On the other hand, all action and investigation is conducted on the basis of tacit meanings -- otherwise it'd be a matter of pure instinct. — Xtrix
I haven't seen that it's been very successful in resolving philosophical issues.
I'm not convinced about this, although perhaps it doesn't matter to the point you are making. I remember having sciatic pain described to me, before I ever had sciatica, as like having streaks of burning electricity pulsing down the leg. Then, one day, I felt something those words described well and it occurred to me that I was sufferring from sciatica, and my self diagnosis turned out to be spot on. So, whilst I certainly cannot feel another person's pain for them, just as I cannot doff their cap for them, I can feel same pain another person feels, I can take the cap from their head and doff with it myself, and we can, it seems, usefully describe to each other exactly what it is we are feeling. But perhaps there is a way of interpreting that story as well such that the inner drops out of the picture.What is hidden, if anything, is what pain feels like for me, compared to what it feels like for you. Is it the same? We can't talk about it, so who knows?
I remember having sciatic pain described to me, before I ever had sciatica, as like having streaks of burning electricity pulsing down the leg. Then, one day, I felt something those words described well and it occurred to me that I was sufferring from sciatica, and my self diagnosis turned out to be spot on. So, whilst I certainly cannot feel another person's pain for them, just as I cannot doff their cap for them, I can feel same pain another person feels, I can take the cap from their head and doff with it myself, and we can, it seems, usefully describe to each other exactly what it is we are feeling. — jkg20
For example, a still very common idea, often attributed to John Locke and openly embraced by Jerry Fodor in the nineteen seventies, is that interpersonal spoken communication works by speakers’ translation of their internal mental vocabularies into sounds followed by hearers’ re-translation into their own internal vocabularies. Again, Descartes considered himself able to talk to himself about his experiences while claiming to be justified in saying that he does not know (or not until he has produced a reassuring philosophical argument) anything at all about an external world conceived as something independent of them. And he and others have thought: while I may make mistakes about the external world, I can infallibly avoid error if I confine my judgments to my immediate sensations. (Compare The Principles of Philosophy, I, 9.) Again, many philosophers, including John Stuart Mill, have supposed there to be a problem of other minds, according to which I may reasonably doubt the legitimacy of applying, say, sensation-words to beings other than myself.
In each of these examples, the implication is that the internal vehicle of my musings could in principle be private (as Kenny [1966, p. 369] showed, this vehicle does not have to be a language for the argument to apply to it): for these problems and theories even to make sense, sharability must be irrelevant to meaning and it must be at least conceivable that my knowledge, even my understanding, is necessarily confined to my own case.
Point taken, descriptions of pains often resort to metaphor. But how about descriptions of afterimages? It doesn't seem to be a metaphorical or non literal use of colour and shape vocabularly when we describe them.I had considered this sort of thing, but I wonder if it isn't more of a comparison - a simile or metaphor - rather than a direct description.
The difference is, obviously, the pain (having it or not having it). What is hidden, if anything, is what pain feels like for me, compared to what it feels like for you. Is it the same? We can't talk about it, so who knows? It won't affect the meaning or use of the word 'pain' anyway. Regardless of what it feels like internally for each of us, reactions to pain, or pain behaviours, tend to appear similar across genuine cases, which may help to explain why someone can pretend to be in pain. This public exhibition also seems the more likely determinant of the meaning/use of the word 'pain'. — Luke
Therefore we have to turn to the internal thing, the thing which is called pain, to establish principles to differentiate real pain behaviour from mock pain behaviour. This is where Wittgenstein fails as you describe. "The private sensation is real, but nothing can be said about it; nothing further about it can be described or discussed in our public language." By claiming nothing can be said about this internal, private thing, he leaves us completely vulnerable, without any principles to address deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
reactions to pain, or pain behaviours, tend to appear similar across genuine cases — Luke
But it wasn't. Their cosmology was wrong. — Marchesk
The point is that debating meanings does not resolve debates such as realism/idealism, because the nature of the world does not depend on our language usage. Nor does our ability to know, for that matter. — Marchesk
In either case, we have spoken about it in words. Wittgenstein is giving us what address the the deception in speech: there is no private language, the so called "private" thing was never private in the first place. — TheWillowOfDarkness
In either case, we have spoken about it in words. Wittgenstein is giving us what address the the deception in speech: there is no private language, the so called "private" thing was never private in the first place. — TheWillowOfDarkness
"Feels like" has similar publicity. I can know what other people feel. My experience may take on similar sensation. Here the topic has moved on from words. In this situation, we are not asking about what words are used, but whether someone feels the same as another. It's not a move from words to knowledge, but a sensation experience all along. — TheWillowOfDarkness
When we are dealing with publicity, we are dealing with whether some people feel or understand as others do, whether it be a language, what happened yesterday or what someone is feeling. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Let me just make sure I understand your position. You believe that pain involves three things:
1. Pain behaviour, including talk, which is entirely public.
2. A sensation of pain, private to the person feeling pain that nobody else but that person can get access to.
3. Something, that the above mentioned sensation represents, and that nobody has any understanding of, including the person feeling the sensation.
I'm not asking for your arguments or your reasons for thinking this for the moment, I just want to make sure I've been able to extract the basis of your position from everything you have been saying. — jkg20
But how about descriptions of afterimages? It doesn't seem to be a metaphorical or non literal use of colour and shape vocabularly when we describe them. — jkg20
This is where Wittgenstein fails as you describe. "The private sensation is real, but nothing can be said about it; nothing further about it can be described or discussed in our public language." By claiming nothing can be said about this internal, private thing, he leaves us completely vulnerable, without any principles to address deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wrong to us, yes. But this itself assumes some correspondence theory of truth about something "out there." — Xtrix
However, you might have a more restrictive notion of what it would take to resolve a philosophical issue than I do. You may even have a more restrictive notion of what counts as a philosophical issue in the first place. — jkg20
But surely "debates such as realism/idealism" do "depend on our language usage". If we are going to debate e.g. "the nature of the world", then we have to do it using language, no? — Luke
Even though we have to use it? — Luke
But pehaps your point is that philosophy itself is futile. — jkg20
No, it makes the debate dependent on them. — Luke
Well, your position is not too far away from Wittgenstein's then. He was pretty clear that once you make the questions you are asking clear, either they will turn out to be addressable by science, or they will rest philosophical ones. — jkg20
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