreceptor... — InPitzotl

If that were true then measuring requires only detection, reception, excitation, folding, and/or perception. According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies and distributions...

Using a photoreceptor to measure requires complex thought and belief about how one sees the world via color vision capabilities. Otherwise, photoreceptors are just doing what they do which is not using tools specifically designed to increase our physiological sensory perception capabilities. All measuring is exactly that.

That's what color is. — InPitzotl

Nah. That's what your account of color is.

The number three would exist, even if there were no intelligent beings to comprehend the number three. Likewise, the predicate P that picks out chairs exists, even if there were never any humans to breathe life into P. — Douglas Alan

The number three is the name we've attributed to a specified plurality of things... a quantity. Numbers are names for quantities.

Predicates are descriptive practices. There are no such things without common language.

So...

That is where we certainly disagree.

Descriptive practices are existentially dependent common language. Predicates are as well. Numbers are names for quantities. Names are used to pick individuals out of the world to the exclusion of all else. Naming practices are existentially dependent upon common language use.

Common language use is existentially dependent upon language users. Everything that is existentially dependent common language is equally dependent upon humans. All predicates, and all names are existentially dependent upon humans.

Where there have never been humans there could have never been naming and descriptive practices.

Predicate logic, when used as too strict a guideline for everyday thought and belief, places a linguistic boundary around that which is not linguistic. — creativesoul

I couldn't disagree more. Logic, like math, is discovered, not invented. Though I believe that everything that is invented is actually a form of discovery.

The predicate P that picks out chairs, existed as an abstract object in the space of predicates long before people existed. It will exist long after we are gone. It would exist if we never existed. Its existence is a necessary, eternal truth.

Likewise for the number pi. Likewise for all of math. Likewise for all of logic.

|>ouglas

I couldn't disagree more. Logic, like math, is discovered, not invented. Though I believe that everything that is invented is actually a form of discovery. — Douglas Alan

You too with the equivocation...

:meh:

Discovery is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Invention is to make something novel by combining pre-existing things in order to make a new, more complex composite thereof... the invention itself.

There are no numbers in nature, aside from our accounting practices. There are pluralities. There are no predicates in nature, aside from our descriptive practices. There are rudimentary level thought and belief. The most basic of these is perhaps the attribution/recognition of causality.

The predicate P that picks out chairs, existed as an abstract object in the space of predicates long before people existed. — Douglas Alan

Moby Dick there too?

You too with the equivocation... — creativesoul

I wasn't equivocating, I was elaborating. Invention is discovery of something in the abstract space of that which can be invented. The word "discovery", however, often has a connotation of stumbling upon something, while the word "invention" has the connotation of creativity. All invention is discovery, though not all discovery is invention.

The number three is the name we've attributed to a specified plurality of things... a quantity. Numbers are names for quantities. — creativesoul

No, "three" is the name we give to the number three. The number three is not a name; it is an abstract entity that represents certain properties of a certain quantity.

|>ouglas

The number three is not a name, it is an abstract entity that represents certain properties of a certain quantity. — Douglas Alan

The number three is a specific mark of our own invention. We use "3" as well as "three" to pick out a specific quantity of individual things. We discovered quantities. Actually, I think it's a bit more accurate to say that we first take note of single things(one) and pluralities(more than one), and we do this long before using different marks to pick out particular quantities.(long before knowing the referent of "two" and 2)

Moby Dick there too? — creativesoul

If one is a modal realist, then of course Moby Dick has always existed and always will.

I'm not a modal realist, but I guess a Platonist of some sort. Though most of the professional philosophers I've met seem to be realists of some kind about mathematics, possibilities, etc. For me, yes, I am a realist about Moby Dick having always existed as an abstract entity in the domain of possible novels.

|>ouglas

The number three is a specific mark of our own invention. We use "3" as well as "three" to pick out a specific quantity of individual things. — creativesoul

If and when we meet space-faring aliens, I guess it will come to you as quite a surprise to you when they have "invented" the same math that we have. What will explain that, pray tell?

|>ouglas

Novels before the author just has no compulsory force whatsoever to me. There's not enough evidence in support of such a claim. All evidence is to the contrary.

If and when we meet space-faring aliens, I guess it will come to you as quite a surprise to you when they have "invented" the same math that we have. What will explain that, prey tell? — Douglas Alan

Yeah. I do not place excessive value upon ideas that are based upon logical possibility alone. I've a hard leaning towards methodological naturalism accompanied by the unknown and a good dash of Occam's razor....

I've a hard leaning towards methodological naturalism — creativesoul

There's nothing supernatural about necessary truth, such as that which is expressed by mathematics.

Any intelligent space-faring beings will need to have discovered much of the same natural law that we have, along with much of the same necessary truths that we have.

|>ouglas

Photoreceptors are part of the system used by creatures with color vision capabilities as a means for detecting the reflection and/or emission of light from a specific source. The light reflected from an apple is not effected in any way whatsoever - by us - until it interacts with our eyes. The spectral distribution emanating from an apple is processed by our visual systems without further thought.

We see distinct colors prior to naming and talking about them.

There are some interesting studies I've seen that lead us to believe that the precision with which we categorize colors can be further increased/complicated by how we talk about them early on.

I find that interesting.

I've a hard leaning towards methodological naturalism
— creativesoul

There's nothing supernatural about necessary truth, such as that which is expressed by mathematics. — Douglas Alan

I agree. 3+2=5 because we won't let it equal anything else. Numbers are rigid designators. Kripke argued - quite successfully on my view - that names are as well.

If that were true then measuring requires only detection (3), reception, excitation, folding, and/or perception. According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies(1) and distributions(2)... — creativesoul

That's incorrect. As you yourself say, "photoreceptors are just doing what they do". And what they do, with respect to responding to light, is send signals proportional to some amount of isomerization of photopsin molecules that they contain. That's it; nothing else. That thing is (3). And if (3) cannot distinguish between spectral distributions (2), then (3) cannot be said to measure which (2) you have. If (3) cannot distinguish frequency components (1) in a spectral distribution, (3) cannot be said to measure frequencies in a spectral distribution. (3) can do neither of these things, so it measures neither.

To reach your conclusion from the assessment requires conflating (3) with (1) and (2). My assessment contains no such conflating; that's all on you.

Please. I've given due attention — creativesoul

...doesn't quite seem so to me. Ignoring your flexing and crowing posts, the only thing you've demonstrated so far was a lack of understanding of what the assessment even is.

You are not talking about what the question is supposed to be.

The point is colors do not actually exist, and that is a fact in the sense that in the outside 3d person empirical reality there are only electric and magnetic fields, and they are transparent. There is no field of purple or substance of green. Therefore, we do not see colors, we "see" something else as colors. For example, colors could be mapped to magnetic density or electric voltage scales, or different orientation of molecules, or even symbols and numbers in some higher order representation mapping.

Novels before the author just has no compulsory force whatsoever to me. There's not enough evidence in support of such a claim. All evidence is to the contrary. — creativesoul

Quite to the contrary. All the evidence supports that much more is possible than is actual. And that math is inevitable once there are beings intelligent enough to discover it. Once we have math, we have theory of computation. Once we have that, we have the set of all possible programs. Once we have the set of all possible programs, one of the elements of that set is the program that Melville's brain instantiated. Once we have the program that Melville's brain instantiated, we have the set of all possible inputs to that program. Once we have that, we have the set of all possible outputs of that program. And contained in the set of all possible outputs is Moby Dick.

|>ouglas

If that were true then measuring requires only detection (3), reception, excitation, folding, and/or perception. According to this criterion, it would make sense to say that a mantis shrimp's eyes are measuring light frequencies(1) and distributions(2)...
— creativesoul
That's incorrect. — InPitzotl

I agree. That is not a correct report of what I wrote.

3+2=5 because we won't let it equal anything else. — creativesoul

3+2=5 because it can't equal anything else. We have no power to let it equal anything else.

|>ouglas

That is not a correct report of what I wrote. — creativesoul

Sans the labels, it's a direct quote. If you don't mean what you say, just say what you mean.

Mantis shrimp's eyes measure... what they measure. The question is what they measure. I define color in terms of what eyes measure in color vision; that's the colorimetric definition. If you're going to object to this, you need to phrase your objection in a form that actually means something, not just accuse me of equivocating by clumsily misrepresenting my assessment's implications.