Not so. If other kinds of claims can be assigned truth values on some other grounds than empiricism, then they can be manipulated through truth-functional logic just the same. The logic doesn’t care what the truth values mean or where they come from. — Pfhorrest

I meant what I said from Wittgenstein's perspective at the time of writing the Tractatus, I am not putting forward any ideas of my own. And I think that W's truth-tables and truth-grounds concern the propositions that make sense only, that point as arrows to somewhere in the world, to the facts, those things that we can have a picture of. For everything else, I don't think he would use truth-functional logic.

I think that the idea of knowing when to be silent is good – it's just that here it's too obviously tied to present theoretical prejudices. — Snakes Alive

What prejudices? What do you mean?

When a person makes what are supposed to be truth statements about the world, then later admits that those statements are really "senseless", then I think we can conclude that the person has come to the realization that those truth statements are really not truthful at all, and therefore wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I believe it is so, but only if there is nothing else but true/false, right/wrong. However if there are other things in-between or elsewhere, then it is a different matter, which I believe is what W. was getting at.

The Wittgensteinian notion of how language works comes from the idea of the world being composed of a Humean mosaic of atomic facts, and the idea that the purpose of language is to say true or false things under certain conditions. It follows from this that for a sentene to have sense is just to carve exactly the set of atomic facts to which it corresponds against those to which it doesn't. The rest of the Tractatus, past the mystical and transcendental stuff, just falls out of that. You can see it as not an account of what language is, but what it would have to be if this picture were right. So Witt. has comments about how everything in natural language must be in order in this way, even though we can't tell how it is and empirically it doesn't look that way. The prejudices are guiding the account of language, not vice-versa.

So Witt's idea of when to be silent is just whenever this mosaic isn't being carved up into 'yes' and 'no.' But then, this isn't how science, language, etc. work. So it's not quite so clear when to be silent or not.

Russell said at some point that what they were trying to do was to break with the idealism of the time. Most probably he meant what we now call "continental philosophy". Analytic philosophy, as it came to be, is a critique and reaction to that, I think. And the Tractatus heralds this attack on what philosophers up to that time were doing, by heavily criticizing their very bone and tool they were using to convey their ideas, what else, language that is. I mean, analytic philosophers wouldn't meet the continentals in their own battlefield, contesting whether they were right or wrong, e.g. on the matter of free will or ethics or metaphysics, but by showing that their project was futile from the beginning, because they didn't understand the logic of language, they didn't even know what they were saying. And this, I think, is what makes the Tractatus so innovative.

And what is this logic of language that makes metaphysics meaingless? I havent seen any particular examples. What's a truth that the philosophy of language can prove?

I'm not saying it's not innovative in its own right, but the line of attack you just outlined had been part of English philosophy at least since Hume, and arguably since Locke. The idea that philosophers' projects are doomed because they don't understand the logic of the language they used to make their claims is quite old, and the empiricists spent a huge amount of time talking about it.

Their solutions were slightly different, in that they had to do with words untraceable to perceptual sources, but even that reappeared in the positivists. Wittgenstein's entire conception of science, what a fact is, etc., are Humean.

Wittgenstein's entire conception of science, what a fact is, etc., are Humean. — Snakes Alive

I'm curious as to how a humean fact differs from , say a Kantian fact...?

A Kantian fact is phenomena acting almost always in accord with what seems reasonable and orderly. With Humean facts, anything is possible at any time

The Wittgensteinian notion of how language works comes from the idea of the world being composed of a Humean mosaic of atomic facts, and the idea that the purpose of language is to say true or false things under certain conditions. — Snakes Alive

I have no idea of what you mean by 'humean mosaic of atomic facts', but in any case, yes, W's purpose of language I believe it is "to say true or false things under certain conditions". Like if I say "I went to the supermarket and bought myself a beer, then went back home and drank it", this would be a perfect example of how language is used, and one could hold me in check on whether I was saying something true or false, by making a picture of what I was saying and comparing this to the actual, for example if there were cameras everywhere, even in my own appartment, to corroborate my story.

It follows from this that for a sentence to have sense is just to carve exactly the set of atomic facts to which it corresponds against those to which it doesn't. — Snakes

The sentence, "I went to the supermarket and bought myself a beer, then went back home and drank it", has perfect sense no matter what, because it points to facts in the world, but it can be either true or false, false if for example I got myself some milk, or if I went to the theater instead, or if I put the beer in the fridge and not drank it (not gonna happen). But maybe you are saying something else.

The rest of the Tractatus, past the mystical and transcendental stuff, just falls out of that. You can see it as not an account of what language is, but what it would have to be if this picture were right. So Witt. has comments about how everything in natural language must be in order in this way, even though we can't tell how it is and empirically it doesn't look that way. The prejudices are guiding the account of language, not vice-versa. — Snakes

The Tractatus, in my eyes, is just saying that language mirrors facts in the world, that it is/was designed to do this, and nothing more. I don't think that W. says what language is supposed to be, he just makes this observation, whether he is right or wrong. And, based on this, he goes on to talk about the abuse of language when people, philosophers mainly, use it wrongfully. But then again, we can discuss.

Humean vs Kantian first bring to my mind their disagreement on the existence of moral facts and moral beliefs. Hume thinks there are only desires, which are not truth-apt, while Kant thinks there are genuine moral beliefs that correspond to some “queer” kind of moral fact.

Necessity applies to the phrase "all bachelors are unmarried." It is contingent whether a horse is black or not. Russell said he couldn't fathom how these concepts could be applied to the world at large, but to many people these ideas have meaning. It's impossible to eradicated these thoughts from human thinking by focusing on grammer. Again, Wittgenstein started a hoax

I have no idea of what you mean by 'humean mosaic of atomic facts', — Pussycat

Then read more! Consider: the reason you don't know what I mean is the same reason you take the Tractatus to be so original: ignorance of the history of philosophy. If you knew what the empiricists had said for example, you'd never think that the tactic of treating philosophers' statements as meaningless rather than wrong, due to them misunderstanding how language works, was original to Wittgenstein.

In general, we tend to think great figures are more original than they are, because we read them in isolation. Once we read more widely, this illusion disappears.

The Tractatus, in my eyes, is just saying that language mirrors facts in the world, that it is/was designed to do this, and nothing more. I don't think that W. says what language is supposed to be, he just makes this observation, whether he is right or wrong. And, based on this, he goes on to talk about the abuse of language when people, philosophers mainly, use it wrongfully. But then again, we can discuss. — Pussycat

The point is that Wittgenstein's early view of language is not based on observation of how language actually works, but on how it must work if the presuppositions he has hold. You basically just recapitulated that very thought process to me in your post.

A Humean fact is one that is totally causally and logically disconnected from every other. Its holding or not holding in principle has no effect on whether any other such fact holds or doesn't hold.

So you imagine the world, like Wittgenstein's picture of the paper divided into pixels, like a mosaic of black-or-white dots, each of which have only two possible values, and the value of each of which is utterly and completely distinct from the values of the others (any combination is possible). Recall that from this, W. concludes in the Tractatus that causality is superstition (Hume speaking).

And of course, we have to remember that when we say 'Hume speaking,' this is an abbreviation for Berkeley speaking, who is Locke speaking...and all the way down (read Epicurus, for example!).

Ah, so Humean facts are the sort that are true or false, while Kantian facts are more ill-defined.

That's not what I said! Please read the post again!

Yes, Mum.

So, a Kantian fact...?

I never said anything about 'Kantian facts.' I'll leave it to anyone who wants to try to exposit Kant. I'm not sure if that's even a term people use.

Hume tried to make metaphysics NOT make sense, instead of working around doubts and reduction. That's like Wittgenstein. I don't see what lock has to do with this. And Berkeley thought the world was a union of our thoughts with God's thoughts, surely meaningless to Wittgenstein. Psychologism is more what Wittgenstein was after, although he wanted to keep certain logical truths objective

The Tractatus, in my eyes, is just saying that language mirrors facts in the world, that it is/was designed to do this, and nothing more. — Pussycat

Isn't the point to say/show what lies outside, or at the limit, of this picture of atomic facts/language/the world, such as the human subject, ethics, and that which can only be shown but not said?

Hume tried to make metaphysics NOT make sense, instead of working around doubts and reduction. That's like Wittgenstein. I don't see what lock has to do with this. — Gregory

Locke (along with Hobbes) postulated that philosophers were prone to talking nonsense, due to not understanding the functions of their language, and in particular due to not associating their words with perceptually-rooted ideas.

Nor am I. So your point is that Wittgenstein feasts with Hume's fork? That's pretty accurate.

But if that is a critique, then some alternative should be offered.

Actually, I hadn't considered that PI might be seen as a rejection of Hume's fork by Wittgenstein. That's an interesting point. Is that your claim?

No – Im not really sure what you're talking about, sorry. There must be some fundamental miscommunication between us.

:grin:

Have I misunderstood? Hume's fork is the distinction between facts on the one hand and relations of ideas on the other. I had taken you to be saying that this is something that Wittgenstein makes use of in the Tractatus - and that seems to me to be right, with elementary propositions in the place of facts and logical space in the place of relations between ideas.

And following this line, the PI is a rejection of Hume's fork, in which what is to count as a fact cannot be made distinct from the relationship of ideas; what counts as simple depends on what one is doing.

I find that intriguing.

Wittgenstein insists on nominalism because of his horror over Hegel on one side and Catholic scholasticism on the other. Descartes had already pointed out the weakness of the nuances of the "schoolmen" of his day, but on the basis that those matters had no solution for our limited minds. Descartes did not say the thousands of Thomist and Scotian subtleties were meaningless. He said they were unprovable ideas. I find them good for mental training. I love reading Edward Feser, even though I disagree with all his argumentation

The following problems I find meaningful and interesting

1) can something be partially true and partially false? How?

2) can something be both real and unreal?

3) can something be composed of both thought AND matter?

4) can spiritual and material refer to the same thing

I like variety in my garden. I just wish Wittgenstein had had a good conversation with Charles Sanders Peirce

Wittgenstein insists on nominalism because of his horror over Hegel on one side and Catholic scholasticism on the other. — Gregory

Rather infamously, Wittgenstein had little background in the history of philosophy.

So I'm wondering if you just made this up. Show me that I'm wrong.

1. Have you stoped beating your wife?
2. Pink Floyd - they're unreal.
3. Mortgages.
4...


Now what does thins have to do with the Tractatus?

Wittgenstein says my questions are meaningless, as you have. They make sense to me, maybe for psychological reasons but not because of semantical mistakes. Wittgenstein read Plato but not Aristotle. Everyone back then knew of the scholastic subtleties. Finally, Russell started this "it's language problem" phenomena is response to Hegel