Right, an "instant" is not a real part of time, and that is why time cannot be continuous. There is something which breaks the continuity, which is called the "instant".

You can not resolve the issue by not addressing the issue, so until you start talking about continuity in terms of infinite divisibility there is no distinction what is it you two are really talking about.

The present is not distinct from the past and the future, it is an indefinite moment such that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

You can not argue with “indefinite”. It means you are unable to say anything specific about it, and using ignorance to claim knowledge is the funniest paradox here, so far.

I don't think aletheist can get past that time is an illusion, or at least subordinate to change in nature.

Some theoretical physicists like Carlo Rovelli say that reality is just a complex network of events onto which we project sequences of past, present and future. The whole Universe obeys the laws of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, out of which time emerges.

Just like time is just a fourth dimension and that there is nothing special about ‘now’; even ‘past’ and ‘future’ are not always well defined. Hence:

"There are parallels with thermodynamics and Bayesian probability theory, which both rely on the concept of entropy, and might therefore be used to argue that the flow of time is a subjective feature of the Universe, not an objective part of the physical description."

I believe that present, past and future are important but widely misconcieved.

They are actually a lot like 3017amen put but he was largely wrong.

What's past and future, is actually an element of the present(thrice versa) but by no means is time separated in this way.

"That had happened."

No, what happened incorporates that effect.

What we are doing is thinking past is only the cut off point of time, when it's a complex shape's back side.

Thinking back to memory is interaction with this back side.

Life is just a special effect with the story of the time.

No, there are states of things independent of human judgments--namely, facts. These are signified by true propositions, which are likewise independent of human judgments. Again, a judgment is a human decision to adopt a certain proposition as a belief. — aletheist

What we are talking about with "S is P" and "S is not-P," are human statements. "S" stands for a subject, which may or may not be, in some way associated to concrete things.

On the contrary, I have consistently maintained that the principle of excluded middle applies to propositions signifying prolonged states of things (what you call "being"), but not to propositions signifying indefinitely gradual states of change (what you call "becoming"), both of which are only realized at lapses of time (not instants). — aletheist

As I said, you've provided no principles by which we might distinguish a "prolonged state" from a "gradual state of change". Any such distinction appears completely arbitrary to me. How long is a "prolonged state", a Planck time length, a second, a year, a million years? And how would you know that what you thought was a prolonged state wasn't really just a gradual state of change? So if there is a "fact" of the matter, as you claim, how do we get beyond the arbitrary judgement of when the law of excluded middle does and does not apply?

I stipulated from the very beginning that in my example, "S" denotes an existential subject, an enduring concrete thing; and "P" denotes one of the innumerable qualities or relations that it possesses at some determinations of time, but not at others. I have never been talking about any other possible referent of either term. — aletheist

As I said, I don't accept your stipulation of an "existential subject". I believe "existential subject" to be undisciplined nonsense.

I have the same opinion of your responses at this point, so maybe it is time (no pun intended) for us to call it quits. — aletheist

Unless you can provide some principles to support what you call an "existential subject", I think it's time for you to call it quits. Drop that nonsense, and start to look at time in a realistic way.

The problem was you then started talk about divisibility in terms of past, present, and future - where did you get that, some reference? — Zelebg

I got that from my own experience. Do you not apprehend the past as different from the future? I see the past as determined events, having occurred and unchangeable, while the future consist of possible events which have not yet been determined. Therefore if time is supposed to consist of past and future, there must be something which separates these two, as they are distinct, clearly not the same. Do you agree that the future must be divided from the past, at the present, in order that the difference between the future and past, which we know from our experience to be real, could be real?

Here's another way of looking at it. Take a look at inertia, or what Newton called momentum. Let's say that a thing will "continue" to exist as it was, while time passes, unless a "force" interferes. Therefore existence would be continuous, except a force might break that continuity. In physics, a force is simply another source of momentum or energy. But in philosophy we have a concept of free will, which respects the fact that a free willing human being might act at any moment, in any given way, as a force. So a free willing human being might act to break the continuity of momentum or inertia, at any moment in time. Doesn't this indicate to you, that this supposed continuity of existence, is not a true continuity?

Explain that to Aletheist. That's where his confusion is, and anything else you two are talking about is beside that essential point. — Zelebg

I'm afraid aletheist is not prepared to uphold the distinction between theory and practise, claiming that a logical subject is a concrete thing.

You can not resolve the issue by not addressing the issue, so until you start talking about continuity in terms of infinite divisibility there is no distinction what is it you two are really talking about. — Zelebg

I already explained the paradox involved with assuming that continuity is divisible, but I'll try again. If something continuous is actually divided, then it is no longer continuous. Do you agree with this basic principle? If so, you'll see that "infinitely divisible" really means that it can be divided anywhere, in the sense of an infinity of possibilities for division. However, it cannot actually be divided anywhere or else it is not continuous.

Therefore we have that issue of the difference between theory and practise here. In theory, we say that the continuous thing can be divided, but in practise it couldn't really be divided because that would just prove that it's not really continuous. So the question is whether there really is such a thing as continuity, or is it just a fiction, a convenient principle made up by mathematicians, geometers, or some other philosophers, as a map, a guide to the possibility of dividing things anywhere. I think that in reality things cannot actually be divided anywhere. And that's an indication that things are not continuous. And time is already divided at the present, so the idea of continuity is just a fiction.

However, it cannot actually be divided anywhere or else it is not continuous.

Continuous does not mean indivisible, it means “composed of no parts”, i.e infinitely divisible. Indivisible is what discrete means, it’s the opposite.

We draw a line from A to B. That line is either continuous in space / time or not, but we can divide it in either case by placing point C somewhere in between.

Continuous does not mean indivisible, it means “composed of no parts” — Zelebg

Right, so if something is divided anywhere, then it has parts, and is not continuous. The continuous is divisible, but it cannot actually be divided.

We draw a line from A to B. That line is either continuous in space / time or not, but we can divide it in either case by placing point C somewhere in between. — Zelebg

Do you agree, that if you divide that line at C, it then consists of the parts AC, CB, and is therefore not a continuous line from A to B?

I think the apparent flow of time that we experience can only be studied in relation to consciousness. All of space and time that has existed, exists, or will exist is part of reality. No events in the future can erase events that have occurred in the past. So everything that has happened, is happening, or will happen is part of what's true. Regardless of whether it's in the past, present, or future of a particular individual.

So as I see it, on the one hand we have the reality of space and time, or if you will, spacetime ... and on the other hand we have conscious beings who experience moving through spacetime along a curve that always has a positive velocity in the "time" direction. At least schematically.

The experience of the flow of time is a bit like how the wick of a candle burns down. It is this interaction of time and consciousness that seems to me the thing to focus on in order to try to understand what's going on.

Do you agree, that if you divide that line at C, it then consists of the parts AC, CB, and is therefore not a continuous line from A to B?

That’s why I insist it should be referred to as “infinite divisibility” rather than “continuity”, it is far more specific and avoids this kind of misinterpretation.

Your logic is not wrong, just inadequate because you don’t get two logically opposite and mutually exclusive categories: continuous / divisible vs. discrete / indivisible.

So no, we divide a line and we do not get two parts, we get two lines, and if we supposed lines are continuous, then obviously we get two continuities. Think of it as analog vs. digital.

You keep insisting to put it in some literal or actual terms as if something really gets cut and divided. It’s all just a thought experiment, so instead of thinking about division as “cutting", think of it as how fine movement and precision you could theoretically achieve with an analog needle sliding over some gauge - then infinite divisibility, i.e. "continuous" is simply a claim there is always unique point C between any two points A and B, while "discrete" is naturally then the opposite claim of that.

That’s why I insist it should be referred to as “infinite divisibility” rather than “continuity”, it is far more specific and avoids this kind of misinterpretation. — Zelebg

But "continuous" is the more descriptive word, it says more about the named property than "infinitely divisible". Infinitely divisible is the way that mathematicians treat the thing which is said to be continuous. Therefore the subject has been changed. Instead of "S is continuous" we now have "S (a continuity) is infinitely divisible. The subject is no longer the thing which is continuous, it is the attribute "continuous" itself. This is how mathematicians quantify, they turn the attribute, or property into the subject, and assign a scale of values, degrees of existence, of the attribute. So for example, when colour is the property we might say "S is red", or "S is Blue". But then we turn the colour itself into the subject and attempt to create a scale of wavelengths to define the different colours. The quantifying of the attribute is only as accurate as the understanding of the attribute which the scale is based on. So a specific scale of wavelengths is not a very accurate way to represent different colours because most real instances of colour are a mixture of wavelengths.

So, when we quantify the attribute, which is called "continuous", with "infinitely divisible", the quantification scale is only as accurate as our understanding of what it means to be continuous. For simplicity sake, the mathematician will say let's just define "continuous" as infinitely divisible and it doesn't matter whether there is such a thing as "real continuity", or even what is being referred to when people say "time is continuous", because this is mathematical continuity we are defining, and so long as we adhere to the definition there ought tot be no problem. However, there is a problem whenever we decide to apply that mathematical scaling to the natural thing which appears to have the attribute of being continuous. It was exemplified by Zeno. The problem arises because there is a discrepancy between what "continuous" means when we say "S (time or space for example) is continuous", and when we say "continuous is infinitely divisible". The thing referred to as continuous is not "continuous" as defined by mathematics. This is because the mathematical definition of "continuous" is adopted for the simplicity or eloquence of mathematical principles, and does reflect what is being referred to when "continuous" is predicated of a subject like time or space. If one is to assert, and insist that the thing which is said to be continuous must have the property as defined in mathematics, this indicates a misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is analogous to one who insists that a thing which is a particular colour, must have only a specific narrow range of wavelength (ignoring the fact that in reality colours are mixed wavelengths). The situation is that the "official", mathematical definition of the property does not match the perception which is named as that property.

Your logic is not wrong, just inadequate because you don’t get two logically opposite and mutually exclusive categories: continuous / divisible vs. discrete / indivisible. — Zelebg

The goal is to describe how things are in reality, not to produce mutually exclusive categories. The reality of categories is that they always overlap and envelope each other, more like sets. A human being is a mammal, is an animal, is a living thing, is an existing thing. The categories are not mutually exclusive.

However, within some categories we will establish extremes, like hot and cold, and scale according to those extremes. But it's not proper to say that they are mutually exclusive, because they are in the same category, and all the intermediates, can be said to be degrees of the two. So "divisible" and "indivisible" are better represented as the two extremes of the same category, like hot and cold. Then these two are the ideals, the perfect extremes, and all things in reality fall somewhere in between, as divisible in some ways, but not divisible in other ways.

So no, we divide a line and we do not get two parts, we get two lines, and if we supposed lines are continuous, then obviously we get two continuities. Think of it as analog vs. digital. — Zelebg

Right, we start with AB as one continuous line. Then we insert C to divide at C, so that AC and CB are distinct line segments. Therefore each of these two is a distinct continuity, but there is no continuity of AB anymore, because that line has been divided at C. However, AB still exists as something we can talk about, so we can say that it consists of two parts, AC and CB. Do you agree or not?

Perhaps your attempt to describe things in terms of a continuous/discrete dichotomy is confusing you. Let's determine what "continuous" means in application, and also what "discrete" means in application, to determine whether these two signify the extremes (ideals) of one category, or whether they signify distinct categories. There could be ambiguity such that sometimes they mean one, and other times they mean the other.

The goal is to describe how things are in reality, not to produce mutually exclusive categories.

This is not physics, it’s ontology and metaphysics. So the first goal is to establish logical categories or else you end up contradicting yourself.

Do you agree or not?

Nothing gets cut, nothing gets divided, it’s a matter of speech and it can be expressed in different context with different terms, as I already explained, but you keep making the same mistake of being strangely literal about a hypothetical abstract concept.

It’s not a matter of opinion. Divisible is the opposite to indivisible, continuous is the opposite to discrete, and analog is the opposite to digital. That’s all.

Can I ask, on one summary point, has there been any consensus on the Reality of Time viz the bivalence/vagueness issue?

Can I ask, on one summary point, has there been any consensus on the Reality of Time viz the bivalence/vagueness issue? — 3017amen

There has not been much consensus about anything in this thread, but please clarify exactly what you mean by "the bivalence/vagueness issue."

There has not been much consensus about anything in this thread, but please clarify exactly what you mean by "the bivalence/vagueness issue." — aletheist

Sure. Whether the so-called reality of past, present, future are either continuous or discrete?

The bivalence issue , I thought, was in large part what you and MU were arguing relative to P and-P, generally speaking. And vagueness would suggest that language cannot capture the phenomenon of time. A common learn-ed example is the infamous red apple thus:

Consider the following statement in the circumstance of sorting apples on a moving belt:
This apple is red.
Upon observation, the apple is an undetermined color between yellow and red, or it is mottled both colors. Thus the color falls into neither category " red " nor " yellow ", but these are the only categories available to us as we sort the apples. We might say it is "50% red". This could be rephrased: it is 50% true that the apple is red. Therefore, P is 50% true, and 50% false. This apple is red and it is not-red.

And so, I thought one argument was that basically, time violated the laws of non-contradiction.

(Of course, I still consider time an illusion. And I also view time subordinate to change.)

Whether the so-called reality of past, present, future are either continuous or discrete? — 3017amen

I believe that time is real and continuous.

The bivalence issue , I thought, was in large part what you and MU were arguing relative to P and-P, generally speaking. — 3017amen

I believe that there are lapses of time during which a concrete thing (S) is changing from possessing an abstract quality or relation (P) to not possessing it, or vice-versa, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false with respect to the attribution of that predicate to that subject at that determination of time. Instead, either "S is becoming P" or "S is becoming not-P" is true.

And so, I thought one argument was that basically, time violated the laws of non-contradiction. — 3017amen

I believe that the principle of contradiction is maintained, because there is no instant or lapse of time at which both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true.

We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate. We cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility. So statements concerning the future are predictions.

e cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say).

But in an absolute sense, the future is just like the past or the present — something will have happened (regardless of whether we know what that is now).

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say). — Daz

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined. So it is true in an absolute sense, if free will is true. If you think that "X will happen" is the same a "Y has happened", in an absolute sense, then you are a hard determinist.

We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate — Metaphysician Undercover

Under what circumstances might the past be altered? The Grandfather Paradox? :chin:

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe the future is determined regardless of what one believes.

Under what circumstances might the past be altered? — jgill

None, since the past is determinate.

I believe the future is determined regardless of what one believes. — Daz

Then you are indeed a hard determinist, as @Metaphysician Undercover stated; presumably also an eternalist, holding that the past, present, and future all exist. My view is more along the lines of the "growing block" theory, holding that the past and present exist, but not the future. The present is the indefinite lapse of time at which the indeterminate future is always becoming the determinate past.

Under what circumstances might the past be altered? — jgill

None, since the past is determinate. — aletheist

Wouldn't be too sure of that. Speculative notions like the multiple universe theory might have a bearing. If it were possible to somehow influence the past, changes might simply flow into an alternate universe, avoiding the Grandfather Paradox.

What we currently know of space and time may seem quaint and naive by future generations. :cool:

Are you familiar with Calculus? The point at which a car is traveling down a road when it passes a stop sign is similar to a derivative. I feel you might be parsing words with the whole notion that there is not an exact position. 1 + 1 = 2 is stored in your mind and my mind somewhere. I'm not sure arguing against exact position adds anything to the conversation. The earth and our galaxy are flying through space but that doesn't mean something else isn't occupying the spot in space that your cat was at in your house 20 minutes ago. I do support special relativity as well as general relativity (as for the latter to the extent to which i understand it).

If we are constantly changing our opinions as to the facts of the past on the basis of new information, then why should we believe that the past is real and immutable?

Suppose that in 2030 society obtains decisive historical evidence concerning the identity of Jack The Ripper in 1888, whereby historians thereafter claim that the riddle regarding Jack the Ripper's identity was solved in 2030. Why should we believe that the actual facts regarding the identity of Jack the Ripper in 1888 existed before 2030? What does this assertion add to our calendar-indexed observations?

If we are constantly changing our opinions as to the facts of the past on the basis of new information, then why should we believe that the past is real and immutable? — sime

You ask why the past is immutable. But as a reason not to think of it that way, you mention only that our thoughts about the past can change. There is an important distinction to be drawn between a) a thing (the past), and b) our thoughts about it later.

We find ourselves perceiving and acting in a world characterized by ceaseless motion and change. That experience is organized according to an order of time, a dimension that runs from "before" to "after". We learn to generalize from the temporal order of our experience to understand and imagine the world in keeping with concepts of "past", "present", and "future".

The state of things in the present is always one of indefinitely gradual change, — aletheist

Our grasp of the state of things seems on some occasions and in some respects to change gradually and indefinitely, on other occasions and in other respects to change definitely and suddenly.

as ongoing events bring different abstract qualities and concrete things together, — aletheist

It seems reasonable to suppose that some events are or involve "appearances", and that other events are not and do not involve "appearances".

such that the indeterminate possibilities and conditional necessities of the future become the determinate actualities of the past. — aletheist

In what sense are possibilities "indeterminate"?

What are conditional necessities of the future?

If there are such things as conditional necessities of the future, might they imply conditional necessities of the past, not merely determinate actualities of the past?

Time is real because this process and its results are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about them. — aletheist

Objective matters of fact do not seem to depend on our thoughts about them.

But our thoughts about them do seem to depend on their availability in experience, as well as on our conceptual (e.g. linguistic) habits.

To all appearances, the temporal character of experience and of the world that appears to us in experience is an objective matter of fact.

Our grasp of the state of things seems on some occasions and in some respects to change gradually and indefinitely, on other occasions and in other respects to change definitely and suddenly. — Cabbage Farmer

In my view, a definite change is an event, which is always realized at a lapse of time during which the change is strictly continuous. Some events are more abrupt than others; i.e., the lapse of time at which they are realized has a shorter duration, causing them to be perceived as more forceful. However, no event is truly instantaneous.

In what sense are possibilities "indeterminate"? — Cabbage Farmer

They are states of things that may or may not be realized (in the future). Only facts that have been realized (in the past) are determinate.

What are conditional necessities of the future? — Cabbage Farmer

Facts signified by conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood; e.g., "If state of things X were to be realized, then state of things Y would be realized."

If there are such things as conditional necessities of the future, might they imply conditional necessities of the past, not merely determinate actualities of the past? — Cabbage Farmer

I suppose that "conditional necessities of the past" are facts signified by counterfactual propositions; e.g., "If state of things X had been realized, then state of things Y would have been realized."

Objective matters of fact do not seem to depend on our thoughts about them. — Cabbage Farmer

That is exactly what it means for something to be real--it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it.