A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants — Arthur Schopenhauer
The above quote encapsulates an argument against free will for if we didn't chose our preferences (likes and dislikes) and all our actions are determined by our preferences then it follows that we're not free; we are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives.
My first suggestion is that we should not conflate preferences with wants or desires. — TheHedoMinimalist
So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here. — TheHedoMinimalist
Willpower is basically reflexive parenting — Pfhorrest
I don’t understand how our “preferences” are not a part of us, as if — NOS4A2
You did not choose them. Nobody asked me whether I wanted to like philosophy. I just do and in the same breath there are others who wouldn't do philosophy even if their life depended on it.
Present you is partially conditioned by past you. — Pfhorrest
That wanting to want something is your will, and the effectiveness of that self-conditioning is the freedom of your will; freedom from the other influences that would condition you otherwise, your own self-conditioning prevailing over those other influences — Pfhorrest
Each of us determine the course of our own lives by the simple fact that nothing else does. — NOS4A2
Couldn't the selective effects of past consequences on behavior explain why one wants to do something at a given time? The interactive effects of myriad experiences of the past impinging on present circumstances to bring about (not coerce) determined thoughts and actions.
Sorry, I've never understood this argument; it has always sounded a bit off to me. Let me overly simplify determinism just for illustration... we'll suppose states are contiguous, and presume "temporal locality", which is at least fair. So, for example, we have some state S8, that leads to S9; and S9 will lead to S10.We are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives. — TheMadFool
It's not so clear to me where the separation here is; let's hypothetically suppose John's parents consider a procedure that would affect their baby. If they opt for it, John grows up to like chocolate. If they opt out, he grows up to prefer vanilla. So what is it that this procedure does... does it affect what flavor John will prefer? Or does it pick which John his parents would give birth to? Or is there a difference? How would you reconcile it?How would we choose our personality traits? — TheMadFool
Volition primarily is about goal driven behavior; you set about some intention to attain, then act to attain it. When I wash my hands and find no towels, I shake my hands to get water off; I'm setting about a goal, and acting to attain it. If my hands shake due to a tick, nothing is setting about the goal of their shaking. I don't think that conflicts with determinism at all; you can program robots to do something similar.Theories of mind indicate both voluntary functions and involuntary functions. — Enrique
Sorry, I've never understood this argument; it has always sounded a bit off to me. Let me overly simplify determinism just for illustration... we'll suppose states are contiguous, and presume "temporal locality", which is at least fair. So, for example, we have some state S8, that leads to S9; and S9 will lead to S10.
To me, this sounds like a kind of bait and switch; as if one is arguing: "(1) S8 leads to S9, inevitably. (2) And S9 leads to S10, inevitably. (3) By 1 and 2, S8 leads to S10, inevitably. (4) Therefore, S10 is not the result of S9, but of S8." ...with the bait-and-switch being (4) which to me seems to flatly contradict (2). I'm perfectly fine, mind you, with 3; that's not a problem for me. But the suggestion that S10 is "predetermined" (here, "preprogrammed") sounds like saying 4... that S10 does not in fact occur due to S9; otherwise, why bother with the word "predetermined"? To me it sounds very off... e.g., if there were multiple ways to S9... say, S8a, S8b, ..., S8n; then I would say how the state evolved to S9 doesn't matter... merely the fact that it did leads to S10, because S10 follows from S9. Likewise, I would say that S8k leads to S10 by virtue of it leading to S9 from which S10 follows. I don't know how to swallow the notion that S8k leads to S10 regardless of S9, or how to interpret "predetermined" (/preprogrammed) otherwise.
(Full disclosure; I'm agnostic on the question of free will; this point here is solely about determinism to me). — InPitzotl
t's not so clear to me where the separation here is; let's hypothetically suppose John's parents consider a procedure that would affect their baby. If they opt for it, John grows up to like chocolate. If they opt out, he grows up to prefer vanilla. So what is it that this procedure does... does it affect what flavor John will prefer? Or does it pick which John his parents would give birth to? Or is there a difference? How would you reconcile it? — InPitzotl
Do you mean preference is a judgement and a want is, well, more visceral, if you will? — TheMadFool
However, the junkie's (is this word still in use?) preference is actually based on another want is it not? I mean though he wants to take drugs he would prefer not to because other wants get in the way e.g. the junkie wants to live longer, live healthier, have friends, family, avoid jail, etc. and these wants are again not of his choosing right? — TheMadFool
Well, I would say that preferences are not only necessarily based on other wants in many cases — TheHedoMinimalist
Rather, I would say that they could also be based on certain beliefs about what is truly better or worse or they could be those beliefs as well. — TheHedoMinimalist
Of course. That's point 3.That S8 leads to S10 AND S9 leads to S10 is not a contradiction because S9 is an intermediate step to S10. — TheMadFool
Of course. That's point 4, and point 4 is the one with the contradiction.If someone were to say, given the causal chan S8 > S9 > S10, that S8 directly causes S10 then that would be a contradiction ... — TheMadFool
So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4. From this perspective, analogously, (a) is something like part of S9; and the argument is that (b), something like S8, is what (c) determines (d) my courses of actions, which is to say, S8>S10. To say that this refutes something like TPA is to say that it refutes that "what I yam" is determining my actions; aka, that it refutes that S9>S10. But that refutation would require the contradiction that is point 4.then it follows that we're not free; (a) we are automatons, each with its own (b) preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately (c) determine (d) every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives. — TheMadFool
It's a similar point to TPA. Under deterministic assumptions, something causes our actions. The question, under TPA, is whether that thing is us or not. That's a matter of perspective, which to me, implies it's simply a language game. To say that priors "force us" to do something is to say that we aren't states in the universe, but rather, are enslaved by them; something akin to "my brain made me do it". To say that we "yam what we yam" is to say that we are states in the universe, and if that's the case, there's no distinction between our doing something and the universe evolving that way; something akin to "I have a soul, it's made of flesh". If we're states in the universe, then some other state wouldn't be us; it'd be some other soul, made of some "other" flesh ("other" meaning simply flesh in a different state).I don't see the relevance to my argument in the OP. — TheMadFool
To give a clear example of what I mean, imagine a drug addict who recognizes that he has a problem with drugs. It seems like this drug addict desires to do drugs but has a preference to not be doing drugs. If you asked the drug addict to make a pros and cons list involving the decision to do drugs, they would argue that doing drugs has more disadvantages than advantages. Nonetheless, they may lack an urge to actually stop doing drugs and they may have a severe urge to continue doing them. So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here. — TheHedoMinimalist
So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4 — InPitzotl
So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4. From this perspective, analogously, (a) is something like part of S9; and the argument is that (b), something like S8, is what (c) determines (d) my courses of actions, which is to say, S8>S10. To say that this refutes something like TPA is to say that it refutes that "what I yam" is determining my actions; aka, that it refutes that S9>S10. — InPitzotl
I think this is a misunderstanding of what the will is. You’ve defined ‘free will’ as “unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline”, which suggests that ‘the will’ is the faculty of choosing available alternatives.
So what is it that impedes this faculty? First of all, it’s ignorance of the existence of alternatives at all. Secondly, it’s isolation from these alternatives, rendering them unavailable. And thirdly it’s exclusion, leaving us unable to choose the alternatives that would otherwise be available.
This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no such thing as ‘free will’. The will has a capacity to be free insofar as we increase awareness, connection and collaboration with a diversity of alternatives. — Possibility
What is the nature of these "certain beliefs"? In the case of the junkie what would just one of these beliefs, unrelated to any want as you claim, be? I'd like to know. — TheMadFool
The issue here is free will and it's defined in terms of unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. — TheMadFool
However, a belief such as that I mentioned just now must have a basis of some sort, right? — TheMadFool
A belief in equality is founded on the difficulty we face with suffering, which slavery entails and also on the happiness that equality will bring. — TheMadFool
Suffering and happiness, the disliking the former and liking the latter, were not choices we ever made; we came preprogrammed as hedonists. Ergo, even if preferences are based on beliefs, beliefs themselves trace their origins to a point when and where it's impossible to make choices, let alone free choices. Similarly, other beliefs, at least those that influence our choices, have origins of the same nature - one that precludes any choice at all. — TheMadFool
Type 1 beliefs don't figure in the issue and so can be set aside for they automatically preclude free will since we, perforce, must believe in them. In case you say that we still have a choice regarding such beliefs, the choices we make would be influenced by our wants which we already agreed preclude free will.
With type 2 beliefs we have choice insofar as believing them is concerned but the choice we make would be based on our wants and that, at the risk of repeating myself, we already know leads us back to what we agreed upon - we didn't choose our wants. — TheMadFool
Ignorance and awareness have a role in the variety of choices of available and the effectiveness of our decisions but our decisions will still depend on our wants/preferences which, as you already know, were not of our own choosing. — TheMadFool
I only disagreed with the claim that beliefs that concern choices are only determined or influenced by wants. — TheHedoMinimalist
The important point here is that they WERE not of our own choosing. But I would argue that we DO have a choice regarding those wants and preferences. Type 1 beliefs aren’t based on the ‘brute facts’ of the world, but only on our perception of them, which has been limited up to the point that we are aware of it, yet far from fixed.
Awareness of our wants and preferences are derived from introspection: we acquire this value and potential information from the response of internal systems to stimulus, and each of these systems in their response have a limited perspective of the organism, the universe and what it means to be ‘human’. When we take this into account, why do we prioritise the value of internal affect? The more we understand how these internal systems ‘perceive’ the limited information they receive, the more discerning we can be about the value and significance of their contributions to our thoughts, motives and actions. — Possibility
The essence of what you've said can be expressed in the desire for freedom: awareness of factors that influence us are important insofar as we can resist them in order to gain control over our destiny so to speak. This is nothing other than a manifestation of our desire for freedom and that, it appears to me, isn't something we picked voluntarily. We are programmed to desire freedom and to the extent that is true, paradoxically, we are not free. Note that there is a choice between wanting freedom and not wanting freedom and ergo our personal want on the matter should've been considered. — TheMadFool
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