it's still 'the Earth' we're talking about. — StreetlightX

As long as/insofar as that's what people name it. ;-)

The importance of Kripke's intervention though (imo) has to do with the way in which he tackles questions of modality - that is, necessity and contingency with respecting to naming. For Kripke, a name is necessary - but this necessity is itself contingent (upon what he calls a primal baptism). It's no accident that Kripke more or less invented modal logic. — StreetlightX

A name is necessary in virtue of what? Insofar as rigid designators are used, they appear to me nothing more than signifiers or markers that a particular exists in the way that it does, and that includes possible worlds.

To clarify, necessity here qualifies truth - it is necessarily true that this is Earth - by virtue of it being called that. I'm not sure what it means to speak of "a particular exist[ing] in the way that it does", so I can't really comment on that. Again, naming, not 'existence', is at issue.

it is necessarily true that this is Earth - by virtue of it being called that — StreetlightX

I can't really wrap my head around that statement. Nothing about it meshes with hiw I think about necessity.

Here you go: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#BasChaRigDesTheInt

To clarify, necessity here qualifies truth - it is necessarily true that this is Earth - by virtue of it being called that. I'm not sure what it means to speak of "a particular exist[ing] in the way that it does", so I can't really comment on that. Again, naming, not 'existence', is at issue. — StreetlightX

Naming some thing is about using a sign/symbol to refer to some thing. Rigid designators name some existant, no? They refer to some particular thing - a thing that exists in all possible worlds. The law of identity is necessarily true for any particular existant thing, no? The identity of some thing can be relayed as A = A. So rigid designators simply signify that some existant thing exists, implicitly acknowledging the law of identity when it does.

Rigid designators name some existant, no? They refer to some particular thing - a thing that exists in all possible worlds. — numberjohnny5

If my parents never had children then I would never have been born. The term "I" here is a rigid designator that either refers to a person who doesn't exist in the possible world in which my parents never had children, or doesn't refer to anything in that possible world.

Yeah, that doesn't help. You might as well go "Here you go" and link to the "philosophy" entry or link to the philosophy department of Princeton.

I've read Naming and Necessity, and more than once, though it's been a long time since I read through more than a passage here and there. A lot of it struck me as untenable to put it politely. Same with Kripke's Wittgenstein book. Although admittedly, that's the case for me with the work of every philosopher (other than myself, haha).

I just commented in another thread that I'm like the anti-Sturgeon when it comes to Sturgeon's law, but that's certainly not the case when it comes to people doing philosophy.

Hmm, I'd say the theory is 'existent-neutral' though: it applies to Pegasus no less than it applies to the Eiffel Tower. But perhaps I'm using the word 'existent' in a different way than you. Perhaps a counter question to understand where you're coming from better: what matter if the law of identity is acknowledged or not? Like, what difference does that difference make?

If my parents never had children then I would never have been born. The term "I" here is a rigid designator that either refers to a person who doesn't exist in the possible world in which my parents never had children, or doesn't refer to anything in that possible world. — Michael

So in the possible worlds where you don't exist, all the rigid designator is doing is acknowledging ¬(A=A), therefore, ¬A relative to the possible worlds where you do exist i.e. A = A or A.

Good for you?

I don't at all recall the answer to this, but what did Kripke say about indexicals with respect to rigid designation? I'd be surprised if he considered indexicals to be rigid designators, but maybe he did.

And bad for that usage of "necessity" making sense.

So in the possible worlds where you don't exist, all the rigid designator is doing is acknowledging ¬(A=A), — numberjohnny5

Wait, it wouldn't be denying identity in those possible worlds.

Ah, yes, I remember that time I presented the 'I can't wrap my head around it' argument, coupled with the irrefutable 'it struck me as untenable' corollary that really got me that summa cum laude way back when. Good times.

Hmm, I'd say the theory is 'existent-neutral' though: it applies to Pegasus no less than it applies to the Eiffel Tower. But perhaps I'm using the word 'existent' in a different way than you. Perhaps a counter question to understand where you're coming from better: what matter if the law of identity is acknowledged or not? Like, what difference does that difference make? — StreetlightX

I'm including fictional existents too, like Pegasus, for instance.

The law of identity matters in virtue of this discussion because if it didn't obtain the concept of "rigid designator" wouldn't be useful. Rigid designators only work if the law of identity obtains, and insofar as the latter obtains, rigid designators can be employed. But then, if that's true, then rigid designators are simply signposts that the law of identity obtains in all possible worlds when referring to some X.

Wait, it wouldn't be denying identity in those possible worlds. — Terrapin Station

It would be acknowledging that in some possible worlds A = A for some particular X relative to some possible worlds in which that X doesn't exist (¬(A = A)).

I wish I could remember any time you presented an argument. Argument, of course not referring to degree of verbosity.

~(A=A) would be conventionally read as negating identity in general. Rather you'd be saying something like (∃w) (~A) & (A-->(A=A)) . . . Although that last part should be more along the lines of "insofar as there is A in any world, then . . ." but there's no way to formalize that that I know of.

Dude, I intervened to try and clean up some misconceptions in the thread, I legit don't care about your dinner table opinions like 'I dont get it'.

~(A=A) would be conventionally read as negating identity in general. Rather you'd be saying something like (∃w) (~A) & (A-->(A=A)) . . . Although that last part should be more along the lines of "insofar as there is A in any world, then . . ." but there's no way to formalize that that I known of. — Terrapin Station

Ah, thanks for letting me know; I've not studied predicate logic yet.

The idea is rather that it's not clear in the slightest what necessity would refer to in any sense (logical, metaphysical, whatever) if necessity fits that example.

Of course, you can just ignore that, and you probably will, but it doesn't help that usage of the term make any sense.

The law of identity matters in virtue of this discussion because if it didn't obtain the concept of "rigid designator" wouldn't be useful. Rigid designators only work if the law of identity obtains, — numberjohnny5

I still don't understand your conditional: "if the law of identity didn't obtain the RD wouldn't be useful"... But useful for what? What (as-yet-unspoken) premise gives rise to this 'if'?

I still don't understand your conditional: "if the law of identity didn't obtain the RD wouldn't be useful"... But useful for what? — StreetlightX

Useful as a signifier/marker/signpost that the law of identity obtains for existents insofar as one can make references to existents. That's the only use or function I see RD's having.

Necessity qualifies truth. This is rigid designation 101 dude, if this confuses you maybe you need to read the book again?

So... If the law of identity didn't obtain, the concept of the rigid designator wouldn't be useful... as a signpost that the law of identity obtains?

So... If the law of identity didn't obtain, the concept of the rigid designator wouldn't be useful as a signpost that the law of identity obtains? — StreetlightX

Yes, as I said in previous posts, the law of identity is implied when using RDs to refer. I can't think of another use for RDs in terms of what's entailed if and when they're employed.

Truth, dude, truth. The whole payoff of the theory has to do with truth.

Necessity qualifies truth. — StreetlightX

Duh.

There's no standard sense of "necessity" in light of which it's necessarily true that something is called by a particular name simply by virtue of being called ("baptized as") that name.

Standard sense? Author and publishing date pls.