(1) is the object being something--an object with an essence. So (2) contradicts (1). — Terrapin Station

Sure, if I am referring to the same time, that would be a contradicton, but I'm not. That's the whole point of the argument. It was stated in the argument: "When a particular object comes into existence..." So it is very clear that I am assuming a time prior to the existence of the object. It is a temporal argument, assuming certain things about time and objects, namely that objects come into existence in time.

I'm an anti-realist on essences. Essences are merely a way we think about objects--basically they're our conceptual abstractions, our universals/type categories. So yeah, that's different than an object itself, since objects themselves have no essences. — Terrapin Station

OK, this is why you're having difficulty understanding, you are not apprehending that an object itself necessarily has an essence. I didn't realize that you didn't grasp this necessary part of the argument. In fact, the whole argument refers to the essence which inheres within the object, not an essence within someone's mind.

Do you agree that each and every object is distinguishable from every other object? There is something, or some things, about each object which makes it other than every other object. This is "what the object is", and we call that its essence. The essence is inherent within the object itself, and this is what makes the object itself, what it is, and not some other object.

When we come to know the object, we reproduce that essence within our minds, then we claim to know what the object is. But this is a reproduction of the object's essence, just like the visual image of the object, within your mind, is a reproduction. This reproduction of the essence is not the same thing as the essence which inheres within the object, or else we'd have to conclude that the object is within the person's mind when the person knows the object. But there must be an essence within the object or else there would be nothing which would allow us to distinguish one object from another.

Sure, if I am referring to the same time, that would be a contradicton, but I'm not. That's the whole point of the argument. It was stated in the argument: "When a particular object comes into existence..." So it is very clear that I am assuming a time prior to the existence of the object. It is a temporal argument, assuming certain things about time and objects, namely that objects come into existence in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, you're saying that (1) obtains prior to the object coming to be, which is what makes it contradictory. There's no object to have an essence prior to the object coming to be.

you are not apprehending that an object itself necessarily has an essence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, because that's clearly false.

Do you agree that each and every object is distinguishable from every other object? There is something, or some things, about each object which makes it other than every other object. This is "what the object is", and we call that its essence. The essence is inherent within the object itself, and this is what makes the object itself, what it is, and not some other object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's better known as haecceity. If in your definition, "essence" is the same as "haecceity" I'd say that there is "Metaphysician Undercover 'essence'," but I'd add that's it's incoherent to say that it's anything other than the object itself, so it can't exist (or subsist, or whatever tortured verbiage we'd need to use to refer to it) aside from the object, and I'd also add that it's (the particularness of) every single property of the object itself (which makes it not map well to "essence" in its conventional definition rather than your definition).

When we come to know the object, we reproduce that essence within our minds — Metaphysician Undercover

That I don't at all agree with. I wouldn't say that we reproduce it at all, and we certainly wouldn't reproduce every single property of it. Rather than reproducing it, we perceive it (from a particular reference point only), we either file it with respect to concepts we've already formulated and/or we formulate new concepts about it, etc.

But this is a reproduction of the object's essence — Metaphysician Undercover

You'd not be able to reproduce every single property of it.

This reproduction of the essence is not the same thing as the essence which inheres within the object, or else we'd have to conclude that the object is within the person's mind when the person knows the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That only follows if you believe that what it is to know an object is to know its essence. That's certainly not something I would say.

Right, you're saying that (1) obtains prior to the object coming to be, which is what makes it contradictory. There's no object to have an essence prior to the object coming to be. — Terrapin Station

No! (1) is the existence of the object., the object with essence, or as you say "haecceity". Prior to the existence of the object (object + haecceity) there is only the haecceity of the object, which is necessary in order that the object comes into being as the object which it is, and not something else. Where's the contradiction?

That's better known as haecceity. If in your definition, "essence" is the same as "haecceity" I'd say that there is "Metaphysician Undercover 'essence'," but I'd add that's it's incoherent to say that it's anything other than the object itself, so it can't exist (or subsist, or whatever tortured verbiage we'd need to use to refer to it) aside from the object, and I'd also add that it's every single property of the object itself (which makes it not map well to "essence" in its conventional definition rather than your definition). — Terrapin Station

OK great, we have a term we can agree on then, haecceity (my spell-check doesn't like that, but I'll go with it). You can assert that the haecceity is nothing other than the object itself, but go back to the argument I first presented, replace "essence" with "haecceity", and tell me how it is not necessary to conclude that the haecceity of the object precedes the existence of the object itself.

That I don't at all agree with. I wouldn't say that we reproduce it at all, and we certainly wouldn't reproduce every single property of it. Rather than reproducing it, we perceive it (from a particular reference point only), we either file it with respect to concepts we've already formulated and/or we formulate new concepts about it, etc. — Terrapin Station

Do we perceive the haecceity, or do we perceive the essence?

You'd not be able to reproduce every single property of it. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's exactly the case, and that's why the essence of the object (which is what exists within one's mind), is not the same thing as the haecceity of the object, which is inherent within the object. Now the question is, is it not necessary to assume that the haecceity of the object is prior to the existence of the object itself? If the object comes into existence in time, which is what the argument assumes, then it is necessary to conclude that the haecceity precedes the object in time, in order that the object will come into existence as the object which it does come into existence as, and not something else. If you remove this necessity, then there will be no object coming into existence, only randomness.

Prior to the existence of the object (object + haecceity) there is only the haecceity of the object, — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is what I'm referring to by (1) (It was my formulation after all!--you can't tell me what it was referring to contra what I had in mind!). There is no object to have haecceity prior to the object ___ing to have haecceity. (I used a "blank" because I don't want to fill in a word that you'll misunderstand--whatever you call it. The object has to ____ in order to have haecceity)

(By the way, haecceity always seemed to address a bizarre non-problem to me as a nominalist. I can only imagine that being an issue if someone buys realism for universals. As a nominalist, what's inexplicable is that anyone would have difficulty with why an object is that particular object versus whatever else it could be in their view.)

tell me how it is not necessary to conclude that the haecceity of the object precedes the existence of the object itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's only not necessary to conclude that, but it MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO FRIGGIN SENSE WHATSOEVER to conclude that. There can't be a something of an object prior to there being the object in question. To me it just reads like you must be insane, because the idea is completely incoherent.

Do we perceive the haecceity, or do we perceive the essence? — Metaphysician Undercover

You perceive the object. That's all there is. As I said, the haecceity issue always seemed like a bizarre non-problem to me. But I agree that "this" object is "this" (and not a different one or whatever we'd suppose it might be on whatever bizarre view is fueling the dilemma in the first place).

Yes, that's exactly the case, and that's why the essence of the object (which is what exists within one's mind), is not the same thing as the haecceity of the object, which is inherent within the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

What in the world? You'd just said that we reproduce the object's essence on your view. Now you're agreeing that we cannot do that?

If the object comes into existence in time, — Metaphysician Undercover

An object coming into existence would BE time, by the way. Time is not something that other things happen "in." Time is change/motion itself.

In order that the object will come into existence as the object which it does come into existence as, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

"The object might come into existence as something else" seems completely random--why in the world would anyone believe that, and what might it even mean? (Does it depend on something like a belief that there are substances that are independent of objects? If so, that's a reason that that's a completely ridiculous belief.) Hence why this is a non-problem. You'd have to explain why you believe it's a problem in the first place.

Which is what I'm referring to by (1) (It was my formulation after all!--you can't tell me what it was referring to contra what I had in mind!). There is no object to have haecceity prior to the object ___ing to have haecceity. (I used a "blank" because I don't want to fill in a word that you'll misunderstand--whatever you call it. The object has to ____ in order to have haecceity) — Terrapin Station

Right, we agree that there is no object to have haecceity prior to that object ___ing. Now, what necessitates your claim that the haecceity which the object has, is not prior to the object itself? My argument necessitates the conclusion that the object's haecceity is prior to the object itself.

As a nominalist, what's inexplicable is that anyone would have difficulty with why an object is that particular object versus whatever else it could be in their view.) — Terrapin Station

Well, we notice that objects exist as the particular objects which they are, and being philosophically minded, we want to know why this is the case. Perhaps as a nominalist this does not interest you?

There can't be a something of an object prior to there being the object in question. — Terrapin Station

When the object exists, it has something. We are calling this its haecceity. Why does it make no sense to say that the haecceity exists prior to the object having it? In fact, the argument presented proves that it is necessary to conclude that the haecceity exists prior to the object having it. Your only objection to the argument is that this "MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO FRIGGIN SENSE WHATSOEVER". Does it not make sense to you that my computer existed prior to me having it? Please, explain to me what I am missing, because it's you who's not making any sense whatsoever.

Now, what necessitates your claim that the haecceity which the object has, is not prior to the object itself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah--so you're just getting at the idea of platonic forms, basically? I don't at all buy that ontologically. Only dynamic structures/relations of matter exist, and they're all particulars. (I'm using "exist" there so that it encompasses everything there is in any sense.) So if there was haecceity, or essence, or anything like that, it would necessarily be dynamic structures/relations of matter. Or it would BE a particular object. In my ontology there are no (real) abstracts. Abstracts are concrete mental occurrences--that is, particular concepts held by individuals.

and being philosophically minded, we want to know why this is the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't justify it. You need some reason to wonder why it's the case, including that you'd need to be able to make sense in the first place of the possibility of it not being the case. That's what prompts doing philosophy about why it's the case.

When the object exists, it has something. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that when objects exist, they are something--they're conglomerations (not in any conventional "emergent" sense) of all of the properties of the dynamic structures/relations of the matter in question.

Does it not make sense to you that my computer existed prior to me having it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, of course. So you're saying the essence/haecceity is an object like a computer that other things can then purchase and have possession of, given a concept of ownership?

Perhaps essence involves the combination of logical understandings with sympathetic intuitions/memories of what & how some thing is. A functional or generative definition, providing a dynamic cognitive and sensate(intensive) history of what and how some thing differentiates it from other things.

Ah--so you're just getting at the idea of platonic forms, basically? I don't at all buy that ontologically. Only dynamic structures/relations of matter exist, and they're all particulars. (I'm using "exist" there so that it encompasses everything there is in any sense.) So if there was haecceity, or essence, or anything like that, it would necessarily be dynamic structures/relations of matter. Or it would BE a particular object. In my ontology there are no (real) abstracts. Abstracts are concrete mental occurrences--that is, particular concepts held by individuals. — Terrapin Station

OK, so you're saying that the haecceity is dynamic structures/relations of matter. There's one peculiar problem with this perspective. Matter only exists as objects, and the haecceity of the object is necessarily prior to the object. This means that these relations which matter will have, when it comes into existence as objects, have some sort of existence prior to the matter itself. The relations which the matter will have when it comes into existence must exist as some sort of formula, which determines how the matter will exist, prior to the matter itself existing.

You can relate to this by referring to the so called "laws of nature" as describing these relations. In order that it is true that matter always, and necessarily behave according to the laws of nature, it is necessary that the laws of nature precede matter itself. Otherwise, when matter comes into existence, there would be no pre-existing laws of nature, and matter might not behave according to the laws of nature at this time. But this possibility must be ruled out if it is true that matter always, and necessarily behaves according to the laws of nature.

How can there be something at time T1 that comes into existence as an object at time T2?

The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, the object comes into existence having a haecceity. What we are referring to is the object's haecceity. At T1 the haecceity exists, at T2 the object exists with that haecceity. The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, it's something the object has.

You are having difficulty because you refuse to consider the haecceity as something other than the object itself. But it is something other than the object, that is why one is called the object, and the other is called the haecceity

The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, the object comes into existence having a haecceity. What we are referring to is the object's haecceity. At T1 the haecceity exists, at T2 the object exists with that haecceity. The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, it's something the object has. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but if the object in question only comes into existence at T2, then that particular object doesn't have its essence (or haecceity) at T1, right?

It is fascinating (if somewhat tedious) to watch the centuries-old debate between realism () and nominalism () hashed out all over again.

I'm always good for tedium.

What would philosophy be without it? 8-)

Okay, but if the object in question only comes into existence at T2, then that particular object doesn't have its essence (or haecceity) at T1, right? — Terrapin Station

Correct, but the object's haecceity exists at T1. Now, you've told me that this makes no sense to you, the possibility that the haecceity of the object could exist prior to the object itself, so let's just refer to it as X. So at T1 X exists, and there is no object. At T2 there is an object which has X. At T2 you might call X the object's haecceity. But X at T1 is the very same thing as X at T2, so despite the fact that it doesn't seem right to you to call it the object's haecceity, because the object doesn't exist, nevertheless, it is the same thing as the object's haecceity, so why not call it what it is?

What is the difference between the object's haecceity and the haecceity of the object?

I don't see any difference there. What you seem to be stuck on, is the fact that we can talk about properties which an object will have, prior to the object actually having those properties. So if I am putting new windows in my house, I can talk about my house's new windows, before I install them, or even order them. You want to make it sound improper to talk about my house's new windows prior to the time that the house actually has the new windows. But how would we ever get anything done if we can't talk about the thing to be done prior to doing it?

Maybe I misread that previous post of yours then. I thought you were saying that the haecceity of the object is at T1 but the object's haecceity is only at T2.

Re this last comment, I'd in no way deny that we can talk about something that can come to be. When we talk about it prior to it coming to be, we're imagining it. At that point, something like "My house's new windows" only exist as something we're imagining. That's not what you're saying with "essence precedes existence," though, is it?

That's not what you're saying with "essence precedes existence," though, is it? — Terrapin Station

No, it's clearly not what I am saying, it's just an example of how it is not nonsense to talk about a thing prior to that thing's existence. In order that this is not nonsense, the words must refer to something, but the object itself does not exist. So the words refer to the object's essence, "what" the thing is. This indicates that what the thing is, is something other than the thing itself.

The haecceity of the thing, as a "what" the thing is, is also something other than the thing itself. And according to the argument presented earlier, the haecceity of the thing is prior to the thing itself.

In order that this is not nonsense, the words must refer to something, but the object itself does not exist. So the words refer to the object's essence, "what" the thing is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The words refer to the idea you have, your imagination of it.

No. The words refer to the idea you have, your imagination of it. — Terrapin Station

Call it what you like, "idea" of the object, "essence" of the object, "image" of the object, "what" the object is, it's all the same thing, just different names. The object does not yet exist, but its idea does. This exemplifies how it is not nonsense to say that the haecceity of the object exists, when the object itself does not yet exist. It exists prior to the object's existence in the same way that the idea of the object may exist prior to the object's existence.

Okay, but it's important to clarify that nothing belonging to the object exists prior to the object, nothing that's at all a property of the object, because the object in no way exists prior to the object.

If we're just saying that an idea or imagining that there could be something like a particular object can exist prior to an object, I certainly agree with that--it's the case as long as there are people in the world and those people imagine things. But all that exists in that case (relative to these concerns) are particular brain states. If you want to call that the "'essence' or 'haecceity' of an object" that's fine. In this case, the properties in question are actually properties of brain states.

So then we could say that the essence or haecceity of an object can exist prior to the object, in this particular, idiosyncratic sense of those terms, as long as people exist and they imagine that there could be something like a particular object (and then once an object obtains, people count it as that particular object), but this would only go for a very small percentage of objects (people don't pre-imagine most of the objects in the world), and it would only be the case that essence or haecceity exist prior to the object in question relative to the object in question. That is, essence or haecceity wouldn't precede existence in general/unqualified, because it turns out that people have to exist in order for them to imagine things. So existence comes first in general. In the history of the world, there's nothing like this sense of essence or haecceity until life begins and people evolve, so that we can have people who imagine objects and then who count objects that obtain or that they become aware of after their imagining, as the objects they imagined

But I seriously doubt that the above is anything like what you'd want to say in this regard. After all, if it were all you wanted to say, you could have just started with, "You can imagine an object prior to it existing. That's all I mean by essence preceding existence for a given object." And then I would have noted that that seems to be an unusual way to use the word "essence," and that would have been that.

Okay, but it's important to clarify that nothing belonging to the object exists prior to the object, nothing that's at all a property of the object, because the object in no way exists prior to the object. — Terrapin Station

This is where we disagree. I think that the haecceity, which belongs to the material object, and is specific to that particular object pre-exists the material object. I've produced my argument for this. You haven't yet supported your claim that nothing which is a property of the object could be prior to the object. That X is a property of Y at T2 does not exclude the possibility that X existed at T1 and Y did not.

So then we could say that the essence or haecceity of an object can exist prior to the object, in this particular, idiosyncratic sense of those terms, as long as people exist and they imagine that there could be something like a particular object (and then once an object obtains, people count it as that particular object), but this would only go for a very small percentage of objects (people don't pre-imagine most of the objects in the world), and it would only be the case that essence or haecceity exist prior to the object in question relative to the object in question. That is, essence or haecceity wouldn't precede existence in general/unqualified, because it turns out that people have to exist in order for them to imagine things. So existence comes first in general. In the history of the world, there's nothing like this sense of essence or haecceity until life begins and people evolve, so that we can have people who imagine objects and then who count objects that obtain or that they become aware of after their imagining, as the objects they imagined — Terrapin Station

That an idea of the object is prior to the object, was an example that I used, to show how "what" the object is may be prior to the object. All these things, "idea", "essence", "haecceity", are instances of "what" the object is. I am not saying that the haecceity is an idea, because clearly ideas depend on human existence, as you explain, and the haecceity precedes the existence of the object , as per the argument, so these two are not the same thing.

The issue though, is that the haeccity of each particular object is necessarily prior to that particular object, so by inductive reasoning we can conclude that haecceity is prior to all objects, in a general, and absolute sense.

As for existence in general, I would say that the haecceity exists, prior to the object, though altheist suggested that I switch "being" for "exists" here, which I explained, I think is a mistake. So existence in the most general sense might precede the haeceity of the object. (This is what allows theologians to say that God exists). But the point of the argument is to demonstrate that the haecceity, which is an immaterial, non-physical existent is prior to the physical existence of the object.

Here is a suggestion by which we might resolve the disagreement expressed at the beginning of this post. Let's assume that the haecciety is properly called "the object". "The haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, object X. Then the object exists as the haecceity prior to having a physical presence as a material object. The material existence Y, is the property. Then we have a continuity of existence of the object, and at T1 the object X, has no material presence, but at T2 the object has a material presence, Y. At T1 X is only a haecceity, at T2, X has the property of material existence, Y.

Let's assume that the haecciety is properly called "the object". — Metaphysician Undercover

No problem there (aside from I don't care for "properly called," but I can just ignore that part).

"The haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, object X.

Right.

Then the object exists as the haecceity prior to having a physical presence as a material object.

A big "Huh???" there. That seems like quite a non sequitur.

Also, related to an earlier statement in your post--"But the point of the argument is to demonstrate that the haecceity, which is an immaterial, non-physical existent is prior to the physical existence of the object," if that's what you're referring to by haecceity or essence, then I'd say there's no such thing, period. I don't buy that there are immaterial, nonphysical existents period. In my view, the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. Now, you can see that as not your problem--the idea of nonphysical existents is presumably coherent in your opinion, but without the idea of it being made coherent for me, there's no way I'd agree that something is a nonphysical existent.

The material existence Y, is the property. Then we have a continuity of existence of the object, and at T1 the object X, has no material presence, but at T2 the object has a material presence, Y. At T1 X is only a haecceity,

At T1, X wouldn't be anything if it has no material presence.

You haven't yet supported your claim that nothing which is a property of the object could be prior to the object. That X is a property of Y at T2 does not exclude the possibility that X existed at T1 and Y did not. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's due to the simple fact that what properties are in the first place is identical to (dynamic structures and relations of) matter. Properties are simply what matter/those dynamic structures are relations of matter are "like," the qualities they have, the way they interact with other things, etc. You can't have that if you don't have the dynamic structures and relations of matter in question. As I mentioned earlier, your view seems to at least partially hinge on you believing in substance as something that can then be "bestowed with" particular properties, as if something were passing out properties to otherwise amorphous material stuff. In my opinion that view is incoherent and there's no reason to believe it. Properties are what the material stuff is like, and that's all there is to properties.

The issue though, is that the haeccity of each particular object is necessarily prior to that particular object, so by inductive reasoning we can conclude that haecceity is prior to all objects, in a general, and absolute sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the haecceity of each particular object were necessarily prior to that particular object, then sure, that would follow. But there's no reason to believe that the haecceity of anything is prior to the thing in question--necessarily or not, especially since the idea of that doesn't even make any sense. When you brought this up earlier, I commented on it being a non-problem. There's no reason to wonder why something comes to be as some particular and not something else unless we can even make sense out of that idea. You pretty much just ignored that and didn't bother trying to explain how that idea could make sense in the first place.

Rather than "properties," consider a quality, such as the color red - not a red thing, like a stop sign, but the color red itself, apart from any instantiation of it; not the particular range of electromagnetic wavelengths that correspond to it, or how we perceive it, or even how we imagine it, but what it is in itself. Is the color red, in this sense, real? Does it have being? Does it (in some sense) exist, even when not actualized? I think that I know how you both will answer, but I am hoping that this might help further clarify your disagreement.

Rather than "properties," consider a quality, such as the color red - not a red thing, like a stop sign, but the color red itself, apart from any instantiation of it; not the particular range of electromagnetic wavelengths that correspond to it, or how we perceive it, or even how we imagine it, but what it is in itself. — aletheist

Properties and qualities are synonyms in my view. I don't believe that there is any "red itself" apart from any instantiation of it.

Remember that I'm a nominalist, including that I'm a nominalist in the sense of rejecting realism for abstract existents in general. I don't believe that anything exists (or "subsists" or anything like that) that isn't physical and that isn't a concrete particular.

Also, in general, I don't buy that anything exists if it's not actualized. That's not to say that I reject possibilities (that is, more than one option for future states), although I'll refrain from explaining what I think possibilities amount to so as to not derail the conversation to a big discussion about that instead. I'll only bring that up if it's necessary for the present discussion.

Properties and qualities are synonyms in my view. — Terrapin Station

Agreed, I was just suggesting an example that is more familiar to most people than haecceity; especially since I tend to think of the latter as the distinct property that only actual things have, so that I am not inclined to equate it with essence myself. Instead, it is the brute "here and now" aspect of any individual thing that reacts with other individual things.

Remember that I'm a nominalist, including that I'm a nominalist in the sense of rejecting realism for abstract existents in general. — Terrapin Station

I remember; again, just hoping for clarification.

Also, in general, I don't buy that anything exists if it's not actualized. — Terrapin Station

I know; again, I agree with you, given my terminological preference for limiting "existence" to actuality.

That's not to say that I reject possibilities (that is, more than one option for future states), although I'll refrain from explaining what I think possibilities amount to so as to not derail the conversation to a big discussion about that instead. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. Maybe start a new thread on that topic? Or have you already discussed it at length previously?

I talked about possibility a bit on a couple other threads recently (although really, I can't remember now if it wasn't on another forum, possibly the old "philosophy forum"), but I'm enjoying the conversation with Metaphysician Undercover as it's proceeding in a pretty friendly way where we seem to actually be getting somewhere.

A big "Huh???" there. That seems like quite a non sequitur. — Terrapin Station

Obviously, I included the conclusion of the earlier argument, which demonstrated that the haecceity of the object is prior to the physical presence of the object, as a premise. Your claimed non-sequitur is because you conveniently forgot this conclusion, and didn't include that premise.

I suggested that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, and you claimed to accept this. But I can see now that you do not really accept this. You have not released the idea that the object is necessarily a physical thing. Haecceitty refers to what the object is, and there is no necessity that what the object is physical. This is an unwarranted assumption if you agree to that proposal.

I don't buy that there are immaterial, nonphysical existents period. In my view, the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

OK, you do not really agree then, you insist that an object must be physical. Therefore you do not agree that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing. "The object" is necessarily physical for you, and since I described the haecceity as non-physical, the haecceity is not necessarily physical. If you say that the haecceity is necessarily physical, then we have no agreement.

We will have to resolve the issue of the original argument in another way then. Remember that the argument demonstrates that there is something prior to the physical object, which determines that the physical object will exist as the particular physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. So by inductive reasoning we can say that there is a "determining factor", or "determining factors" which are prior to each and every physical object, and therefore prior to all physical objects. Clearly this is something other than a physical object. Since your claim here is that only physical objects exist, then we have to assign something other than "existence" to the "determining factors".

At T1, X wouldn't be anything if it has no material presence. — Terrapin Station

But we have to respect that argument, which assumes that a physical object cannot be anything other than the physical object which it is, and therefore there must be a determining factor, or determining factors which are prior to that object, ensuring that the object is the physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. This is T1, it is a time prior to the existence of the physical object. We cannot say that the "determining factor" is nothing, because if it were really nothing then it would not have the capacity to determine the particularities of the physical object.

That's due to the simple fact that what properties are in the first place is identical to (dynamic structures and relations of) matter. Properties are simply what matter/those dynamic structures are relations of matter are "like," the qualities they have, the way they interact with other things, etc. You can't have that if you don't have the dynamic structures and relations of matter in question. — Terrapin Station

I think you are misunderstanding something here. You say that properties are what dynamic structures and relations of matter are "like". So "properties" aren't the very same thing as dynamic structures and relations of matter, they are some form of similitude. You observe that the human mind creates these similitudes, as ideas, descriptions of the real dynamic structures and relations of matter. However, you do not take the necessary steps to advance your understanding, to see that the dynamic structures and relations of matter only exist because of the determining factors, and in fact, the dynamic structures and relations of matter are themselves just a similitude of the determining factors. As much as you say that we cannot have ideas about the dynamic structure and relations of matter without the dynamic structures and relations of matter to copy, there cannot be dynamic structures and relations of matter without the determining factors which create these.

There's no reason to wonder why something comes to be as some particular and not something else unless we can even make sense out of that idea. — Terrapin Station

I really don't see the issue here. The world is the way that it is. We notice the contingency of objects, and because of this we can change the world to an extent, to make it be more the way we want it to be. Due to the nature of contingency we can see that it was not necessary that the world came to be in the way that it did. Therefore the question of why the world is the particular world which it is, and not some other world, is a very reasonable question.

Agreed, I was just suggesting an example that is more familiar to most people than haecceity; especially since I tend to think of the latter as the distinct property that only actual things have, so that I am not inclined to equate it with essence myself. Instead, it is the brute "here and now" aspect of any individual thing that reacts with other individual things. — aletheist

Let's assume that the haecceity is as you say "the brute here and now" aspect of any individual thing. We can ask, what constitutes "here and now". Doesn't that particular spatial-temporal position simply define what the object is, in the most simple way? The object which has this very particular position. But space and time are completely conceptual, so how does this conceptualization of the object coexist with the object itself, such that the object has an actual, and real haecceity, rather than just a conceptualized spatial temporal positioning.

But space and time are completely conceptual ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. I lean toward the latter, as I believe you do, and was merely suggesting that there is a distinction between haecceity and essence. It may be just another Peircean terminological preference on my part, like limiting "existence" to actuality.