Thanks for the helpful clarification. A few quick follow-up questions ...

1. Is it fair to say that physicalism is your most fundamental view here, since it seems to be the primary basis for your rejection of universals?

2. If ideas are not properly characterized as nonphysical existents, then what exactly are they?

3. What minimum interval of time is required for an object to become a different object - i.e., something with different properties?

1. Is it fair to say that physicalism is your most fundamental view here, since it seems to be the primary basis for your rejection of universals? — aletheist

I wouldn't personal use the phrase "most fundamental," but it's definitely one of my core views.

If ideas are not properly characterized as nonphysical existents, then what exactly are they?

Ideas, and all mental phenomena, are specific brain states.

What minimum interval of time is required for an object to become a different object - i.e., something with different properties?

An object changing or in motion is what time is in my ontology. So whatever the smallest change would be, including the smallest relational change with respect to other objects.

I wouldn't personal use the phrase "most fundamental," but it's definitely one of my core views. — Terrapin Station

I guess what I meant to ask is this: Do you reject the reality of universals because you embrace physicalism, or do you embrace physicalism because you reject the reality of universals?

Ideas, and all mental phenomena, are specific brain states. — Terrapin Station

In that case, how is it that multiple brains can instantiate the same idea, or that a single brain can maintain the same idea over time? Or is it your view that no two ideas (brain states) are truly the same?

An object changing or in motion is what time is in my ontology. — Terrapin Station

As a thought experiment, what if one object changes, but another does not (at all)? Has time passed for the second object, simply because the first object changed, no matter how spatially distant the two objects are?

So whatever the smallest change would be, including the smallest relational change with respect to other objects. — Terrapin Station

That was my basic question - what is the smallest possible change, and how much time does it take for it to happen? Said another way, how many changes occur to an object in one second of time - i.e., how many different objects come into and out of existence during that interval?

Don't leave out "in this way"... that "the world logically precedes what we say about it".

There is an interpretation under which Sartre is both correct and profound. With common objects, that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same. With humans, that they are and what they are differ - at least while they have the capacity for choice.

I'm not overly happy with "existence precedes essence" as a summation of this idea. the terms essence and existence are fraught with misunderstanding, and precedes is ambiguous.

A brief critique of essence.

An essence of some item is the set of properties that are necessary and sufficient for some thing to be that item.

A necessary property of some item is one that is correctly attributed to that item in all possible worlds.

It is a trivial exercise to posit a possible world in which any particular property associated with an item is absent from that item.

Therefore the notion of essence is incoherent.

This is just a generalisation of Kripke's Thales example.

Such suggestions aren't exactly trival though, for many different idenities extend beyond a singular moment. One may, for example, suggest a possible world where I sprout gills. The property of "no gills" is not actually necessary to me, a human, at all. There are many such changes I might undergo which are thought impossible by "what properties Willow must necesarily have."

The notion of "essence" is incoherent, but Kripke's approach only leads to people asserting it under the guise of what's necessary to a thing-- e.g. "I'm human, so I can't possibly have gills at any time."

Sartre's point is "essence" is entirely incohrent. There are no properties which necessary belong to anything. Not only does it not make sense to pose something without its necessary properties, but the idea of necessary properties within existence is itself entirely mistaken.

Rather than trivial, suggesting something might be other than properties associated with it, picks out a possible outcome.

Existence always has power over "essence"-- my properties can always change because they are an expression of my existence, rather than a rule of what I necesarily am. "Existence before essence" means that presence (whatever it might be) has primacy over associated properties (essence).

What defines a thing is not a notion of what properties are necesarily to it, but rather its existence.

"Existence before essence" means that presence (whatever it might be) has primacy over associated properties (essence). — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think so. It's more like the measurement problem. Sartre was a wild guy. He was in the French Resistance during WW2.

Can we be clear that for Sartre "existence precedes essence" only in the case of humans. Willow's last appears to me to confuse this.

What is special about people, as opposed to chairs and hills, is that they get to choose what they are.

Did you choose what you are?

I guess what I meant to ask is this: Do you reject the reality of universals because you embrace physicalism, or do you embrace physicalism because you reject the reality of universals? — aletheist

The latter definitely isn't the case--I don't think that all there is to physicalism is antirealism on universals.

I wouldn't necessarily say that the former is the case, though, either. I see them as consistent with each other, not dependent on each other.

In that case, how is it that multiple brains can instantiate the same idea, or that a single brain can maintain the same idea over time? Or is it your view that no two ideas (brain states) are truly the same? — aletheist

The latter. Again, this is consistent with nominalism.

As a thought experiment, what if one object changes, but another does not (at all)? Has time passed for the second object, simply because the first object changed, no matter how spatially distant the two objects are? — aletheist

Yes--time has passed for the objects. This is what I meant by "including the smallest relational change with respect to other objects."

what is the smallest possible change, and how much time does it take for it to happen? Said another way, how many changes occur to an object in one second of time - i.e., how many different objects come into and out of existence during that interval? — aletheist

The smallest possible change is just the slightest motion or change of position (of at least a part or a relation to another object then). Time "passing" simply is these changes. A second, per the International System of Units, is defined simply by transitional states of cesium 133 atoms for example. So we're just talking about motion relative to other motion. I have no idea what, relative to seconds as defined above, the "smallest possible change" would be, but that will simply be an empirical issue to answer.

Don't leave out "in this way"... that "the world logically precedes what we say about it". — Banno

I wasn't leaving that out. I don't know why you'd say that we can't separate what is said from what it is about so that one logically precedes the other.

With common objects, that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same. With humans, that they are and what they are differ - at least while they have the capacity for choice. — Banno

I don't really get what you're saying here. Why would that something is a human and that the human exists not be "much the same" (and just because humans are able to make choices?) I don't get what the distinction between "that they are" and "what they are" would be so that it's different for humans than chairs.

And precedes is ambiguous. — Banno

? What are some of the different definitions "precedes" suggests to you?

What about final causation, which is often subsequent (temporally) to the effect? — aletheist

I don't think final cause is subsequent to the effect. "Final cause" refers to the intent which brings about the existence of the object. Otherwise you would have the object being the cause of itself.

Even most efficient causation is really simultaneous with the effect, rather than prior to it; e.g., application of force to a mass causes acceleration, which ceases when the force is removed. — aletheist

The acceleration is subsequent to the application of force, this is evident from the way that physicists describe this as the kinetic energy of the object which acts as the force is converted to potential energy and this is converted to the kinetic energy of the object which accelerates.

Some people use "cause" as a synonym for "reason"--a la "what's the reason" for something, where they're looking for an explanation or simply for something to be put into other words. That's different than a cause in the other sense. You seemed to be conflating the two at times. — Terrapin Station

Yes, there are times when people use "reason" to be synonymous with "cause", but not all uses of "reason" are synonymous with "cause". When "reason" is used as synonymous with "cause", then a temporal order is implied.

With common objects, that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same. With humans, that they are and what they are differ - at least while they have the capacity for choice. — Banno

Since many different objects exist, and the chair is only one of them, how is it that you can say "that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same"? The table exists, and it's not a chair, so clearly, that it is exists, and that it is a chair, are completely different things, or else the table would also be a chair, because it exists.



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Sartre does focus on human and their decision making and relationships. My point was about the logical structure of what he's trying to say-- what "existence preceeds essence" is getting at. His "freedom" is a forerunner of radical contingency, limited more or less to human actions and idenities.

Humans are no doubt special in that they have particular awareness and self-direction.

Choice is sort of a reflection of radical contingency. In having choice, humans are not bound to any predetermined outcome. Their acts have to make what happens.

I see them as consistent with each other, not dependent on each other. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough, thanks.

The smallest possible change is just the slightest motion or change of position (of at least a part or a relation to another object then). Time "passing" simply is these changes. — Terrapin Station

Does this entail that space and time are discrete, rather than continuous? If not, why not?

Yep.

The point is measurement problems are incohrent because one does not achieve knowledge by relying on a set of associated properties.

To understand a state, one has to grasp the thing that exists. "Essence" is not a description or measurement of anything. It's just someone pretending to know what something must be.

"Final cause" refers to the intent which brings about the existence of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that intent is not realized until the object exists and is employed for that purpose. In that sense, the final cause is subsequent to the event. Besides, human purposes are not the only kind of final cause.

The acceleration is subsequent to the application of force ... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the (instantaneous) acceleration is simultaneous with the application of the force; F=ma at any given time.

Yes, there are times when people use "reason" to be synonymous with "cause", but not all uses of "reason" are synonymous with "cause". When "reason" is used as synonymous with "cause", then a temporal order is implied. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone could say, "What's the cause of the ∃ symbol in logic?" Where what they're asking is for an explanation of it: "It's the existential quantifier--you can read it as 'there exists a(n)'"

Does this entail that space and time are discrete, rather than continuous? If not, why not? — aletheist

I wouldn't say it implies either. Again, that's just going to turn out to be an empirical issue (if it's indeed something we can discover).

The point is measurement problems are incohrent because one does not achieve knowledge by relying on a set of associated properties.

To understand a state, one has to grasp the thing that exists. "Essence" is not a description or measurement of anything. It's just someone pretending to know what something must be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think this has anything at all to do with Sartre.

I don't know why you'd say that we can't separate what is said from what it is about so that one logically precedes the other. — Terrapin Station

To be clear, what is said and what it is about are quite distinct: one is words, the other a thing. That's not at issue.

What I was pointing out to Willow is that the world is all that is the case - to be is to be the subject of a predicate; it's words all the way down.

This branch of the discussion goes thus: Willow says "A"; Banno says "~A". Terrapin says "B" as if it meant "~~A".

We are talking about different things.

It has plenty to do with it-- this is what "bad faith" is about. People deny their responsibility by claiming to measure who people must be. The "measurement" of "It's my nature. I necessarily cannot do anything else" is Sartre's major target.

But that intent is not realized until the object exists and is employed for that — aletheist

As I understand final cause, it always precedes the thing brought about, as the intent to bring that thing about. I don't understand what you mean by the intent is not realized until later, the intent is real, as the cause of the free will act which causes the thing to be brought about.

Besides, human purposes are not the only kind of final cause. — aletheist

Could you give me an example of final cause which is not human intent?

No, the (instantaneous) acceleration is simultaneous with the application of the force; F=ma at any given time. — aletheist

F=ma is not an expression of causation though.

Someone could say, "What's the cause of the ∃ symbol in logic?" Where what they're asking is for an explanation of it: "It's the existential quantifier--you can read it as 'there exists a(n)'" — Terrapin Station

That really appears like a misuse of the word 'cause' to me, and a real stretch of the imagination on your part. If someone used cause in that way, to ask for the meaning of a symbol, how would you know what the person was talking about? If I asked you what's the cause of "3", or what's the cause of "sun", would you know that I was asking you for the meaning of these symbols?

It seems to me that, on your view, there would have to be some minimum amount of change (or motion) associated with a minimum interval of time; otherwise, nothing would ever change (or move), and there would be no time. Hence space and time must be discrete. If they were truly continuous, then "adjacent" states would be indistinguishable.

It would be a contradiction because it would mean a thing was present without its meaning. My computer cannot exist prior to expressing the meaning of that computer. No doubt many things have existed before my computer, but they are not the something which is my computer.

The meaning of an a existing thing is always expressed when it exists. The existence of my computer cannot preceed being that computer.

P is X, the subject state, whatever that might be.

Can we be clear that for Sartre "existence precedes essence" only in the case of humans.

What is special about people, as opposed to chairs and hills, is that they get to choose what they are. — Banno

Again, for Sartre, essence and existence can correspond for ordinary things; but what makes an individual human distinct is that they become what they are only after they exist. Hence the 'precedes' in his aphorism is temporal.

It just seems to me that if we are going to criticise Sartre, we should start by agreeing as to what he said.

I don't understand what you mean by the intent is not realized until later ... — Metaphysician Undercover

I intend to drive some nails. I make a hammer accordingly. The final cause of the hammer is not achieved until I actually drive the nails with it - after I have made it.

Could you give me an example of final cause which is not human intent? — Metaphysician Undercover

The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food.

F=ma is not an expression of causation though. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is an expression of the relation between force, mass, and acceleration. If you apply a certain force to a certain mass, a certain acceleration will simultaneously occur.

I don't know what you'd take meaning to refer to. It's definitely different than what I take it to refer to.

More or less the predicate, I think. In this case there is X (a thing) which is a computer. How would one have the existence of this computer prior to that predicate being expressed in the world?

It's impossible. X, the computer, cannot be prior to the computer. When X is a computer, it must always express the meaning of computer, else we would be claming there was a computer before the computer was there.