It seems that it's hard to say whether we have free will or not. — Rystiya

It's hard to say what free will is. It's hard to even get people to think seriously about the question: they would rather argue endlessly about "free will" than think about the question that ought to be addressed before anything else.

The solution is simple — Rystiya

The solution to what?

think about the question that ought to be addressed before anything else — SophistiCat

What is the matrix?

The solution to deal with its demoralizing power. ‘Solution’ sounds confusing, I’ll change that.

If see the mind instead of the external world as the greatest (most fundamental) reality, and see the eternal world as merely a circumstance encountered by the mind. If this is done successfully, we will stop asking ‘how to deal with my internal world’, and ask ‘how to deal with the external world’ instead.
It is logical to do so, not only because we can’t be aware of the external world without a mind, but also because we can’t know we know about the external world until our life experience (or feelings) tell us about ourselves. In other words, if we deny the realness of our minds, we must also deny the realness of external world; if we deny the realness of external world, we don’t have to deny the realness of our minds.
By doing so, the demoralizing power of free will isuue would be greatly diminished, as it is now reduced to a small problem we happen to encounter as we are trying to understand the external world sensed by our minds. — Rystiya

Sounds good to me. :)

People define free-will in different ways. And so they argue about different things. But it really goes back to the concept of "you". You like others, will say you have a body, you have a brain, you have... maybe a spirit or soul... two arms and two legs. Who is "you"? The idea of there being a "you" and the continuation of self is intertwined with all definitions of free-will.

These are a few definitions I've considered.

Definitions

• Free-will is being able to have chosen differently.
• Free-will is being able to make choices that are not the product of causal chains; indeterministic.
• Free-will is being able to make choices that God doesn't want you to choose; freedom.
• Free-will is being able to choose freely. Choose what you want to choose; freedom.

People define free-will in different ways. And so they argue about different things. — Malice

Agreed, but there's also "more at stake" concerning free will, and also, "it's obvious".

The more-at-stake aspect can be seen two ways; there's psychological satisfaction with saying that we have free will, because it means we're in control, and we like being in control. Ironically, there's also psychological satisfaction with saying that we do not have free will, because it means we're not blameworthy, and nobody likes to be blamed. Both of these things have non-personal aspects as well; to say others have free will allows us to say that others have responsibility, so we can hold someone morally culpable (though there are those who assign moral culpability without their concept of free will as well; not as popular, but fairly represented). The opposite, to not hold people morally culpable, also has appeal for the opposite reason... it makes people victims of circumstance and/or accident. Both non-personal aspects seem to have to do with politics and strategy for how to deal with people who don't conform to rules. (For example, how much and do we blame addicts for their behavior? But certainly we blame child abusers for theirs... unless, their activities possibly are the result of brain tumors (real example))

The it's-obvious aspect comes from an illusion of expertise. That illusion is the product of our familiarity with the will; after all, we spend our entire lives making choices, we can observe ourselves doing so, and it kind of "comes easy". I claim that this expertise is illusory because what really happens that drives our choices isn't accessible to us in our "easy" self reflection; it's beyond the veil of what we can introspect (at least directly; I make no claims one way or the other for introspection being able to reveal things indirectly). And on top of all of this, there are people who confuse volition (action directed towards an intention) and choice (the selection of and initiation of an action from a set of alternatives).

But it's a really, really old question as well; older than our language. The ancient Greeks started to discover these questions as they formulated their ideas about human nature and natural law..

The more-at-stake aspect can be seen two ways — InPitzotl

There is definitely more to consider when thinking of the implications of how we see and deal with people. There is definitely that. As far as we know the brain behaves like a deterministic system. Whatever we call free-will, it's likely that the only choices we make are determined by our nature, which is intuitive if you think about it. We do exactly what it is in our nature to do, and never otherwise. Nature as in, our exact state.

A problem that we can run into with the idea of moral responsibility and thus law, is that some people get off easier if it is determined that they could not have chosen otherwise because of their condition, such as someone that is severely mentally ill. But if we're deterministic, then that is the case for everyone, so those decisions would have to consider more than what they currently do.

There is a possibility for indeterminism. It has never been demonstrated in a macroscopic system. But even if it was, we have no control over that either. So it doesn't solve that particular issue.

It's hard to say what free will is. It's hard to even get people to think seriously about the question: they would rather argue endlessly about "free will" than think about the question that ought to be addressed before anything else. — SophistiCat

And yet you, yourself, proposet that we clarify what free will is, before answering the question; and then you blast everyone for not answering the question; which is actually "Has anyone done this before", yet you very elegantly also don't answer the question.

Where am I, and why am I here? This is not a deep philosophical question here that I asked, but a practical one.

There is a possibility for indeterminism. It has never been demonstrated in a macroscopic system. — Malice

Oh, it's even worse than this; indeterminism hasn't even been demonstrated in microscopic systems. The common notion is that quantum mechanics demonstrates indeterminism, but if you peel that layer of the onion and look at it, it's not quite this simple. Whether QM demonstrates indeterminism depends on your favorite QM interpretation... though, the type of determinism you find in say MWI is a strange, quantum realist (and thus classical non-realist) type of determinism that just makes this all the more complicated.

if we deny the realness of our minds, we must also deny the realness of external world; if we deny the realness of external world, we don’t have to deny the realness of our minds. — Rystiya

What exactly do you mean by this? The self exists in contrast to something else and that something else seems to be the "external world". I don't see how denying the "external world" doesn't involve denying the existence of a self, the mind in your terms?

Also, for the mind to know itself requires some content that it processes AND the concept of a self which combined results in self-knowledge as in "I am thinking something". Without the "external world" there would be both nothing to think about and no other to serve as contrast to the I a necessity for the mind to know itself.

Perhaps I digress.

Oh, it's even worse than this; indeterminism hasn't even been demonstrated in microscopic systems — InPitzotl

That's true. I typically think about the Copenhagen interpretation. But some prefer the Many-Worlds interpretation, I think they tend to be programmers. Richard Feynman seemed keen on the one with time traveling both ways, I don't recall the name, multiple histories or something like that.

No one makes a mistake on purpose. We all do what we think we ought at that particular time for our own particular reasons.

Free will is all about whether or not one could have chosen otherwise... all else being equal.

Nope.

If all the external world is an illusion, the mind does not need to be an illusion. But if the mind is illusion, the world must also be an illusion. That is what I mean.

There is no mind without an external world. All mind is thought and belief. All thought and belief consists of meaningful correlations drawn between different things. Thought and belief are themselves existentially dependent upon a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, association, and/or otherwise 'connecting' the aforementioned things.

The mind bridges the external and the internal 'worlds', if one chooses to use such language.

I honestly find it a pointless discussion in practice, since regardless of whether it "exists" or not, people still behave the same way (e.x. whether people did it out of 'free will', or were 'predestined' or pre-determined to do it, people still stop smoking, and so on). It's like a "who came first, the chicken or the egg debate" which makes no practical difference either way when making an omelet.

Sadly, the "free will does not exist" nonsense will just be used by anti-intellectual media and its consumers to justify fatalistic thinking (e.x. I can't quit smoking because I'm 'addicted' or lack 'free will' in the matter, even though this doesn't change the fact that some people do indeed quit smoking, 'free will' or no...)

The solution to deal with its demoralizing power. ‘Solution’ sounds confusing, I’ll change that — Rystiya

What does "its" refer to here? You never say.

People define free-will in different ways. And so they argue about different things. But it really goes back to the concept of "you". You like others, will say you have a body, you have a brain, you have... maybe a spirit or soul... two arms and two legs. Who is "you"? The idea of there being a "you" and the continuation of self is intertwined with all definitions of free-will. — Malice

Nature as in, our exact state. — Malice

Our nature is not identical with our physical state. I am not making some dualistic statement here - I am just agreeing with what you said earlier that I quoted here. What constitutes "you" or "your nature" isn't simply reducible to your physical body (or else your personal identity would be extremely volatile). It is a somewhat vague notion rooted more in psychology and culture than in physics - you know, like "free will."

All mind is thought and belief. — creativesoul

No, I think mind is something which can create thoughts, which can believe or disbelieve them.

The trick is not to separate internal and external or render one superior to other. The problem of the mind is to realize the differentiated continuity between them; the flow that takes a different shape in each sphere. We cannot stop dealing with the internal world as long as we have an internal world. The same is also true for the external world. The more we understand and reorganise the internal world, the more we reorganise the external. Neither our minds, nor the external world are unreal. Similar to everything else, learning to do / realise these things is a matter of process. And the essence of this process is becoming. Free will stems from this gradual realisation. However, human mind is impatient; wants immediate answers, which is an essential part of the becoming of the mind and its free will. Thus, you are searching for free will even when you think you minimised the issue of free will. It is also why people define free will in different ways. Each response is a bus stop for the individual to breathe. What mind needs, mind does throughout ages, until it is neither determined nor needs to determine. In the process, the mind and external reality swing between determinism and indeterminism that is experienced in the microcosm in form of pain, suffering, mistakes, crimes etc.