Did anyone read the article?
It seemsto me that the error is in thinking...
...that a belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; these conditions are, we might say, the ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself. In this sense, basic beliefs are not, or are not necessarily, groundless beliefs.
There seems to me a contradiction involved in setting out basic beliefs as dependent on anything. — Banno
The articles goes to pains that it's not a justificatory relationship between a basic belief and something else, it's something more like a practical one. If one sees a tree, in normal circumstances one may hold that one sees a tree, and infer that the tree exists. The inference there is not an act of cognition, it is a practical presupposition, like that "I am holding a fork" is true when one is holding a fork. The argument construes belief in "God exists" in precisely the same manner as belief that forks exists while holding them.
While I disagree with the conclusions, I enjoy the conceptual machinery here. Basic beliefs spring from a context of activity, if one has a context involving God, belief in God is basic. The interesting question in my book is the status of being basic; is it a property of a statement, is it a binary relationship between a statement and a context, or is it a ternary relationship between a statement and a context and an event or activity? — fdrake
I enjoy the conceptual machinery here. Basic beliefs spring from a context of activity, if one has a context involving God, belief in God is basic. The interesting question in my book is the status of being basic; is it a property of a statement, is it a binary relationship between a statement and a context, or is it a ternary relationship between a statement and a context and an event or activity? — fdrake
:up:Without God, man dissolves into nature, mind into matter. So God is as real as the distinction between man and nature, or self and world.
And, Planting[a] has to admit, as unreal. — unenlightened
Some of my beliefs, however, I accept but don't accept on the basis of any other beliefs. Call these beliefs basic. I believe that 2 + 1 = 3, for example, and don't believe it on the basis of other propositions. I also believe that I am seated at my desk, and that there is a mild pain in my right knee.
The articles goes to pains to argue that it's not a justificatory relationship between a basic belief and something else which grounds it, it's something more like a practical one.
— fdrake
Indeed, it does; but does it succeed? — Banno
That's exactly what a basic belief IS.What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs. — creativesoul
What if the notion of "basic" amounts to something like being foundational to all other beliefs.
— creativesoul
That's exactly what a basic belief IS. — Relativist
If you ever stop to say something is without need of justification, you're saying that it's beyond question, and therefore asking anyone who might disagree just to take your word for it, on faith. — Pfhorrest
To be warranted, a belief needs rational justification. Justification means showing how the belief is inferred from other warranted beliefs. Ultimately, there will be beliefs that aren't derived from prior beliefs- these are the basic beliefs, the foundation for one's entire belief structure.In what way are they foundational? — creativesoul
...beliefs that aren't derived from prior beliefs- these are the basic beliefs, the foundation for one's entire belief structure. — Relativist
I agree, but we can still analyse any specific belief to determine whether or not it is warranted. A belief that is fully wartanted would rely only on other warranted beliefs, so there are layers upon layers - until reaching the foundation. At any rate, that's the theory upon which foundationalism is based.Although it is quite clear that belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, and is thus accrued in a way, I do not think that happens in a strictly linear fashion — creativesoul
That is the general problem with foundationalism. Plantinga addresses this by arguing that beliefs that are "basic in the proper way" (i.e. properly basic) have warrant. The "proper way" is that it was produced by a sound mind, in an environment supportive of proper thought in accord with a design plan successfully aimed at truth.Are the foundational beliefs warranted? What about justificatory regress? — creativesoul
Indeed, it does; but does it succeed? — Banno
(2) is rooted in basic belief only if there is a God who speaks to humans and we actually have the faculty to hear it. — Relativist
On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God:The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God — Sam26
On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God: — Relativist
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