if only because consistency of behavior between invariant structures begs the question of an organizing principle. — Pneumenon
The individual bonds are not indifferent to their context at all — Pneumenon
And there's nothing about the laws of physics which the primacy of flux denies: indeed, what do the 'laws of physics' bear upon? Chage. — StreetlightX
Constancy is just ordered flux, the invariant in variation. I'll only add: both are perfectly real, only that the one furnishes the sufficient reason for the other. — StreetlightX
the vital thing is to show how e.g. the individual molecules provide sufficient reason for the laws of physics. — Pneumenon
No, no. It's about the 'individual molecules'. Individual molecules are not 'change' (what would that even mean?) It's about the relations between them, the minimisation of forces between molecules. In other words: regulated change. Not relata but relations are primary. — StreetlightX
The Second Law of Thermodynamics would appear to be permanent, for example. — Pneumenon
Think Heraclitus and Parmenides. — Pneumenon
1. Reality is fundamentally flux, and permanency is constructed
2. Reality fundamentally is, and change is an illusion
Reality is fundamentally flux
But this is not the only or even most perspicacious way of looking at it. The other, inverse, way of understanding it is as the expression of a positive fact about nature (and not just a negative limitation upon it): energy differentials are productive of order. That is, the second law attests to the fact that every form of organisation (structure, identity) requires the maintenance of difference without which it would collapse into nothingness.
...
The 2nd law, interpreted negatively, is derivative of this primary fact of nature, which, again, attests to the primacy of flux. The 2nd law is 'permanent', but it's permanence is parasitic upon the permanence of - you guessed it - change. — StreetlightX
Constancy is just ordered flux, the invariant in variation. I'll only add: both are perfectly real, only that the one furnishes the sufficient reason for the other.
It is a positive fact about nature that organized systems require difference. But this is no less juridical than the negative interpretation. — Pneumenon
Why does the flux have this positive property, and not another? — Pneumenon
I said the flux provides the sufficent reason for structure, not that the flux (I really dislike this word btw!) is accountable for in terms of sufficient reason (confusion of expalnanda with explanandum here). — StreetlightX
My question is, what is it in flux, or change, that provides sufficient reason for the permanence (or apparent permanence) of general laws, e.g. the laws of physics? The Second Law of Thermodynamics would appear to be permanent, for example. I grant you that the Second Law bears on change, but this does not locate the suffient reason for that law in change. — Pneumenon
Why in the world would you appeal to a principle of sufficient reason, if change is not accountable for in terms of sufficient reason? — Pneumenon
I think part of the confusion here stems from working with an inadequate vocabulary ('change' is possibly even worse than 'flux' insofar as change implies a *thing* that changes, subordinating difference once more to identity!) — StreetlightX
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.