the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world — Gregory
Heidegger seems to be trying to say the world has existence but not being until we bring being to it. But existence is manifested being. I don't see how someone can make a distinction between existence and being, but that seems to be Heideggers major thought. Any ideas? — Gregory
Being "absorbed" in hammering would describe some madman waiving whatever heavy object. It is not about "mechanical" reacting in different directions. It (Dasein) is not about something just happening in an entirely unconscious darkness. — waarala
The East has generally said the world is illusion. The West says it exists. Heidegger seems to be trying to say the world has existence but not being until we bring being to it. — Gregory
Heidegger calls dasein being-wth-care. So the care of Being and our care add more being to an already existing world? — Gregory
Heidegger calls dasein being-wth-care. So the care of Being and our care add more being to an already existing world? — Gregory
Care is used by Heidegger in a purely ontologically existential manner and has nothing to do with caring, or worrying, as we would say in English. Care doesn’t refer to experiences because it’s a completely formal structure. It is devoid of any experiential content. — Wolfman
If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover
If "care" has nothing to do with caring then why would he have called it "care"? — Metaphysician Undercover
Heidegger has to invent new terms when he tries to reflect phenomena as they are given as themselves. That is, entirely unmediated through given terms or concepts. Which doesn't mean that intentional structures like care are not in themselves intricately mediated complicated wholes. — waarala
I think getting hung up on the terminology itself is besides the point, because Heidegger just needs to call it something to, as you say, "avoid mediation through given terms or concepts." — Wolfman
a slice of phenomenology from Husserl and ignored the its main endeavor. — I like sushi
there is no consistency on this in B&T as the term changes to suit the subject matter in focus throughout the work. — I like sushi
Actually I think it's very important to understand the terminology. "Care" is a descriptive term, and it is used to describe aspects of temporality. So to understand how Heidegger describes temporality we need to understand what "care" means. It wouldn't make sense to just say "care" refers to temporality, because that's not really the case, "care" describes temporality, so we need to understand what "care" means as a descriptive term, in order to understand temporality. — Metaphysician Undercover
... As ways in which human beings behave, sciences have this being’s (the human being’s) kind of being. We are defining this being terminologically as Da-sein. Scientific research is neither the sole nor the most immediate kind of being of this being that is possible. Moreover, Da-sein itself is distinctly different from other beings. We must make this distinct difference visible in a preliminary way. Here the discussion must anticipate subsequent analyses which only later will become truly demonstrative.
Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in being this being is concerned about its very being.
... And because the essential definition of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a “what” that specifies its material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it in each instance has to be its being as its own, the term Da-sein, as a pure expression of being, has been chosen to designate this being.
Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself. Da-sein has either chosen these possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in them. Existence is decided only by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities...
If the interpretation of the meaning of being is to become a task, Da-sein is not only the primary being to be interrogated; in addition to this it is the being that always already in its being is related to what is sought in this question. But then the question of being is nothing else than the radicalisation of an essential tendency of being that belongs to Da-sein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of being.
8. The Outline of the Treatise
The question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the emptiest. But at the same time the possibility inheres of its most acute individualisation in each particular Da-sein (* authentic: bringing about standing-within the there). If we are to gain a fundamental concept of “being” and prescription of the ontologically requisite conceptuality in all its necessary variations, we need a concrete guideline. The “special character” of the investigation does not belie the universality of the concept of being. For we may advance to being by way of a special interpretation of a particular being, Da-sein, in which the horizon for an understanding and a possible interpretation of being is to be won. But this being is in itself “historic,” so that its most proper ontological illumination necessarily becomes a “historical” interpretation.
The elaboration of the question of being is a two-pronged task; our treatise therefore has two divisions.
Part One: The interpretation of Da-sein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.
Part Two: Basic features of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of temporality.
The first part consists of three divisions:
1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Da-sein.
2. Da-sein and temporality.
3. Time and being.
...
First you asked, "why did he have to call it care?" (emphasis mine), which is something different than needing to "understand what 'care' means," as you're saying now, MU. We can understand what care means without having to know why he called it care. — Wolfman
I can also know what a capybara is without knowing the etymology of the word (I don't). In any case, both of your questions are answered now. — Wolfman
There 's a big difference here. "Care" already has a common use. To choose that word to refer to something else, something we can't seem to describe, while intending complete separation from the common meaning in the reader's mind, would not be a reasonable thing to do. If Heidegger was at all reasonable, we ought to assume that he intended at least some association with the common use. — Metaphysician Undercover
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