No.
I am saying that if some G's are F, and some G's not F.
Then you cannot say that All G's have — m-theory
What's contradictory about that? — Terrapin Station
So the statement "Truth is dependent upon the mind and truth is dependent upon the world" looks like this. — m-theory
The Venn diagram for "truth is dependent upon the mind" (by itself) is identical to your diagram, except that the portion of the circle for "World" that is outside the circle for "Mind" is omitted. Hence the conjunction does not set up a contradiction; both statements can indeed be true. If we say instead (as you did above) that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds," and then add the premiss (as suggested by ↪Terrapin Station) that "minds are part of the world," we get his diagram (Gs=World, Fs=Mind, phi=Truth). In this case, "truth is dependent upon the world" is necessarily true; more precisely, "truth is exclusively dependent upon part of the world." The only way I can see to make the two statements genuinely contradictory is to say that "truth is exclusively dependent upon minds" and "minds are not part of the world." — aletheist
There is also no contradiction between "this product is exclusively for women" and "this product is for people." This becomes clearer if we change the second premiss to "this product is for some people." There would only be a contradiction if the second premiss instead was (as you rewrote it above) "this product is for all people." — aletheist
Again 'Truth is exclusively dependent upon minds"
Is not logically equivalent to the statement
"Truth is dependent upon mind and upon the world"
One has a logical connective and the other does not. — m-theory
Hence the diagram is wrong/contradictory with the labels you have applied to the variables used in the diagram. — m-theory
Using the term people denotes the set containing both men and women which leads to contradiction. — m-theory
The labels that I applied were G=World, F=Minds, and phi=Truth. All truth is exclusively mind-dependent, and all minds are part of the world; i.e., world-dependent. Therefore, all truth is (also) world-dependent. — aletheist
So the statement "Truth is dependent upon the mind and truth is dependent upon the world" looks like this. — m-theory
Which is not identical to this diagram in any way. — m-theory
So you'd say you're depicting a contradiction there? — Terrapin Station
any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it — aletheist
I did make the case that truth about worlds are world dependent and not mind dependent.I am not as interested in the content of your argument as I am in trying to sort out its logic. What you seem to be saying is that any truth about the world is necessarily a truth that depends on the world. You may be right, but you have yet to offer an argument to demonstrate it... — aletheist
...since this is the first time (as far as I can tell) that you have clearly articulated this additional premiss. — aletheist
In addition, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here. As a couple of us have pointed out, if all minds are world-dependent, and all truth is mind-dependent, then there is no contradiction in acknowledging that all truth is (also) world-dependent. — aletheist
This is not equivalent to my example.
So if you say "This is exclusively a triangle and it is also a shape"
It does not have set membership of exclusively triangles, it also has set membership of shapes. — m-theory
What you're apparently saying here is that
IF:
* φ is a property of Fs
* φ is ONLY a property of Fs; φ is not found elsewhere
* Fs are Gs
* The class of Gs includes things that are not Fs as well
Then we can't say "φ is exclusively a property of Fs and φ is a property of some Gs" without stating something contradictory? — Terrapin Station
I pointed out that it is a contradiction to say that φ is exclusive to F
Because the statement
Some G's are not F's is true about the world, not minds. — m-theory
If it is true about the world that all truth depends on minds. — m-theory
Then we can imagine a world without minds.
In which case it is not true about the world that there is no truth.
For were it is true that there is no truth
I agree it is absolutely reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent. — m-theory
A statement is only true about the world if the world is a certain way, and thus depends on the world. "The world contains elephants" is true iff there are elephants in the world, and false otherwise. — Pneumenon
, I am not sure that anyone seriously claims that all truth is exclusively mind-dependent in the way that you have sought to establish here. — aletheist
truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
No one is saying that there is no truth (unqualified) by the way. What we'd say is that if in world x there are no minds, then in world x there is no truth, and in world x, it's neither true nor false that there's no truth. However, with us in world y where we do have minds, we could say in world y that there is no truth in world x, and we could say this is true in world y (about world x), because in world y we're judging it to be true. — Terrapin Station
Adding "exclusively" to "mind-dependent" just says that there's no part of the world that's not mind that is a part where truth obtains. — Terrapin Station
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