the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world — Gregory

The word "Existing" in your quote seems not right. Where did you get it? And are you sure it's "Being"? with some difficulty I find the quote in Stambaugh, and instead of Being it's Da-sein, which makes a whole lot more sense, and certainly within the context. I invite you to return for a re-read or two or three. That will be faster, much more authoritative, and more satisfying than anything I could contribute.

Many philosophers prior to Heidegger thought that we could give an exhaustive account of the world by explicating substances and their properties. It was thought that by using a predicate calculus, we could formally represent everything intelligible in the world. But Heidegger claims that the world does not consist merely of the sum of all entities (i.e. of all self-sufficient substance, as Aristotle, Descartes, or Spinoza would refer to it) and their properties (though this is one mode of being -- presence-at-hand), rather it also includes two other modes of being that allow us to deal with the world and make sense of it. There are more holistic ways of being that can't be explained in terms of substances:

1. There is also zuhandenheit or 'readiness-to-hand,' a kind of availableness for 'equipment.' Certainly we could think of a hammer, for example, in terms of its physical constitution (e.g. having a wooden handle, a metal head, and being of such-and-such dimensions), but that kind of description does not seem to exhaust what it means to be a hammer. What it means to be a hammer is to be a part of a complex network of associations that involve cultural practices, skills, purposes, and so forth. If there weren't things that needed hammering, or people to use the hammer for the purpose of hammering, then we wouldn't have hammers, rather just pieces of wood with metal heads attached to their ends. Heidegger doesn't think adding properties to an object (e.g. being heavy, long, metal, wooden, or even "for the purpose of hammering") completely explain what it means to be a hammer. Hammers and hammering are culturally defined, and there is a kind of normative element involved with them. We could use a hammer as an ice pick, for example, but that wouldn't make a hammer an ice pick. What it means to be a hammer is to have a place in the practices of a culture in which it is related to other equipment and the goals and skills of people within that culture.

There is also such a thing, for Heidegger, as being 'unready to hand,' in that if a hammer is too heavy, too flimsy, or too unbalanced for you to do a job with, it becomes a "thing." So there is a kind of situated holism that goes with equipment, and it involves not only the the thing you are hammering with, but the nails, the wood, the situation you find yourself in, and so on and so forth.

2. The other way of being, going more to your question, is dasein; that is, being a human being -- being us. Human beings aren't merely objects or equipment, nor are they thinking substances (pace Descartes), transcendental subjects (pace Kant), or self-sufficient minds that just happen to have mental states and intentional contents (pace Searle). Heidegger doesn't think that a substance ontology is equipped to uncover what it really means to be a human being, because we aren't states, substances, or consciousnesses. Our way of being is more aptly described as an activity or process. We give ourselves an identity by taking up certain practices, and taking a stand on what it means to be the kind of being we are. Heidegger calls dasein's way of being existence. But 'existence' has a very specific connotation in his metalanguage. It doesn't refer to existence in the way we ordinarily think trees, tables, and physical matter exist. For Heidegger only human beings exist. That is to say that only human beings are concerned in their activity such that they can take a stand or have an interpretation of what it means to be a human being. Basically, what it means to exist isn't to be rational, or to be a thinking substance, or to be a creature of God, rather it just means being able to have those culture-relative interpretations in the first place. We're in an understanding of being before we even consciously think about it, and we're already acculturated and socialized before we can even be cognizant of that fact. We have a certain style of existence that we cannot step out of, and we are always manifesting that existence no matter what kind of activity we are doing.

The title ‘Ontological Hermeneutics’ may help guide you a little. As with many philosophical works Heidegger employ his own jargon to lay out his ideas (eg. The use of the suffix -ness in English translations, and terms like ‘ontic’).

In philosophical jargon the ‘Ontic’ is more or less framed as ‘physical being’, whereas the ‘Ontological’ is more or less about what constitutes ‘being’.

Tip: I found B&T easier to read through if you just read the last 2-3 paragraphs of each section - the rest you may find to be mostly ‘redundant’ (meaning if you’re like me you may find yourself frustrated after reading several pages only to find he was saying nothing more than what was said in the final paragraphs - I found I could’ve essentially removed at least 50% of the words and still have the complete ideas set out before me).

Heidegger seems to be trying to say the world has existence but not being until we bring being to it. But existence is manifested being. I don't see how someone can make a distinction between existence and being, but that seems to be Heideggers major thought. Any ideas? — Gregory

It might help to think of dasein in terms of dealing or coping with things at the most basic level; that is, a level involving unreflective, unthinking, totally absorbed activity. This level of existence does not necessarily involve contemplating/imagining, rather doing (though the latter exhausts the former). Thus existence is said to manifest itself.

There is reflection and thinking involved in everyday activity. Heidegger calls it sight (Sicht). This (more general) sight guides circumspection (Umsicht). Umsicht is constantly reflecting how things relates to each other. The most banal acts like grabbing the door knob requires Umsicht (to illustrate the difference: Sight would be here all that is necessitated "to go out (from this building)"). (This doesn't mean neurotic behaviour!) Using hammer "authentically" involves always concentrated effort i.e rather intensive "about-sight"/circumspection/Umsicht. Being "totally absorbed" in hammering would describe some madman waiving whatever heavy object. It is not about "mechanical" reacting in different directions. It (Dasein) is not about something just happening in an entirely unconscious darkness.

Being "absorbed" in hammering would describe some madman waiving whatever heavy object. It is not about "mechanical" reacting in different directions. It (Dasein) is not about something just happening in an entirely unconscious darkness. — waarala

That's not what I am saying.

I'm saying that the defining characteristic of dasein is that it expresses a certain way of taking over itself in its activity; that is, it takes a stand on its being, or has an interpretation of what it means to be a human being. But dasein doesn't have to be actively, consciously thinking about what it means to be a human being. For dasein to take a stand on its own being is just to behave in a certain way that reflects what it means to be a human being. Dasein can take a stand on itself by deliberately thinking about taking a stand on itself, BUT more often than not, dasein manifests itself in practical activities, like opening doors, using hammers, speaking languages, and so on and so forth.

The problem I have with Heidegger is that people get lost in his jargon and discuss his terminology without ever stepping outside it.

Not all that surprising given that it’s a poorly written knock-off :D

In any case, Heidegger wasn't afraid to question and problematize i.e. think and reflect.

I'm not against Heidegger. He has done a lot of important work.

Yeah.

Anyway, I remember having this conversation about the "absorbed" part with Dreyfus (RIP) when I was a student, and he said when we talk about dasein falling that in English we might say someone "fell to work," which means they dug in and were involved in whatever they were working on. It is the most primordial element of dasein in the present that is experienced as discourse, made concrete in absorbed dealing, and found in a care structure of being-amidst-entities. So when Heidegger talks about "explicit understanding," that is not the most basic way we are involved with things with ourselves.

poorly written knock-off :D — I like sushi

A knock-off of who?

Thanks for the responses.

Heidegger calls dasein being-wth-care. So the care of Being and our care add more being to an already existing world?

The East has generally said the world is illusion. The West says it exists. Heidegger seems to be trying to say the world has existence but not being until we bring being to it. — Gregory

That's not what he's saying -- from my reading anyway. In fact "existence" is reserved for the being of human beings in Being and Time.

To understand the quoted passage, you have to understand his sense of the "preontological understanding of being" which we all have, and the ready-to-hand activity which we're most often engaged in. Both of these aspects are contrasted with the present-at-hand -- which is what he's saying about "objective" or "factual" reality out there in the world.

Being has been tied to "presence" for millennia, since the Greeks in fact. The term "ousia" (and parousia) Heidegger uses as examples of this. But he repeatedly points out that "being" is almost always something absent, concealed, hidden.

Great response. I think you've understood Heidegger well.

Heidegger calls dasein being-wth-care. So the care of Being and our care add more being to an already existing world? — Gregory

"More being"? What does that mean?

Dasein's existence is care, which gets re-interpreted later as temporality. Our thrown-ness, our falling, our projection end up becoming the three aspects of a unified time (temporality, as apart from "world time" or "clock time" of ordinary use): past, present, future. They're all happening at once. It's in terms of time that we interpret or understand "being" at all -- both what the "world" is and what we are (as human beings).

Husserl

Thanks.

Heidegger calls dasein being-wth-care. So the care of Being and our care add more being to an already existing world? — Gregory

I’m not sure if I understand the question, but let me say more.

Remember thus far Heidegger has explained dasein as a being that takes a stand on its own being, and its primordial being is expressed in thrownness (past), falling (present), and projecting (future).

In his chapter on care, Heidegger just wants to explain how these three elements all hang together in a systematic way. Contra Wittgeinstein, who says we cannot say anything unified about these background practices (which he terms the “hurly burly”), Heidegger says they are primordially and constantly whole -- a single primordial unitary phenomenon -- and despite the appearance of its manifold nature, has structure. This structure is 'care'.

Care isn’t a new concept. It’s just a name that Heidegger is giving the three-fold structure of being that he’s already introduced. So really the care chapter is just a culmination of everything Heidegger has been saying in Division 1. He furthermore says the formally existential totality of dasein’s ontological structure is understood within the framework of this care structure. Care is used by Heidegger in a purely ontologically existential manner and has nothing to do with caring, or worrying, as we would say in English. Care doesn’t refer to experiences because it’s a completely formal structure. It is devoid of any experiential content.

Care is essentially the structure that Heidegger uses architectonically to cover every way being consists in. It is the structure of a being that takes a stand on its being. Within the care structure we are able to make sense of not only Dasein’s three temporal primordial elements of being-in (i.e. thrownness, falling, and projecting), but also how each element of being-in is experienced as (i.e. disposedness, discourse, and understanding), how they are made concrete (i.e. mood, absorbed dealing, and pressing into possibilities), and their essence (i.e. facticity, being-fallen, and existentiality). Heidegger just refers to the care structure of each as (a) being-already-in-the-world, (b) being-admist-entities, and (c) being-ahead-of-itself, respectively.

Care is used by Heidegger in a purely ontologically existential manner and has nothing to do with caring, or worrying, as we would say in English. Care doesn’t refer to experiences because it’s a completely formal structure. It is devoid of any experiential content. — Wolfman

If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"?

If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think Sorge/care/concern is an entirely formal term (even though it is meant to describe a "pure" category which conditions any concrete experiences). There is certain connotations that H. intends to incite. There is even some threat involved. Dasein is actively involved in maintaining itself. Dasein is a living being in a temporal world. However, care as a metaphysical concept has to be kept separate from all "naturalism" or "historical materialism". These, like sociology, psychology etc all "conceptual systems" and their terms are under "phenomenological reduction" in the phenomenology of Dasein. Heidegger has to invent new terms when he tries to reflect phenomena as they are given as themselves. That is, entirely unmediated through given terms or concepts. Which doesn't mean that intentional structures like care are not in themselves intricately mediated complicated wholes.

If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Heidegger has to invent new terms when he tries to reflect phenomena as they are given as themselves. That is, entirely unmediated through given terms or concepts. Which doesn't mean that intentional structures like care are not in themselves intricately mediated complicated wholes. — waarala

I think this is right. There is also an element of sorge that connotes something almost like "anxiety," which relates to Heidegger's conception of dasein as always looking ahead of itself. I think getting hung up on the terminology itself is besides the point, because Heidegger just needs to call it something to, as you say, "avoid mediation through given terms or concepts." Indeed Dreyfus says of Heidegger's decision to use care in describing his primordial unitary structure, "Well, I suppose he could have called it anything really."

I think getting hung up on the terminology itself is besides the point, because Heidegger just needs to call it something to, as you say, "avoid mediation through given terms or concepts." — Wolfman

Actually I think it's very important to understand the terminology. "Care" is a descriptive term, and it is used to describe aspects of temporality. So to understand how Heidegger describes temporality we need to understand what "care" means. It wouldn't make sense to just say "care" refers to temporality, because that's not really the case, "care" describes temporality, so we need to understand what "care" means as a descriptive term, in order to understand temporality.

I wouldn’t worry about it. Heidegger didn’t even know what he meant by Dasein, he just fooled many into thinking he did actually mean something by burying it under layers of obscure and pointless text.

That said, he does explore some interesting ideas. I just don’t buy into most of it because he seems - to my eyes - to have hijacked a slice of phenomenology from Husserl and ignored the its main endeavor.

Note: my opinion, but I’ve yet to see anyone show quotes prior to B&T that explicate what he meant by Dasein - there is no consistency on this in B&T as the term changes to suit the subject matter in focus throughout the work.

a slice of phenomenology from Husserl and ignored the its main endeavor. — I like sushi

What main endeavor was that? Did Husserl ever prove anything people considered now as settled?

there is no consistency on this in B&T as the term changes to suit the subject matter in focus throughout the work. — I like sushi

being there. or, being here. dasein is used quite consistently.

Actually I think it's very important to understand the terminology. "Care" is a descriptive term, and it is used to describe aspects of temporality. So to understand how Heidegger describes temporality we need to understand what "care" means. It wouldn't make sense to just say "care" refers to temporality, because that's not really the case, "care" describes temporality, so we need to understand what "care" means as a descriptive term, in order to understand temporality. — Metaphysician Undercover

First you asked, "why did he have to call it care?" (emphasis mine), which is something different than needing to "understand what 'care' means," as you're saying now, MU. We can understand what care means without having to know why he called it care. I can also know what a capybara is without knowing the etymology of the word (I don't). In any case, both of your questions are answered now.

Yeah, but it’s a noun not a verb. I understand perfectly well how talking about ‘time’ is a tricky matter. The use of Da-sein is prelimarily vague, consistently attached to the spine of the discussion, and then ends in a philosophical shrug.

It is lucid in places once you hammer through the pages (not ‘Da-sein,’ just the general problems outlined).

... As ways in which human beings behave, sciences have this being’s (the human being’s) kind of being. We are defining this being terminologically as Da-sein. Scientific research is neither the sole nor the most immediate kind of being of this being that is possible. Moreover, Da-sein itself is distinctly different from other beings. We must make this distinct difference visible in a preliminary way. Here the discussion must anticipate subsequent analyses which only later will become truly demonstrative.

Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in being this being is concerned about its very being.

... And because the essential definition of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a “what” that specifies its material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it in each instance has to be its being as its own, the term Da-sein, as a pure expression of being, has been chosen to designate this being.

Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself. Da-sein has either chosen these possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in them. Existence is decided only by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities...

I could go on. The tail chasing continues, as it does throughout the book. Like I mentioned in a previous post here it is easier to just skip to the last paragraphs before bothering with the needless word salad.

If the interpretation of the meaning of being is to become a task, Da-sein is not only the primary being to be interrogated; in addition to this it is the being that always already in its being is related to what is sought in this question. But then the question of being is nothing else than the radicalisation of an essential tendency of being that belongs to Da-sein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of being.

Then there is the summary of the opening sections:

8. The Outline of the Treatise

The question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the emptiest. But at the same time the possibility inheres of its most acute individualisation in each particular Da-sein (* authentic: bringing about standing-within the there). If we are to gain a fundamental concept of “being” and prescription of the ontologically requisite conceptuality in all its necessary variations, we need a concrete guideline. The “special character” of the investigation does not belie the universality of the concept of being. For we may advance to being by way of a special interpretation of a particular being, Da-sein, in which the horizon for an understanding and a possible interpretation of being is to be won. But this being is in itself “historic,” so that its most proper ontological illumination necessarily becomes a “historical” interpretation.

The elaboration of the question of being is a two-pronged task; our treatise therefore has two divisions.

Part One: The interpretation of Da-sein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.

Part Two: Basic features of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of temporality.

The first part consists of three divisions:

1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Da-sein.
2. Da-sein and temporality.
3. Time and being.

...

Da-sein is itself is a place-holder, or a ‘possibility’. There is no filling in for this place-holder and he ends with a number of questions and throughout the work certainly throws up some interesting, albeit needlessly obtuse, observations and ideas.

I’m not saying this in a dismissive manner I just found too much of his writing in B&T to be extraneous.

First you asked, "why did he have to call it care?" (emphasis mine), which is something different than needing to "understand what 'care' means," as you're saying now, MU. We can understand what care means without having to know why he called it care. — Wolfman

Perhaps, if we could understand what he means by "care", we would understand why he would have called it that. I agree with you that there is not a necessary relationship here, it is one of probability, and I'm willing to take that chance, because I think the probability is relatively high.

I can also know what a capybara is without knowing the etymology of the word (I don't). In any case, both of your questions are answered now. — Wolfman

There 's a big difference here. "Care" already has a common use. To choose that word to refer to something else, something we can't seem to describe, while intending complete separation from the common meaning in the reader's mind, would not be a reasonable thing to do. If Heidegger was at all reasonable, we ought to assume that he intended at least some association with the common use.

There 's a big difference here. "Care" already has a common use. To choose that word to refer to something else, something we can't seem to describe, while intending complete separation from the common meaning in the reader's mind, would not be a reasonable thing to do. If Heidegger was at all reasonable, we ought to assume that he intended at least some association with the common use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I touched on that here: "There is also an element of sorge that connotes something almost like 'anxiety,' which relates to Heidegger's conception of dasein as always looking ahead of itself." So no, not complete separation.