I consider myself to be undecided between compatiblism and incompatiblism but I definitely reject the notion of libertarian free will. But, I wanna play devil’s advocate and make some technical suggestions.

My first suggestion is that we should not conflate preferences with wants or desires. It’s a pretty common practice to do this in philosophy and I really cannot blame OP or anyone else for assuming that preferences and desires are synonymous. But, it seems like desires are more like urges and impulses while preferences are more like value judgements or beliefs about what’s better and what’s worse. To give a clear example of what I mean, imagine a drug addict who recognizes that he has a problem with drugs. It seems like this drug addict desires to do drugs but has a preference to not be doing drugs. If you asked the drug addict to make a pros and cons list involving the decision to do drugs, they would argue that doing drugs has more disadvantages than advantages. Nonetheless, they may lack an urge to actually stop doing drugs and they may have a severe urge to continue doing them. So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here.

The believer of libertarian free will could take advantage of this conflict—they may ask: what determines whether the drug addict chooses to act on his desires or act on his preferences? A skeptic of free will would likely respond that the personality trait of conscientiousness determines whether or not someone has a tendency of having desires that align with their preferences. People who are more conscientious will tend to have an urge to do the thing that they think is the right thing to do which is the thing that aligns with their preferences. While people who are low in conscientiousness would be more driven by their irrational impulses which are contradictory to their preferences. The skeptic of free will would then state that your level of conscientiousness is determined by gene-environment interactions.

The believer of libertarian free will might argue back that one could be born with a low level of conscientiousness and improve his consciousness across time with hard work and dedication. They might point out that sometimes someone has a low level of conscientiousness as a young adult but becomes very conscientious as he gets older.

But, there seems to be something paradoxical about claiming that one could essentially become hardworking in the future through hard work and dedication. After all, what determines whether or not someone is capable of working hard at developing an ability to work hard? It seems like a more plausible explanation for why some people become more hardworking over time is that they simply experienced a sort of growth spurt of conscientiousness kinda like a growth spurt that one might have with their height or an event in their life that was triggered by the environment triggered a sudden improvement in conscientiousness. So, I think ultimately we should reject this argument for free will. But, I figured that it was worth mentioning since free will is often associated with a mystical notion of “willpower” which basically a kind of strange non-deterministic change in conscientiousness.

Can a parent make a child want what the parent wants the child to want?

Not directly on the spot, of course, but certainly through extensive conditioning over time, yes.

Willpower is basically reflexive parenting. Present you is partially conditioned by past you. Future you is partially conditioned by present you. If you want to want something other than you want, you can take actions to condition future you to want that thing that present you wants to want but doesn't. That wanting to want something is your will, and the effectiveness of that self-conditioning is the freedom of your will; freedom from the other influences that would condition you otherwise, your own self-conditioning prevailing over those other influences.

The above quote encapsulates an argument against free will for if we didn't chose our preferences (likes and dislikes) and all our actions are determined by our preferences then it follows that we're not free; we are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives.

Our preferences grow and alter with the rest of us. If our actions are determined by our preferences, then our actions are determined by us. I don’t understand how our “preferences” are not a part of us, as if foreign. Each of us determine the course of our own lives by the simple fact that nothing else does.

My first suggestion is that we should not conflate preferences with wants or desires. — TheHedoMinimalist

So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here. — TheHedoMinimalist

I see. Your example of the junkie who wants drugs but prefers not to take them is interesting. However, I fail to see the distinction between "want" and "prefer" as used herein. Do you mean preference is a judgement and a want is, well, more visceral, if you will? However, the junkie's (is this word still in use?) preference is actually based on another want is it not? I mean though he wants to take drugs he would prefer not to because other wants get in the way e.g. the junkie wants to live longer, live healthier, have friends, family, avoid jail, etc. and these wants are again not of his choosing right?

Basically, preferences as defined by you - judgements rather than just desires - are just cases where wants play off against each other.

Willpower is basically reflexive parenting — Pfhorrest

Correct. However, if I have preferences or more accurately wants, then every choice I make is tainted by these wants and since I never chose them, I remain trapped within the walls of my wants.

I don’t understand how our “preferences” are not a part of us, as if — NOS4A2

You did not choose them. Nobody asked me whether I wanted to like philosophy. I just do and in the same breath there are others who wouldn't do philosophy even if their life depended on it.

You did not choose them. Nobody asked me whether I wanted to like philosophy. I just do and in the same breath there are others who wouldn't do philosophy even if their life depended on it.

But no one and nothing else determined your affinity for philosophy but yourself.

If you are able to choose you than by implication you are already not a blank page, you already have a personality with some sort of bias. Also, randomness is in the eye of the beholder. Randomness is a pattern which is impossible to describe mathematically. There is not such a thing as 'random choice'
When you choose a lottery ticket number 'at random' it is not really random. Your choice is through some unconscious bias.

Theories of mind indicate both voluntary functions and involuntary functions. The determinist claims that even voluntary functions are composed of involuntary functions. But the concept of "involuntary function" along with every additional concept is analyzed and applied more or less voluntarily. So it seems existence of the concept "involuntary" strongly suggests but does not prove that deterministic phenomena exist, and the general realm of concepts appears more or less non-deterministic. This forms a non-continuous spectrum ranging from relative determinism to relative non-determinism infused with and bounded by massive uncertainty. Voluntarily doing what you want is relatively non-deterministic, and not being able to voluntarily want what you want is relatively deterministic.

Present you is partially conditioned by past you. — Pfhorrest

This is an interesting way to put it. We are ever-changing organisms as a result of our experiences, but the changes aren't evident until some point in the future.

That wanting to want something is your will, and the effectiveness of that self-conditioning is the freedom of your will; freedom from the other influences that would condition you otherwise, your own self-conditioning prevailing over those other influences — Pfhorrest

I think it's problematic to use will as part of the premise and the conclusion. It leads to circular reasoning. The things you want are your will and your will is the things you want. It also seems to contradict the point made about conditioning; even conditioning that is designed by the person himself.

Each of us determine the course of our own lives by the simple fact that nothing else does. — NOS4A2

Couldn't the selective effects of past consequences on behavior explain why one wants to do something at a given time? The interactive effects of myriad experiences of the past impinging on present circumstances to bring about (not coerce) determined thoughts and actions.

Couldn't the selective effects of past consequences on behavior explain why one wants to do something at a given time? The interactive effects of myriad experiences of the past impinging on present circumstances to bring about (not coerce) determined thoughts and actions.

I suppose it could explain why one wants to do something at a given time, but I don't see why one would bother. Each "effects of past consequences" and "experience of the past impinging on present circumstances" occurs at the level our own being and nowhere besides. So I think it's somewhat redundant to say our past selves determine our future selves.

So I think it's somewhat redundant to say our past selves determine our future selves. — NOS4A2

Except, entropy. Why do you remember the past but not the future?

We are automatons, each with its own preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately determine every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives. — TheMadFool

Sorry, I've never understood this argument; it has always sounded a bit off to me. Let me overly simplify determinism just for illustration... we'll suppose states are contiguous, and presume "temporal locality", which is at least fair. So, for example, we have some state S8, that leads to S9; and S9 will lead to S10.

To me, this sounds like a kind of bait and switch; as if one is arguing: "(1) S8 leads to S9, inevitably. (2) And S9 leads to S10, inevitably. (3) By 1 and 2, S8 leads to S10, inevitably. (4) Therefore, S10 is not the result of S9, but of S8." ...with the bait-and-switch being (4) which to me seems to flatly contradict (2). I'm perfectly fine, mind you, with 3; that's not a problem for me. But the suggestion that S10 is "predetermined" (here, "preprogrammed") sounds like saying 4... that S10 does not in fact occur due to S9; otherwise, why bother with the word "predetermined"? To me it sounds very off... e.g., if there were multiple ways to S9... say, S8a, S8b, ..., S8n; then I would say how the state evolved to S9 doesn't matter... merely the fact that it did leads to S10, because S10 follows from S9. Likewise, I would say that S8k leads to S10 by virtue of it leading to S9 from which S10 follows. I don't know how to swallow the notion that S8k leads to S10 regardless of S9, or how to interpret "predetermined" (/preprogrammed) otherwise.

(Full disclosure; I'm agnostic on the question of free will; this point here is solely about determinism to me).

How would we choose our personality traits? — TheMadFool

It's not so clear to me where the separation here is; let's hypothetically suppose John's parents consider a procedure that would affect their baby. If they opt for it, John grows up to like chocolate. If they opt out, he grows up to prefer vanilla. So what is it that this procedure does... does it affect what flavor John will prefer? Or does it pick which John his parents would give birth to? Or is there a difference? How would you reconcile it?

Theories of mind indicate both voluntary functions and involuntary functions. — Enrique

Volition primarily is about goal driven behavior; you set about some intention to attain, then act to attain it. When I wash my hands and find no towels, I shake my hands to get water off; I'm setting about a goal, and acting to attain it. If my hands shake due to a tick, nothing is setting about the goal of their shaking. I don't think that conflicts with determinism at all; you can program robots to do something similar.

Except, entropy. Why do you remember the past but not the future?

I suppose because the past has occurred. But remembering occurs in the present, as does everything else. There are no anterior states.

Sorry, I've never understood this argument; it has always sounded a bit off to me. Let me overly simplify determinism just for illustration... we'll suppose states are contiguous, and presume "temporal locality", which is at least fair. So, for example, we have some state S8, that leads to S9; and S9 will lead to S10.

To me, this sounds like a kind of bait and switch; as if one is arguing: "(1) S8 leads to S9, inevitably. (2) And S9 leads to S10, inevitably. (3) By 1 and 2, S8 leads to S10, inevitably. (4) Therefore, S10 is not the result of S9, but of S8." ...with the bait-and-switch being (4) which to me seems to flatly contradict (2). I'm perfectly fine, mind you, with 3; that's not a problem for me. But the suggestion that S10 is "predetermined" (here, "preprogrammed") sounds like saying 4... that S10 does not in fact occur due to S9; otherwise, why bother with the word "predetermined"? To me it sounds very off... e.g., if there were multiple ways to S9... say, S8a, S8b, ..., S8n; then I would say how the state evolved to S9 doesn't matter... merely the fact that it did leads to S10, because S10 follows from S9. Likewise, I would say that S8k leads to S10 by virtue of it leading to S9 from which S10 follows. I don't know how to swallow the notion that S8k leads to S10 regardless of S9, or how to interpret "predetermined" (/preprogrammed) otherwise.

(Full disclosure; I'm agnostic on the question of free will; this point here is solely about determinism to me). — InPitzotl

That S8 leads to S10 AND S9 leads to S10 is not a contradiction because S9 is an intermediate step to S10. If someone were to say, given the causal chan S8 > S9 > S10, that S8 directly causes S10 then that would be a contradiction because s/he would be forgetting and contradicting the fact that S9 is a required step before S10 occurs. Anyway, I don't see the relevance to the argument in the OP.

t's not so clear to me where the separation here is; let's hypothetically suppose John's parents consider a procedure that would affect their baby. If they opt for it, John grows up to like chocolate. If they opt out, he grows up to prefer vanilla. So what is it that this procedure does... does it affect what flavor John will prefer? Or does it pick which John his parents would give birth to? Or is there a difference? How would you reconcile it? — InPitzotl

I don't see the relevance to my argument in the OP. All I'm saying is that we all come with a predetermined, as in decided without our choice being considered, set of preferences (likes and dislikes). Ergo, it follows that we don't have free will because everything and anything we do proceeds from these preferences and we had no hand in acquiring them. If we're given the hypothetical opportunity to choose our personality, the set of our preferences determining that, then either these choices will be made according to some other set of preferences (preferences for preferences) or it must be necessarily random. If the former then we must be able to choose these preferences for preferences too and so on ad infinitum. If the latter then random selection is not really a choice is it? Either way there is no free will because one path regresses to infinity; when do we stop an select our preferences freely? And the other path is akin to rolling a dice, again no free choice.

Do you mean preference is a judgement and a want is, well, more visceral, if you will? — TheMadFool

Yes, I would say that’s a pretty accurate representation of the distinction that I was going for.

However, the junkie's (is this word still in use?) preference is actually based on another want is it not? I mean though he wants to take drugs he would prefer not to because other wants get in the way e.g. the junkie wants to live longer, live healthier, have friends, family, avoid jail, etc. and these wants are again not of his choosing right? — TheMadFool

Well, I would say that preferences are not only necessarily based on other wants in many cases. Rather, I would say that they could also be based on certain beliefs about what is truly better or worse or they could be those beliefs as well. Regarding the junkie case, the junkie not only wants to avoid the negative consequences of using drugs but he also believes that those negative consequences are truly bad. This belief might be independent of his desire for those things or at least I think that there could be desire independent beliefs(some philosophers may disagree). On the other hand, the junkie only wishes to use drugs but he may lack the belief that those drugs have any intrinsic benefit for him(again that’s actually a controversial premise but I think few would challenge it.) The believer in libertarian free will might argue that we choose our beliefs about what is good or bad for us or they may argue that we choose to either prioritize our desires or prioritize our beliefs about what is good or bad. I actually think that we don’t choose what we believe about goodness and badness. I also don’t think we choose to prioritize our value beliefs over our desires or vice versa. If you agree with me, then you would have no reason to believe in libertarian free will. But, if you think I’m wrong about assuming that we don’t choose what we believe about value or what we prioritize, then I would say that you have reason to accept libertarian free will. Of course, you might also disagree with my topology of desires, preferences, and beliefs and that might give you a different reason to reject libertarian free will that are somewhat unrelated to my reasons for rejecting it. I was mostly trying to make an argument regarding the concept analysis of desires and preferences rather than object to your position on free will which I consider plausible.

You've made a valid distinction between preferences and wants if by that you mean the former are well thought out so to speak and the latter are subconscious i.e. not ever given serious thought. Since wants aren't an issue here, they're patently not conscious choices, let's discuss preferences.

Let's stick to your junkie example. I understand the want for drugs; after all he's addicted. As you said though he may, after careful consideration, prefer not to want drugs. I suggested that that could be explained with another want, say the want to live healthier, opposing his want for drugs. You seem to disagree. You say

Well, I would say that preferences are not only necessarily based on other wants in many cases — TheHedoMinimalist

Rather, I would say that they could also be based on certain beliefs about what is truly better or worse or they could be those beliefs as well. — TheHedoMinimalist

What is the nature of these "certain beliefs"? In the case of the junkie what would just one of these beliefs, unrelated to any want as you claim, be? I'd like to know.

Sorry for the double post but I would like to mention one more point, if it is one.

The issue here is free will and it's defined in terms of unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline.

In the junkie example you so kindly put forth I found your claim that the kinds of beliefs one may have may be an alternative to wants in re the way we make choices.

I fully comprehend, at least I think I do, that a belief can influence choice; for instance the belief in equality can make you condemn slavery and sans that belief we either wouldn't care or may even support slavery. However, a belief such as that I mentioned just now must have a basis of some sort, right? A belief in equality is founded on the difficulty we face with suffering, which slavery entails and also on the happiness that equality will bring. Suffering and happiness, the disliking the former and liking the latter, were not choices we ever made; we came preprogrammed as hedonists. Ergo, even if preferences are based on beliefs, beliefs themselves trace their origins to a point when and where it's impossible to make choices, let alone free choices. Similarly, other beliefs, at least those that influence our choices, have origins of the same nature - one that precludes any choice at all.

Consider "The Popeye Argument" (because "I yam what I yam and that's all that I yam"). The idea here is that I am free if I'm the one that decides my course of actions. The argument (TPA) is that this is entailed when the thing that decides my course of actions is me; aka, "what I yam".

That S8 leads to S10 AND S9 leads to S10 is not a contradiction because S9 is an intermediate step to S10. — TheMadFool

Of course. That's point 3.

If someone were to say, given the causal chan S8 > S9 > S10, that S8 directly causes S10 then that would be a contradiction ... — TheMadFool

Of course. That's point 4, and point 4 is the one with the contradiction.

then it follows that we're not free; (a) we are automatons, each with its own (b) preprogrammed set of dispositions that will ultimately (c) determine (d) every course of action that we'll ever choose in the course of our lives. — TheMadFool

So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4. From this perspective, analogously, (a) is something like part of S9; and the argument is that (b), something like S8, is what (c) determines (d) my courses of actions, which is to say, S8>S10. To say that this refutes something like TPA is to say that it refutes that "what I yam" is determining my actions; aka, that it refutes that S9>S10. But that refutation would require the contradiction that is point 4.

I'm not sure you're claiming that you're arguing against TPA. But you're certainly arguing against something. And I can easily reverse engineer what you're arguing against based on what you're arguing... that would be that we cannot be something like "original causes" of what we are. What I'm curious about is how many people argue that to be free means that we're original causes of what we are.

I don't see the relevance to my argument in the OP. — TheMadFool

It's a similar point to TPA. Under deterministic assumptions, something causes our actions. The question, under TPA, is whether that thing is us or not. That's a matter of perspective, which to me, implies it's simply a language game. To say that priors "force us" to do something is to say that we aren't states in the universe, but rather, are enslaved by them; something akin to "my brain made me do it". To say that we "yam what we yam" is to say that we are states in the universe, and if that's the case, there's no distinction between our doing something and the universe evolving that way; something akin to "I have a soul, it's made of flesh". If we're states in the universe, then some other state wouldn't be us; it'd be some other soul, made of some "other" flesh ("other" meaning simply flesh in a different state).

(And FTR, I think it's a bit more complex than this; qualitatively it may be abbreviated as a matter of what our dispositions are, but in terms of determinism as an explanation of the world we live in, we're agents; as agents, we both affect and are affected by both "mere" world states and other individuals... so it's really more like a whole world state being a certain way evolving to the next world state, as opposed to merely "our predispositions" determining the thing we do).

I think this is a misunderstanding of what the will is. You’ve defined ‘free will’ as “unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline”, which suggests that ‘the will’ is the faculty of choosing available alternatives.

So what is it that impedes this faculty? First of all, it’s ignorance of the existence of alternatives at all. Secondly, it’s isolation from these alternatives, rendering them unavailable. And thirdly it’s exclusion, leaving us unable to choose the alternatives that would otherwise be available.

This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no such thing as ‘free will’. The will has a capacity to be free insofar as we increase awareness, connection and collaboration with a diversity of alternatives.

Let’s look at this example of the drug addict or ‘junkie’ already offered.

To give a clear example of what I mean, imagine a drug addict who recognizes that he has a problem with drugs. It seems like this drug addict desires to do drugs but has a preference to not be doing drugs. If you asked the drug addict to make a pros and cons list involving the decision to do drugs, they would argue that doing drugs has more disadvantages than advantages. Nonetheless, they may lack an urge to actually stop doing drugs and they may have a severe urge to continue doing them. So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here. — TheHedoMinimalist

What if, instead of assuming a conscious decision has been made to ‘do drugs’ and asking them to make a list of pros and cons to that decision, you ask them to list alternatives to doing drugs, describe the perceived availability of those alternatives and what capacity they perceive in themselves to choose those alternatives - then I think you’ll get a clearer picture of this ‘decision’ to do drugs.

It isn’t so much about conflict between preferences and desires: it’s about awareness of, connection to and collaboration with diverse possibilities, or the perceived value and potential of alternatives. Whether you’re able to directly increase the value and potential of this diversity from the drug addict’s conscious perspective, or do so by corralling the causal conditions of their unconscious actions, the freedom of the will is more complex than simply ‘wanting what he wants’.

So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4 — InPitzotl

So against TPA, this has no teeth unless you're trying to make point 4. From this perspective, analogously, (a) is something like part of S9; and the argument is that (b), something like S8, is what (c) determines (d) my courses of actions, which is to say, S8>S10. To say that this refutes something like TPA is to say that it refutes that "what I yam" is determining my actions; aka, that it refutes that S9>S10. — InPitzotl

I see what you mean. S9 would be the preferences we're born with that determines the course of our actions, S10. S8 would be the preferences for our preferences and for that too there would be another set of preferences S7 and so on. However, my position is that S8 determines S9 and S9 in turn determines S10 and you can continue the chain of causation backwards to infinity. Nothing that I've said comes to close to the claim that S8 causes S10 directly. There's an intermediate step, S9; the whole point of an infinite regress being the existence of an infinite number of links in the chain.

I think this is a misunderstanding of what the will is. You’ve defined ‘free will’ as “unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline”, which suggests that ‘the will’ is the faculty of choosing available alternatives.

So what is it that impedes this faculty? First of all, it’s ignorance of the existence of alternatives at all. Secondly, it’s isolation from these alternatives, rendering them unavailable. And thirdly it’s exclusion, leaving us unable to choose the alternatives that would otherwise be available.

This doesn’t mean, however, that there is no such thing as ‘free will’. The will has a capacity to be free insofar as we increase awareness, connection and collaboration with a diversity of alternatives. — Possibility

Ignorance and awareness have a role in the variety of choices of available and the effectiveness of our decisions but our decisions will still depend on our wants/preferences which, as you already know, were not of our own choosing.

What is the nature of these "certain beliefs"? In the case of the junkie what would just one of these beliefs, unrelated to any want as you claim, be? I'd like to know. — TheMadFool

Well, the junkie may believe that living a longer life would be better for him. Nonetheless, he may actually be suicidal and desire to die soon because of his drug addiction. The junkie may also desire to do drugs but proclaim that drugs caused him nothing but trouble and provided him with no benefit whatsoever. It’s worth remembering that if the junkie is a hardcore addict then he probably doesn’t even experience pleasure from taking drugs anymore; rather drugs only alleviate his withdrawal symptoms. In addition, the drug addict may believe that he’s better off not being in jail but can become apathetic towards the prospect of his own arrest despite this. So, it’s seems like these are some examples of the drug addict having beliefs about value that don’t correspond to his desires and vice versa.

The issue here is free will and it's defined in terms of unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. — TheMadFool

I’m not sure if it is defined in those terms actually. There seems to be a diversity of ways of understanding and defining free will. I suppose that what you mean by free will in the OP is that it is an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming nothing more than that in the OP than I agree with you that there isn’t an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming that this is the only proper way of understanding free will, then I’m not sure if I agree.

However, a belief such as that I mentioned just now must have a basis of some sort, right? — TheMadFool

I agree that there is usually a basis for a belief. But, I’m not sure why that basis necessary has to be a want instead of something else. Maybe they are simply based on intuitions or introspective observations.

A belief in equality is founded on the difficulty we face with suffering, which slavery entails and also on the happiness that equality will bring. — TheMadFool

Well, it seems like the belief in equality could be based on a variety of things which may be unrelated to wants. For example, one might believe in equality simply because they are persuaded by John Locke’s arguments for it. I think one could accept Locke’s argument for natural rights without necessarily having a desire for natural rights to exist. Though, I think most people who are persuaded by Locke’s argument probably do simply wish to live in a world with natural rights.

Suffering and happiness, the disliking the former and liking the latter, were not choices we ever made; we came preprogrammed as hedonists. Ergo, even if preferences are based on beliefs, beliefs themselves trace their origins to a point when and where it's impossible to make choices, let alone free choices. Similarly, other beliefs, at least those that influence our choices, have origins of the same nature - one that precludes any choice at all. — TheMadFool

I agree with the first sentence of this post to an extent. I think everyone was pre-programmed to like pleasure and to dislike suffering. But, I’m not sure how this entails that no one could have a choice motivating belief that is not hedonistically motivated. Do you think that all human motivations are influenced by pleasure and suffering?

Thank you very much for the reply. It does seem like beliefs matter for free will and there is evidence where a well-considered and accepted belief runs counter to our wants and has, on occasion, prevailed in the ensuing battle. This clearly shows that beliefs can cause us to behave against what we've agreed upon as wants which are basically dispositions we had no hand in acquiring.

However, consider the following: Beliefs seem to come in two flavors viz. 1)those that we have no choice over e.g. those based on brute facts of the world and 2) those we can choose and the reason for this being either that we haven't discovered their truth/falsehood or it's impossible to do so or there's some other reasons I'm unaware of.

Type 1 beliefs don't figure in the issue and so can be set aside for they automatically preclude free will since we, perforce, must believe in them. In case you say that we still have a choice regarding such beliefs, the choices we make would be influenced by our wants which we already agreed preclude free will.

With type 2 beliefs we have choice insofar as believing them is concerned but the choice we make would be based on our wants and that, at the risk of repeating myself, we already know leads us back to what we agreed upon - we didn't choose our wants.

I can post pictures :up: :smile:

Type 1 beliefs don't figure in the issue and so can be set aside for they automatically preclude free will since we, perforce, must believe in them. In case you say that we still have a choice regarding such beliefs, the choices we make would be influenced by our wants which we already agreed preclude free will.

With type 2 beliefs we have choice insofar as believing them is concerned but the choice we make would be based on our wants and that, at the risk of repeating myself, we already know leads us back to what we agreed upon - we didn't choose our wants. — TheMadFool

I agree with this. I don’t think we choose our beliefs either. I only disagreed with the claim that beliefs that concern choices are only determined or influenced by wants.

Anyone can post pictures.

Ignorance and awareness have a role in the variety of choices of available and the effectiveness of our decisions but our decisions will still depend on our wants/preferences which, as you already know, were not of our own choosing. — TheMadFool

The important point here is that they WERE not of our own choosing. But I would argue that we DO have a choice regarding those wants and preferences. Type 1 beliefs aren’t based on the ‘brute facts’ of the world, but only on our perception of them, which has been limited up to the point that we are aware of it, yet far from fixed.

Awareness of our wants and preferences are derived from introspection: we acquire this value and potential information from the response of internal systems to stimulus, and each of these systems in their response have a limited perspective of the organism, the universe and what it means to be ‘human’. When we take this into account, why do we prioritise the value of internal affect? The more we understand how these internal systems ‘perceive’ the limited information they receive, the more discerning we can be about the value and significance of their contributions to our thoughts, motives and actions.

I only disagreed with the claim that beliefs that concern choices are only determined or influenced by wants. — TheHedoMinimalist

Can you tell me how we form beliefs that are not, in some way, tied to our wants?

The important point here is that they WERE not of our own choosing. But I would argue that we DO have a choice regarding those wants and preferences. Type 1 beliefs aren’t based on the ‘brute facts’ of the world, but only on our perception of them, which has been limited up to the point that we are aware of it, yet far from fixed.

Awareness of our wants and preferences are derived from introspection: we acquire this value and potential information from the response of internal systems to stimulus, and each of these systems in their response have a limited perspective of the organism, the universe and what it means to be ‘human’. When we take this into account, why do we prioritise the value of internal affect? The more we understand how these internal systems ‘perceive’ the limited information they receive, the more discerning we can be about the value and significance of their contributions to our thoughts, motives and actions. — Possibility

The essence of what you've said can be expressed in the desire for freedom: awareness of factors that influence us are important insofar as we can resist them in order to gain control over our destiny so to speak. This is nothing other than a manifestation of our desire for freedom and that, it appears to me, isn't something we picked voluntarily. We are programmed to desire freedom and to the extent that is true, paradoxically, we are not free. Note that there is a choice between wanting freedom and not wanting freedom and ergo to be free we should have had a say in deciding whether we want to be free or not.

Anyone can post pictures. — Pfhorrest

:grin:

The essence of what you've said can be expressed in the desire for freedom: awareness of factors that influence us are important insofar as we can resist them in order to gain control over our destiny so to speak. This is nothing other than a manifestation of our desire for freedom and that, it appears to me, isn't something we picked voluntarily. We are programmed to desire freedom and to the extent that is true, paradoxically, we are not free. Note that there is a choice between wanting freedom and not wanting freedom and ergo our personal want on the matter should've been considered. — TheMadFool

What does it mean to even have this ‘freedom’ that you desire? For every individual to be naturally unimpeded in their worldline, they must be a universe unto themselves. But without interaction there is no awareness of alternatives to even want. There is no worldline, no existence to speak of. This ‘freedom’ you desire is tantamount to non-existence. You do have the capacity to choose that. So is it really this ‘freedom’ that you want, or something else?

For me, it isn’t a matter of resisting influential factors, but of understanding them in order to connect and collaborate. Control is an illusion generated by ignorance, and destiny is a limited perception of potential. We are not isolated individuals, but possible manifestations of one unlimited will. Freedom as I understand it comes from maximum awareness of, connection to and collaboration with the possibilities of the universe. It’s not something we can just be given prior to achieving this. Our capacity for freedom IS there. We simply need to understand how to exercise it in light of our particular manifestation and perception of potential - recognising that, where we are limited, it is our awareness, connection and collaboration beyond that limitation that ultimately sets us free.