What we do is assume intention, or purpose, as final cause, without claiming to know the source of that intention. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, in theology they want to go beyond this, to account for the existence of intention in general, as it appears to be a very unusual (unnatural) form of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover
But we do not normally assume intention, or purpose, as final cause in cases where no human is involved. Again, a seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline has a final cause, regardless of whether any intelligent agent (i.e., God) wills it to be so. — aletheist
Some people would see final cause in these instances that you mention, and most of those people would be religious people, and attribute this intention to the Will of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
Physicalists for example claim that all instances of causation are reducible to efficient causation. This is the basis for determinism. So they don't see final cause here at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
My understanding is that Terrapin Station is a physicalist, and yet he is arguing for final causes along lines similar to what I have been saying. I think that it is important to be able to talk about final causation without relying on human and/or divine intentions. — aletheist
If you require every final cause to be identical to some intention in some mind, then I agree that this is the only approach that works; but since it effectively presupposes theism, obviously non-theists will reject it out of hand. — aletheist
Intention is defined by purpose, and I see that living things in general, act with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
Non-living things, such as a ball at the top of an incline, do not have intentions or act with purpose; yet they have final causes, such as coming to rest at the bottom of the incline. — aletheist
I would not say that a ball which roles down a hill is caused to do this by a final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would, and so would others. Per Wikipedia, citing Edward Feser's book on Aquinas: "Finality thus understood is not purpose but that end towards which a thing is ordered. When a match is rubbed against the side of a matchbox, the effect is not the appearance of an elephant or the sounding of a drum, but fire. The effect is not arbitrary because the match is ordered towards the end of fire which is realized through efficient causes." — aletheist
When something like the ball on the hill is ordered towards an end, it is God who is doing this ordering. — Metaphysician Undercover
... we can say that "the match is ordered towards the end of fire", by the will of the human being who struck the match. — Metaphysician Undercover
The laws of nature are what order it toward that end. God is one explanation of those laws, but obviously not the only one. The final cause would still be there, even if it turned out that there is no God; belief in final causes does not entail theism. Final causation has to do with regularities in the universe, not just the intentions of intelligent agents. — aletheist
But fire is no longer "the end". When you remove the intention you no longer have an end. The fire of the match lights something else, and so on. Sure you can say that the match is ordered toward the "end" of fire, but you are just imposing that judgement. It is not a description of what is really happening unless you allow that there is intention ordering the chemicals to an end. It is intention which produces the chemical composition, and intention lights the match. With that intention we have final cause. There is nothing about the chemical composition of the match which gives it an inherent "end" of fire, it could just as well get rained on and rot into the ground. "End" refers to the intended purpose.No, the match is ordered towards the end of fire by its chemical composition and the phenomenon of friction. — aletheist
Those who see it as the laws of nature, see it as efficient cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
The essence of something is that which if you took it away, the identity would change to something else. Identity is usually a convention of language. Humans being the only animals with language, we create identity based on certain measurements/distinctions. Once the convention is established as to the definition of a thing, we can then determine at what point a thing is no longer a thing. Interestingly enough, once a thing has been a thing, it's parts can still be referenced to the prior situation of that thing. A smashed table, can still have legs that once were a part of the thing, but are now its own thing. So oddly, the trace of a thing can not be taken away once it has already been established. The thing can have residual existence beyond its presence as a reference. — schopenhauer1
Identity is usually a convention of language. — schopenhauer1
A smashed table, can still have legs that once were a part of the thing, but are now its own thing. — schopenhauer1
Obviously so, in my opinion, since essences only obtain by there being sentient beings who mentally form type abstractions. — Terrapin Station
Doesn't transformation present a problem for determining 'essence' of some kinds of objects? — Bitter Crank
Does something in the essence of a hammer precede the being of a railroad spike? — Cavacava
We could do with more iconoclasm and less reverence. Plato, Aristotle, etc. were just guys with ideas and biases etc. like the rest of us. — Terrapin Station
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