f utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence? — JacobPhilosophy
If utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence? — JacobPhilosophy
If utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence — JacobPhilosophy
"Love" is an extension of pleasure, which I am deeming to be unnecessary when considering not having been born. — JacobPhilosophy
taking the asymmetry into account, the lack of joy or pleasure isn't inherently bad. You may disagree with this premise. — JacobPhilosophy
that is making the assumption that the avoidance of suffering is only valuable to those that currently live. Again, to reference Benatar's asymmetry, (you may disagree), to not have been born is more ethical, as to avoid pain is inherently good, but to avoid pleasure is neutral (when considering hindsight and nonexistence). — JacobPhilosophy
Take this hypothetical: your parents want to either have a child and subject the baby to intense pain or simply not have the child, wouldn't you prefer the latter? — JacobPhilosophy
points 4 and 5 are a direct contradiction. — JacobPhilosophy
I understand the underlying contradiction that if a thing is good, then surely the absence of said thing is bad. However, I believe that point 5 is disregarded in the asymmetry, and your argument is that point 5 is implied by point 1. Benetar would disagree that pleasure therefore deems importance. In addition, I believe that [good and not bad] (Extinction) is better than [good and bad] (Existence). Although, as I have previously stated there does seem to be some contradiction in the idea that pleasure and pain are asymmetrical. — JacobPhilosophy
I don't deny that there would be disadvantages to existing people in not bringing into existence new generations, the question though is whether we are entitled to treat other people as means to our ends in that way. Say if we keep reproducing new generations for our benefit and then those new generations have to suffer and then they need to produce new generations for their benefit, what we have is what I call a procreational Ponzi scheme. — Benatar
I do understand your point, but the idea to do what is good (pleasure is good) only applies to the living. The idea to avoid what is bad (pain is bad) in Benetar's belief can apply to both life and potential life. — JacobPhilosophy
I do understand your point, but the idea to do what is good (pleasure is good) only applies to the living. The idea to avoid what is bad (pain is bad) in Benetar's belief can apply to both life and potential life. — JacobPhilosophy
I know this is hard to measure and therefore suffers in terms of validity, but it makes sense to me and the term "asymmetry" can still be applied. Benetar, as previously mentioned, would claim that the lack of pleasure to an existing being is bad, but to a potential being is good. The lack of pain to an existing being AND a potential being is good in both cases. — JacobPhilosophy
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.