if only because consistency of behavior between invariant structures begs the question of an organizing principle. — Pneumenon

Don't think this is necessary. One of my favourite examples is the soap bubble: why does it have the form it does? Because the sphere is the shape that best minimizes surface tension. But the minimzation of surface tension is a 'local' phenomena: each molecule of the soap bubble only interacts with the molecules next to it, and the bonds that form are indifferent to the global structure: yet the sphere nonetheless emerges from the sum of these local interactions. Finally, 'minimization of surface tension' is of course a modulation of difference.

Another well-known example might be the behaviour of swarms of birds, which can be said to be roughly governed by similar 'local laws': move in the same direction as your neighbours; remain close to your neighbours; avoid collisions with your neighbours (note that as with the bubble, all three 'rules' have as their 'content' regulation of change, which is primary). Modulate correctly, and you get:

Fair enough, but I think this kicks the can down the road. You're just reducing the regularity of the soap bubble to smaller regularities, which, in turn, beg the question of organizing principles. I guess you can insist that it's anarchic self-organization all the way down, but this ignores contextual constraint. The individual bonds are not indifferent to their context at all; if you don't believe me, swat a soap bubble with your hand sometime. If the left side of that soap bubble collided with the right side, those bonds would cease to exist. But they don't because it's a sphere.

More generally and simply: this all still relies on the laws of physics working a certain way. Hence my comment about organizational principles.

Swarm intelligence and pendulum entrainment and so on, that stuff is all very fascinating. But you're still left appealing to general laws to make any of it work. The laws of gravitation, or of interaction of particles, or the instincts of starlings, do not admit of reduction to flux without relying on brute facticity.

:up:

The individual bonds are not indifferent to their context at all — Pneumenon

I didn't say this: I said they were indifferent to global structure, which they are. Swat a soap bubble and you get a cascading wave of local bond-breaking which travels across the bubble. The bubble doesn't pop instantaneously: it takes time.

And there's nothing about the laws of physics which the primacy of flux denies: indeed, what do the 'laws of physics' bear upon? Change. Without which they would be laws of nothing at all.

And there's nothing about the laws of physics which the primacy of flux denies: indeed, what do the 'laws of physics' bear upon? Chage. — StreetlightX

The question isn't about what the laws of physics bear upon, but what explains them. Your claim was:

Constancy is just ordered flux, the invariant in variation. I'll only add: both are perfectly real, only that the one furnishes the sufficient reason for the other. — StreetlightX

To substantiate this, the vital thing is to show how e.g. the individual molecules provide sufficient reason for the laws of physics, which are, after all, permanent.. Saying that the laws of physics govern molecules, such as those of soap bubbles, does not show that flux provides the sufficient reason for permanency. To explain the actions of flux (e.g. the change in the atoms of the soap bubble) you still have to appeal to general laws. But in that case, the general laws are supplying the sufficient reason for the flux in particulars, not the reverse.

the vital thing is to show how e.g. the individual molecules provide sufficient reason for the laws of physics. — Pneumenon

No, no. It's not about the 'individual molecules'. Individual molecules are not 'change' (what would that even mean?) It's about the relations between them, the minimisation of forces between molecules. In other words: regulated change. Not relata but relations are primary.

No, no. It's about the 'individual molecules'. Individual molecules are not 'change' (what would that even mean?) It's about the relations between them, the minimisation of forces between molecules. In other words: regulated change. Not relata but relations are primary. — StreetlightX

I may be deeply misunderstanding you, so let me back up here a moment.

You said, if I have understood you correctly, that flux (change) provides sufficient reason for permanency, or any appearance thereof. My question is, what is it in flux, or change, that provides sufficient reason for the permanence (or apparent permanence) of general laws, e.g. the laws of physics? The Second Law of Thermodynamics would appear to be permanent, for example. I grant you that the Second Law bears on change, but this does not locate the suffient reason for that law in change.

@Pneumenon - btw I realised I missed out a crucial 'not' in my post above, just corrected that, sorry about the confusion.

The Second Law of Thermodynamics would appear to be permanent, for example. — Pneumenon

It's a question here of how to interpret the standing of such laws. There are two ways to do this: one, by understanding the law as a pure prohibition: entropy in a closed system cannot decrease over time. This is the law understood in a juridical fashion, as it were, a statute written in the Book of Nature (where exactly?). But this is not the only or even most perspicacious way of looking at it. The other, inverse, way of understanding it is as the expression of a positive fact about nature (and not just a negative limitation upon it): energy differentials are productive of order. That is, the second law attests to the fact that every form of organisation (structure, identity) requires the maintenance of difference without which it would collapse into nothingness. Or to quote Levi Bryant on this:

"Substances, entities, or objects are negentropic systems. An object is a highly ordered system. Or, amounting to the same thing, an object is a highly improbable being. I am deeply interested in questions of how there’s any order in the world at all and of the sort of work required by negentropic systems to stave off entropy. How do they do it? Why do improbabilities (highly ordered objects) persist? And if my hypothesis that objects are negentropic systems, it also follows that objects are not stupid clods that just sit there. Rather, objects must be a work, an activity, a process. A brute, motionless clod that sits there would be the exact opposite of negentropy, for entropy is the evaporation of all work, its disappearance, or the descent into equaprobability. Work is the maintenance and continuation of improbability; the unlikely arrangement of parts in a particular order" (cite).

The 2nd law, interpreted negatively, is derivative of this primary fact of nature, which, again, attests to the primacy of flux. The 2nd law is 'permanent', but it's permanence is parasitic upon the permanence of - you guessed it - change.

Think Heraclitus and Parmenides. — Pneumenon

I was looking for something in the way of critical reflection, but I find only free-floating metaphors here. I've also been thinking about the metaphysics of time lately, but I prefer a more grounded approach.

1. Reality is fundamentally flux, and permanency is constructed
2. Reality fundamentally is, and change is an illusion

There is a glass of water on my table, what about it do you call "flux"? The glass was full few days ago, now it's half empty, what about that change you call "illusion"? Flux is change, why is your second statement contradicting the first one?

Reality is fundamentally flux

Flux means flow / motion. What is flowing? What are you trying to say, do you even know?

But this is not the only or even most perspicacious way of looking at it. The other, inverse, way of understanding it is as the expression of a positive fact about nature (and not just a negative limitation upon it): energy differentials are productive of order. That is, the second law attests to the fact that every form of organisation (structure, identity) requires the maintenance of difference without which it would collapse into nothingness.
...

The 2nd law, interpreted negatively, is derivative of this primary fact of nature, which, again, attests to the primacy of flux. The 2nd law is 'permanent', but it's permanence is parasitic upon the permanence of - you guessed it - change. — StreetlightX

I guess I don't see how re-interpreting it like this solves the problem. It is a positive fact about nature that organized systems require difference. But this is no less juridical than the negative interpretation.

And, importantly, this does not find sufficient reason for the law in the flux. Remember, the initial claim was that permanent principles have their sufficient reason in change:

Constancy is just ordered flux, the invariant in variation. I'll only add: both are perfectly real, only that the one furnishes the sufficient reason for the other.

But there is nothing about change that provides sufficient reason for this; the flux could just have easily
have worked differently. Why does the flux have this positive property, and not another? There is, as of now, no sufficient reason for this - which means there's no sufficient grounding for organizing principles in flux.

It is a positive fact about nature that organized systems require difference. But this is no less juridical than the negative interpretation. — Pneumenon

Huh? That systems are maintained by energetic difference is not some kind of stipulative rule: systems not maintained because they require difference but because without such difference they would dissapate. To cast this in the form of a 'law' would be nothing but an anthropormorphism, putting the legal cart before the perfectly natural horse, as it were.

Why does the flux have this positive property, and not another? — Pneumenon

I don't understand your question: I said the flux provides the sufficent reason for structure, not that the flux (I really dislike this word btw!) is accountable for in terms of sufficient reason (confusion of expalnanda with explanandum here).

I said the flux provides the sufficent reason for structure, not that the flux (I really dislike this word btw!) is accountable for in terms of sufficient reason (confusion of expalnanda with explanandum here). — StreetlightX

Why in the world would you appeal to a principle of sufficient reason, if change is not accountable for in terms of sufficient reason?

The big problem here, as I see it, is methodological: there is no reason to appeal to a principle of sufficient reason if you're going to accept brute facticity. If change does not need a reason for the way it is, then the way things change (not that things change, but the specific way in which they change) is just a brute fact. And if you're going to say that patterns or tendencies in change are brute facts, then whither your prinicple of sufficient reason?

That's my problem. Your argument looks like this:

1. Change is primary over structure because it provides the sufficient reason for structure.
2. Change itself is not accountable for in terms of sufficient reason.

The problem is that, from 2, it follows that:

3. The way in which things change is not accountable for in terms of sufficient reason.

Which is the same as saying that manner in which change happens is a brute fact: why does change happen this way, and not some other way? The answer you give appears to be "because that's just the way it is." But brute facts are not compatible with the PSR, by its very nature.

My question is, what is it in flux, or change, that provides sufficient reason for the permanence (or apparent permanence) of general laws, e.g. the laws of physics? The Second Law of Thermodynamics would appear to be permanent, for example. I grant you that the Second Law bears on change, but this does not locate the suffient reason for that law in change. — Pneumenon

I don't wish to interrupt the current exchange, and perhaps the discussion has already moved on, but Google defines an intuition as "the ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning". The laws of physics seem to rely on a lot of conscious reasoning, no?

Yeah, but in philosophy you use "intuition" in kind of a different way. :-)

I doubt it, but that's probably for another discussion.

Why in the world would you appeal to a principle of sufficient reason, if change is not accountable for in terms of sufficient reason? — Pneumenon

I think part of the confusion here stems from working with an inadequate vocabulary ('change' is possibly even worse than 'flux' insofar as change implies a *thing* that changes, subordinating difference once more to identity!). In any case, bracketing that problem for the moment, what I said was simply that variation provides the sufficient reason for the invariant. But the invariant just is what is to be accounted for. Recall the question to which the PoSR responds: why is there some-thing rather than no-thing? A: because variation. But variation is no *thing*: it is the pre-individual, it is that out of which, or from which, there are *things* - as things, as structure - to be accounted for at all.

Which is another way of saying that this question: "why does change happen this way, and not some other way?" - is badly formulated. "Change" in the abstract - 'change in general' - doesn't 'happen', only changes to this and changes to that. The right question is: why this change in the structure and not another? In other words the question of sufficient reason can only be formulated at the level of the individuated, at the level of structure, beyond which is simply loses its field of applicability. This is both to de-fang the PoSR and to intensify it. De-fanged (and de-theologized, I might add) because rendered immanent, referring reason(s) to the world and how it is (no longer looking outside it); intensified because no longer taking for granted that there are things at all and demanding instead an account of how they come to be at all.

Let me make sure that I have understood you: you want to say that there is some kind of variation, or change, or flux, or difference, whatever we want to call it, that is primary, out of which everything else arises, and for which there is no account.

Perhaps I'm just dense, but I guess I don't understand this. What does this variation/change/flux/whatever consist in? You say:

I think part of the confusion here stems from working with an inadequate vocabulary ('change' is possibly even worse than 'flux' insofar as change implies a *thing* that changes, subordinating difference once more to identity!) — StreetlightX

And "variation" (your term) implies a thing that varies. And "difference" (also your term) implies two things that are different, and a third thing with respect to which they are different. What puzzles me is that you consistently criticize the words I use, but your own terminology seems to have the same problem. Of course, perhaps I'm being uncharitable here: when you said "inadequate vocabulary," perhaps you meant that the philosophical vernacular itself lacks the terminology to describe what you want. But still, you really ought to introduce a term of your own that doesn't have the same problems that my terms do. And the language you've been using so far, it seems to me, doesn't escape any of your own criticisms.

(I grant you that "change implies a thing that changes" sounds awfully stodgy - there is something Scholastic and Oxfordian about such an argument. But I am much more flummoxed by the reverse: "There is a primal difference which is not a difference between two things." How on Earth am I to make sense of a free-floating variance that is not the variation in anything in particular? Maybe you just "get it" and I don't. But if you "get it," then maybe you could introduce some terminology that works...?)

At any rate, your notion of change/flux/variance/difference seems to be awfully recalcitrant with regards to being expressed in words, although this may be simply my own failing and not that of your concept. Regardless, though, until it is neatly captured in words, it does not provide a sufficient reason for much of anything. And now we come full circle to the original point: how is variation/difference to provide a sufficient reason for things, if it lies outside of the space of justification? If something cannot be justified, it cannot meaningfully participate in inferential relations, including justifying other things.