Truth, dude, truth. The whole payoff of the theory has to do with truth. — StreetlightX
That's... really not it but OK man — StreetlightX
Indeed, and the LOI is necessarily true, hence how RDs just "pick out" or signify some existant among and relative to others in lieu of LOI obtaining. — numberjohnny5
Standard sense? Author and publishing date pls. — StreetlightX
The importance of Kripke's intervention though (imo) has to do with the way in which he tackles questions of modality - that is, necessity and contingency with respecting to naming. For Kripke, a name is necessary - but this necessity is itself contingent (upon what he calls a primal baptism). It's no accident that Kripke more or less invented modal logic. It's where all the good stuff is. — StreetlightX
Standard sense=a way a term is normally, conventionally used, at least in a particular milieu (so in this case, philosophy, and we could specifically say both metaphysics/ontology and modal logic). So it's not specific to a particular author. — Terrapin Station
Yea. But a strong adherence to the LOI is a route to hard determinism, which is a feature of human thought, but the opposite is also there, manifest in words like could, would, and should. — Mongrel
And anytime someone says Kripke is dealing with essences, you can be 100% sure they don't know what they are talking about. — StreetlightX
(Interestingly, Barack Obama is used as an example in that article, too. Great minds think alike. ;)) — Michael
If I may, one way to think about this is to consider what allows you to speak of two worlds with different Obamas in the first place. Kripke's point is that your very ability to speak of two different Obamas, has, as it's prerequisite, the ability to think of an entity designated Obama of whom 'can speak mandarin' can be predicated of (or not) in the first place. That is, you wouldn't even understand what it means to speak of 'two different Obamas' had you not already had some idea of a 'an Obama' which can be in some way different in two different worlds to begin with. Otherwise it wouldn't be two different Obamas, it would be two different people altogether. You wouldn't be able to speak of 'different Obamas'. This is why a proper name is a rigid designator: it designates the same thing in all possible worlds. — StreetlightX
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