Kant's theory of practical reason has been perhaps the most audacious attempt to find an independent and unquestionable source of moral certainty, and even though this certainty was limited to the formal conditions under which material moral commandments might be admissible to all, and could not directly confer validity on the commandments themselves, the idea seems wrong. The validity of the famous Kantian claim - I must act only according to a principle that I might will to be a general law - was based on the fact that I cannot be consistent if I act otherwise, and that a principle of conduct that does not observe this restriction is counterproductive. If, for example, my behavior is guided by a principle that allows me to lie whenever it suits me, then my principle justifies everyone else's lies, and yet when everyone has the right to lie, no one is believed any longer and no liar achieves his goal; consequently, the principle self-destructs.
This argument is not convincing and may be circular. Even on the assumption that some principles — it doesn't matter whether they are explicitly admitted or not — necessarily ground my behavior, that is, whatever I do, I always believe, however vaguely it may be, that there is a normative "principle" that justifies my behavior (and the assumption is far from obvious), there is no reason why those principles must necessarily have universal validity or why I have, as it were, to impose my rules on all humanity (not only Kant had this opinion; Sartre had it too, for reasons he did not explain). I am not at all inconsistent if I prefer other people to follow rules that I do not want to follow. If, to continue with the example given above, I lie whenever I feel like it but I want everyone else to be invariably frank, I am perfectly consistent. I can always, without contradicting myself, reject the arguments of those who try to convert me or push me to change my way of acting by telling me: "What if everyone did the same?" Since I can coherently maintain that other people's actions do not concern me, or that I positively want them to obey the rules that I refuse to follow.
In other words, an imperative that demands that I be guided by norms that I wish were universal has, in itself, no logical or psychological foundation; I can reject it without falling into contradictions, and I can admit it as a supreme guideline only by virtue of an arbitrary decision(...) — Kolakowski
Granted that football could not exist without football-players, it could perfectly well exist without this or that football-player
When I first read this, I found Kolakowski's refutation quite convincing, and I still think that what he says is correct in some sense. — Amalac
Well OP? What's your response? — Agent Smith
yeah come on OP Agent Smith has been waiting for 5 minutes already. :roll: — emancipate
Only if you ignore/forget that it's an ethics that is under consideration. — tim wood
Kolakowski's argument as presented seems similar to a claim that an illegal chess move can be somehow a legal chess move. — tim wood
We don't have access to K's understanding of what ethics is. Generally, though, ethics concerns regard for others. Any argument that turns that upside down is no longer within ethics but is something else. — tim wood
Kolakowski's argument, if it even is one, would require as a premise a proposition that clearly states the difference between you and others. Everyone is unique of course, but then...everyone else is too :chin: — Agent Smith
Those who argue: “the influence of a group of many people cannot be achieved if each person belonging to that group thinks their individual actions change nothing, therefore it's not true that an individual's actions change nothing” could be accused of committing the fallacy of division, trying to infer that because the actions of a group composed of many people has a significant influence in the course of many events, a single person belonging to that group also has a significant influence with their actions. — Amalac
An analogy which illustrates this is given by Russell:
Granted that football could not exist without football-players, it could perfectly well exist without this or that football-player — Amalac
It can be argued that if many people become convinced that what Kolakowski says is true, this would have very bad consequences: no one would vote, making democracy useless. No one would stop purchasing animal products, increasing the amount of suffering of sentient animals, etc.
But that is not — strictly speaking — an objection to Kolakowski's argument, which seems to me to have no logical flaws, it is rather an observation of possible bad consequences of publicly stating and defending the argument, and its possibly convincing many people.
That would no doubt be true if it came from someone who is quite famous and influential. But what about the average person? I honestly doubt they could have much of an influence in other people's decisions with regards voting or meat purchasing, even if they posted their opinions here. I don't know how many people visit this site, but I doubt it's that many, and as I said before many of them won't even bother reading threads about those subjects. Furthermore, one would have to prove that those people who do change their mind about these subjects, wouldn't have changed their mind if they hadn't read person X's post about a certain subject. — Amalac
Not sure I quite get what you mean by this, but your concern has, I think, already been addressed in the OP: — Amalac
The Categorical Imperative (CI): Adopt only those maxims that you would will to be a universal law.
You may not like done unto you, what you do to others. It appears Kant's CI is simply a variation on the Golden Rule. So, the question is, what's wrong with the Golden Rule? — Agent Smith
The golden rule doesn't apply to actions like voting (those actions which you don't do to someone) though and sometimes people want to be told a lie rather than the truth, which is not compatible with Kant's criterion, so I don't think you can equate the two. — Amalac
I don't either. But whoever said it had to? And certainly, wrt logic, the denial does not itself entail anything. K. has (it seems) provided a specious argument. I wonder why.I don't see why it would have to be logically necessary that the criterion to determine whether an action is or is not good, is whether or not it can be universalized without contradiction. — Amalac
I don't either. But whoever said it had to? And certainly, wrt logic, the denial does not itself entail anything. K. has (it seems) provided a specious argument. I wonder why. — tim wood
To the question: What if everyone did the same? One can answer: that hypothetical scenario is irrelevant, in the real world it's almost certain that not everybody will do the same things I do, and most likely won't change their actions or decisions due to finding out about my individual actions or decisions. — Amalac
At the end I'm unsure, is Kolakowski's objection valid after all? — Amalac
Kant's universalization rule implies the Golden rule (role reversal). — Agent Smith
I think you're right, but I'm not sure. Are the CI and Golden rule logically or morally equivalent? — T Clark
So either Kant offers no argument for accepting that what the categorical imperative says is true (which he considered to be a synthetic a priori truth), or — as Kolakowski says — Kant's argument may be circular. — Amalac
“From now on I'm thinking only of me."
Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: "But, Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way."
"Then," said Yossarian, "I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't I?” — T Clark
Kant included three formulations for the categorical imperative:
1 - Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
2 - Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
3 - Thus the third practical principle follows [from the first two] as the ultimate condition of their harmony with practical reason: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will. — T Clark
But chess is a reasonable analogy. There's nothing in logic that says you have to play chess. — tim wood
You do not have to be ethical, but you cannot be unethically ethical. — tim wood
To ask this you must first affirm the possibility of an ethics. That done, then off to the races! Nor will I argue Kant with anyone who has, apparently, neither read not understood him. There is plenty online of both Kant and secondary sources on his ethics. And you will find that he is comprehensive in presentation to a degree that does not lend itself to short, easy summary-as-argument.The non-trivial question would then be: should we act ethically or should we act as the consequentialists say we should? — Amalac
but this phrase of Kant's – that in writing meant was only as a guide to a more complex analysis – seems to ask, given the opportunity to influence what we perceive as the right thing, what would we select? — kudos
To ask this you must first affirm the possibility of an ethics. That done, then off to the races! — tim wood
Nor will I argue Kant with anyone who has, apparently, neither read not understood him. — tim wood
And, to be sure, that you do not have to be ethical by any standard, or ethical at all, but that once you claim to be, then like the chess player, bound by the rules you have yourself adopted to be under. — tim wood
But we can start small. Do you have any problems with reason or the golden rule or good intentions? — tim wood
Didn't Kant say that the consequences of an action are not morally relevant to virtue?
And you will find that he is comprehensive in presentation to a degree that does not lend itself to short, easy summary-as-argument. — tim wood
Kant's theory of practical reason has been perhaps the most audacious attempt to find an independent and unquestionable source of moral certainty — Kolakowski
I'm not saying your interpretation of Kant is wrong and I admit that I'm not sure where you got this line, is it a direct quote? — kudos
(...)That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law. In this context the guiding principle of the will is conformity to law as such, not bringing in any particular law governing some class of actions; and it must serve as the will’s principle if duty is not to be a vain delusion and chimerical concept. Common sense in its practical judgments is in perfect agreement with this, and constantly has this principle in view.
Consider the question: May I when in difficulties make a promise that I intend not to keep? The question obviously has two meanings: is it prudent to make a false promise? does it conform to duty to make a false promise? No doubt it often is prudent, but not as often as you might think.
Obviously the false promise isn’t made prudent by its merely extricating me from my present difficulties; I have to think about whether it will in the long run cause more trouble than it saves in the present. Even with all my supposed cunning, the consequences can’t be so easily foreseen. People’s loss of trust in me might be far more disadvantageous than the trouble I am now trying to avoid, and it is hard to tell whether it mightn’t be more prudent to act according to a universal maxim not ever to make a promise that I don’t intend to keep.
But I quickly come to see that such a maxim is based only on fear of consequences. Being truthful from duty is an entirely different thing from being truthful out of fear of bad consequences; for in the former case a law is included in the concept of the action itself (so that the right answer to ‘What are you doing?’ will include a mention of that law); whereas in the latter I must first look outward to see what results my action may have. — Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals , page 11
Can you will that your maxim become a universal law? If not, it must be rejected, not because of any harm it might bring to anyone, but because there couldn’t be a system of universal legislation that included it as one of its principles, and that is the kind of legislation that reason forces me to respect. I don’t yet see what it is based on (a question that a philosopher may investigate), but I at least understand these two:
•It is something whose value far outweighs all the value of everything aimed at by desire,
•My duty consists in my having to act from pure respect for the practical law. — page 12
What, exactly, is trivial? You might say that geometry is trivial - generations of students have said as much if not in the same words - but it not at all trivial in application.Once again, it's trivial. — Amalac
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