I take it from this that overwhelming emotions, and at least part of classical view, remains intact. — Luke
Nearly but not quite. More like "We don't always have emotion experiences, even when we are being emotional."Like, what is your actual point? That we don't always experience emotion?
"We don't always have emotion experiences, even when we are being emotional." — jkg20
There is not muh too it really. I'm simply expressing some scepticism that, psychologically, there is anything systematic and appropriate for scientific investigation going on when people exhibit emotional behaviour. — jkg20
The vast variety of ways of displaying anger and other emotions. Why assume there is some one thing in common with them all? — jkg20
As a consequence, situated conceptualizations of anger are heterogeneous. Packets of conceptual knowledge about anger will vary within a person over instances as context and situated action demand. No single situated conceptualization for anger need give a complete account of the category anger. There is not one script for anger, but many. On any given occasion, the content of a situated conceptualization for anger will be constructed to contain mainly those properties of anger that are contextually relevant, and it therefore contains only a small subset of the knowledge available in long-term memory about the category anger.
The situation, then, will largely determine which representation of anger will be constructed to conceptualize a state of core affect, with the result that the experience of anger (or of any emotion) will be sculpted by the situation. This idea is, in principle, consistent with the fundamental assumption of appraisal views of emotion: The meaning of a situation to a particular person at a particular point in time is related to the emotion that is experienced. — p.33
why assume that there is any representation going on at all when one is angry?The situation, then, will largely determine which representation of anger will be constructed to conceptualize a state of core affect
If self-reports of emotion experience have any validity at all, then when projected into geometric space, those reports should exhibit a simple structure (Thurstone, 1935), with one factor each for anger, sad- ness, fear, and so on. This would provide evidence that each kind of emotion is associated with an experiential primitive feeling, meaning that the feeling cannot be broken down into component parts or reduced to any- thing else psychological. If self-reports fail to show simple structure, then this can be taken as evidence that those reports are not valid.
Barrett refers in her book to what she calls ‘affective realism’, which I understand to be a misapplication similar to transcendental illusion: — Possibility
St. Thomas, the Intellectualist, had argued that the intellect in man is prior to the will because the intellect determines the will, since we can desire only what we know. Scotus, the Voluntarist, replied that the will determines what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know. — 3017amen
why assume that there is any representation going on at all when one is angry? — jkg20
sourceWhy is one angry? Because one is hurt, someone has said an unkind thing; and when someone says a flattering thing you are pleased. Why are you hurt? Self-importance, is it not? And why is there self-importance? Because one has an idea, a symbol of oneself, an image of oneself, what one should be, what one is or what one should not be. Why does one create an image about oneself? Because one has never studied what one is, actually. We think we should be this or that, the ideal, the hero, the example. What awakens anger is that our ideal, the idea we have of ourselves, is attacked. And our idea about ourselves is our escape from the fact of what we are. But when you are observing the actual fact of what you are, no one can hurt you. Then, if one is a liar and is told that one is a liar it does not mean that one is hurt; it is a fact. But when you are pretending you are not a liar and are told that you are, then you get angry, violent. So we are always living in an ideational world, a world of myth and never in the world of actuality.
Can there be involuntary emotions, according to this theory?
— Luke
I'm not entirely clear about how volition fits into the picture here, if at all. I think Barrett does have alot to say about it in her book, but I haven't yet read it. Maybe Possiblity can shed some light here? At this point, I think I can say this: it's less a question of whether emotions are voluntary or not (they arise at the intersection of some very complex and layered bio-social interactions and processes) so much as how one goes about relating to one's emotions. — StreetlightX
Anger is a population of diverse instances, not a single automatic reaction in the true sense of the phrase. The same holds for every other category of emotion, cognition, perception, and other type of mental event. It might seem like your brain has a quick, intuitive process and a slower, deliberative one, and that the former is more emotional and the latter more rational, but this idea is not defensible on neuroscience or behavioural grounds. — FB - ‘How Emotions Are Made’
Reflexes in your peripheral nervous system have sensory neurons wired directly to motor neurons. We call the resulting actions ‘involuntary’ because there is one, and only one, specific behaviour for specific sensory stimulation due to direct wiring.
Your brain, however, is not wired like a reflex. If it were, you’d be at the mercy of the world, like a sea anemone that reflexively stabs whatever fish happens to brush up against its tentacles. The anemone’s sensory neurons, which receive input from the world, are directly connected to its motor neurons for movement. It has no volition.
A human brain’s sensory and motor neurons, however, communicate through intermediaries, called association neurons, and they endow your nervous system with a remarkable ability: decision-making. When an association neuron receives a signal from a sensory neuron, it has not one possible action but two. It can stimulate or inhibit a motor neuron. Therefore, the same sensory input can yield different outcomes on different occasions. This is the biological basis of choice, that most precious of human possessions. Thanks to association neurons, if a fish brushes against your skin, you can react with indifference, laughter, violence, or anything in between. You might feel like a sea anemone at times, but you have much more control over your harpoon than you think.
Your brain’s control network, which helps select your actions, is composed of association neurons. This network is always engaged, actively selecting your actions; you just don’t always feel in control. In other words, your experience of being in control is just that - an experience.
...Scientists are still trying to figure out how the brain creates the experience of having control. But one thing is certain: there is no scientific justification for labeling a ‘moment without awareness of control’ as emotion.
...Emotions are not temporary deviations from rationality... They are not even your reactions to the world. They are your constructions of the world. Instances of emotion are no more out of control than thoughts or perceptions or beliefs or memories. The fact is, you construct many perceptions and experiences and you perform many actions, some that you control a lot and some that you don’t. — FB
You have put pithily exactly what I was trying, but obviously failing, to put across. I certainly didn't mean to give the impression that I believe we never represent anger, and if that is the impression I gave, I apologise for not being clearer. As a matter of fact I also think that sometimes, in very specific circumstances, it also makes sense to say that we are confronted with representations of our own anger.Well folks seem to get angry, and we talk about anger. So we represent it. But I rather agree with you if you are saying that the startling insights of neurobabble have been once again contrasted with a straw man of primitive ignorance.
Moreover, I like that similar ideas can be arrived at from totally different paths - it makes an idea more robust, and allows for a greater extension of the concept into new and exciting areas. — StreetlightX
..the machine of active inference.. — fdrake
This is the fact that a man can do what he knows is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
The OP seemed to indicate that we were in conscious control of our emotions, e.g. saying that emotions are the "outcome of an evaluative process", which e.g. could be used to deter a bully. — Luke
but a Unconscious mind only reacts to "emotions" . We have a developed a second , conscious mind in — Colin Cooper
Non intelligunt, vos can re publica quaestio ? — 3017amen
If you wanted to read about it, IEP talks about Austin's use of the term; it's a more general failure/unsuccess category than "right" or "wrong", and he applies it to speech acts. My motivation for using it was to stress that goal/task relevance acts as a constraint in active inference, the "failures" we have with it are also rooted in comparisons to what we're trying to do. — fdrake
Barrett's theory of emotions is an entirely unconscious or involuntary view of what's happening 'under the hood'. If this is right, then how does our conscious feeling of emotions tie into this? — Luke
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