To begin with, the postulates of moral theory are supposed to be self-evident truths which means we don't actually have a choice. These postulates are then used to infer logically necessary conclusions regarding what course of action we must take given any situation. Here too we lack choice in the matter. — TheMadFool

Do we lack a choice, or are we limited by the scope and extent of our own reason? Moral theories may entail or at least imply action consequences, but only to the extent that they are comprehended. Most people in fact suffer from a host of insidious cognitive biases which may (have been proven to) prevent the drawing of accurate conclusions.

So how can we assume the standpoint of successful and deliberate rational choice. when even attaining this level of pure objectivity is itself problematic?

Do we lack a choice, or are we limited by the scope and extent of our own reason? Moral theories may entail or at least imply action consequences, but only to the extent that they are comprehended. Most people in fact suffer from a host of insidious cognitive biases which may (have been proven to) prevent the drawing of accurate conclusions.

So how can we assume the standpoint of successful and deliberate rational choice. when even attaining this level of pure objectivity is itself problematic? — Pantagruel

Indeed, each of us is beset by our own clouded judgments but that is a minor issue compared to what the real problem is - obligatory moral codes rob us of freedom, freedom of will to act the way we wish to act so that we may own them and bear their consequences, good or bad, with the full conviction that the fruits of our actions are well-deserved.

obligatory moral codes rob us of freedom, freedom of will to act the way we wish to act so that we may own them and bear their consequences, good or bad, with the full conviction that the fruits of our actions are well-deserved. — TheMadFool

I think what you are saying amounts to a contradiction.

On the one hand, you suggest that in order to be responsible, we must act freely. On the other hand, you suggest that if a moral code is obligatory, that contradicts the premise of moral action being freely chosen.

But moral obligation is volunteeristic. Yes, it is an "obligation," but an obligation is not a cause. This is clear from that fact that people can and do ignore their obligations.

If, as I suggested, however, we usually only grasp our obligations imperfectly (due to whatever limitations of our own knowledge), then the "necessitation" of moral obligations is really a function of the degree of our understanding of same.

So if we do, in some sense, lose our autonomy in submitting to moral choice, it is in the form of embracing a higher rationality. So how is acting in accordance with the dictates of reason any different in the moral sense than in a positivistic sense? We choose to do anything because our reason leads us to the choice.

Your objection would apply equally to the very concept of free-will: I cannot choose X if there are independent reasons for choosing X....

Perhaps there is a loop:
To improve on democratic laws and regulations all the time (Kantian Ethics) and so to achieve a greater being-in-nature, a stronger in-touch presence in the World (Virtue Ethics).

But to improve laws and regulations until they are perfect, require cognition and the way I see it, the greater being-in-nature, a stronger in-touch presence in the World actually has the cognition of improving laws and regulations as cause.

Consequently, the virtue ethics of greater being-in-nature, a stronger in-touch presence in the World is the effect of improving the democratic laws and regulations in this self-reinforcing circle!

Good?

liken this state of affairs to a man who's forced (obligated) to behave in a certain way by force, say, with a weapon. — TheMadFool

You keep mixing two different concepts of obligation or necessity.

If I adopt a rule (not just a moral one) that I believe I must fulfill for a certain purpose because it is the best, I am not giving up my freedom. I am making my freedom concrete in the world in the form of possibilities to carry it out in one act. I insist, this happens with any norm for action.
My freedom is still present at any time because I can either renounce to the norm, to the proposed end or modify the conditions of application of the rule. This has taken place not only at the time of choosing the rule, as you say, but also while I am still applying it. I insist that this refers to any rule.

In other words, the rule is valid only as long as I freely accept it.
As I am constantly accepting and applying standards, both instrumental and moral, political, social, etc., your theory would make freedom abstract, totally inapplicable.

Your example of the gun diverts attention from a different problem.

Wider conceptually, like the concept 'fruit' is a wider concept than 'apple'.... it includes more things. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure, but what I was asking was what.

Greek culture was among other things, the Homeric myths, tragic plays, a pantheon of flawed Gods — ChatteringMonkey

Are we talking about Greek culture or Greek morality theories? The problem started when someone spoke of the Greeks' concept of morality being more Aristotelian than Platonic. We weren't talking about cults and myths.

As for concepts of morality, leaving aside religious and mythological concepts, which do not have a theory of morality, properly speaking, it is a problem that arises with Greek democracy. There are three basic conceptions: the Sophistic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian. All three were later developed in different forms and all three were rooted in Hellenistic culture as fundamental pillars. Along with the other cultural traditions you cite, of course. To say that Socratism was not a component of Greek culture is not very accurate. And to base your argument on the fact that it was condemned, even less so. Its survival in subsequent centuries implies that it was not so far removed from Greek culture. And Platonism was even less so when it coalesced into such important forms of culture as Neo-Platonism which affected Christianity itself.

Indeed, Athens erected a wake condemning the death of Socrates years after his death. But this doesn't mean anything. Socrates' death was political and his subsequent vindication was political too.

You keep mixing two different concepts of obligation or necessity.

If I adopt a rule (not just a moral one) that I believe I must fulfill for a certain purpose because it is the best, I am not giving up my freedom. I am making my freedom concrete in the world in the form of possibilities to carry it out in one act. I insist, this happens with any norm for action.
My freedom is still present at any time because I can either renounce to the norm, to the proposed end or modify the conditions of application of the rule. This has taken place not only at the time of choosing the rule, as you say, but also while I am still applying it. I insist that this refers to any rule.

In other words, the rule is valid only as long as I freely accept it.
As I am constantly accepting and applying standards, both instrumental and moral, political, social, etc., your theory would make freedom abstract, totally inapplicable.

Your example of the gun diverts attention from a different problem. — David Mo

A simple question: Can one be obligated to do something AND free to not do it? The answer to this question will settle our difference.

A simple question: Can one be obligated to do something AND free to not do it? The answer to this question will settle our difference. — TheMadFool

As I said, it is clear that people do not always fulfill their obligations.

What would be the point of having the concept of obligation if it dictated action? There would be no "cognitive gap" - obligation would become just another kind of behaviouristic causation.

Are we talking about Greek culture or Greek morality theories? The problem started when someone spoke of the Greeks' concept of morality being more Aristotelian than Platonic. We weren't talking about cults and myths. — David Mo

The "Greeks' concept of morality" is the morality as lived by the Greeks, right? What else would it be? And myths, like those of Homer, are historically, among other things stories to preserve and instruct the morality of a culture. So if we are talking about morality as lived by the Greeks, the myths are certainly relevant it seems to me.

Referring to Aristotle as a source of information about that Greek morality makes sense because he was a kind of proto-scientist/empirist, case in point being all those elaborate taxonomies he was so fond of making... Referring to Plato as a source doesn't make as much sense, because he was a rationalist/idealist. And either way I don't think his ideas about morality where all that representative of Greek morality, for the reasons I explained earlier.

And i'm not talking about how Greek idea's have been received and used later on, that's not Greek culture, but European Christian culture.

A simple question: Can one be obligated to do something AND free to not do it? — TheMadFool

Yes. Because moral obligation is not a physical necessity. Pantagruel answered you in the same way. In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. In the physical sense of necessity your decision is previously determined by cause. Only in this sense "obligation" is opposed to freedom. I don't know if it's the same in English, but in Spanish to call physical necessity an obligation sounds strange.

What would be the point of having the concept of obligation if it dictated action? — Pantagruel

In behaviorism the decision to do anything is determined. There is no such thing as freedom. Therefore the concept of obligation is just a euphemism for a series of hidden causes: conditioned reflex. Skinner tried to demonstrate this in a very popular book: Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In its time it impacted me, but today that behaviorism seems untenable to me.

The "Greeks' concept of morality" is the morality as lived by the Greeks, right? — ChatteringMonkey

It's not like that. It's one thing what you do, it's another what you know about what you're doing. I doubt very much that in archaic Greece there was any discussion about whether morality was based on wisdom or truth. Or something similar. At least I don't remember it in Homer.

Morality for them was between religion and tradition. If that is what you mean by traditional Greece, that limits it to the world of myth, in which case any reference to moral reflection is superfluous, including Aristotelian. And our debate is also superfluous.

Ok fine, I suppose we were talking past eachother then.

Don't you think it is strange though to view those two as seperate from eachother?

I do think Aristotle for example was conceptualizing morality as lived in Greece at the time.

You also seem to insist on using myth as a pejorative. Those weren't written overnight, I think plenty of reflection, moral and other, went into them.

I do think Aristotle for example was conceptualizing morality as lived in Greece at the time.

You also seem to insist on using myth as a pejorative. T — ChatteringMonkey

No. I'm talking about myth as something different from philosophical reflection on morality, including that of Aristotle.

If you don't define what morality is as the Greeks of the time lived it, there's no way to know its relationship with Aristotle and Plato.
I have taken as a reference something concrete that I know: Homer. So, neither Plato nor Aristotle correspond to Homer's mytho-poetic thought. In Homer we do not find the classic concepts of moral reflection and those that are similar are seen in a different way. Homer's concepts of timé, diké, areté and the like do not refer to moral responsibility, but to civic cohesion based on honour and shame. There can be no concept of virtue as character, because the concept of psychological character is alien to Homer. And much less of the Aristotelian virtue that refers to nature, a philosophical concept and not a mythical-poetical one.

If we take the classics of the Greek theatre that we know, there is no concordance either, although Sophocles is usually related to the democratic movement of the polis and Euripides to the sceptical reaction. In general, the plays I know deal with the polis-gods conflict, especially in connection with the hybris, in a non-aristotelian way.

The quality man (agathos) must ensure the success of his community (oikos) and must prevent, for the oikos or for him, the loss of ground compared to other oikos or agathos, through effective means, whether they are fair or not.

The values of the Homeric man do not obey to desirable conducts and according to a certain human nature (as will be the case of the ethics of virtue of the classic Greek philosophy), but, rather, those values respond to certain conditions, especially, social conditions

We do not find in the Homeric poems an 'ethical theory', a systematic and well-founded reflection that justifies human acts, but rather, in the words of Aristotle, an energy, an action that determines our being.

Yes. Because moral obligation is not a physical necessity. Pantagruel answered you in the same way. In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. In the physical sense of necessity your decision is previously determined by cause. Only in this sense "obligation" is opposed to freedom. I don't know if it's the same in English, but in Spanish to call physical necessity an obligation sounds strange. — David Mo

Let's unpack, for the sake of clarity, what you mean by "Yes. Because moral obligation is not a physical necessity.

To begin with, there's no point in discussing physical necessity. Surely if something is a physically necessary, then it either is or will be no matter what.

Let's talk about moral obligation. My understanding of it is that if an action is morally obligated one has no choice in the matter - we must either do or refrain from doing what is our obligation (morally). Are we on the same page here?

Then you said, "In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow".

The only way I can make sense of your statement is we have a choice in which among the various moral theories available we adopt. Perhaps you mean something else and if you do, then please elaborate.

If I understood you correctly then my previous post addresses this point. Anyway...moral theories maybe chosen, yes, but a couple of observations:

1. Moral theories are either true or false. Are you saying we can choose to adopt a false moral theory? If yes, then your actions as obligated by the false theory will differ from those obligated by the true theory, making them morally wrong. So, given that a true moral theory exists, there's actually no choice at all. You must adopt, without choice, the true moral theory unless of course you want to commit immoral acts, that too, as obligated by the false moral theory.

I think the idea of choice in moral theories comes to you because a true moral theory, if it exists, has not been discovered till date. Given this is the case, indeed, we're free to choose one that we feel is better. Nevertheless, once adopted, all extant moral theories will obligate that you either acting or refrain from acting in certain ways.

2. Picking up from the last sentence above, we see that all [extant] moral theories directly control our actions - we're obligated to either act or not to act by them. It seems then your story of "choice" in morality can be summed up with the statement, we're free to decide how to be not free.

moral obligation is not a physical necessity. (...) In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. — David Mo

I pretty much agree with your argument, but here, mightn’t it be said we chose immorally, rather than irrationally? Reason does obligate, but merely some other reason is sufficient to negate moral conformity.

Hmmm....maybe the choice is immoral, but the judgement which then facilitates the act which follows from the choice, is irrational. Could you live with that?

Moral theories are either true or false. — TheMadFool

Are we talking about moral theories or moral systems? A moral theory tells us what is the nature of what we call "good" and a moral system dictates to us the moral norms, that is, those that allow us to do good. That is, the difference between ethics (moral philosophy) and morality. Moral theory is not normative. It is descriptive, and can be false or true, at least in theory. A system of moral norms is neither true nor false. It is good or bad, convenient or inconvenient, advisable or inadvisable, that is, imperative or prescriptive. Here there are no criteria of truth except as regards means and ends.

I thought we were talking about systems of morality. Didn't you?

I pretty much agree with your argument, but here, mightn’t it be said we chose immorally, rather than irrationally? — Mww

I was thinking of those who think that there is no rationality in morality and that we make decisions based on our emotions or particular tastes. The amoralists, the cynics or the vitalists. But it's also true that one can choose a system that seems more rational than another. Because we must recognize that definitive reasons in morality are not very apparent. Unless you are a convinced intellectualist like Socrates or a dogmatic rationalist. But these seem philosophies of other times.

But these seem philosophies of other times. — David Mo

So.....no causa sui? With respect to moral systems based on an autonomous will, rather than ethical theories based on cultural norms, I mean.

we must recognize that definitive reasons in morality are not very apparent. — David Mo

Not very indeed.

Are we talking about moral theories or moral systems? A moral theory tells us what is the nature of what we call "good" and a moral system dictates to us the moral norms, that is, those that allow us to do good. That is, the difference between ethics (moral philosophy) and morality. Moral theory is not normative. It is descriptive, and can be false or true, at least in theory. A system of moral norms is neither true nor false. It is good or bad, convenient or inconvenient, advisable or inadvisable, that is, imperative or prescriptive. Here there are no criteria of truth except as regards means and ends.

I thought we were talking about systems of morality. Didn't you? — David Mo

Moral/Ethical Theories

:chin:

If by causa sui and autonomy you refer to Spinoza and Kant, both are philosophers of other times. They have all my respect and surely can suggest current philosophies (more Kant than Spinoza) but one can't hold them literally. The concept of moral autonomy is essential to demarcate morality of religion or sociology, but it cannot lead to a universal and necessary moral principle as Kant intended.

Moral/Ethical Theories — TheMadFool

??

1. Why is something a moral obligation?

In my opinion a moral standard is mandatory because I feel very bad if I break it and I think it is reasonable to feel that way. In my opinion. Other people would give other reasons. This is ethics.

This post caught my eye as is fabulous topic & something I find so curious. I think everyone needs to (& will at some point) experience a Moral v Virtue decision in their lives. However, this may be beyond theory, simply as we can all react unpredictably when faced with emotionally heavy issues. I believe people have both a moral and virtuous view on life. The difference that I see is that morals are handed down to you as rules; whereas virtue you learn & develop for yourself.

whereas virtue you learn & develop for yourself. — Marylil

There is nothing you can learn for yourself. Everything you learn is mediated by language and social environment. When you learn something through "personal" experience you cannot let go of all the cultural preconcepts and views that form the "I" that you are. Originality is just the way you mix your cultural background in a personal way. This is especially true of moral issues because the social pressure for conformity is strong on this ground.

That is why virtue is something that is taken from certain models that can be found within your reach. That is why an attack against one of the models we have chosen is often responded to with great violence. Because we ourselves are being attacked.
I think the difference between virtue and moral rules is that the model is more visible in virtue than in rules. It's just a difference in visibility.

Any action that represents a good thing to do is virtuous if it is done for the right reason, that is without an ulterior motive. A morally virtuous action requires the right intention and the right disposition. Saving that drowning child because it blocks your path would not be virtuous nor would a donation to charity if it was done only to secure a tax reduction. But given that the right disposition is in place, any good action would also be a virtuous action.

An obligation, on the other hand, has a narrower extension. All virtuous acts are not obligations, but any fulfilled obligation is virtuous (if done for the right reason).

An obligation is a possibility for a virtuous act that is given particularly to you. You acquired it when you were placed in a particular circumstance. Since you happened to pass that child in the pool the obligation to rescue it was given. At other times we acquire an obligation by committing ourselves to something. If you marry or have children, you are obligated to take care of your family, but you probably have no obligation towards other people’s children (although it would certainly be virtuous if you took care of them anyway).

My first instinct was that charitable financial donation is one such example, however I found myself finding it easy to justify this as an obligation, using Peter Singer's example of witnessing a child drowning and not intervening; the event is not caused by the witness (as poverty is not), yet it is still an obligation to rescue the child. I currently cannot think of any other examples of moral virtue and would love to hear some. — JacobPhilosophy

I can define ad hoc an ethical system consisting entirely of moral obligations and sins and wrt that system, yes, there's no merely virtuous act. That doesn't eliminate morally virtuous acts from ethics, merely from that one of a potentially infinite number of ethical systems.

I can also more easily and more acceptably define a system of ethics containing no obligations whatsoever. It would look pretty similar to modern secular Western ethics. Wrt that, finding morally virtuous but not obligatory actions would be a piece of cake.

I can define ad hoc an ethical system consisting entirely of moral obligations and sins and wrt that system, yes, there's no merely virtuous act. That doesn't eliminate morally virtuous acts from ethics, merely from that one of a potentially infinite number of ethical systems.

I can also more easily and more acceptably define a system of ethics containing no obligations whatsoever. It would look pretty similar to modern secular Western ethics. Wrt that, finding morally virtuous but not obligatory actions would be a piece of cake. — Kenosha Kid

It would be interesting to hear you defend either ethical system. Of course it’s a piece of cake to put a label on something and claim that it’s something that really exists, it’s a lot more difficult to say why it is so.

I think we should accept @JacobPhilosophy’s premise for this thread and assume that both obligations and virtuous acts exist.

An ethical system that emphasizes obligations might also acknowledge virtuous acts. You could say that whenever an act is an obligation, it is virtuous to perform it, although that probably involves playing down the significance of virtue.

The other way around is also possible, any virtuous act may be considered an obligation and that’s probably what puzzles @JacobPhilosophy since obligations seem to carry a stronger force which would push the significance of virtue aside. (You say “Do!” or “Don’t!” and all doubt is removed.)

However, even if you call all virtuous acts an obligation, the nature of the obligation would necessarily vary in strength. No one can seriously think you have the same strong duty to take care of any child as you have toward your own child. Virtue covers everything that’s good, but strong obligations must be limited in number.

I think we should accept JacobPhilosophy’s premise for this thread and assume that both obligations and virtuous acts exist. — Congau

You misunderstand. It was precisely because Jacob suggested he could refer to an unconventional system of ethics in order to promote a virtue into an obligation that I made the above point. I'm not in favour of such trickery. Your response---to assume that both virtues and obligations exist---is precisely what Jacob is questioning, so I think you misunderstand him also.