Maybe. But I think your argument makes the mistake of conflating existence with suffering.

No, because you would not only eradicate suffering, but also joy, love, beauty, etc.

One can only minimize suffering in living beings, so if the greatest ethics is to minimize suffering one must concentrate his efforts on alleviate the suffering, not destroying the sufferers.

taking the asymmetry into account, the lack of joy or pleasure isn't inherently bad. You may disagree with this premise.

Well, minimize =/= eliminate, so ...

f utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence? — JacobPhilosophy

You know I struggled with that a long time myself when I was having problems with depression, so I really can sympathize with that perspective.

Eventually, long after I put aside even thinking about it, I met a very lovely squat little Chinese girl working in Quality Assurance in silicon valley to whom I posed the question what she thought of the one child policy in China, and if she had moved to the USA so she could have the beautfiul babies she showed us pictures of. And I expressed concern how overpopulation was ruining the planet, perhaps not appropriately, but only to express that I did understand why her home country had done so. And what did she say. She said, "the more people there are, the more love there can be." Well as they say more wisdom can be found in one sentence from the love of the innocent than all the annals of philosophy. Well they do say that. Maybe it isnt true, but they do say it, lol.

I appreciate the sentiment, and am not depressed by any means myself, but I am merely taking a rationalist perspective (or trying to). "Love" is an extension of pleasure, which I am deeming to be unnecessary when considering not having been born. These are very complex and subjective questions.

If utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence? — JacobPhilosophy

Yes. Sadly, it is tricky to actually try to apply in real life. The only currently foreseeable way to achieve extinction of life even just on our planet is through human civilization and technology that is probably at least hundreds of years away. How does one further that scenario in our lifetime?

As an antinatalist of course I won't willingly procreate, but at the same time, I realize that if I somehow got all other humans to do the same, it would actually prevent the extinction of life.

I think you mean to say negative utilitarianism, unless I’m mistaken. Either way, @schopenhauer1 started a thread that probably covers what you’re asking.

Here

Minimizing suffering doesn't mean creating a state of minimal suffering, it means avoiding current suffering. The difference is in tense: your perceiving a future where there exists minimum suffering, which would be non-existence, or zero suffering. However, we live in the present and we must avoid suffering in our day-to-day activities. The only way to avoid daily suffering is to sustain a society that protects us from suffering. This, of course, isn't even considering the fact that we're completely ignoring the good in life, which one could easily argue outweighs the bad.

If utilitarianism dictates that the greatest policy of ethics is to minimise suffering, wouldn't the most ethical position be the extinction of all existence — JacobPhilosophy

It's to maximize happiness, not to minimize suffering.

"Love" is an extension of pleasure, which I am deeming to be unnecessary when considering not having been born. — JacobPhilosophy

TO YOU, love is an extension of pleasure lol. The fact is, love sometimes means doing things that are not pleasant at all. Really, you do need to learn to qualify your statements properly, sorry to say. It's part of being a good philosopher.

taking the asymmetry into account, the lack of joy or pleasure isn't inherently bad. You may disagree with this premise. — JacobPhilosophy

So JacobPhilosophy, have you heard of antinatalism? Please look at most of the threads I started. They are exactly about this idea regarding the win/win of not procreating. Obviously someone not born, doesn't get deprived of happiness not had. However, someone not born means no suffering which is always good. Please see the philosopher David Benatar's asymmetry argument. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benatar

The whole idea behind reducing suffering is to make life worth living. To then think that causing a mass extinction follows from it is a egregrious error.

1. If you want to reduce suffering then you want to make life worth living
2. If you want to make life worth living then causing a mass extinction is not an option
3. You want to reduce suffering (utilitarianism)
4. You want to make life worth living (1, 3 modus ponens)
5. Causing mass extinction is not an option (2, 4 modus ponens)

I am familiar with Benatar's asymmetry, and book "better never to have been", this is why I am referencing it.

that is making the assumption that the avoidance of suffering is only valuable to those that currently live. Again, to reference Benatar's asymmetry, (you may disagree), to not have been born is more ethical, as to avoid pain is inherently good, but to avoid pleasure is neutral (when considering hindsight and nonexistence).

that is making the assumption that the avoidance of suffering is only valuable to those that currently live. Again, to reference Benatar's asymmetry, (you may disagree), to not have been born is more ethical, as to avoid pain is inherently good, but to avoid pleasure is neutral (when considering hindsight and nonexistence). — JacobPhilosophy

How are we to reduce the suffering for those who're not alive?

Because out of two situations: one in which you are born and suffer, and another in which you are not born, it is most ethical to take the latter, wouldn't you agree? As a vegan, this is a common belief about animal agriculture; it is more ethical to stop breeding animals to put them in terrible conditions than to continue. Why can't this be applied to an extreme scale logically?

I don't think I explained well enough. My point is that for that potential being, a lack of existence is preferable in hindsight. I don't believe that their lack of being disregards this, as I have previously given with the animals. Take this hypothetical: your parents want to either have a child and subject the baby to intense pain or simply not have the child, wouldn't you prefer the latter?

Take this hypothetical: your parents want to either have a child and subject the baby to intense pain or simply not have the child, wouldn't you prefer the latter? — JacobPhilosophy

This scenario assumes that life is suffering. Indeed if the life is going to be a one-sided experience of only pain then, nonexistence is preferable. What the scenario fails to factor in is that life is a mixed bag of pain and pleasure.

Given the above is true, you can't justify extinction for you would be completely ignoring the pleasure involved in living. The idea is to reduce suffering but to keep the pleasure and not focus entirely on suffering which is the case if you're suggesting we should kickstart a mass extinction.

Let's take a closer look at Benatar's asymmetry:

1. Presence of pleasure is good
2. Presence of pain is bad
3. Absence of pain is good
4. Absence of pleasure is not bad

Agreed. However, if 1 is true then the following must be true as well:

5. Deprivation of pleasure is bad

And if one were to suggest mass extinction then people would be deprived of pleasure and that we know from 5, which follows from 1, is bad.

points 4 and 5 are a direct contradiction. Benetar's point is exactly the opposite of point 5 and I assume he is pro-extinction to some extent. You either agree with him or you don't, which is fine either way but you can't have both. I personally have not made my decision on whether the deprivation of pain is inherently negative yet. It certainly seems to make sense to me that if I am not to exist, I have no preference and therefore not coming into being is a state of neutrality. Even in modern life, it appears that there are objective forms of pain but only subjective pleasure, that may be more intense to each person based on exposure to such pleasure. As Siddhartha Gautama believed, greatfulness of certain material desires dwindles, and only true happiness can prevail. As happiness is subjective to each person, so therefore is pleasure. I'm rambling, take no notice of me.

points 4 and 5 are a direct contradiction. — JacobPhilosophy

If apples are good for you (presence of pleasure is good) then I would be doing something bad by withholding apples from you (deprivation of pleasure is bad).

Please continue.

You're right you know but something's wrong with Benatar's asymmetry. Let's go through it again:

1. Presence of pleasure is good
2. Presence of pain is bad
3. Absence of pain is good
4. Absence of pleasure is NOT BAD

By causing an extinction you would be eliminating 1. the presence of pleasure and 2. the presence of pain but that leaves us with the combination [good & not bad.] If we didn't opt for mass extinction then we're left with the combination [good & bad.]

So, it's a choice between [good & bad] vs [good & not bad]. Good cancels good but not bad is better than bad. Ergo, antinatalism.

Great argument if you ask me but if 1 is true then something follows from it:

5. Not causing causing pleasure matters [if your homework affects your grades then you should do your homework]

If 4 is true then

6. Not causing pleasure doesn't matter [if not doing your homework doesn't affect your grades then you may choose not to do your homework]


5 contradicts 6

There's an inconsistency in Benatar's asymmetry.

I understand the underlying contradiction that if a thing is good, then surely the absence of said thing is bad. However, I believe that point 5 is disregarded in the asymmetry, and your argument is that point 5 is implied by point 1. Benetar would disagree that pleasure therefore deems importance. In addition, I believe that [good and not bad] (Extinction) is better than [good and bad] (Existence). Although, as I have previously stated there does seem to be some contradiction in the idea that pleasure and pain are asymmetrical.

I understand the underlying contradiction that if a thing is good, then surely the absence of said thing is bad. However, I believe that point 5 is disregarded in the asymmetry, and your argument is that point 5 is implied by point 1. Benetar would disagree that pleasure therefore deems importance. In addition, I believe that [good and not bad] (Extinction) is better than [good and bad] (Existence). Although, as I have previously stated there does seem to be some contradiction in the idea that pleasure and pain are asymmetrical. — JacobPhilosophy

Ok. Benatar's asymmetry depends on one single claim: the absence of pleasure is NOT BAD. Prima facie this is very believable.

However, Benatar also makes the claim: presence of pleasure is good. This too is very believable.

However, these two statements lead to a contradiction which I already explained in my previous posts. Let me repeat it here for the sake of a better discussion

1. Presence of pleasure is good............Benatar
2. Absence of pleasure is NOT BAD......Benatar
3. We should do what's good....Benatar would agree
4. IF the presence of pleasure is good AND we should do what's good THEN, we should bring about pleasure
5. The presence of pleasure is good AND we should do what's good (1, 3 conjunction)
6. We should bring about pleasure...(4, 5 modus ponens)
7. IF we should bring about pleasure THEN there's something wrong in not bringing about pleasure...(Benatar might disagree but why?)
8. There's something wrong in not bringing about pleasure...(6, 7 modus ponens)
9. IF absence of pleasure is not bad THEN not the case that something's wrong in not bringing about pleasure...Benatar would definitely agree
10. Not the case that something's wrong in not bringing about pleasure....(2, 9 modus ponens)
11. Something's wrong in not bringing about pleasure AND not the case that something's wrong in not bringing about pleasure...(8, 10 conjunction) CONTRADICTION
12. Either not the case that presence of pleasure is good or not the case that absence of pleasure is not bad...(from 1 to 11 reductio ad absurdum)

@schopenhauer1 I visited the wiki and followed a link to a conveniently recent debate where he discussed his ideas. I was surprised and pleased to find that he actually made a comment that addressed the point I made in this thread, that "the only way to avoid daily suffering is to sustain a society that protects us from suffering":

I don't deny that there would be disadvantages to existing people in not bringing into existence new generations, the question though is whether we are entitled to treat other people as means to our ends in that way. Say if we keep reproducing new generations for our benefit and then those new generations have to suffer and then they need to produce new generations for their benefit, what we have is what I call a procreational Ponzi scheme. — Benatar

But I simply think that Benatar has a pessimistic view on this cycle of procreation. He seems to think that we all are suffering, and to alleviate that suffering, we procreate, which will just bring more suffering beings into existence. This leads to his procreational Ponzi scheme.

I believe, however, that the cycle of procreation is symbiotic.

We are born into this world of pain and pleasure. As living, conscious beings, we strive to avoid pain, and indulge in pleasure (note: avoiding pain is fundamental, indulging in pleasure is a byproduct). In order to minimize pain, we build society, but society can only be sustained with new generations. So it is essential that we bear new generations and then those new generations will live to experience pain and pleasure, but in a society that shields the pain from them and provides pleasure for them to indulge in.

This isn't a Ponzi scheme. We aren't using new generations merely as means to an end. It's the circle of life.

I do understand your point, but the idea to do what is good (pleasure is good) only applies to the living. The idea to avoid what is bad (pain is bad) in Benetar's belief can apply to both life and potential life. In developing the asymmetrical argent, I have personally come to the conclusion that the absence of pleasure is not as negative as the absence of pain is positive. Therefore it is overall the best thing to do (not existing that is) and the desire to do what is good (pleasure) can be overridden by the greater good (preventing all pain, which is far worse). As I have previously stated, suffering is far more objective and intense. I do not believe that the most intense pleasure can outweigh the most intense pain, therefore pleasure and pain are not direct opposites. The contradiction Benetar makes, saying that the absence of pleasure isn't bad, may be answered, in my opinion, with the idea that it IS bad, but it is not as bad as it is good to eliminate pain as an entity. I know this is hard to measure and therefore suffers in terms of validity, but it makes sense to me and the term "asymmetry" can still be applied. Benetar, as previously mentioned, would claim that the lack of pleasure to an existing being is bad, but to a potential being is good. The lack of pain to an existing being AND a potential being is good in both cases. The basis on which he justifies this may be the imbalance (or asymmetry) of pleasure and pain. I can understand that, conceptually, if I were not to be born, I would be indifferent to not having experienced the pleasures in life. However, my indifference may not extend to pain, and it is preferable to me to not be born into pain, and indifferent to me to be born into pleasure. You treat pleasure and pain as direct opposites like ph 1 and ph 14 or -50 degrees and +50 degrees Celsius. I don't have this view and I don't believe that the neutral pH 7 can be reached with the same amount of pleasure and pain (bad analogy sorry). I'm sure a lot of people who use this forum have masters degrees and PhDs I'm just a bored 16 year old in quarantine who has an interest but I'm trying to improve my rationality on complex topics.

So this whole thing relies on a false notion of what Benatar holds. The logic is wrong because there's a missing premise around 1 and 2 there. The premise is:

The presence of pain is bad.
The presence of pleasure is good.
The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

Your missing mainly that last one in your calculation. THAT is the asymmetry. Absence of pain is an absolute good (the state of affairs that no one actually suffers). It is ONLY bad to not have pleasure/benefits/goods if there is somebody who exists for which this would be a deprivation.

I do understand your point, but the idea to do what is good (pleasure is good) only applies to the living. The idea to avoid what is bad (pain is bad) in Benetar's belief can apply to both life and potential life. — JacobPhilosophy

Yes, that is the main argument many people ignore or don't fully get.

I do understand your point, but the idea to do what is good (pleasure is good) only applies to the living. The idea to avoid what is bad (pain is bad) in Benetar's belief can apply to both life and potential life. — JacobPhilosophy

I don't see how bringing about pleasure does NOT apply to potential life. Can I not plan for my child to have a pleasurable experience on earth, while alive? If the answer is "yes" then pleasure is as equally applicable as pain to potential life. If "no", why?


I fully agree with you snd the esteemed Benatar. My argument, you already know, is not about Benatar's and your conclusion - it is definitely better not to exist than to live a life of suffering. All I'm trying to say is that Benatar's premises lead to a contradiction. What follows...I don't know.

I know this is hard to measure and therefore suffers in terms of validity, but it makes sense to me and the term "asymmetry" can still be applied. Benetar, as previously mentioned, would claim that the lack of pleasure to an existing being is bad, but to a potential being is good. The lack of pain to an existing being AND a potential being is good in both cases. — JacobPhilosophy

One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :

There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).

If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.

There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it.