I think that some sort of combination of deontological base system along with a consequent system is pragmatic. I think consequentialism is more suitable to the granular.

Considering the categorical imperative on the basis of the Kingdom of Ends, and allowing that contradictions in one's maximums must be entail contradictions to one's own authenticity. So, perhaps a virtuous lie. Thinking of it as an attempt to purify intent under the presumption of moral law that ought to guide our actions, and control of the less charming aspects of our will.

I think authenticity is about the coherence between how we act and our acceptance of responsibility for these actions, regardless of their size.

I don't see a flaw. One can in fact lie, they just should understand what doing so involves and implies. Mainly that you're a proponent of lying. You're showing us all how to do it, and if it works out for you, then it worked out for lying. Good job.

I don't see how "consequentialism" can lead to anything other than "if it helps me win, then it's good", and the only mitigating factor being deontological... the ends justify the means. The better the ends, the more justifiable any means becomes.

I don't see how "consequentialism" can lead to anything other than "if it helps me win, then it's good", and the only mitigating factor being deontological... the ends justify the means. The better the ends, the more justifiable any means becomes. — Wosret

With Kant, the "Ends" seem vague to me. Besides that we are autonomous free agents in this Kingdom, what exactly are the Ends, if not the fulfillment of some sort of intrinsic goods? So Kant's CI may be its own consequentialism- mainly that of fulfilling ends, but what of the ends themselves? What are we striving for as humans in the first place? What is the point of being autonomous agents? The kind of things like stealing, murder, and such are the bugs in the system... What are we trying to do in this system, according to Kant? You may fill in your own theme here, but please make it clear whether the Ends you are filling in are yours or you are trying to convey Kant's take on this.

I'll answer both. Kant's claim was that morality wasn't about material consequences but was about perfecting our characters. Whether shit goes well or badly for you is in God's hands.

I don't know about grand purposes, but everyone is off doing shit for reasons all the time, and that's what I encounter in my day to day life. There is no justification for good things, they are their own justifications. They are justified by virtue of being the things they are, and being good things themselves, are the fodder of justification of less quality things.

I'll answer both. Kant's claim was that morality wasn't about material consequences but was about perfecting our characters. Whether shit goes well or badly for you is in God's hands. — Wosret

I am guessing because the CI was central to his philosophy, a good character was central to being better at following the dictates of the CI. If this is the case, then this is a vicious circle. We live simply to be good at following the dictates of a logical moral reasoning but for no ends except to follow the logical moral reasoning. Thanks Kant! Way to suck the life out of life!

I don't know about grand purposes, but everyone is off doing shit for reasons all the time, and that's what I encounter in my day to day life. There is no justification for good things, they are their own justifications. They are justified by virtue of being the things they are, and being good things themselves, are the fodder of justification of less quality things. — Wosret

So it looks like you think that there are some goods that people are living for. Therefore, the CI in this case is simply a way to act when there are bugs (murder, stealing), but is impotent for what we are positively striving for (that is to say, what is valuable).

Also, to get to the point of the OP, how about non-major things in everyday life, how granular or useful is the CI in solving daily decisions on how to act?

I think authenticity is about the coherence between how we act and our acceptance of responsibility for these actions, regardless of their size. — Cavacava

But to the point of the OP, can the CI be useful in everyday decisions or only "major ones" (murder, stealing, etc.). If this is the case, Kant's morality is actually rather confined and does not say much for the positive striving of human ends. In fact, it may even be its biggest flaw, as it is simply following logic to follow logic, but has no attachment to what is valuable for humans which is arguably in the realm of morality. It is at the least a cousin in value theory.

No, I said that I don't know about grand purposes. I just know that people are always about doing stuff for reasons. That's it.

I don't see a problem with it. If the universal abstract I'm opposed to lying, but in everyday life situations... not so much. This is certainly true, but that's just because living it is always a lot harder than saying it.

If the universal abstract I'm opposed to lying — Wosret

I like that statement of it because, for me, it highlights one of the main problems of the CI, which is that to me this statement either simply means (1) ' I think that in most situations it is wrong to lie', or it means (2) 'to lie contributes <insert number> negative points to the moral worth of an action' or (3) it means nothing at all.

For instance, for me, sticking needles into toddlers satisfies both 1 and 2, but there are rare situations in which I support it - most notably, immunisations against certain deadly diseases, and local anaesthetics for necessary operations. It makes no sense at all to me to say that even in those situations I am 'universally abstractly' opposed to sticking the needle in the toddler, unless all that means is 1 or 2. Under interpretations 1 and 2, the decision to inject the toddler in those situations is not a departure from the moral principle arising from a weak moral agent making sub-optimal decisions in the heat of the moment, but rather a careful application of the moral principle.

Kant arrives at his categorical imperative in his Groundwork by regressively tracing back normative sentiments to figure out what the presumed synthetic constituent parts of his transcendental must look like, he then moves synthetically to construct CI 1/2/3 .

The easy answer to actual practice is to set up rules, like the 10 commandments, easy rules that can be followed instead of trying to get the form of your maximum just right. That's why the 10 Commandments got such good press. They are easy to use. When stumped you go through some modification of the CI procedure.

Perhaps differently if one practices virtue, by submitting the will to test it against itself enough, it becomes 2nd nature for a person to act virtuously.

The main problem with Kan is his dismissal of desire, a kind of castrated hedonism (Adorno applies this to his aesthetics, and I think it also applies to his ethics)

When stumped you go through some modification of the CI procedure. — Cavacava

Well, this is the problem I would like fleshed out.. How does that look for an everyday situation? Can it really be applied for the real human and not this abstract Kantian fictitious character?

No, none of those. Simply that you're a proponent of lying. Just as if you were all gung-ho about pricking people with needles all the time, the benefits of needles.

Analogies make terrible arguments. The problem with this one is that if historically people were emphatic about the evils of needling people, then one would think that there was a context within which this was a problem. Otherwise, it would be a senseless thing to say. Notice that something like lying is ever present, universally, in all the cultures. No context needs to be established, we immediately apprehend this one. Secondly, no one would suggest that needling people was itself good, but most importantly, it would still be wrong to force it if it wasn't consensual. It fails every relevant factor as an analogy.

No, none of those. Simply that you're a proponent of lying. — Wosret

Things are getting more confusing. We now have two sentences I don't understand, rather than just one:

(1) 'I am opposed to lying in the abstract'; and
(2) 'I am a proponent of lying'

What does each of them mean, and can their truth value change according to context?