I take it from this that overwhelming emotions, and at least part of classical view, remains intact. — Luke

No. The classical theory is that stimuli put the brain into a recognisable state (which can be labelled a particular emotion) which then either causes, or makes more likely, a particular set of responses. It's a one way process and the recognition of that state (by either yourself or an outside observer) is simply and act of journalism, just noting what is the case.

The trouble is there's no evidence that this is the case. None of the states we talk about (anger, fear, jealousy...) can be recognised physiologically, we do not reliably report the same physiological states in each of these categories and neither do outside observers.

Barrett's theory is that the emotional state of the brain is no less a part of the active inference model of cognitive process than, say, perception is. Stimuli put a part of our brain into a certain state. Higher order parts of the brain then try to predict the reason why these lower order parts are in the state they're in. That prediction acts as both a forward-acting imperative (creates behaviour) and a backward-acting suppressor (tunes out conflicting data). The forward-acting imperative is some behaviour solely designed to help this part of the brain confirm or deny it's prediction. This process then continues with the lower part of the brain now being put into a new state resulting from stimuli caused by the actions the higher part of the brain just initiated.

(I'm using lower and higher here as hierarchical terms, it's nothing to do with animal/rational, or basic/advanced as these terms are often used to mean)

So emotion is a model of some higher order part of the brain to explain the state of several lower order parts of the brain in response to stimuli, then to initiate some action to both filter results assuming that model is the case and to interact with the environment in such a way as to confirm that model.

This explains why there's no strictly applicable physiological signatures to our emotions, one model only need be sufficient to predict a cause of the stimuli and initiate action to better predict that cause, it need not act as a filing system sorting those causes into reliable categories.

The 'labelling' of these stimuli as being in an emotional category, is itself one of the actions the second order part of the brain is carrying out to either firm-up or cast aside its inference model. The labelling itself acts as a filter/action initiator alongside other actions.

I've oversimplified that a lot just to try and get a short overview, hopefully the main point still carries.

The ability to control our emotions in some ways is a side-effect of the fact that third order parts of our brain are also using active inference models to predict why those second order parts are in the state they're in (have the models they have). we can use the backward-acting responses from these to interfere with or constrain the models they choose.

When we can't control our emotions is then a matter of there being no access (no circuitry) between the second order part of the brain and the actions it initiates. It doesn't have any impact on Barrett's theory which is about the indeterminacy of emotional states (and the reasons why they are indeterminate).

For involuntary emotional responses the two theories would look like this;

Classic - Stimuli (I stub my toe) > emotion (anger) > unavoidable response (I yell obscenities)

Active Inference - Stimuli (I stub my toes) > several lower order neural circuits are put into various states (pain, adrenal response, muscle contractions...) > a second order circuit uses the model 'anger' to predict the cause of the states of all these lower order circuits (some external threat is hurting me) and sends out action initiators to yell obscenities(frighten off the external state) > no third order circuit interferes with these action initiators (I yell obscenities) > the first order circuits report the response of the environment to my actions (the pain stopped) > the second order circuit either updates its model according the amount of errors deviating from its expectations, or suppresses deviant information (all good - I yelled at the cause of pain and the pain went away - well done me).

Like, what is your actual point? That we don't always experience emotion?

Nearly but not quite. More like "We don't always have emotion experiences, even when we are being emotional."

Imagine you played a madness game, 'they're hot and I'm not' where players who are hot headed are to appear on radar.

In this analogy, an emotional state activates an effect. It also shows the competitive scene where more anger occurs than sadness; reiterrating my post earlier, 'we gain different amounts of energy' - playing this game - it's scene. Our emotions cycle differently depending on habitat.

Perhaps though a greater reading is due. Lesser to call it angry than to interpret it wordlessly. I know, he is - (is it angry I insert here?) - probably not.

We don't always have emotion experiences, even when we are being emotional. — jkg20

Then how do we know we're being emotional?

"We don't always have emotion experiences, even when we are being emotional." — jkg20

It's hard to know what to make of this. Perhaps you can elaborate.

There is not muh too it really. I'm simply expressing some scepticism that, psychologically, there is anything systematic and appropriate for scientific investigation going on when people exhibit emotional behaviour.

There is not muh too it really. I'm simply expressing some scepticism that, psychologically, there is anything systematic and appropriate for scientific investigation going on when people exhibit emotional behaviour. — jkg20

On what grounds? And how does that relate to what you said before?

On what grounds? The vast variety of ways of displaying anger and other emotions. Why assume there is some one thing in common with them all? I have never seen a convincing argument to establish that there must be. The burden of proof here is on those who think there is.

The vast variety of ways of displaying anger and other emotions. Why assume there is some one thing in common with them all? — jkg20

Huh? This is exactly what the paper argues against??

As a consequence, situated conceptualizations of anger are heterogeneous. Packets of conceptual knowledge about anger will vary within a person over instances as context and situated action demand. No single situated conceptualization for anger need give a complete account of the category anger. There is not one script for anger, but many. On any given occasion, the content of a situated conceptualization for anger will be constructed to contain mainly those properties of anger that are contextually relevant, and it therefore contains only a small subset of the knowledge available in long-term memory about the category anger.

The situation, then, will largely determine which representation of anger will be constructed to conceptualize a state of core affect, with the result that the experience of anger (or of any emotion) will be sculpted by the situation. This idea is, in principle, consistent with the fundamental assumption of appraisal views of emotion: The meaning of a situation to a particular person at a particular point in time is related to the emotion that is experienced. — p.33

This is the 2nd time you've made an objection based on something the paper directly disavows. That emotions are 'natural kinds' with unifying features is the biggest target of the account which it aims to dismantle at every point. I'm beginning to think you haven't read it at all, or if you have, you haven't understood much, if any of it.

So the author agress with me that there is nothing systematic and appropriate for psychological investigation? Why not just say that then, instead of presenting an alternative account of what is involved in that systematicity? For instance, when she writes

The situation, then, will largely determine which representation of anger will be constructed to conceptualize a state of core affect

why assume that there is any representation going on at all when one is angry?

It's not an assumption, it's the basis of the account being given. Again this is pretty basic stuff - I no longer think it wise to take you seriously on this unless you demonstrate your understanding.

By "the basis of the account being given" I presume you are referring to the author's positive account of what is going on, and not the account which she is attacking? If that is so, then the basis of her account is that each time there is emotional behaviour there is a representation of the emotion. I reject that basis on the grounds that I see no reason for believing that every time a person feels an emotion they must be representing anything at all. Why is that a misunderstanding of her position?

It might of course be a misunderstanding on my part of the notions of representation and representing, but I won't get any clarification on that point from that article.

If self-reports of emotion experience have any validity at all, then when projected into geometric space, those reports should exhibit a simple structure (Thurstone, 1935), with one factor each for anger, sad- ness, fear, and so on. This would provide evidence that each kind of emotion is associated with an experiential primitive feeling, meaning that the feeling cannot be broken down into component parts or reduced to any- thing else psychological. If self-reports fail to show simple structure, then this can be taken as evidence that those reports are not valid.

But I think we already knew that, didn't we? A report is not an expression. Don't believe me when I say I am angry, believe the smack in the gob. What we used to call a few years ago a 'fight or flight response' is a physiological call to action which is named after the event 'anger' or 'fear' according to the direction of the action taken. Experience is conceptualised after the event, necessarily so. Not experiences at all, but confabulated justifications of otherwise inexplicable behaviour. "I smacked you in the gob because I was angry - it must have been like that."

Barrett refers in her book to what she calls ‘affective realism’, which I understand to be a misapplication similar to transcendental illusion: — Possibility

That's very cool. I think I might have to pick up that book. Thank you.



Will have a read of that tomorrow, and will try to make a post about that "infelicity" thing regarding it. If you wanted to read about it, IEP talks about Austin's use of the term; it's a more general failure/unsuccess category than "right" or "wrong", and he applies it to speech acts. My motivation for using it was to stress that goal/task relevance acts as a constraint in active inference, the "failures" we have with it are also rooted in comparisons to what we're trying to do.

A manager whose only mode of negotiating is angry discipline is being "infelicitous" in the sense I was using it; contrary to their goal in reality, signalling a predictive failure they will not recognise or their heuristics do not deem relevant.

St. Thomas, the Intellectualist, had argued that the intellect in man is prior to the will because the intellect determines the will, since we can desire only what we know. Scotus, the Voluntarist, replied that the will determines what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know. — 3017amen

Actually, Aquinas says that in the absolute sense, will is prior to intellect. If not, the will could not be free. Also if this were not the case, we could not account for the dilemma which Socrates exposed, Plato faced, and Augustine expounded. This is the fact that a man can do what he knows is wrong.

why assume that there is any representation going on at all when one is angry? — jkg20

Well folks seem to get angry, and we talk about anger. So we represent it. But I rather agree with you if you are saying that the startling insights of neurobabble have been once again contrasted with a straw man of primitive ignorance. Let's just say that it would be an unnecessary distraction for one who is angry to be experiencing an inner state at all, let alone conceptualising it, and he would be better employed directing the fist to the face. And it is in retrospect that he declares his anger as some-internal-thing that provoked the blow. To experience oneself emotionally is to be divided from oneself.

I wonder how this kind of insight could be related to the incontrovertible neurofacts?

Why is one angry? Because one is hurt, someone has said an unkind thing; and when someone says a flattering thing you are pleased. Why are you hurt? Self-importance, is it not? And why is there self-importance? Because one has an idea, a symbol of oneself, an image of oneself, what one should be, what one is or what one should not be. Why does one create an image about oneself? Because one has never studied what one is, actually. We think we should be this or that, the ideal, the hero, the example. What awakens anger is that our ideal, the idea we have of ourselves, is attacked. And our idea about ourselves is our escape from the fact of what we are. But when you are observing the actual fact of what you are, no one can hurt you. Then, if one is a liar and is told that one is a liar it does not mean that one is hurt; it is a fact. But when you are pretending you are not a liar and are told that you are, then you get angry, violent. So we are always living in an ideational world, a world of myth and never in the world of actuality.

source

Can there be involuntary emotions, according to this theory?
— Luke

I'm not entirely clear about how volition fits into the picture here, if at all. I think Barrett does have alot to say about it in her book, but I haven't yet read it. Maybe Possiblity can shed some light here? At this point, I think I can say this: it's less a question of whether emotions are voluntary or not (they arise at the intersection of some very complex and layered bio-social interactions and processes) so much as how one goes about relating to one's emotions. — StreetlightX

Barrett refers in her book to ‘the illusion of a two-system brain’: with an emotional, instinctive side kept in check or controlled by a rational, thinking side. She notes flawed experimental design for helping perpetuate this fiction by disrupting the brain’s natural process of non-stop prediction in psychological laboratory tests, breaking the dependency of brain states on those that came before, so that it looks like the brain responds automatically first and then makes a ‘choice’ later. Neuroscience, however, shows that thinking and feeling are not distinct in the brain, and that there is an important distinction between volition and awareness of volition.

Anger is a population of diverse instances, not a single automatic reaction in the true sense of the phrase. The same holds for every other category of emotion, cognition, perception, and other type of mental event. It might seem like your brain has a quick, intuitive process and a slower, deliberative one, and that the former is more emotional and the latter more rational, but this idea is not defensible on neuroscience or behavioural grounds. — FB - ‘How Emotions Are Made’

Reflexes in your peripheral nervous system have sensory neurons wired directly to motor neurons. We call the resulting actions ‘involuntary’ because there is one, and only one, specific behaviour for specific sensory stimulation due to direct wiring.
Your brain, however, is not wired like a reflex. If it were, you’d be at the mercy of the world, like a sea anemone that reflexively stabs whatever fish happens to brush up against its tentacles. The anemone’s sensory neurons, which receive input from the world, are directly connected to its motor neurons for movement. It has no volition.
A human brain’s sensory and motor neurons, however, communicate through intermediaries, called association neurons, and they endow your nervous system with a remarkable ability: decision-making. When an association neuron receives a signal from a sensory neuron, it has not one possible action but two. It can stimulate or inhibit a motor neuron. Therefore, the same sensory input can yield different outcomes on different occasions. This is the biological basis of choice, that most precious of human possessions. Thanks to association neurons, if a fish brushes against your skin, you can react with indifference, laughter, violence, or anything in between. You might feel like a sea anemone at times, but you have much more control over your harpoon than you think.
Your brain’s control network, which helps select your actions, is composed of association neurons. This network is always engaged, actively selecting your actions; you just don’t always feel in control. In other words, your experience of being in control is just that - an experience.
...Scientists are still trying to figure out how the brain creates the experience of having control. But one thing is certain: there is no scientific justification for labeling a ‘moment without awareness of control’ as emotion.
...Emotions are not temporary deviations from rationality... They are not even your reactions to the world. They are your constructions of the world. Instances of emotion are no more out of control than thoughts or perceptions or beliefs or memories. The fact is, you construct many perceptions and experiences and you perform many actions, some that you control a lot and some that you don’t. — FB

:up:

Well folks seem to get angry, and we talk about anger. So we represent it. But I rather agree with you if you are saying that the startling insights of neurobabble have been once again contrasted with a straw man of primitive ignorance.

You have put pithily exactly what I was trying, but obviously failing, to put across. I certainly didn't mean to give the impression that I believe we never represent anger, and if that is the impression I gave, I apologise for not being clearer. As a matter of fact I also think that sometimes, in very specific circumstances, it also makes sense to say that we are confronted with representations of our own anger.

Edit : although where you use the term "neurobabble" my preference would be for "psychobabble", or perhaps both.

Moreover, I like that similar ideas can be arrived at from totally different paths - it makes an idea more robust, and allows for a greater extension of the concept into new and exciting areas. — StreetlightX

..the machine of active inference.. — fdrake

These two descriptions are incompatible. If there is a multitude of different processes which might derive a similar idea, we cannot describe this process (inference) as a machine. And, due to the uniqueness and particularities of circumstances, it is more realistic to assume that an idea is never arrived at in the same way. Therefore we cannot describe inference in mechanistic terms.

Some semioticians might veil this fact, gloss it over, or hide it under equivocation because there is a cross-over of terminology in systems jargon. However, the habits of a living being are completely distinct from the workings of an inanimate machine because the living being creates a unique situation with each response to circumstances, what we call difference, thereby understanding through reference to difference; while the machine is designed on principles of similarity.

This is the fact that a man can do what he knows is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU!

Can you elucidate a bit more on that?

My interpretation of Will is that it is dumb, blind, emotive force that causes us to exist. In a humanistic existential context, it would be the Will to live and not commit suicide, for example. In other words as apposed to instinct, we have an intrinsic need to live and feel happy. In an ontological way, it is our need to be. We want to feel happy; it is our way of Being.

And in that sense, the OP question becomes, like Colin Cooper's post suggested, we don't learn emotions. Another example (from Colin's post) one could add to the mix of things, is the emotive feeling and phenomenon of listening to music. We don't learn the initial emotional experience when listening to same. Nor do we understand what biological advantages that has to our species. When we hear it, we like it; it feels good to us.

Emotions themselves are not concepts. Our will to listen to music (jazz, rock, country, classical, bebop) confers no biological advantages to our species. Same with Love. (Lower life forms utilize instinct and emergent properties genetically coded to procreate.) The will (and choice) to love someone, listen to music, or any (higher order) emotional phenomenon is an innate feature of higher consciousness.

What is the nature of this feeling to satisfy those existential needs, is my question to Streetlightx.

I've downloaded some of Barrett's papers and will try to understand them, but for now I am confused. The OP seemed to indicate that we were in conscious control of our emotions, e.g. saying that emotions are the "outcome of an evaluative process", which e.g. could be used to deter a bully. This motivated my question of whether there were any involuntary emotions, or emotions out of our control. However, recent posts by @Isaac and @Possibility seem to indicate that Barrett's theory of emotions is an entirely unconscious or involuntary view of what's happening 'under the hood'. If this is right, then how does our conscious feeling of emotions tie into this?

"Emotions" are not spiritual or mental states . We are conscious of our emotions , but a Unconscious mind only reacts to "emotions" . We have a developed a second , conscious mind in evolution , which questions everything , which tries to make sense of everything for us , including "emotions" . In reality "emotions" and "consciousness" are Organic ,Neurons ,electrochemical and who knows what else . But it is not in reality spiritual or even mental states . What we call emotions is something that more then likely was developed very early in the beginnings of life . In fact we probably underestimate just how important "emotions " really are in the development of life , more then likely because of our arrogance that only humans really feel "emotions" . Our conscious mind is a pretty unique evolution step , the fact that it is capable of questioning its very own existence is amazing .You could say we are what a AI would be like if it developed consciousness . Can we develop consciousness within technology ? Yes , we will one day , once we understand more of how it actually works , which we will in time , I believe our conscious mind will eventually evolve as by its nature , it drives evolution itself .
The more we question the more we will evolve , which never stands still .One day I believe our conscious mind will learn how to control the unconscious mind , if you look you will see people have been trying and doing this already . Imagine if we could control the unconscious with the conscious . Turn pain on or off , tell our antibodies what to attack and what not to , could we even stop decay and death itself with control of our unconscious mind ?

Sorry , I am going of on a one :))) But I do believe the way we have evolved the 2 minds is amazing . One theory is its the development of the Human eye and the way it sees that enabled the development of a Conscious mind . Makes sense , its all about how we perceive things .Fascinating stuff :)

The OP seemed to indicate that we were in conscious control of our emotions, e.g. saying that emotions are the "outcome of an evaluative process", which e.g. could be used to deter a bully. — Luke

Ah, apologies if my OP gave off that impression, which, on review, probably does. Was trying to condense alot of info into a few short paragraphs and the qualification that the evaluative process in question was mostly non-conscious was something I probably should have added. As to your question - 'how does our conscious feeling of emotions tie into this?', I think the answer is that conscious feeling makes available additional cognitive resources in order to evaluate one's situation, specifically resources like language ("I am feeling angry") and general rational reflexivity ("should I be feeling angry?"). On a quick skim through of the papers I've read the closest I found was this:

"The experience of emotion is presumed to emerge when the feeling state is attended to, whether by deliberate introspection, or because the feeling state has rapid onset or intensity." (Solving, p.3).

I think though that the language of 'constraint' that Barrett and her colleagues use in her short paper on language that @Issac posted is useful: insofar as emotions are largely ambiguous and 'uncertain' (or as I prefer to say, differential) in their significance, and become more and more individuated on the basis of context (i.e the same feeling may be emotionally experienced as anger in one context, grief in another), consciousness and language help provide additional context. Here is Barrett et. al. on language: "emotion words (with associated conceptual content) that become accessible serve to reduce the uncertainty that is inherent in most natural facial behaviours and constrain their meaning to allow for quick and easy perceptions of emotion." The very act of calling an emotion anger serves to help individuate it, and alter body states (remember: emotion functions as a prediction about the best distribution of bodily resources).

In the same manner, if conscious feeling allows for prolonged consideration of emotion (over time periods longer than the largely 'automatic' mirco-temporality of brain processes: see the distinction that @possibility worte of between the two-levels of brain processing - quick/intuitive and slow/deliberative), then the 'rise to consciousness' is effectively the provision of more sustained context-making resources in order to better make emotion-predictions, or indeed, 'purely' rational ones ("I'm thoroughly pissed off at you at the moment, but it's in my interests to not punch you in your face"). This last but is somewhat speculative on my part (again, perhaps Barrett addresses this more in her book), but is motivated by Barrett's hypothesis the emotions are part of the brain's architecture which helps it "regulate your autonomic nervous system, your immune system and your endocrine system as resources are spent in seeking and securing more resources" ("The theory of constructed emotion").

but a Unconscious mind only reacts to "emotions" . We have a developed a second , conscious mind in — Colin Cooper

Are you suggesting that emotions determine what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know? And would that square with the notion that the primitive limbic system somehow precedes the intellect?

Non intelligunt, vos can re publica quaestio ? — 3017amen

My Latin's very spotty. It seems someone doesn't understand something, and some sort of proceeding on acts against the public interest. That's the best I can do.

Hahaha, indeed Cici !!!

"Are you suggesting that emotions determine what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know? And would that square with the notion that the primitive limbic system somehow precedes the intellect? "

A very interesting perception and observation . Not one I thought about until now . Yes , "emotion" drives the intellect I would say , the path of thought even . The old funny view of a mad scientist for example , clearly driving by emotion on there intellectual path , the joy of learning is clearly a "emotion" driven thing . interesting :) . That would tempt one to say yes the limbic system proceeds and even drives the intellect , maybe the brain itself .As I said I think we probably totally underestimate the importance of "emotions" to the beginnings of life . We come from a single cell , always fascinated me where the motivation comes from that enable the evolution of more complex life . You could even ask where does the motivation come from for everything . But once again I loose myself and get carried away :)

If you wanted to read about it, IEP talks about Austin's use of the term; it's a more general failure/unsuccess category than "right" or "wrong", and he applies it to speech acts. My motivation for using it was to stress that goal/task relevance acts as a constraint in active inference, the "failures" we have with it are also rooted in comparisons to what we're trying to do. — fdrake

Thanks. I've had a look at the IEP and re-read the exchange in that light. It now makes a bit more sense, I think. You're saying that certain emotional responses resulting from the model might betray some higher goal even though they're the correct output from the model - so infelicitous, not "wrong"? That there could be a situation where we confuse the accurate function of the model for an accurate output? Like presuming that if a car is running really well it must be taking us where we want to go?

If so do you not think that the infelicitous output would simply constitue a prediction error of some higher model? Tom Fitzgerald has done some work with Karl Friston on active inference and habit formation which covers some of that ground. I might PM you with it though, I suspect the online equivalent of a series of blank looks if we start discussing it here!

Barrett's theory of emotions is an entirely unconscious or involuntary view of what's happening 'under the hood'. If this is right, then how does our conscious feeling of emotions tie into this? — Luke

That wasn't my intention, only to give you an idea of how both theories deal with involuntary responses. Both theories also deal with voluntary responses too. The degree to which you feel a decision is being made is not a distinguishing factor between the approaches. They really differ in the manner, felicity and the breadth in which the contributory factors are collected into a class.

Classic emotional theory has a consistent, entirely physiological collection of interoception states directly form an identifiable emotional state which then informs behavior (either via influencing concious choice, or directly).

Active inference theory has a varied collection of interoception states, together with perception states (from the environment) form a model predicting their cause. This model then initiates reactions (again, either direct involuntary or influencing voluntary choices). One of these actions is the labelling of the experience with a learned emotional label. These actions both then modify the environment and the perception/interoception states which modify the model, and so on.