When there is similarity in the occurrence of complex events, it's not a matter of random chance or coincidence, and this allows us to produce scientific laws, and make predictions.

That there are scientific laws that are used to predict and model observable behaviour, no one would deny. Philosophical contention begins when one adopts more than an instrumentalist view of those laws and then, further, assumes that the same systematic approach works for all phenomena.

Consider that each time you see a different scenario in front of you, this is a different sensation.

Is it? Why should I accept that seeing something is a sensation? Seeing something can cause me to have sensations, a tingle up my spine for instance, but that doesn't entail that seeing something is itself a sensation.

Philosophical contention begins when one adopts more than an instrumentalist view of those laws and then, further, assumes that the same systematic approach works for all phenomena. — jkg20

Clearly we need to go beyond instrumentalism to understand what things like feelings and ideas are. And of course there is going to be contention here. Isn't that the point I'm making, that these things, feelings, like pain, are to a significant degree, unknown? Have I made my point then?

So what are you saying, inductive reasoning is not useful to philosophy? Then how do you propose that we proceed toward understanding the existence of things like sensations?

Is it? Why should I accept that seeing something is a sensation? Seeing something can cause me to have sensations, a tingle up my spine for instance, but that doesn't entail that seeing something is itself a sensation. — jkg20

Sight is a sense. Seeing something is a sensation. Hearing something is a sensation. Smelling something is a sensation. Tasting something is a sensation. Feeling something is a sensation.

It appears to me like you are trying to distinguish between one type of sensation and another, and make the unjustified claim that one type of sensation is a sensation and the other type of sensation does not qualify to be called a sensation. Are you arguing that "feeling" is the only proper sense?

That we cannot even agree on what the word "sensation" refers to is more evidence that particular types of sensations cannot be properly categorized. That's the key point to my argument, We cannot properly classify different types of feelings or sensations (which feelings are and are not pain, for example) until we have a working definition of "sensation" itself, to be able to identify which things we ought to look at to determine whether they qualify as pain or some other type of feeling.

You asked me to prove #4, which makes a statement about the unknown. The fact that there is contention and disagreement on basic principles concerning this subject, is evidence which supports the truth of #4. Do you agree with this at least?

You asked me to prove #4, which makes a statement about the unknown. The fact that there is contention and disagreement on basic principles concerning this subject, is evidence which supports the truth of #4. Do you agree with this at least?

No I do not agree, not yet anyway. Premise 4 makes a general claim that the cause of no pain can be known. I have presented counterexamples of cases where I know what the cause of a pain is. You say I do not know in those cases, it seems because you have some commitment to the idea that claims to specific instances of knowledge have always to be backed up by the availability of some systematic theory. I find that stance more open to doubt than the stance that I know in some specific cases what the cause of my pain is. (Incidently, there are also cases where I do not have the faintest idea what is causing my pain.)

Sight is a sense. Seeing something is a sensation.

Again, why do I have to accept that just because there is a sense of sight that all sight involves sensations? It seems to me that I would have to buy in to a very specific account of what vision is in order to accept that inference.

Premise 4 makes a general claim that the cause of no pain can be known. — jkg20

I've clarified this already. I'm not saying that the cause of pain is unknowable, but that it is unknown. And the reason, as I've explained is that we do not have adequate knowledge of what pain is, in order to be able to identify a cause of it. How can we agree on the cause of "pain" when we cannot even agree on what "pain" refers to? That we cannot agree on what "pain" refers to, has been demonstrated in our discourse.

I have presented counterexamples of cases where I know what the cause of a pain is. You say I do not know in those cases, it seems because you have some commitment to the idea that claims to specific instances of knowledge have always to be backed up by the availability of some systematic theory. — jkg20

Let me tell you again why your claims of having presented instances where you know what the cause of pain is, are false claims. You can identify something as a cause of a feeling, or sensation, but you haven't identified why that feeling or sensation occurs as pain rather than pleasure, or some other sort of sensation. Until you can explain why those occurrences cause the feeling of pain rather than some other feeling, you have not identified the cause of pain. You are just making unjustified assertions.

Again, why do I have to accept that just because there is a sense of sight that all sight involves sensations? It seems to me that I would have to buy in to a very specific account of what vision is in order to accept that inference. — jkg20

Yes, you would have to buy into the conventional account which says that vision is a sense, and that sensations are what senses produce. The sense of sight produces the sensations involved with sight. So images such as dreams are not sensations produced by sight.

No one forces you to accept conventional definitions. But if you refuse conventional definitions in a philosophical discussion you need to justify your refusal or else it appears like you are simply refusing because conventional wisdom doesn't support your particular philosophy. Any philosophy not supported by conventional wisdom needs to be justified or else people just dismiss it as crackpottery.

Regardless, let's just accept that we cannot agree on what a "sensation" is, and we might allow that there is no such thing as "conventional wisdom" concerning this matter. Clearly this supports the truth of #4. We do not know the cause of pain. We say that pain is a certain type of feeling or sensation, but we do not even know what a feeling or sensation is. How can you suppose that we know the cause of pain when we do not even know what pain (as a type of feeling or sensation) is?

we do not have adequate knowledge of what pain is, in order to be able to identify a cause of it — Metaphysician Undercover

You said earlier that it was an "unpleasant feeling". Now you don't know what it is?

As for the cause of pain, science and medicine have some understanding of how pain works.

How can you suppose that we know the cause of pain when we do not even know what pain (as a type of feeling or sensation) is

Luke got there before me, but I thought we were agreed that we know that pain is a certain type of feeling. Now you are suggesting we do not even know that? I'm completely lost now. I think I'll have to retire from this thread and return to something simpler like the complete works of Hegel.

No one forces you to accept conventional definitions. But if you refuse conventional definitions in a philosophical discussion you need to justify your refusal or else it appears like you are simply refusing because conventional wisdom doesn't support your particular philosophy. Any philosophy not supported by conventional wisdom needs to be justified or else people just dismiss it as crackpottery.

Just a few final parting remarks.
First, I do not have a particular philosophy. I was trying to get clear about yours.

Second, what do you mean by "conventional definition". If you mean a definition you find in the dictionary, it is perfectly conventional to deny that vision always involves sensations. Sometimes it can, e.g. when seeing phosphenes and afterimages for instance, but that does not mean it always does. You would have to invoke some kind of argument from illusion or hallucination to get to the conclusion that all vision involves sensations, and I'm sure you are aware that arguments from illusion and hallucination are by no means generally accepted to be sound.

You said earlier that it was an "unpleasant feeling". Now you don't know what it is? — Luke

Correct, I can say that it is an unpleasant feeling, but I do not know in objective terms, what distinguishes a pleasant feeling from an unpleasant feeling. "Knowing" requires objectivity. The fact that I can talk about this distinction between pleasant and unpleasant, making my own subjective distinction between these two, and I can even assume that such an objective distinction might at some future time be produced, doesn't mean that I believe that there is currently an objectively defined difference between them, which I might refer to in making that judgement, and that would be required in order for me to know. Therefore claiming that I can distinguish pleasant feelings from unpleasant feelings, within myself, and refer to the unpleasant ones as pain, does not amount to a claim that I "know" what pain is. Knowledge requires more than a subjective opinion.

Luke got there before me, but I thought we were agreed that we know that pain is a certain type of feeling. Now you are suggesting we do not even know that? — jkg20

Back when I posted that, I thought that we could agree that pain was a certain type of feeling. As the discussion progressed I attempted to ground the notion of "feeling" in sensation, and we could not agree. Therefore I concluded that we do not know what a feeling is. Since we had defined "pain" in relation to "feeling", and it became evident that we do not know what a feeling is, I had to make the further conclusion that we really do not know what pain is. Attempting to prove what something is, by relating it to something unknown, instead of relating it to something better know, is a step in the wrong direction. That could be a matter of deception. "I know what pain is, it's a feeling". What's a feeling? "I don't know". See, you could replace "feeling" here with any imaginary word and the deception would be exposed.

That was the difference in perspective between us. I attempted to prove that "pain" is unknown by relating it to something more general, vague, and ambiguous, "feeling", the direction which the common definition leads us, toward the unknown. You attempted to prove that "pain" is known, by relating it to particular instances of pain which you have experienced. The difference is that I was looking to the public, objective, and conventional definition, while you were looking to personal, private experiences. What I refer to as "pain" is justified. What you refer to is not, it's a matter of personal opinion.

Second, what do you mean by "conventional definition". If you mean a definition you find in the dictionary, it is perfectly conventional to deny that vision always involves sensations. Sometimes it can, e.g. when seeing phosphenes and afterimages for instance, but that does not mean it always does. You would have to invoke some kind of argument from illusion or hallucination to get to the conclusion that all vision involves sensations, and I'm sure you are aware that arguments from illusion and hallucination are by no means generally accepted to be sound. — jkg20

Conventional definition is the one commonly accepted and used. If you insist on demonstrating contradictory definitions, each of which could be called conventional, then this just proves my point, that the thing referred to by that word remains unknown because there is contradiction within the supposed knowledge of it.

The fact that I can talk about this distinction between pleasant and unpleasant, making my own subjective distinction between these two, and I can even assume that such an objective distinction might at some future time be produced, doesn't mean that I believe that there is currently an objectively defined difference between them, which I might refer to in making that judgement, and that would be required in order for me to know. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's be clear here: do you lack knowledge of the cause or the effect? You don't know what pain is or you don't know what causes it?

Regarding the effect, you aren't making a subjective distinction between 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. You didn't invent the meanings of these words. If you are unsure what they mean, you can look up their meanings in a dictionary.

No one forces you to accept conventional definitions. But if you refuse conventional definitions in a philosophical discussion you need to justify your refusal or else it appears like you are simply refusing because conventional wisdom doesn't support your particular philosophy. Any philosophy not supported by conventional wisdom needs to be justified or else people just dismiss it as crackpottery.

Otherwise, if you want to know the causes of pain, then this might help to begin with:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7wfDenj6CQ

Let's be clear here: do you lack knowledge of the cause or the effect? You don't know what pain is or you don't know what causes it? — Luke

"Pain" is what we called a type of feeling. What I argued is that there is an underlying process, and the feeling, which we refer to as pain has a relation to this underlying process. Further, since we do not adequately know the underlying process, we cannot claim to completely understand pain itself. Jkg20 was skeptical about this underlying thing, so I referred to it as the cause of pain. So the argument is that to completely understand pain requires that we know its cause.

Regarding the effect, you aren't making a subjective distinction between 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. You didn't invent the meanings of these words. If you are unsure what they mean, you can look up their meanings in a dictionary. — Luke

I don't think looking in the dictionary is going to help me to understand the phenomenon of pain. I went through this already with jkg20. I look up "pain", in the dictionary to get an objective definition, and it tells me that pain is an unpleasant feeling. Then I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain. Clearly that is a subjective judgement.

Otherwise, if you want to know the causes of pain, then this might help to begin with: — Luke

Your referred video doesn't answer the question asked though, why a specific type of feeling is felt as pain rather than as pleasure, or something else. It even hinted at this problem with reference to variability in pain sensitivity. So notice the title, and the conclusion of the video, how your brain "responds" to pain. The narrator starts as if he is going to tell you what causes pain, but then he gets to this issue of variability, and concludes by talking about how you brain responds to pain. There's a gap, the cause of the feeling which is called pain, which is left unexplained.

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.

On the other hand, that mind is intrinsic and underlies everything, is exactly what creatures with minds would say. Especially after they spend a lot of time thinking.

"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon

self doubt or low self esteem.

I wouldn't recommend either. Self doubt and low self esteem usually mean misery. I guess we should all just try to find a balance.

I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you judge it as "unpleasant" rather than "pleasant"?

Your referred video doesn't answer the question asked though, why a specific type of feeling is felt as pain rather than as pleasure, or something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

The topic of the video is pain, including its known causes. Weren't you asking what causes pain? Wasn't that what you claimed not to know? Well, now you know, or have some knowledge. At any rate, the causes of pain are not "unknown" as you indicated earlier.

Furthermore, I don't understand your question about "why a feeling is felt as pain rather than pleasure". An unpleasant feeling simply is pain, as per your own definition.

Why do you judge it as "unpleasant" rather than "pleasant"? — Luke

That's the point.

Weren't you asking what causes pain? — Luke

I went through this already, what I meant by "cause". We are talking about a type of feeling, and what distinguishes it from other types of feelings. The issue is what causes this type of feeling to be felt as pain rather than as pleasure or something completely different.

Well, now you know, or have some knowledge. — Luke

Further, the issue wasn't that we have no knowledge about this. Clearly we have some knowledge on this subject, that's why we have conventional definitions of things like pain and pleasure. If there was no knowledge about them, we wouldn't even be able to agree on definitions. The issue is the deficiency and inadequacy of that knowledge.

We have the feeling, and we have the underlying thing which we say causes the feeling. As I explained to jkg20, we cannot say that the injury is the cause of the feeling, because damage to an object is not sufficient to account for the feeling. Furthermore, we need to account for why the different feelings are substantially different, some being painful and some pleasurable for example.

Furthermore, I don't understand your question about "why a feeling is felt as pain rather than pleasure". — Luke

Do you recognize that some feelings are pleasurable and some are painful? If this is a true difference, then there must be something about the feeling itself which makes it painful or pleasurable. If there was not, then we could not distinguish between pleasure and pain, and we could name the particular instances of feeling, this or that, randomly. So, both of these are feelings, one is called pleasure, and one is called pain, but they are classed together, as feelings. Therefore we can ask what is it about the feeling itself which makes it felt as pain rather than as pleasure. There must be something within the feelings themselves, which allows them to be distinguished from each other, in this way, otherwise such judgements would be random.

That's the point. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the point? You said: "I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain". I asked why you judge it as unpleasant rather than pleasant.

The issue is what causes this type of feeling to be felt as pain rather than as pleasure or something completely different. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand. You appear to assume that a feeling of pain could instead have been a feeling of pleasure or some other feeling. Why assume this? If you're asking for something besides the cause of pain here, then what is it?

Furthermore, we need to account for why the different feelings are substantially different, some being painful and some pleasurable for example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because they're different feelings?

It's as though you were to ask why some colours are substantially different, some being green and some red for example, but then when vision and colour perception is explained to you, you claim that you were asking a different question.

If this is a true difference, then there must be something about the feeling itself which makes it painful or pleasurable. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could look up a different video on the physiology of pleasure. I doubt it works the same way as the physiology of pain. Or you could tell us why you have a feeling that you judge as unpleasant and call it pain..

What's the point? You said: "I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain". I asked why you judge it as unpleasant rather than pleasant. — Luke

Right, that's the issue I'm trying to determine, that's why I said that's the point. I think that the feeling which I call "pain" is in some way similar to a feeling I had previously, which I called "pain", so I call it by the same name. I believe that's why I call it pain, because I've already called similar feelings pain, and that was acceptable, but I'm not really too sure about that. And, I've never been asked to validate, is it really pain I'm feeling, or am I making a false claim.

don't understand. You appear to assume that a feeling of pain could instead have been a feeling of pleasure or some other feeling. Why assume this? — Luke

I assume this, because it's a part of an accepted philosophical procedure of dialectics, which we can use to find fault in descriptions. If it hasn't been demonstrated that it is impossible for the thing being described to be other than the description (in which case the description might be wrong), then we assume that it is possible for the thing to be otherwise from how it's described. Then we proceed to look for, and examine the reasons why the thing is described in the way that it is. This allows us to verify or falsify the description.

Judging by your reactions to my postings concerning deception, you do not seem to have a truly philosophical attitude toward the possibility of false description; as if the possibility of a false description (deception) ought not be a concern to philosophers.

If you're asking for something besides the cause of pain here, then what is it? — Luke

There are numerous ways that "cause" can be used, and I think you must be interpreting it in a different way from how I am using it. So I'll explain how I use it. If something exists as a unique, particular thing, we can ask why is the thing the particular thing which it is, instead of something else. Then we seek the cause of that thing being the thing which it is, the reason why it is what it is instead of something else. We can also ask the same question about a type of thing, why is a specific type of thing this type instead of some other type. In this case we have a specified type of thing, "pain", as a type of feeling, and I am asking that question. So I am asking about the reason why this type of thing, pain is the type of thing which it is. This will validate this "type", as a valid type, there are real causes for a thing being of this named type rather than a different named type.. If no valid reason can be given, as to what causes a thing to be this type rather than to be some other type, then this descriptive 'type" cannot be accepted as a true descriptive term.

Because they're different feelings? — Luke

When I ask why is pain different from pleasure, "because they are different feelings" is not an answer. It's not an answer because that assumption is already implied in the question. If I asked why is red different from green, "because they are different colours" is not an acceptable answer because the assumption that they are different colours is already implied by the question. Similarly, the assumption that pain and pleasure are different feelings is already implied within the question.

From your responses, I believe that you are not at all interested in this question. That's fine, we can just drop it if that's what you want.

It's as though you were to ask why some colours are substantially different, some being green and some red for example, but then when vision and colour perception is explained to you, you claim that you were asking a different question. — Luke

The problem is that what you think was explained to me, wasn't explained to me. I already explained that to you. The video presented what you propose as the cause of pain, but when it got to the point of what they called "variability in pain sensitivity", and this would be where the true cause of the sensation lies (what makes the sensation pain rather than some other feeling), it skipped over this, and went on to talk about the brain's responses to pain.

So it's not the case that I changed the question I was asking. You just misinterpreted what I meant by "cause of pain", as did jgk20, and you offered me a solution which related to your interpretation, rather than what I really meant. And then when I explain what I meant, you accuse me of changing the question. I'm not changing the question, your the second person that I've had to explain this very same question to already. And now I'll explain it again to you.

We are discussing here "pain", as a type of feeling, and the reasons why some feelings can be classed as this type rather than some other type. You show me through your video, how some particular instances of "feeling" are caused. The video gives no real explanation as to why the feeling which comes out of these circumstances is felt as pain and not some other type of feeling, so it does not answer the question. The reason why the video fails here is that it gives no indication of what type of thing a feeling is.

Do you see this? If we're grounding the concept of "pain" in "a type of feeling", then we require some explanation of what a feeling is, in order to be able differentiate it from other feelings as a valid "feeling". Your video goes in a completely different direction, instead of defining "pain" with "type of feeling", it grounds pain in an identifiable type of physical occurrence, an injury. This would require that we go by a different definition of "pain", "the feeling caused by a physical injury". But that was not our accepted definition of "pain". Furthermore, this definition would exclude a huge portion of the feelings which we call "pain", things such as emotional suffering, hunger, etc.. That would be an unwarranted narrowing of the definition of pain, which would mislead us in our enquiry as to what pain actually is.

So it's not the case that I changed the question I was asking. You just misinterpreted what I meant by "cause of pain", as did jgk20, and you offered me a solution which related to your interpretation, rather than what I really meant. And then when I explain what I meant, you accuse me of changing the question. I'm not changing the question, your the second person that I've had to explain this very same question to already. And now I'll explain it again to you.

We are discussing here "pain", as a type of feeling, and the reasons why some feelings can be classed as this type rather than some other type. You show me through your video, how some particular instances of "feeling" are caused. The video gives no real explanation as to why the feeling which comes out of these circumstances is felt as pain and not some other type of feeling, so it does not answer the question. The reason why the video fails here is that it gives no indication of what type of thing a feeling is.

Do you see this? If we're grounding the concept of "pain" in "a type of feeling", then we require some explanation of what a feeling is, in order to be able differentiate it from other feelings as a valid "feeling". — Metaphysician Undercover

@jkg20 was previously trying to work out the unknown aspect of pain you claimed there to be, other than our public expressions and private sensations of pain. I have been trying to work out whether it is the cause (of pain) or the effect (pain itself; what pain is; the meaning of "pain") to be this unknown aspect. More accurately, I have been trying to pin you down on what else there could be to explain about pain besides these two.

Now you're saying that this unknown aspect of pain of yours - which turns out to be not even specifically about pain - is actually an "explanation of what a feeling is"? Well, I could recommend that you look up the word "feeling" in the dictionary, or else look into the physiological causes of feelings. However, you'd probably just change the subject again.

Your video goes in a completely different direction, instead of defining "pain" with "type of feeling", it grounds pain in an identifiable type of physical occurrence, an injury. This would require that we go by a different definition of "pain", "the feeling caused by a physical injury". But that was not our accepted definition of "pain". Furthermore, this definition would exclude a huge portion of the feelings which we call "pain", things such as emotional suffering, hunger, etc.. That would be an unwarranted narrowing of the definition of pain, which would mislead us in our enquiry as to what pain actually is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It would make no difference if the video were to include all types of pain. You weren't interested in the narrow explanation because you weren't even talking about pain specifically.

I have been trying to work out whether it is the cause (of pain) or the effect (pain itself; what pain is; the meaning of "pain") to be this unknown aspect. — Luke

As I described, both of these have unknown aspects. I don't see why any of this is a problem to you. Do you believe that anything is known in an absolute sense? Doesn't quantum physics and the uncertainty principle demonstrate to you that all things have unknown aspects? I don't understand this idea that some people have, that we have absolute knowledge about things, that's so evidently false. So I attempted to use the fact that the cause of pain is unknown, to demonstrate that pain itself has unknown aspects. But both you and jkg disputed that the cause of pain is unknown.

More accurately, I have been trying to pin you down on what else there could be to explain about pain besides these two. — Luke

OK, so after my last long post with great effort to explain, hopefully you now understand.

Now you're saying that this unknown aspect of pain of yours - which turns out to be not even specifically about pain - is actually an "explanation of what a feeling is"? — Luke

Right, now you're catching on. Since we defined pain as a type of feeling, don't you agree that we need to know what a feeling is, in order to know what pain is? For example, if we defined "green" as a type of colour, we would need to know what colour is in order to know what green is. And if we defined "human being" as a type of animal, we would need to know what an animal is, to know what a human being is. If you disagree with this principle, which appears self-evident to me, can you please explain why you disagree with it.

Well, I could recommend that you look up the word "feeling" in the dictionary, or else look into the physiological causes of feelings. — Luke

As I explained to jkg already, this won't work if you're trying to prove that "pain", or now "feeling", is really known, because moving in this direction, toward the more general, the definitions get increasingly vague and ambiguous, thus demonstrating the truth of what I've been arguing, that the thing being discussed is really unknown.

You weren't interested in the narrow explanation because you weren't even talking about pain specifically. — Luke

Of course I was talking about pain specifically, "pain" as defined by us already, as a specific type of feeling. If you want to change the definition such that we are only talking bout a specific type of pain, or define pain in some completely different way, then it is clearly you who has come into this discussion intent on changing the subject. I am adhering to the conventional definition of pain which jkg and I agreed upon already. I have not changed the subject, but adhered strictly to it.

If you think this definition is unacceptable and you want to discuss "pain" under some other definition, then propose your definition and we can discuss its acceptability. But all that you are really doing, in declining the conventional definition is proving my point, that the nature of pain is unknown, because you'd be saying that "pain" refers to something different for you, from what it refers to for others who accept the conventional definition we've already been using. Therefore we couldn't even identify the thing referred to by "pain", let alone proceed in any attempt toward understanding and knowing it.

Do you believe that anything is known in an absolute sense? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe that anything can be known in any sense?

"In any sense" means we'd have to consider various definitions of "know". If knowing requires absolutely excluding the possibility of mistake, then no we can't "know" anything in that sense. But if you allow that "know" implies that things which you know might turn out to be wrong, then yes, things can be known

Good, then I don't see the problem. I'm not going to play this game where I point out to you that we have knowledge (in a non-absolute sense) of what "pain" means and what causes it, and then you continue to question whether our knowledge of its causes is absolute and to pretend that you're not sure whether you feel pain or to know what it is.

So you should be coming around to seeing things my way then. We have less than perfect knowledge of pain. When someone has less than perfect knowledge about something, they might be deceived concerning that thing. Therefore we might be deceived concerning pain.

Remember, the real possibility of deception, and how to address this, was my concern. Do you agree with me, that the way to avoid deception is to obtain a better knowledge of the beetle itself, in the box, the feeling, "pain"?