That there are scientific laws that are used to predict and model observable behaviour, no one would deny. Philosophical contention begins when one adopts more than an instrumentalist view of those laws and then, further, assumes that the same systematic approach works for all phenomena.When there is similarity in the occurrence of complex events, it's not a matter of random chance or coincidence, and this allows us to produce scientific laws, and make predictions.
Is it? Why should I accept that seeing something is a sensation? Seeing something can cause me to have sensations, a tingle up my spine for instance, but that doesn't entail that seeing something is itself a sensation.Consider that each time you see a different scenario in front of you, this is a different sensation.
Philosophical contention begins when one adopts more than an instrumentalist view of those laws and then, further, assumes that the same systematic approach works for all phenomena. — jkg20
Is it? Why should I accept that seeing something is a sensation? Seeing something can cause me to have sensations, a tingle up my spine for instance, but that doesn't entail that seeing something is itself a sensation. — jkg20
You asked me to prove #4, which makes a statement about the unknown. The fact that there is contention and disagreement on basic principles concerning this subject, is evidence which supports the truth of #4. Do you agree with this at least?
Again, why do I have to accept that just because there is a sense of sight that all sight involves sensations? It seems to me that I would have to buy in to a very specific account of what vision is in order to accept that inference.Sight is a sense. Seeing something is a sensation.
Premise 4 makes a general claim that the cause of no pain can be known. — jkg20
I have presented counterexamples of cases where I know what the cause of a pain is. You say I do not know in those cases, it seems because you have some commitment to the idea that claims to specific instances of knowledge have always to be backed up by the availability of some systematic theory. — jkg20
Again, why do I have to accept that just because there is a sense of sight that all sight involves sensations? It seems to me that I would have to buy in to a very specific account of what vision is in order to accept that inference. — jkg20
we do not have adequate knowledge of what pain is, in order to be able to identify a cause of it — Metaphysician Undercover
Luke got there before me, but I thought we were agreed that we know that pain is a certain type of feeling. Now you are suggesting we do not even know that? I'm completely lost now. I think I'll have to retire from this thread and return to something simpler like the complete works of Hegel.How can you suppose that we know the cause of pain when we do not even know what pain (as a type of feeling or sensation) is
Just a few final parting remarks.No one forces you to accept conventional definitions. But if you refuse conventional definitions in a philosophical discussion you need to justify your refusal or else it appears like you are simply refusing because conventional wisdom doesn't support your particular philosophy. Any philosophy not supported by conventional wisdom needs to be justified or else people just dismiss it as crackpottery.
You said earlier that it was an "unpleasant feeling". Now you don't know what it is? — Luke
Luke got there before me, but I thought we were agreed that we know that pain is a certain type of feeling. Now you are suggesting we do not even know that? — jkg20
Second, what do you mean by "conventional definition". If you mean a definition you find in the dictionary, it is perfectly conventional to deny that vision always involves sensations. Sometimes it can, e.g. when seeing phosphenes and afterimages for instance, but that does not mean it always does. You would have to invoke some kind of argument from illusion or hallucination to get to the conclusion that all vision involves sensations, and I'm sure you are aware that arguments from illusion and hallucination are by no means generally accepted to be sound. — jkg20
The fact that I can talk about this distinction between pleasant and unpleasant, making my own subjective distinction between these two, and I can even assume that such an objective distinction might at some future time be produced, doesn't mean that I believe that there is currently an objectively defined difference between them, which I might refer to in making that judgement, and that would be required in order for me to know. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's be clear here: do you lack knowledge of the cause or the effect? You don't know what pain is or you don't know what causes it? — Luke
Regarding the effect, you aren't making a subjective distinction between 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. You didn't invent the meanings of these words. If you are unsure what they mean, you can look up their meanings in a dictionary. — Luke
Otherwise, if you want to know the causes of pain, then this might help to begin with: — Luke
A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.
On the other hand, that mind is intrinsic and underlies everything, is exactly what creatures with minds would say. Especially after they spend a lot of time thinking.
"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon
I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your referred video doesn't answer the question asked though, why a specific type of feeling is felt as pain rather than as pleasure, or something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you judge it as "unpleasant" rather than "pleasant"? — Luke
Weren't you asking what causes pain? — Luke
Well, now you know, or have some knowledge. — Luke
Furthermore, I don't understand your question about "why a feeling is felt as pain rather than pleasure". — Luke
That's the point. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is what causes this type of feeling to be felt as pain rather than as pleasure or something completely different. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, we need to account for why the different feelings are substantially different, some being painful and some pleasurable for example. — Metaphysician Undercover
If this is a true difference, then there must be something about the feeling itself which makes it painful or pleasurable. — Metaphysician Undercover
What's the point? You said: "I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain". I asked why you judge it as unpleasant rather than pleasant. — Luke
don't understand. You appear to assume that a feeling of pain could instead have been a feeling of pleasure or some other feeling. Why assume this? — Luke
If you're asking for something besides the cause of pain here, then what is it? — Luke
Because they're different feelings? — Luke
It's as though you were to ask why some colours are substantially different, some being green and some red for example, but then when vision and colour perception is explained to you, you claim that you were asking a different question. — Luke
So it's not the case that I changed the question I was asking. You just misinterpreted what I meant by "cause of pain", as did jgk20, and you offered me a solution which related to your interpretation, rather than what I really meant. And then when I explain what I meant, you accuse me of changing the question. I'm not changing the question, your the second person that I've had to explain this very same question to already. And now I'll explain it again to you.
We are discussing here "pain", as a type of feeling, and the reasons why some feelings can be classed as this type rather than some other type. You show me through your video, how some particular instances of "feeling" are caused. The video gives no real explanation as to why the feeling which comes out of these circumstances is felt as pain and not some other type of feeling, so it does not answer the question. The reason why the video fails here is that it gives no indication of what type of thing a feeling is.
Do you see this? If we're grounding the concept of "pain" in "a type of feeling", then we require some explanation of what a feeling is, in order to be able differentiate it from other feelings as a valid "feeling". — Metaphysician Undercover
Your video goes in a completely different direction, instead of defining "pain" with "type of feeling", it grounds pain in an identifiable type of physical occurrence, an injury. This would require that we go by a different definition of "pain", "the feeling caused by a physical injury". But that was not our accepted definition of "pain". Furthermore, this definition would exclude a huge portion of the feelings which we call "pain", things such as emotional suffering, hunger, etc.. That would be an unwarranted narrowing of the definition of pain, which would mislead us in our enquiry as to what pain actually is. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have been trying to work out whether it is the cause (of pain) or the effect (pain itself; what pain is; the meaning of "pain") to be this unknown aspect. — Luke
More accurately, I have been trying to pin you down on what else there could be to explain about pain besides these two. — Luke
Now you're saying that this unknown aspect of pain of yours - which turns out to be not even specifically about pain - is actually an "explanation of what a feeling is"? — Luke
Well, I could recommend that you look up the word "feeling" in the dictionary, or else look into the physiological causes of feelings. — Luke
You weren't interested in the narrow explanation because you weren't even talking about pain specifically. — Luke
Do you believe that anything is known in an absolute sense? — Metaphysician Undercover
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