The OP speaks in terms of the effects of language on perception and belief.

Knowledge of that includes knowledge of language, perception, and belief in addition to any and all relevant causal relationships/connections/associations one may draw between the three. That's quite a mountain to climb. Climbing it requires prep work. I want to start with some common sense stuff, then return to the notion in the OP.

Perception does not require language. Belief does not either. However, belief does require perception, as does language. As a result, we know that some of the most basic rudimentary thought and belief exist in their entirety prior to language. We know that language cannot effect what the most basic of beliefs consist in/of. Language does not effect what basic belief is existentially dependent upon.

All language is belief based, whereas not all belief is language based. So...

The effects that language acquisition and use has upon belief and perception is only understood in terms of being but one necessary elemental constituent therein. Remember, not all belief consists of and/or or is existentially dependent upon language use.

Language cannot effect what non-linguistic belief and perception consist of.

The effects of language on belief and perception assumes a causal connection between language acquisition/use and the subsequent belief and perception of the user.

Perception and belief prior to language, and perception and belief afterwards, and the remarkable differences between them as well as any direct causal connection.

What counts as perception prior to language? Or belief prior to the same, for that matter?

Whatever it is, it does not include language. Thus, however language effects it, that effect will not include any change whatsoever in the elemental constituency of either. Furthermore, whatever effect happens it is an effect including that same elemental constituency, whatever it may include.

Introducing language to a language less creature does not effect/affect what that creature's pre-existing belief consisted of. Rather, it is supposed that the introduction effects/affects the subsequent belief or perception.

Pouring milk upon dry cereal does not effect/affect what the cereal was made of prior to the introduction event.

That's perhaps the best analogy for supporting all my suggestions regarding how we ought approach this topic.

Language effects belief and perception when language use is a part of them(although I reject it's being a part of physiological sensory perception). Language can begin to effect an otherwise language less creature's subsequent belief by virtue of becoming a part thereof. Let me briefly explain... if I may...

All belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. Sometimes one of those things is language use itself. When this happens, the language begins to effect/affect the creature(I suppose we can say) as a direct result of 'causing' it to draw correlations between the language use and something else(or other things).

The language is sometimes said to 'inform' the thought or belief. Linguistically informed belief is belief that is existentially dependent upon language in a very specific way... that an integral part of that particular belief is language use.

All metacognition is linguistically informed, for example.

However, prior to being able to think about one's own thought and belief, one must have something to think about as well as the ability and/or means for picking it out to the exclusion of all else and subsequently considering it as a subject matter in and of itself. Language affords one such a 'luxury'. Nothing else suffices. Naming and descriptive practices are required to pick out one's own mental ongoings, of which perception and belief are most certainly included.

They key take-away here is that we can be wrong about belief and perception, and are if we do not drawn and maintain the key distinction between basic rudimentary basic belief and belief that consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon language by virtue of language use being one of the necessary elemental constituents therein.

If we are mistaken about belief regarding what it consists of, at a bare minimum, then we are sure to be mistaken about any particular effects/affects that language may or may not have upon it, simply because we do not know what is being affected/effected. No way to know how belief is effected/affected if we do not first know what it is that's being effected/effected. Knowing what to look for precedes the looking.

Belief exists in it's entirety long before language acquisition. Perception does as well.

Until those two things are rightly understood in terms of what they consist of, then there can be no hope in possibly understanding how language begins to affect/effect them.

All metacognition is linguistically informed, for example. — creativesoul

I'd be interested to get a description of your concept "metacognition". What is the relationship between cognitive structure and linguistic structure in this case?

Metacognition is thinking about thought and belief. The second question does not make much sense to me. Cognition and language both consist of correlations, but talking in terms of relationship between structure is fraught.

Think I agree with the way you partitioned the concepts. A distinction certainly exists between perception/belief as somehow etched in cognition, language as a mechanism for expressing /interpreting these perceptions/beliefs, and the kind of perception/belief acquisition that only occurs in conjunction with language use.

The question I have is whether language use is intrinsic to the structure of the concepts in language-influenced belief and related perceptions or merely a passive means of representation for what is being etched in cognition by a perhaps substantially nonlinguistic mechanism despite the greater complexity or experiential indirectness. That's what I'm getting at with the idea of structure: does language use pattern language-acquired thought such that the thought cannot even occur without language use, or is language more superficial? To what extent is the logicality or associational structure of language itself a constituent component of the thought itself? Does this vary by conceptual context and nonnegligibly between different minds?

Think I agree with the way you partitioned the concepts. A distinction certainly exists between perception/belief as somehow etched in cognition, language as a mechanism for expressing /interpreting these perceptions/beliefs, and the kind of perception/belief acquisition that only occurs in conjunction with language use. — Enrique

That's not how I 'partitioned the concepts'(whatever that's supposed to mean). Nor would I even agree with such a parsing for reasons that need not be gotten into at this time. You've misunderstood something somewhere along the line, I'm sorry to say. Although, there could be much agreement. I mean, the above report may not be too far off to be of good use.

Perhaps this will help to clarify my position and thus whether or not it's true that you do agree with the position I'm advocating for/from...

All concepts consist of language use. Thus, they are existentially dependent upon language. Some conceptions pick something out of this world that exists in it's entirety prior to being noticed, and others do not.

Belief, perception, and language exist in their entirety prior to our taking note of them. If one's conception of any of the three cannot take this into proper account, then they've gotten something wrong somewhere along the line about them.

Perception is the simplest of the three, with belief being the second, and language beng the most complex. Language is existentially dependent upon(requires) both belief and perception. When and where there has never been belief, there could never be language. When and where there has never been perception there could never be belief.

I would not say that language effects one's perception. Whereas it certainly effects one's beliefs, emotions, and 'states' of mind.

That's what I'm getting at with the idea of structure: does language use pattern language-acquired thought such that the thought cannot even occur without language use, or is language more superficial? — Enrique

I would be very hesitant to talk in terms of structure here...

Some belief requires language. It's rather simple really. All belief consist of correlations drawn between different things. When language use is one of those things, that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language use. Language use is a necessary elemental constituent thereof. Such thought or belief cannot exist without language in much the same way that an apple pie cannot exist without apples.

It has nothing to do with structure, and everything to do with necessary elemental constituency and existential dependency.

To what extent is the logicality or associational structure of language itself a constituent component of the thought itself? Does this vary by conceptual context and nonnegligibly between different minds? — Enrique

I think I've just answered this bit.

All belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. Sometimes one of those things is language use itself. When this happens, the language begins to effect/affect the creature(I suppose we can say) as a direct result of 'causing' it to draw correlations between the language use and something else(or other things).

The language is sometimes said to 'inform' the thought or belief. Linguistically informed belief is belief that is existentially dependent upon language in a very specific way... that an integral part of that particular belief is language use.

All metacognition is linguistically informed, for example. — creativesoul

Can you provide a specific instance of this? I'm not sure I've accurately grasped what you have in mind.

All metacognition is linguistically informed, for example.
— creativesoul

Can you provide a specific instance of this? I'm not sure I've accurately grasped what you have in mind. — Enrique

This very conversation is perhaps a perfect example of this.

So I gather that you mean a cognitive process of making correlations is interposed between perception and language, with varying degrees of generality, and some kinds of correlations can be made without language while some cannot. If my interpretation is accurate, what does this correlative activity consist of? How would you characterize its composition?

So I gather that you mean a cognitive process of making correlations is interposed between perception and language, with varying degrees of generality, and some kinds of correlations can be made without language while some cannot. — Enrique

That's better, but I hesitate to frame the discussion in terms of "without language", for it allows segue into a conflation between being unspoken and being existentially independent of language. One could say that unspoken thought and belief does not require language or that unspoken thought and belief is an example of thought or belief 'without' language.

If my interpretation is accurate, what does this correlative activity consist of? How would you characterize its composition?

The "correlative activity"(your term, not mine) is thought and belief. It requires(is existentially dependent upon) a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. It consists of mental correlations.

How do you causally relate the plurality of correlation to the perceptual manifold? I have my own ideas but I'm trying to see if I can validate or improve the model.

How do you causally relate the plurality of mental correlation to the perceptual manifold? — Enrique

I do not. The notion of "perceptual manifold" is not something that I find appealing. I prefer the simplest possible adequate explanation, and find no need for such language use.

What is "the perceptual manifold" on your view?

What is "the perceptual manifold" on your view? — creativesoul

The perceptual manifold is basically all qualia constitutive of qualitative experience. I was curious how you would explicitly fit the concept of correlation together with a concept of qualitative experience.

I would begin by dropping the excessive language.

You prove to me what inference is not, narrows down the relevant context quite a lot, so thanks. I mean that in a good way lol

You're more than welcome, although I'm not sure how I helped or in what way.

:smile:

The notions of quale, qualitative experience, and phenomenology in general are, as I see it anyway, self-perpetuating problems in and of themselves. Amidst the problems of separating something from itself, they also work from the basic presupposition that we cannot directly perceive anything or sometimes a conflation between 'perception'(including thought and belief) and reality. The notion of "perception" in such a framework tends to be a catch-all phrase referring to all sorts of starkly different thought and belief, ranging from highly complex linguistically informed thought and belief through the most simple. In doing so, the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief is lost in the process, and thus such a framework has an inherent inability to address the question in the OP, as I've explained in the first few posts here.

How would you relate your concept of correlation to intentional and deliberative thought?

On my view...

All thought and belief, ranging from the simplest to the most complex, consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. If intentional and deliberative thought is a kind of thought, and I'm right about what all thought and belief consists in/of, then intentional and deliberative thought consists of mental correlations satisfying whatever counts as being intentional and deliberative thought as compared/contrasted to/with other kinds.

Having been interested in doing philosophy for some time, I've a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the criterion another is working, especially in situations such as this one, as it is quite the nuanced conversation. Common sense tells me that that name could be rightfully, meaningfully, acceptably, and/or sensibly used in a plurality of differing ways, not all of which are amenable to one another. More plainly put, it could be used to pick out all different sorts of things, including many things that are not what I'm picking out to the exclusion of all else. Hence... my apprehension is prevalent.

Here's the simpest use/sense of that term that makes perfect sense to me...

Intentional and deliberate thought always consists of a creature focused upon something in particular. That kind of thought and belief would show itself early on. If such thought existed in it's entirety prior to language use, then it does not consist of language use.

Language use could become the focus. Language use certainly helps determine the focus. Language use can and does become an integral elemental constituent of the thought and belief of language users. Language use becomes a necessary elemental constituent of thought when that thought includes mental correlations being drawn between language use and something else.

Intentional and deliberate thought does not always include language, but certainly can.

So, how does language use effect/affect intentional and deliberate thought?

It broadens the scope.

From a psychosocial angle, which is one I'm more comfortable with, it goes without saying that translating from one language to another throws up weird artifacts of meaning. For example, the Ancient Greek ἀντίστροφος, counterpart, literally means twisted together, which I traced back to originating in ordinary rope. Clearly vocabulary binds fluent speakers to a certain scheme, as your Korean example alludes to. — Zophie

This example seems to correlate well with the externalist view of belief and meaning. We have an artifact in the world and an interpretation by which the word forms and categorizes. What I find curious is where these priorities of say the Korean group on prepositions (I live in Korea and have never heard of this!) and that of Europeans prioritizing nouns comes from. The environmental pressures narrow focus and create differences in behavior which creates differences in linguistic focus? That seems too easy of an explanation.