Which comes first in time, the end or the means? I am not referring to any thought about the end, or the desire for the end, or the decision to adopt a particular end as a goal; I am talking about the end itself. — aletheist

As I said, "end" is defined as "a thing one seeks to attain; a purpose". So the goal, or end is first in time, prior to the means That is "the end itself". Then the individual brings into effect the means which have been determined necessary to achieve the end. The end itself (which is the goal), may or may not be achieved. You seem to be forgetting that the end itself is an object in the sense of "objective", goal. Despite the fact that it may or may not be achieved, it is still the object. You know, in the rules of games, there is "the object" of the game. That is the goal. The object is the goal, which is "the end itself'. So your question is only contradictory. You ask me about "the end itself", yet stipulate that it is something other than the object which is known as the end.

The end or goal isn't an intention. The end or goal is to drive in nails. — Terrapin Station

As I said "to drive nails" implies intention. Intention is implicit in that phrase. You even indicate this with "goal". The goal is to drive nails. As the end, driving nails is the objective, the goal. Having that goal, one must obtain a hammer as the means to that end.

These are really simple words, "goal", "end", "purpose", "intention". How is it that the two of you do not understand them? Are we not learning the simple words in school anymore? I don't think that's the case. You all use these words, you just don't know how to relate them to causation. It's not these words that you don't understand, it's final cause you don't understand, so you don't see how these words refer to a cause. That's what Aristotle taught. Clearly, as per your definitions, these terms, "end", "goal", "telos", "purpose", describe what final cause is. Do you not understand what "final cause is the goal" means? You know a goal is something sought, an aim, don't you? Final cause is the goal, the purpose, telos. How many times must I repeat what is written in your definitions before you dispel your misunderstanding in favour of understanding?

As I said "to drive nails" implies intention — Metaphysician Undercover

But it isn't the same thing as intention, and "final cause" refers to the "drive nails" part, since that's the end in question, it doesn't refer to the intention part.

Consider this example. My goal is to win the lottery, that is my intention. The means to this end is to buy tickets. It is impossible that winning the lottery is the cause of me buying tickets because I never win. The cause of me buying tickets is the intent to win, my goal of winning. This is "cause" in the sense of "final cause", "that for the sake of which a thing is done".

It is impossible that winning the lottery is the cause of me buying tickets because I never win. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not impossible that it's the final cause, however, because all that "final cause" refers to is the end or "that for the sake of which" something is done. The final cause doesn't have to be realized.

What's throwing you off is the word "cause." Think of "cause" as simply a name in this context--like if we'd call it "Joe" instead. If the "Joe" is the end or goal of something, then the "Joe" in this case is "winning the lottery." The "Joe" isn't "your intention to win the lottery." You're not buying the ticket with the end or goal of your intention.

It's not impossible that it's the final cause, however, because all that "final cause" refers to is the end or "that for the sake of which" something is done. The final cause doesn't have to be realized. — Terrapin Station

Excellent, now you're catching on, the final cause is the goal, what is intended, and that's why it doesn't matter if it's realized or not, it still is the cause. There is no necessity of realization, because the cause is the goal itself, not the realization of the goal. According to aletheist's understanding of final cause, it is the realized thing which is the cause. But this is impossible because the caused activity occurs regardless of whether or not the goal is realized.

What's throwing you off is the word "cause." Think of "cause" as simply a name in this context--like if we'd call it "Joe" instead. If the "Joe" is the end or goal of something, then the "Joe" in this case is "winning the lottery." The "Joe" isn't "your intention to win the lottery." You're not buying the ticket with the end or goal of your intention. — Terrapin Station

We're talking about a cause here. Do you not understand this? The word "Joe" could refer to any non-existent thing, a pink unicorn, or me winning the lottery which never happens. How could these non-existent things be a cause of anything? All you are doing is making "final cause" into some sort of nonsense. But if the concept appears as nonsense, then surely you have misunderstood the concept. That's what I am trying to demonstrate to you. The way you understand "final cause" renders it as nonsense, my understanding does not. Surely you have misunderstood the concept, especially if you can switch out your understanding for mine, and have the concept make sense.

There is no necessity of realization, because the cause is the goal itself, not the realization of the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the goal itself, and not the intention prior to the object in question.

We're talking about a cause here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the contemporary, especially colloquial, more limited sense of "cause." That's just the point. You can't think of "cause" in that way and understand "final cause." The word substitution is meant to break the associations you're making with the word "cause," because that's resulting in a mental block.

This happens similarly with students when they're trying to learn various aspects of formal logic, including conditionals, and including validity (where under non-relevance logics, everything validly follows from a contradiction). That's why we stress to not try to parse logic in terms of natural language. Doing so often leads to mental blocks.

Right, the goal itself, and not the intention prior to the object in question. — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about? Intention is necessarily implied by goal. There is no goal without intention.

The word substitution is meant to break the associations you're making with the word "cause," because that's resulting in a mental block. — Terrapin Station

If, when you put the word back in, the result is nonsense, then clearly the exercise has failed. Your exercise demonstrates that any non-existent thing could be a cause. That's the nonsense meaning you're trying to associate with "cause". It's nonsense and should be rejected.

What are you talking about? Intention is necessarily implied by goal. There is no goal without intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, in Aristotle, intention isn't necessarily implied by ends or goals, because objects that have nothing to do with sentient creation have ends or goals, too--Aristotle buys the notion of telos in general. Sentient beings are the only ones with intentionality, however. In fact, intentionality is often taken to be a mark of sentience.

Aside from that though, it's important to not conflate the end or goal with the intention to achieve some end or goal. "Winning the World Series" is different than my (team's) intention to win the World Series--after all, we might not win, despite the intention. But "winning the World Series" is the end or goal. It's not true that our intention to win the World Series is the end or goal. We don't have a goal to intend to win the World Series in other words.

If, when you put the word back in, the result is nonsense, then clearly the exercise has failed. Your exercise demonstrates that any non-existent thing could be a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you're resuming the contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" when you use that word. Again, try using it as if it were a proper name instead.

It's always some future state that hasn't yet obtained that will be the final cause for a given existent, as that future state that hasn't yet obtained is the end or goal of that object. Hence, "(growing into an) oak tree" is the final cause for a particular oak seed, where that final cause is a future state that hasn't obtained relative to that seed, and where there is no intentionality involved.

It's not true that our intention to win the World Series is the end or goal. — Terrapin Station

You're wrong here, it is true that the team's intention to win The World Series, is the very same thing as the team's goal, or end. Why would you say that it's not true? It's just different ways of saying the very same thing. "Our intention is to win The World Series", "Our goal is to win The World Series", and "Our end is to win The World Series", all mean the very same thing.

You're confusing scope.

"To win the World Series" is identical to the goal. It's the goal under a different name.

"To intend to win the world series" isn't identical to the goal. The goal is not to intend to win the World Series.

"Goal" is the "directed-towards" in this situation. It's not the what's doing the directing, in other words.

I don't know how long you want to go on with this, by the way. You're never going to agree with me, and I'm never going to agree with you. But I don't mind going back and forth with it for as long as you'd like to until you get tired of it.

First, in Aristotle, intention isn't necessarily implied by ends or goals, because objects that have nothing to do with sentient creation have ends or goals, too--Aristotle buys the notion of telos in general. Sentient beings are the only ones with intentionality, however. In fact, intentionality is often taken to be a mark of sentience. — Terrapin Station

Have you seen the way that Aquinas demonstrates that Aristotelian principles are consistent with Christian theology? These instances in nature, in which non-sentient beings are observed to have ends, or goals, purposefulness, are attributed to the Will (intention) of God.

To win the World Series" is identical to the goal. It's the goal under a different name. — Terrapin Station

Right, "to win The World Series" is the identity of the goal. It is the goal identified, the object identified. Now, we can use your switch tactic, and switch "goal" with "intention", without changing the meaning of the statement. "To win The World Series" is the identity of the intention. It is the intention identified, the object identified.

"To intend to win the world series" isn't identical to the goal. The goal is not to intend to win the World Series. — Terrapin Station

This doesn't make sense, only because you use some odd sort of phrasing, "to intend to win". Of course "to intend" is not identical with "the goal". To intend is an action, a verb, "the goal" is an object, the noun. You need to maintain consistency "the intention" is the same thing as "the goal"

"Goal" is the "directed-towards" in this situation. It's not the what's doing the directing, in other words. — Terrapin Station

This demonstrates your misunderstanding of "final cause". Under the concept of final cause, the goal is doing the directing, not vise versa, that's how the goal is a cause. You apprehend "goal" as a "directed-towards", but the concept of final cause requires that we apprehend "goal" as what is doing the directing, that's why its a cause. This is the central principle of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. When we come to understand the reality of the situation, that the goal is doing the directing, rather than vise versa, then we set good goals, ones which are conducive to good behaviour.

This demonstrates your misunderstanding of "final cause". Under the concept of final cause, the goal is doing the directing, not vise versa, that's how the goal is a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is you not caring that you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this.

You think I'm misunderstanding it. I think you're misunderstanding it. Will either of those change?

(Not that this matters for anything in my opinion, by the way. I think that Aristotle's four causes is a waste of time, really)

Would it make sense for any baseball team (even the Cubs) to announce today that its goal, intention, or purpose is to win the 2016 World Series? If not, why not?

Which is you not caring that you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this.

You think I'm misunderstanding it. I think you're misunderstanding it. Will either of those change? — Terrapin Station

There's one big difference between my understanding of final cause, and your understanding of final cause. Yours allows that any non-existing thing, and even a thing which never has, or will exist, ever, past or future, could be a cause. This renders "cause", in this sense, as incomprehensible, incoherent nonsense. Can you make sense of the idea that something which never has, nor never will, exist, is a cause? My way of understanding final cause allows that a real existing thing, with observable effects, intention, is a cause.

Simply put, my way of understanding is reasonable, and clearly consistent with what Aristotle wrote about "final cause". Your way, while it may be consistent with what Aristotle wrote, is unreasonable because it renders this sense of "cause" as nonsense. Therefore my interpretation is reasonable while yours is unreasonable.

This whole line of discussion began because asserted that "the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect," and then challenged anyone who disagreed to "describe a type of causation which is not like that." I responded by pointing out that final causation "is often subsequent (temporally) to the effect," and that "most efficient causation is really simultaneous with the effect." We have been quibbling ever since over whether the final cause is the desire/goal/intention/purpose to achieve a future state of affairs, or that future state of affairs itself. My whole point was simply that final cause is always about the future. In that sense, the "cause" is temporally subsequent to the "effect"; the end is temporally subsequent to the means.

The various difficulties being raised disappear if you treat finality as a global constraint. To have a goal is to accept a constraint towards which all material and efficient actions must tend.

As a person, it is clear enough that to have the intention of winning the championship is the cause of of some collection of steps I take (or actions, like getting drunk, that I avoid). And the goal has to be clearly foreseen to be effective as a general constraint on my actions.

But finality as a causative constraint is then also something that can be unintentionally accepted. It doesn't have to be a conscious and "freely" chosen thing. Animals follow evolutionary goals that have become embedded in the habits of their genetics. Weather patterns follow thermodynamic goals that are meet the least action principle of entropic material systems.

So telos simply is a way to talk about the reality of constraints as causes.

Because of the great pragmatic success of classical mechanics - treating nature as a reductionist "machine", a blind web of deterministic cause and effect - we find it very easy to accept the notion of causation as nominalistic construction. You take a bunch of Lego bits and build them up into something - the form and purpose of that something being now an arbitrary whim of the human mind.

But through biology especially, we can see that nature is organic. It has a developmental character based on all four of Aristotle's causes - the two upwardly constructive ones of material and efficient cause, balanced by the two downwardly constraining ones of forrmal and final cause.

So the notion of purpose can be generalised to nature by pointing out that nature does serve generalised purposes. And having those purposes results in necessary forms - the ones best designed to serve then. That understanding is now central to modern physics. It is why thermodynamics and the physics of dissipative structure has moved to centre stage as folk try to work out a final theory to unite the dichotomy of quantum mechanics and relativistic mechanics.

Then as to which comes first, which comes second, the whole discussion becomes rather moot if time itself has to be re-thought to make it possible to unify physics.

In a developmental view of the situation - where the trajectory is not so much from the past to the future as from the vague to the crisp - then both existence and essence, both the "material" constructive causes and the "formal" constraining causes, start vague and develop strength as the way they must work together to produce something stable - like a Cosmos - comes into focus.

So neither is first or last. Both mutually co-arise (to pinch the Buddhist term).

Yet also, because the constructive causes are the most local or smallest in terms of spatiotemporal scale, they seem to become established first. They are crisply existent "from the get-go" - even if they happen to be contextless fluctuations or one-off dyadic reactions (Peirce's firstness and secondness) when they first appear.

Then it takes longer for the constraining causes - the forms and the telos - to emerge into view because they are the long-run or global states of being. The essences actually have to develop historically, even if retrospectively, they will be seen as always having to have been a necessary result.

So the paradox is that finality has to undergo an actual history to actually be real in the end. But that end was always immanent - the only real possibility at the start.

Didn't Hegel make that kind of argument for God and the Cosmos - there had to be a journey via "our" imperfection for there to be then the "other" of a heavenly perfection?

So it is a boot-strapping cosmology which Peirce did an even better job on. And now we can appreciate its physical truth as we come to understand the Cosmos as beginning in the chaos of a quantum foam state, the Big Bang, and running down the entropic hill to arrive at its super-dissipated, crisply final, outcome, the infinitely cold and vast Heat Death.

Can you make sense of the idea that something which never has, nor never will, exist, is a cause? My way of understanding final cause allows that a real existing thing, with observable effects, intention, is a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Broken record time: That's because you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this.

Broken record time: That's because you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this. — Terrapin Station

No, I'm offering a reasonable interpretation of "final cause", as intention, exactly as it is described by Aristotle. The contemporary narrow sense of "cause" excludes intention as a cause, that is what supports determinism. And, this reasonable interpretation of "final cause" which I put forward is far more charitable than the incoherent, incomprehensible, nonsense interpretation of "final cause" that you've put forward, which is completely inconsistent with Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics..

Yes. You're offering what seems to you to be a reasonable interpretation, where you "modestly" see your interpretation necessarily as identical to Aristotle's, because you're grafting the narrow, contemporary sense of "cause" onto "final cause." The contemporary sense of "cause" wouldn't say that an intention is a cause of something in vacuo, but that's not what you're saying either.

No, I'm offering a reasonable interpretation of "final cause", as intention, exactly as it is described by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

A seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline does not have any intentions, yet each has a final cause - the full-grown plant and coming to rest at the bottom of the incline, respectively.

There is a continuity of usage which makes any term comprehensible.
In the case of "final cause", that continuity can be followed from Aristotle through Christian theology. It is this continuity which I adhere to. And this understanding of "final cause" is completely distinct from any contemporary sense of "cause". Your accusation is unjustified.

You, on the other hand, are introducing a narrow contemporary sense of "final cause" which renders "final cause" in the traditional sense incomprehensible.

The contemporary sense of "cause" wouldn't say that an intention is a cause of something in vacuo, but that's not what you're saying either. — Terrapin Station

What you mean by "vacuo", I don't know, but the traditional understanding allows that final cause is prior to any material existence, and that is what I'm saying. And, in theology they demonstrate that prior to material existence there was necessarily final cause, the Will of God. I think you should reconsider your accusation.

A seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline does not have any intentions, yet each has a final cause - the full-grown plant and coming to rest at the bottom of the incline, respectively. — aletheist

In theology, the intention (Will) of God is assigned to such cases of final cause. And the intention of God is not necessarily within the object which acts with final cause. As an example, I explained that the components within my computer act with purpose, toward an end, which is the operation of my computer. The intention involved here is proper to the human beings which made the computer, the intention is not considered to be within the computer itself, though the parts act with purpose (final cause).

There is a continuity of usage which makes any term comprehensible. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a claim for which you're supplying neither any empirical evidence nor any argumentation.

In theology, the intention (Will) of God is assigned to such cases of final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a Philosophy Forum, not a theology forum. You are effectively conceding that there are no final causes apart from willing agents, which - as I understand it - was not Aristotle's own position.

This is a Philosophy Forum, not a theology forum. You are effectively conceding that there are no final causes apart from willing agents, which - as I understand it - was not Aristotle's own position. — aletheist

No I'm not conceding that, this is the theological argument which introduces God as the source of telos in natural things. Aristotle did not seek the source of telos, he just affirmed that it was there. So there is no inconsistency between Aristotle saying that the seed develops with intention, but not determining the source of that intention, and the theologian claiming the source of that intention as God.

That's a claim for which you're supplying neither any empirical evidence nor any argumentation. — Terrapin Station

I told you, the continuity of usage is within theological principles, try reading Aquinas' fifth way. Furthermore, that continuity of usage continues in modern day philosophy as is evident from the definitions you provide which define "final cause" with "goal", "end", "telos", and "purpose".

It appears we have two choice of interpretation:

1) My interpretation, supported by thousands of years of tradition in theological principles, as well as the definitions provided by you. This interpretation allows for an immaterial final cause (intention), which despite being immaterial, is nevertheless something real

2) Your interpretation, supported by you and alethist. This interpretation allows that something with absolutely no existence, is a final cause.

The choice is clear, unless you can show me something that I am missing.

I told you, the continuity of usage is within theological principles, — Metaphysician Undercover

Which has nothing to do with the claim you made. Your claim was about the conditions required for comprehensibility.

... this is the theological argument which introduces God as the source of telos in natural things. Aristotle did not seek the source of telos, he just affirmed that it was there. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are not discussing "the source of telos in natural things," we are discussing what that telos is itself. While I am a theist, it seems problematic to me to require the existence/reality of God in order for natural things to have final causes. It also seems highly dubious that Aristotle himself would have endorsed such a view.

We are not discussing "the source of telos in natural things," we are discussing what that telos is itself. While I am a theist, it seems problematic to me to require the existence/reality of God in order for natural things to have final causes. It also seems highly dubious that Aristotle himself would have endorsed such a view. — aletheist

I don't think it is necessary to assume God, and I agree that Aristotle probably didn't think this way either. What we do is assume intention, or purpose, as final cause, without claiming to know the source of that intention. Intention as a cause is supported by evidence. All we are doing is making an account of the evidence, a description of how intention causes the production and manufacture of things. However, even in human beings who act with conscious intention, and provide us with much evidence of intention as cause, the source of intention is unknown. And this is of concern to some people.

So we can conclude from the evidence of human beings that intention is a cause, this is the cause of artifacts, artificial things. Then we can proceed to acknowledge this type of causation in other things as well. This does not require that we assume the existence of God, it is just a matter of concluding that intention is a cause, and looking for that cause in various places. However, in theology they want to go beyond this, to account for the existence of intention in general, as it appears to be a very unusual (unnatural) form of causation.

Which has nothing to do with the claim you made. Your claim was about the conditions required for comprehensibility. — Terrapin Station

So you think that you can use a word to mean whatever you want it to mean, and this would be comprehensible? I think not, it is the continuity of similar usage from one person to the next which produces comprehensibility.