Not if there is no other way to justify it. — Samuel Lacrampe

So, let me clarify. You're going with: "'X is self evident because it begs the question' does not beg the question if I cannot justify X"?

A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced (i.e. justified) by anything else, and (2) if everyone believes it to be true by default — Samuel Lacrampe

(1) is a red herring; not being evidenced in no way suggests self-evident. (2) is an appeal to popularity.

Now can you think of a way to justify the PoSR without begging the question? — Samuel Lacrampe

Me? Absolutely! It would go something like this. QM is well evidenced. A popular theory that grants indeterminism, on analysis, really only becomes indeterministic per application of the BR. But said application is strange. When Schrodinger has his cat in a box, per this story, we're supposed to use a particular rule to describe the box contents... the cat is in superposition. But when Schrodinger opens the box, we use a different rule... the box's wavefunction collapsed. That seems wrong... introduce Everett. Let's say we put Schrodinger and his cat-box in a bigger box now, shut the lid, and have Everett describe this system. How is he supposed to describe it? According to the rules he should describe it the same way Schrodinger describes the cat in the box contents... Schrodinger is in superposition. But Schrodinger, inside this box, describes the same thing differently... well, sort of. There's a portion of the wavefunction where Schrodinger describes seeing the live cat, and another where he describes seeing the dead cat, and these two are in superposition. But each of these reports a collapse of the wavefunction. So is something really collapsing? BR seems redundant and unreal; it introduced bigger issues. So let's just toss it out; instead of thinking that us "Everett's" are part of "the world", imagine we're just parts of a bigger universal wavefunction. Now SE is all that really happens; the rest is just what that wave function looks like to Schrodinger, and to Everett. Given that only the SE is real, since there's no indeterminism in the SE, the universe must be deterministic. Maybe there's a deeper principle like this, where everything happens for a reason.

This is an example justification of PoSR. I don't think it helps you.

So what? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're responding to the so what.

Why should we not believe in the PoE or that 2=5, if not because it violates the law of non-contradiction? — Samuel Lacrampe

What use would that have? By contrast, embracing LNC and denying PoSR would have the use:

(1) There are only 3 possible explanations for all events: determinism, free will, and randomness, as so: — Samuel Lacrampe

...of modeling the randomness possibility. I've asked this as a question, now I'll rephrase this. You should be interested in all of the possible ways you can be wrong. It is suspicious for you to propose to be interested in truth but not be interested in such things.

This is not how I interpret sufficiency. E.g. Observing that a floor can support a 10 kg weight is sufficient to conclude that it can support 10 kg or less; but it could also support more. But maybe you can give me an example of what you mean by [sufficiency?]? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's not a problem but it doesn't help you. A floor that can support 20kg ipso facto can support 10kg; these two things are not alternates, they are counterfactuals. Note that both can be true for the same floor at the same time, regardless of whether there's a 20kg weight on it, a 10kg weight on it, or neither. But a man who poaches an egg cannot scramble that egg and vice versa. So if this man does poach an egg, but "could have" scrambled it, it's not true that the egg was scrambled. Those are alternates. If that man's free will does lead to poaching the egg, but could have led to scrambling it, then we can't say the man's free will is sufficient to poach the egg. (Unless you want free will possibilities that are counterfactual; but such being consistent with determinism, that implies compatibilist free will, which stops dead steps before your soul conclusoin).

From implication, if P=>Q, then P is sufficient for Q. That means that if P holds, Q absolutely must hold. So P is sufficient for Q. By contrast, Q is not sufficient for P (though we can say it's necessary; if Q doesn't hold, P cannot hold). To use your example with counterfactuals, if the floor can hold 10kg then it can hold 5kg. If it cannot hold 10kg, it cannot hold 20kg. So for it to be able to hold 20kg, it has to be able to hold 10kg; but it still can be true that it can hold 10kg and not hold 20kg. So the fact that it can hold 10kg is necessary for the fact that it can hold 20kg to be true (same reason as in implication; were it not to support 10kg, it cannot support 20kg), but is not sufficient (same reason as in implication; that it can hold 10kg does not imply that it can hold 20kg). Again, back to alternates, if a man's free will is a sufficient cause for the egg to be poached, that egg will get poached; it's impossible for it to be scrambled, because "free will is sufficient" is like saying "free will => egg is poached". And if that's the case, the egg cannot be scrambled, which conflicts with the possibility of the alternate.

So, let me clarify. You're going with: "'X is self evident because it begs the question' does not beg the question if I cannot justify X"? — InPitzotl

I don't understand your statement; can you rephrase it another way? Otherwise if it helps, begging the question to defend a claim does not entail that the claim is false. It actually means the claim is not a self-contradiction, which is a good thing.

(1) is a red herring; not being evidenced in no way suggests self-evident. (2) is an appeal to popularity. — InPitzotl

(1) The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". You don't see it? Similar to how the term "Triangle" has the words "tri" (three) and "angle" in it.
(2) When a claim cannot be evidenced any other way, then the appeal to popularity is sufficient to tip the scale in its favour. We could also use a reductio ad absurdum too instead.

Me? Absolutely! [...] — InPitzotl

Your lengthy paragraph seems to be an attempt at giving an adequate reason to justify the PoSR. Now if that reason is inadequate, then it fails to justify the claim; and if it is adequate (or in other words sufficient), then it presupposes the PoSR, that is, it begs the question.

What use would that have? — InPitzotl

To claim that the alternative to the LNC has no use that you see, does not prove the LNC to be true.

You should be interested in all of the possible ways you can be wrong. — InPitzotl

I am. You just haven't shown how I was wrong yet, since we are still arguing about the PoSR. Of course, I trust your comment applies to you too.

So if this man does poach an egg, but "could have" scrambled it, it's not true that the egg was scrambled. — InPitzotl

Sure; but so what? Free will means that before the choice is made, there are numerous possibilities, like poaching and scrambling. As you wrote, before choosing to poach an egg, the man "could have" scrambled it.

I don't understand your statement; can you rephrase it another way? — Samuel Lacrampe

Follow the quotes back.

The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". — Samuel Lacrampe

Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.

You don't see it? — Samuel Lacrampe

I see a perfectly rational way to deny PoSR.

When a claim cannot be evidenced any other way, then the appeal to popularity is sufficient to tip the scale in its favour. — Samuel Lacrampe

While I can appreciate the meta-ness of argumentum ad populum defenses of argumentum ad populum, it does nothing for me. The popular opinion was wrong in the past... there's no reason to believe it has any unique access to truth. "If a million people believe a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing." Ambrose Bierce.

Your lengthy paragraph seems to be an attempt at giving an adequate reason to justify the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

Who said anything about adequate, except for you just now?

Now if that reason is inadequate, then it fails to justify the claim

I'm perfectly okay with that. So it's inadequate. But it's a justification.

I apparently have to remind you again; I have no particular opinions on PoSR, except that you're flat wrong about it not needing justification.

Might I remind you... justification does not entail truth. Justifications aren't proof; they're just good reasons to think something is true.

To claim that the alternative to the LNC has no use that you see, does not prove the LNC to be true. — Samuel Lacrampe

But you're the one bringing up proving that LNC is true, not me. For me, it's enough that it's useful. Paraconsistent logics may also be useful. A system with PoE isn't "bad" because it lacks LNC; it's "bad" because everything is both true and false, which suggests that truth and falsity have no meaning. That's good enough for me; if it's not good enough for you, fine. Demonstrate a (non-vacuous) use for a system with PoE in play.

I am. You just haven't shown how I was wrong yet, — Samuel Lacrampe

But you're not. You just changed "possibly wrong" to "shown how I was wrong". Those are entirely different things.

Of course, I trust your comment applies to you too. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ways you have established that I can be wrong, so far:
(a) Denying PoSR is not logically consistent (with a system in which you presume PoSR)
(b) You personally believe PoSR is a law of logic
(c) If we assume PoSR and someone else doesn't, they made an error
(d) PoSR is self-evident because asking for a justification for it begs the question
Regarding (a), that's not compelling because it begs the question. (b) is testimonial. (c) presumes personal inerrancy. (d) one need not appeal to PoSR to justify it, and even if one did that does not suggest it needs no justification. Also, it's possible PoSR is wrong (in the case of random mechanics), therefore, it's not necessarily true that it's correct. Since it's not necessarily true, that it holds requires justification. IOW, all of your claims of PoSR being self evident are trivially refuted by the mere possibility of considering random mechanics.

Free will means that before the choice is made, there are numerous possibilities — Samuel Lacrampe

Free will being a sufficient reason for any of those possibilities means that's the only possibility. Go back to randomness... if a collapsing wave function (CWF) causes the photon to go left, as a result of Born Rule application which specifies a 50% probability of doing so, it still factually goes left. I might incorrectly say, if it goes left, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go left; but if it goes right, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go right. That would be incorrect because it would be a redefinition of sufficiency to the degree that it becomes meaningless. But under such redefinitions, randomness would follow PoSR. See how that works?

Again, it's really, really simple. It boils down to a single question... how many things can your free will decision possibly result in? If you say one, it's a sufficient reason for that thing, but you can't prove we have a soul. If you say more than one, it's not a sufficient reason for whatever happens, and you can't say it follows PoSR. That should be enough, but I understand why it's not. It's inconvenient for you.

Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated. — InPitzotl

But everything needs to be demonstrated ... as per that one principle called PoSR :joke:.
But if you are serious with that claim, then how do we determine what needs and does not need to be demonstrated?

So it's inadequate. But it's a justification. — InPitzotl

A justification is defined as "showing a claim to be right" (source). So it cannot be inadequate.

"If a million people believe a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing." Ambrose Bierce. — InPitzotl

True, but I see no better way to pick one first principle (or axiom) vs its opposite. E.g. some people may not believe in the LNC, and be very consistent in their beliefs (ie they contradict themselves), and I see no way to refute them other than to show it's a very unpopular belief.

I have no particular opinions on PoSR, except that you're flat wrong about it not needing justification. — InPitzotl

I have provided a justification for the PoSR, namely, that it is a self-evident principle.
Also, you are appealing to the PoSR for demanding a reason to justify it. From this link, "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause."

But you're the one bringing up proving that LNC is true, not me. For me, it's enough that it's useful. — InPitzotl

Recall that you denied that "the LNC is self-evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else", by attempting to justify it in another way. Since this has not been accomplished, my position on the matter stands, namely that the LNC is self-evident, in a similar manner as it is for the PoSR.

(d) one need not appeal to PoSR to justify it. — InPitzotl

You may give it a try. Just remember that "The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause", and to justify is to give a good reason.

IOW, all of your claims of PoSR being self evident are trivially refuted by the mere possibility of considering random mechanics. — InPitzotl

What is this random mechanics, and what's your justification to claim it exists?

Again, it's really, really simple. It boils down to a single question... how many things can your free will decision possibly result in? If you say one, it's a sufficient reason for that thing, but you can't prove we have a soul. If you say more than one, it's not a sufficient reason for whatever happens, and you can't say it follows PoSR. — InPitzotl

As per underlined, why is that the case? I suspect you have a wrong grasp of the term "sufficiency". Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time.

But if you are serious with that claim — Samuel Lacrampe

No, that was a correction, not a claim. I responded to your definition of self-evident, which was based on armchair lexicography (some misguided "definition-by-literal" theory you invented), with the accepted definition. By the way, atom literally means indivisible; awful literally means full of awe; pompous literally means having magnificence.

A justification is defined as "showing a claim to be right" (source). So it cannot be inadequate. — Samuel Lacrampe

At least you're using a dictionary now, but you're over-interpreting "show". Also a dictionary isn't a great source for this (dictionaries document how words are commonly used; we're discussing terms in philosophy, which isn't a lay subject... though I could defend my definition this way anyway). What you need is a philosophy based reference that discusses this particular usage, like IEP:

Further still, true belief may not even be necessary for justification. If I understand Newtonian physics, and if Newton’s arguments seem right to me, and if all contemporary physicists testify that Newtonian physics is true, it is plausible to think that my belief that it is true is justified, even if Einstein will eventually show that Newton and I are wrong. We can imagine this was the situation of many physicists in the late 1700s. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

True, but I see no better way to pick one first principle (or axiom) vs its opposite. — Samuel Lacrampe

No method is better than a bad one.

E.g. some people may not believe in the LNC, and be very consistent in their beliefs (ie they contradict themselves), and I see no way to refute them other than to show it's a very unpopular belief. — Samuel Lacrampe

Might I suggest it more rational to give up your view that winning debates is a metric of truth than it is to embrace logical fallacies as a method of winning debates?

Recall that you denied that "the LNC is self-evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else", by attempting to justify it in another way. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't recall that because it never happened. First off, begging the question isn't wrong on the condition that I provide an alternative ("by attempting"...); it's wrong on the face of it. To say "LNC is self evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else" is to say "X is self evident when X cannot be evidenced by anything else", and if that were true for X=LNC, it would have to be true for X=an invisible massless cow is eating invisible massless grass in the middle of the sun. Second, I didn't justify the LNC being "true"; in fact, I explicitly pointed out a case where it wasn't "true" (paraconsistent logic). Third, it's not my rule that I should be able to prove things are self-evident; it's your rule. My rule is simply that things aren't self evident just because you wish them up to be by committing logical fallacies out of desperation to win arguments against hypothetical deniers. But I do have an applicable rule; one I've mentioned before. Any referential claim (by which I mean something about the properties of or behaviors of an object to which you refer) requires justification (i.e., the don't-tell-God-what-to-do principle). PoSR falls into this camp.

Since this has not been accomplished, my position on the matter stands, namely that the LNC is self-evident, in a similar manner as it is for the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

By that criteria, both LNC and PoSR are not self-evident, because you commit three logical fallacies when debating a hypothetical denier of both. Your logical fallacies are invalid defenses of these things being self-evident, since they are, well, logical fallacies. So since you failed to refute the denier's position, the denier's position stands...namely, that neither LNC nor PoSR are self-evident. Not quite a checkmate, but definitely a stalemate. I mentioned this before, too; debates cannot be criteria for truth because I can easily construct conflicting irrefutable arguments. Only here, you actually provided the conflicting irrefutable argument (well, mostly; I just tweaked it slightly).

What is this random mechanics, and what's your justification to claim it exists? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's the wrong question, with the wrong burden. Random mechanics involves a process whereby an event happens as a stochastic selection among a set of possibilities, such as by application of the Born Rule. Your claim is that PoSR is logically self-evident. Logic implies necessity. If random mechanics were possible, that would suffice to refute necessity. Random mechanics is possible. Therefore PoSR isn't necessarily true. O/c, this is insufficient to disprove PoSR; PoSR still could be true. It's just that, if it is true, it's contingently true.

As per underlined, why is that the case? — Samuel Lacrampe

By definition of sufficiency.

I suspect you have a wrong grasp of the term "sufficiency". — Samuel Lacrampe

Then you're wasting your words... "proof by suspicion" is not valid.

Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time. — Samuel Lacrampe

If A can cause B, but B doesn't always happen, then in those cases where B does in fact happen, A is (maybe) a reason for B. For example, if a car swerves into my path while I'm driving, and as a result we have an accident, then the car swerving into my path is a reason for the accident. But cars swerving into my path don't necessarily cause accidents every time; I may see the car swerving and swerve to avoid it. But because it doesn't necessarily cause accidents every time, that reason is not sufficient to cause an accident. That's what you have here... A that causes B, but only sometimes. Such, given B, can be a reason for B, but cannot be a sufficient reason, because B doesn't always follow.

definition of self-evident — InPitzotl

You are using the common use definition as opposed to the philosophical definition. Better reference is here. But this doesn't matter. Let's use the term "First Principle" or "Axiom" if it makes things clearer.

true belief may not even be necessary for justification. If I understand Newtonian physics, and if Newton’s arguments seem right to me, and if all contemporary physicists testify that Newtonian physics is true, it is plausible to think that my belief that it is true is justified, even if Einstein will eventually show that Newton and I are wrong. We can imagine this was the situation of many physicists in the late 1700s. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This does not invalidate my point that justification means "showing a claim to be right". Before Einstein, that belief was justified because Newton's demonstrations were believed to be right. Once Newton's demonstrations were no longer believed to be right after Einstein, then we would no longer have a justification for them. To loop back, you cannot have an "inadequate justification".

No method is better than a bad one. — InPitzotl

The method is not "bad" but "weak-yet-valid". In a situation where we cannot remain agnostic, then it is more reasonable to side with the popular belief than against it. So a weak-yet-valid method is better than no method.

Might I suggest it more rational to give up your view that winning debates is a metric of truth than it is to embrace logical fallacies as a method of winning debates? — InPitzotl

I give you an equally non-rational and rhetorical response: I suspect you deny the PoSR, and the effectiveness of debates, and the criteria for first principles because believing in the soul is an inconvenience. :halo:

it would have to be true for X=an invisible massless cow is eating invisible massless grass in the middle of the sun. — InPitzotl

You forget that "self-evidence" (or first principle if you will) has 2 criteria. (1) cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) is the popular belief, or its opposite is absurd. You are missing criteria (2).

Second, I didn't justify the LNC being "true"; in fact, I explicitly pointed out a case where it wasn't "true" (paraconsistent logic). — InPitzotl

Your argument is valid IF paraconsistent logic is true, that is, we observe that some objects behave in a way that does not follow classical logic but paraconsistent logic. Otherwise, this paraconsistent logic is merely a thought experiment.

Third, it's not my rule that I should be able to prove things are self-evident; it's your rule. — InPitzotl

It is indeed my position, that I have defended with an argument, and it stands until the argument is refuted.

Any referential claim (by which I mean something about the properties of or behaviors of an object to which you refer) requires justification — InPitzotl

Is this different from the PoSR?

By that criteria, both LNC and PoSR are not self-evident, because you commit three logical fallacies when debating a hypothetical denier of both. [...] — InPitzotl

What three logical fallacies?

If random mechanics were possible, that would suffice to refute necessity. Random mechanics is possible. Therefore PoSR isn't necessarily true. — InPitzotl

Why do you claim random mechanics is possible?

that would suffice to refute necessity [...] O/c, this is insufficient to disprove PoSR — InPitzotl

Do you not see yourself appealing to the PoSR every time we enquire about what is true?

But because it doesn't necessarily cause accidents every time, that reason is not sufficient to cause an accident. — InPitzotl

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "sufficient" with "necessary"? Otherwise, what is the difference between the two terms for you?

You are using — Samuel Lacrampe

Nice try, but the definition I use aligns well with the definition given by your source, and poorly with your linked to "common" definition. And your definition-by-literal definition doesn't seem to fit at all.

Let's use the term "First Principle" or "Axiom" if it makes things clearer. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not much of a difference; axioms (in philosophy) are statements presumed to be self-evident.

This does not invalidate my point that justification means "showing a claim to be right". — Samuel Lacrampe

It invalidates this point:

justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true — Samuel Lacrampe

Before Einstein, that belief was justified because Newton's demonstrations were believed to be right. — Samuel Lacrampe

But Newton's equations weren't "true"; they were just close. So Newtonian physics wasn't "sound", it was just justified. But the beliefs weren't justified because the demonstrations were believed (this isn't a chicken-and-egg game); they were believed because they were justified by being demonstrated.

Once Newton's demonstrations were no longer believed to be right after Einstein, then we would no longer have a justification for them. — Samuel Lacrampe

Einstein predicted the location of a star in the famous 1919 eclipse. Once the eclipse happened the star was observed to be in the predicted spot. That justified belief in relativity.

To loop back, you cannot have an "inadequate justification". — Samuel Lacrampe

But that's superfluous, since all "adequate" means is enough to convince you. That one star observation was enough to convince a lot of people. Some people wanted more. To this day there's doubt that relativity is "true", since QM and GR haven't been melded together yet (and since in addition there are singularities).

I give you an — Samuel Lacrampe

To me that looks like an argument from ridicule with a tu quoque fallacy thrown in for good measure. That's quite a great distraction from, you know, actually defending the point in question... which, here, is, how is committing three fallacies to argue that a thing is self-evident going to help in your goal to convince the LNC denier that he shouldn't deny the LNC?

What three logical fallacies? — Samuel Lacrampe

Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity ("I see no better way to..."), appeal to popularity.

Is this different from the PoSR? — Samuel Lacrampe

Can you point to, or write, a philosophical paper that adequately justifies the belief that wavefunction collapse is unreal?

You forget that "self-evidence" (or first principle if you will) has 2 criteria. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, just dealing with question begging separately. The appeal to popularity doesn't help; miasma theory, phlogiston, vitalism, spontaneous generation, all were popularly believed. We know people spread urban legends, because we have inventories of them. Cult personalities and propaganda run rampant; group think is a thing, Milgram is a thing, Dunning-Kruger is a thing, cultural differences is a thing. The only situations where popular opinion is trustworthy are those in which you have some other justification (at a minimal, the specific situations in which you have good reason to believe the populace itself is justified); in such cases, you have a valid justification other than "everybody else thinks its true". Two wrongs just make two wrongs.

or its opposite is absurd — Samuel Lacrampe

In this "productive" debate, that tiny little phrase is actually rational. Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity, and appeal to popularity are just as garbage as they ever were, and will always be as garbage as they always were. But reductio ad absurdum? That can actually be a valid argumentation technique. This is a glimmer of actual rationality that I welcome. Do you think you can attempt a reductio on PoSR (without meaninglessly just "opining" the absurdity)?

Your argument is valid IF paraconsistent logic is true, that is, we observe that some objects — Samuel Lacrampe

All humans are capable of reasoning about conflicting information without concluding that 2=5.

It is indeed my position — Samuel Lacrampe

If it's your position that you can prove self evident things, and it's your position that PoSR is self evident, then why all the fuss? Just prove PoSR, like I asked you to several posts before.

Why do you claim random mechanics is possible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because there's no inconsistency in a model including it. And since this is about reality, the most accurate authority of what reality is like is... reality itself. Instead of telling God what to do, you should just ask him what he's doing. So far, in the randomness camp, the ball could land either way... maybe it's MWI-like, maybe it's CI-with-BR-like.

Do you not see yourself appealing to the PoSR every time we enquire about what is true? — Samuel Lacrampe

If inquiring about what is true is equivalent to appealing to the PoSR, then you should be able to drop the PoSR postulate and replace it with a simple inquiry about what is true. So, if you're serious, do that... and derive that wavefunction collapse is unreal.

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "sufficient" with "necessary"? Otherwise, what is the difference between the two terms for you? — Samuel Lacrampe

No; and you would know that if you knew what necessary and sufficient means (i.e., you're bluffing again). But, okay, let's do this. A is sufficient for B means that if you have A, you definitely have B. A is necessary for B means that in order to have B, you have to have A. These are related but not the same; you can have mere reasons, necessary reasons, sufficient reasons, and necessary and sufficient reasons. The car swerving was a reason for the crash (but not necessary; I could have a crash by running into a telephone pole... and not sufficient; I could swerve to avoid such a car). For Pat to be a bride, it is necessary that Pat is female (but not sufficient; simply being a female doesn't make you a bride). If you ate a bowl of cereal this morning, that's sufficient to say that you had breakfast this morning (but not necessary; eating pancakes this morning would also be having breakfast this morning). For a computer to be Turing Complete, it is both necessary and sufficient that it be capable of simulating a Turing machine (a computer that cannot simulate a Turing machine is never Turing Complete; a computer that can is always Turing Complete).

Nice try, but the definition I use aligns well with the definition given by your source, and poorly with your linked to "common" definition. And your definition-by-literal definition doesn't seem to fit at all. — InPitzotl

From the same link: "In informal speech, self-evident often merely means obvious, but the epistemological definition is more strict." And also "A logical argument for a self-evident conclusion would demonstrate only an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion based on one or more premises that differ from it (see [...] begging the question)."

It invalidates this point: [...] — InPitzotl

It does not. We believe a claim was justified because we believe the argument was sound. One cannot say that a claim was justified even though the argument was not sound. Hopefully that helps with your Newton objection too.

But that's superfluous, since all "adequate" means is enough to convince you. — InPitzotl

Inadequate in this context means "no rational error"; that is, the argument cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. Note that it could be refuted at a later date, once further evidence is available. This is what happened with Newton and Einstein. Note also that a flawless argument can still fail to convince some people; but that doesn't make the justification itself "inadequate".

how is committing three fallacies to argue that a thing is self-evident going to help in your goal to convince the LNC denier that he shouldn't deny the LNC? — InPitzotl

We are definitely not on the same page; because my point is that not being able to prove the LNC is part of what makes the LNC self-evident.

Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity ("I see no better way to..."), appeal to popularity. — InPitzotl

Begging the question: Showing that one cannot avoid begging the question to demonstrate self-evidence is not a fallacy.
"I see no better way ...": Do you see a better way to dismiss the opposite of a first principle like the LNC? If not, then it stands that my way is the best one available. No fallacies there either.
Appeal to popularity: See the explanation below regarding reductio ad absurdum.

No, just dealing with question begging separately. The appeal to popularity doesn't help; miasma theory, phlogiston, vitalism, spontaneous generation, all were popularly believed. — InPitzotl

That's the problem. Your counter-examples fail to deal with criteria (1) and (2) at the same time. Dealing with criteria (1) or (2) separately is ... insufficient. :wink:

But reductio ad absurdum? That can actually be a valid argumentation technique. — InPitzotl

You seem to fail to realize that a reductio ad absurdum is effective only when most of the population believes the alternative claim is absurd. In other words, reductio ad absurdum and appeal to popularity are both sides of the same coin.

Do you think you can attempt a reductio on PoSR (without meaninglessly just "opining" the absurdity)? — InPitzotl

Sure thing; although note that it is not much different than my first attempt.
A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced by anything else, and (2) choosing the contradictory claim is absurd. PoSR: (1) To justify it is to provide a sufficient reason to believe in it. (2) Its contradictory (ie "not everything must have a reason or a cause") is absurd, because it invalidates the demand to justify any claims ever. E.g. the soul exists. Much shorter OP.

All humans are capable of reasoning about conflicting information without concluding that 2=5. — InPitzotl

If that's all you mean by paraconsistent logic, then it does not conflict with classical logic, and so we are done with this topic I suppose.

you can prove self evident things — InPitzotl

Correction: I can prove claims to be self-evident, not self-evident claims to be true. By definition, self-evident claims cannot be proven.

Because there's no inconsistency in a model including it. — InPitzotl

What kind of model do you speak of? A computer model? But generating truly random numbers from computers is not possible. A model in your mind? But none of your thoughts are random or uncaused. There is a difference between the perception of randomness (ie we lack information to predict an effect) and real randomness.

Can you point to, or write, a philosophical paper that adequately justifies the belief that wavefunction collapse is unreal? — InPitzotl

So, if you're serious, do that... and derive that wavefunction collapse is unreal. — InPitzotl

Are you saying that the wavefunction thing and the PoSR are incompatible? If so, I would just say that the wavefunction may be real, but that it has a cause, even if that cause may not be observable.

If you ate a bowl of cereal this morning, that's sufficient to say that you had breakfast this morning (but not necessary; eating pancakes this morning would also be having breakfast this morning) — InPitzotl

I agree with you on the definitions of sufficient and necessary in logic. But I see 2 errors. First, as per the original link you sent, "This article is about the formal terminology in logic. For causal meanings of the terms, see Causality." and free will is about causality, not identity (logic). Second, if we must stretch the example to speak about cause and effect, then what causes you to eat cereals is the intent to have breakfast. So "intending to have breakfast" is the cause, and "eating cereals" is the effect. And like you said, the cause can also have the effect of "eating pancakes". So the PoSR does not remove the possibility of many options.


Side note: the posts are getting long. Good to consider dropping a few side topics to better focus on the main ones? We'll call it a draw on the topics we drop haha.

From the same link: — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, that's the "common" one... "it's obvious". But also, in the common one, it simply says the epistemological definition is more strict. So my definition was: "Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.". And the "philosophical" one, from the link: "a self-evident proposition is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof". And your definition-from-literal:

The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". You don't see it? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're quibbling over some interpreted "strictness" of my definition, but mine still aligns with the philosophical one, and yours is still nowhere close.

And also — Samuel Lacrampe

...okay, but that doesn't quite fit, because far from being ignorant of begging the question, you're literally embracing it. Your source seems to treat it as a bad thing. Also, you have this theory that debates lead to truth; so there must be something you can debate me with that would convince me.

We believe a claim was justified because we believe the argument was sound — Samuel Lacrampe

No, because we believe Newtonian mechanics was justified pre-Einstein, yet we don't believe it's sound. And belief that an argument is sound is not the same thing as an argument being sound.

One cannot say that a claim was justified even though the argument was not sound.

IEP did.

Inadequate in this context means "no rational error"; that is, the argument cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, let's go with that one then. In the current knowledge base of physics, best I understand, randomness cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence, nor can determinism be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. So neither conclusion is a rational error.

We are definitely not on the same page; because my point is that not being able to prove the LNC is part of what makes the LNC self-evident. — Samuel Lacrampe

And that's ridiculous. Not being able to prove massless cows are eating massless grass in the center of the sun doesn't make it self evident. You can't prove something is self evident by begging the question. And you can't prove it by begging the question and appealing to popularity.

Begging the question: Showing that one cannot avoid begging the question to demonstrate self-evidence is not a fallacy. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree. But using the fact that something begs the question to "prove" that something is self evident is a fallacy.

That's the problem. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, that's not the problem. The problem is that you're using logical fallacies to justify that claims are self evident, not that I'm not using enough of them.

You seem to fail to realize that a reductio ad absurdum is effective only when — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem isn't that I "fail to realize" this; the problem is that it's flat out wrong and you're just making it up. Since when did reductio have to do with popular opinion? Wiki gives this example of a reductio:

There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one.

...how is this even related to people's beliefs in smallest positive rationals?

(1) it cannot be evidenced by anything else ... (2) Its contradictory (ie "not everything must have a reason or a cause") is absurd, because it invalidates the demand to justify any claims ever. E.g. the soul exists. Much shorter OP. — Samuel Lacrampe

As for (1), you're confusing justification with proof; I don't hold PoSR to be self evident; and you're trying to prove PoSR anyway. As for (2), nonsense; denial of PoSR does not require invalidating the demand to justify all claims. In fact, Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified. Real experiments show QM works. Born Inequalities provide a way to show the difference between application of BR according to QM and hidden variables. Real experiments bear BI out. Add some aesthetics, such as presumptions like that classical physics is real (by presuming that QM is just a calculation trick for example), and you get justified randomness.

What kind of model do you speak of? — Samuel Lacrampe

A conceptual model; a Copenhagen Interpretation of QM with WFC realism. It's conceivably possible WFC is real.

But none of your thoughts are random or uncaused. — Samuel Lacrampe

How do you know? They could be. But even if they aren't, that's irrelevant. None of my thoughts grow leaves either, but I can think of trees. And even if my thoughts are all caused and non-random, I can think of the word "random". There are thoughts like Bell Inequalities, and thoughts like "let's find out"; as agents we can interact with the world and, say, perform experiments confirming Bell's Theorem. Ask God what he's doing.

There is a difference between the perception of randomness (ie we lack information to predict an effect) and real randomness. — Samuel Lacrampe

And?

Are you saying that the wavefunction thing and the PoSR are incompatible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes; "real" WFC and PoSR are incompatible ("real" meaning a WFC theory that treats it as real rather than merely MWI or QD or something).

If so, I would just say that the wavefunction may be real, but that it has a cause, even if that cause may not be observable. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ironic... you're right on both fronts, but in being right you demonstrate you have no idea what you're talking about. Lucky you for being right. Wavefunction realism is what MWI posits. The wavefunction evolves according to the Schrodinger Equation, and that's completely deterministic. It's also, coincidentally, not observable. But that's not where quantum indeterminism comes in. Quantum indeterminism comes in when the Born Rule applies; the Born Rule is entirely stochastic in nature. The Born Rule results in a wave function collapse (WFC). Wave function collapses take the quantum wavefunction and bring them into a classical result, when it's observed. WFC realism would posit that the collapse is real... that pieces of the wavefunction actually disappear into classical measurements. That implies quantum indeterminacy, and that is incompatible with PoSR.

But I see 2 errors. — Samuel Lacrampe

Funny, because you didn't show any error in what you typed. You just had two comments:

"This article is about the formal terminology in logic. For causal meanings of the terms, see Causality." — Samuel Lacrampe

...so go to that link.

Incidentally, remember when you said this?:

Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time. — Samuel Lacrampe

...well, that link phrased it thusly:

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. — Causality

if we must stretch the example to speak about cause and effect, then what causes you to eat cereals is the intent to have breakfast. — Samuel Lacrampe

Doesn't matter. PoSR states that everything has a sufficient reason. That includes "eating breakfast", but it also includes "eating cereal for breakfast". Ignoring the latter is simply cherry picking; the rule, if it applies, applies to everything (because that's what the rule says it applies to). Besides, if we can just clump alternatives and ignore the specifics and that "counts", then PoSR doesn't rule out randomness, because Banno's photon went through "a slit".

We'll call it a draw on the topics we drop haha. — Samuel Lacrampe

But we're playing the debate game... isn't that what you wanted? After all, isn't that how truth is demonstrated... by spinning wheels trying to convince people your points don't need justified because by committing the right two fallacies you prove it's self evident?

If you want an alternative, we could just have a discussion about ways in which you could be wrong.

There's an even easier argument than the OP regarding the soul and free will.

A physical , interlocked, universe of causation does not exist.

The Universe exists as an Idea in a greater mind than our own, a Universe of correlation that builds reality rather than causation building reality.

We are a sub-set of the greater mind given a degree of autonomy from it , by it. Its thoughts are the boundary of our lives so it can give us autonomy if it so wills.

Maybe there's a deeper principle like this, where everything happens for a reason. — InPitzotl

I don't think Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle undermines determinism. What humans can or can't measure don't say much. Likewise with radioactive decay. It is a function in quantum spacetime but we measure it in physical spacetime. What is 'random' in physical space time does not need to be random at its source. It is very easy to create mathematical functions that generate seemingly random results where the input is perfectly ordered*. So these are not arguments against determinism. What human beings can determine or measure does not have any bearing on whether events are truly deterministic.

If the physical universe is deterministic and mind is non physical then mind can create a non deterministic event. Say a rock rolls down a hill. That, the determinists would argue, is purely deterministic. But if a person, with a mind, decides to put his foot out and stop the rock, that is not physical determinism. If mind/soul are non physical then non deterministic events can be possible.

*eg. X³ modulo p where p is prime and X = 1, 2, 3...
Here are the results for p = 43 with input 1, 2, 3...Input is regular but output is random.
The function calculates the remainder when X³ is divided by 43

1
8
27
21
39
1
42
39
41
11
41
8
4
35
21
11
11
27
22
2

my definition was: "Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated." — InPitzotl

But if a claim does not need to but can be demonstrated, then it means it could be demonstrated without begging the question, which the statement in the wiki disallows. Or leaving the wiki aside, we agreed we could also call a self-evident claim a "first principle". But we demonstrate a claim by appealing to a principle prior to that claim, which cannot exist for first principles, by definition.

that doesn't quite fit, because far from being ignorant of begging the question, you're literally embracing it. — InPitzotl

?? My point is the same as that of the wiki, namely that any attempt to demonstrate a self-evident claim to be true would be committing the fallacy of begging the question.

No, because we believe Newtonian mechanics was justified pre-Einstein, yet we don't believe it's sound. And belief that an argument is sound is not the same thing as an argument being sound. — InPitzotl

It was justified. It no longer is. Similarly, we believed it was sound, we no longer do.

In the current knowledge base of physics, best I understand, randomness cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence, nor can determinism be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. So neither conclusion is a rational error. — InPitzotl

But randomness and determinism are contradictory, aren't they? If so, then how can the currently available set of data lead to two contradictory conclusions?

Not being able to prove massless cows are eating massless grass in the center of the sun doesn't make it self evident. You can't prove something is self evident by begging the question. And you can't prove it by begging the question and appealing to popularity. — InPitzotl

Why do you say the "massless cows" claim cannot be demonstrated true or false without begging the question? And why do you say the claim is popularly believed?

But using the fact that something begs the question to "prove" that something is self evident is a fallacy. — InPitzotl

Why is that a fallacy? Also I suspect you do not understand the statement in the Wiki link, because it supports my claim.

There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one.

The Wiki states the reductio ad absurdum "attempts to establish a claim by showing that the opposite scenario would lead to absurdity or contradiction." Your example is an example of contradiction, not absurdity. Admittedly, I did not know we would also call it "reductio as absurdum" in that case. Anyways, back to the self-evident criteria, I mean it to say "absurd", not "contradiction". And "absurd" means "away from common sense".

(1), you're confusing justification with proof; I don't hold PoSR to be self evident; and you're trying to prove PoSR anyway. — InPitzotl

A proof is a justification that gives certainty. And I honestly don't understand the rest of your claim.

Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified. — InPitzotl

You seem to appeal to the PoSR to support these theories, and then conclude that the PoSR is false. Is this not like sawing off the branch you are sitting on? I offer a better explanation that preserves the PoSR all the way through: these theories don't exclude the possibility of a non-physical cause.

I can think of the word "random" — InPitzotl

We can imagine the literal word "random" made of letters, we cannot imagine randomness; because we have never perceived randomness, and we cannot imagine something we have not perceived, inasmuch as a blind man born blind cannot imagine a colour. At best, we can imagine "unpredictability". Similarly, it is useful to talk about "infinity" in math, but we cannot imagine it.

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. — Causality

Interesting. I did not know that was what "sufficient cause" means. Alright.
But... that is not what "sufficient" means in the PoSR. The PoSR states: "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs." This should be interpreted as "the cause has enough 'power' to produce the effect", or "an effect cannot be greater than its causes". For example, if a lightbulb is on, then there must exist a power source sufficiently large to light it up. That power source of course could also be used for other things.

But if a claim does not need to but can be demonstrated, then it means it could be demonstrated without begging the question, which the statement in the wiki disallows. — Samuel Lacrampe

You keep treating demonstrate/justify and logical proof as the same thing. All three are different things. You demonstrate something by just doing a thing and showing that a principle is working, for that one event. You justify something by giving a good reason to believe it. You prove something logically by applying logical axioms and/or theorems.

Or leaving the wiki aside, we agreed we could also call a self-evident claim a "first principle". But we demonstrate a claim by appealing to a principle prior to that claim, which cannot exist for first principles, by definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

We're not agreeing on what is self evident. But you're trying to prove something is self evident, and at the same time, trying to say that you cannot prove it.

My point is the same as that of the wiki — Samuel Lacrampe

No it's not; you've confused yourself into thinking it's the same. The wiki says exactly this:

A logical argument for a self-evident conclusion would demonstrate only an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion based on one or more premises that differ from it (see ignoratio elenchi and begging the question).

...what you're not grasping is that this is a direct criticism of your attempts to logically argue for a self evident conclusion. This wiki is saying that you by doing so are demonstrating an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion... that you're begging the question. That's supposed to be a bad thing, but you're doing it.

It was justified. It no longer is. — Samuel Lacrampe

It was justified but it was never sound. Relativity didn't become true when Einstein proposed it; to the degree that it's "truer" than Newton, it was "truer" dating back to the Big Bang singularity.

Why is that a fallacy? Also I suspect you do not understand the statement in the Wiki link, because it supports my claim. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, you suspect I don't understand the Wiki link because you do not understand it. See the quote above? Who is offering a logical argument that PoSR is self evident? That's not me, that's you. So who is being demonstrated ignorant of the purpose of persuasively arguing that position? If anyone that would be you, not me; I'm the attempted persuadee, you're the persuader. I'm the one doubting the PoSR is self evident. And who is begging the question by proposing that logical argument? Not me; that's you. I'm unconvinced PoSR is self evident, so I'm asking, not for a logical argument, but for a justification. Because... whose opinion is it that debates lead to truth? Not mine; that's yours.

And "absurd" means "away from common sense". — Samuel Lacrampe

...according to Einstein (apocryphally but believably), common sense is the set of prejudices learned by the age of 18.

You seem to appeal to the PoSR to support these theories, — Samuel Lacrampe

How?

and then conclude that the PoSR is false.

Wrong; I conclude PoSR isn't necessarily true. It's just a simple modal logic exercise. Maybe instead of bluffing you should read up on modal logic.

We can imagine the literal word "random" made of letters, — Samuel Lacrampe

It's trivially false that I cannot imagine something I don't perceive. I can imagine that there's a kidney underneath my skin somewhere; I can imagine the pipe running to my property delivering water. I can imagine uncomputable numbers, incompressible numbers, Godel numbers, and TM's that UTM's cannot decide are halting or not. I can imagine dependence and independence. You're fishing.

Similarly, it is useful to talk about "infinity" in math, but we cannot imagine it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Unless you're prepared to argue that there are a finite number of counting numbers because PoSR, I don't think you want to go there.

Interesting. I did not know that was what "sufficient cause" means. Alright. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sufficient has meant that since before you started your post. And I've been telling you what it means. I linked to an article even; you obviously didn't read it. Not until I spoon fed it did you agree. So what made you think you were qualified to lecture me on what sufficient means if you had no idea?

Sufficient has meant that since before you started your post. — InPitzotl

Not in the context of the PoSR; which is what matters for this post. To confirm, in the statement about the PoSR "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs", "sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. And it is in that sense that I use the term "sufficient" for this post.

I'm the one doubing the PoSR is self evident. — InPitzotl

I'll try one more time, but I'm running out of ways to explain the same thing. To demonstrate that a claim is self-evident is not the same as to demonstrate that a self-evident claim is true. The latter is a fallacy; the former is not. My aim is to show that the PoSR is self-evident, not that it is necessarily true.

Replace PoSR with LNC in your above statement, and similarly, I could show the LNC is self-evident, but not necessarily true. A denier of the LNC cannot be persuaded to be wrong with arguments that presuppose the LNC. As it is with the LNC, so it is with the PoSR.

It was justified but it was never sound.[...] — InPitzotl

Sounds like we are in agreement here. Let's close this topic.

How [am I appealing to the PoSR]? — InPitzotl

By saying that "Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified", it is appealing to the PoSR in the form of "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true." So QI theory is believed to be true because there is a sufficient explanation in support of it. Likewise, if there was not a sufficient explanation in support of it, then QI would not be believed to be true.

It's trivially false that I cannot imagine something I don't perceive. — InPitzotl

That's not quite what I meant, but that's okay because I have changed my mind on this. We can after all imagine an event without imagining a cause for that event. That's fine; it just means that the PoSR is not derived from logical necessity (which is what we'd expect from a self-evident principle).

Wrong; I conclude PoSR isn't necessarily true. [...] — InPitzotl

It is indeed not "necessarily true" in the sense that it is not derived from logical necessity, as per above, but I clam it is nevertheless true for all cases, similar to how logic cannot itself be derived from logical necessity, and yet is believed to be true for all cases.

Thomas Aquinas was already talking about this back then (but I cannot find the source of this anymore). — Samuel Lacrampe

it's everywhere in his writings on the soul

Not in the context of the PoSR — Samuel Lacrampe

That sounds like special pleading to me. But, okay.

"sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

And what does greater mean? Surely snowflakes can cause avalanches, and hurricanes can result from a butterfly flapping its wings. Is a rock greater than a stick? Is elasticity greater than magnetism? Are you just saying that if something requires x amount of energy then you need at least x amount of energy? Greater has to actually mean something you can use if you're going to define PoSR this way, and if it does, I'd like to know what that meaning is.

But whatever greater means, that has to be the thing you use to rule out Born Rule application of wave function collapse, because that's precisely what you're ruling out when you rule out the randomness Banno was talking about. (But even this would not be too convincing, because even if you ruled this out, the theory Banno described would do perfectly well as a physical theory... it just wouldn't apply to our world).

My aim is to show that the PoSR is self-evident, not that it is necessarily true. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, I'll attack this differently too... let's start here. Do you mean that PoSR is "obvious" (the common definition)? Because it's not so obvious to me. Or do you mean that PoSR "is known to be true without justification"? Because that would entail that I know it to be true, and I can find reasonable doubt of it being true (WFC realism). Because I can reasonably doubt it, you have to justify it to me. That's what this stuff really means. And what you're really trying to do is futile on top of futile... you're trying to prove to me that you don't have to justify PoSR to me.

Well, what about my reasonable doubt... the possibility that WFC is real?

By saying that "Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified", it is appealing to the PoSR in the form of "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true." — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not even related to the that claim; it's appealing only to the fact that a belief is justified if there's justification for it, which is kind of tautological. In fact, "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true" is not even true! If your version of PoSR entails that it is, then I straight out disbelieve it; Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem's much better justified.

Thanks! Will check it out.

And what does greater mean? Surely snowflakes can cause avalanches, and hurricanes can result from a butterfly flapping its wings. Is a rock greater than a stick? Is elasticity greater than magnetism? Are you just saying that if something requires x amount of energy then you need at least x amount of energy? — InPitzotl

Greater in terms of "causal power" or "ability". This is still quite generic, so I'll give examples.
Indeed if talking about energy events, then the energy from the effect cannot be greater than the energy from the causes. If reality is nothing but physical, which can be reduced or supervened by matter, energy, and arrangement of matter, then the effect cannot be greater in amount of matter/energy than the causes. If on the other hand a property cannot be reduced to anything simpler, let's assume free will for example, then the cause of free will must also possess free will.

A closed system with nothing but one snowflake cannot cause an avalanche, or with nothing but a butterfly cannot cause a hurricane. Now an effect cannot be greater than the sum of its causes. In a system that is highly unstable, a single snowflake may be sufficient to cause an avalanche. Finally, if a rock has more matter than the stick, then we could carve a stick out of the rock.

that has to be the thing you use to rule out Born Rule application of wave function collapse, because that's precisely what you're ruling out when you rule out the randomness Banno was talking about. — InPitzotl

I assume "randomness" here means that sometimes we observe event A and sometimes event B, with no apparent causes to explain that change. So if every change requires a sufficient cause, this type of randomness indeed cannot exist.

even if you ruled this out, the theory Banno described would do perfectly well as a physical theory... it just wouldn't apply to our world — InPitzotl

If the possible worlds only retain logic, then indeed randomness is possible in other worlds; but if they retain both logic and causality, then randomness is not possible. I'd say both should be retained because possible worlds are thought experiments, and both LNC and PoSR are laws of thought (as further explained below).

do you mean that PoSR "is known to be true without justification"? — InPitzotl

This one. The PoSR cannot be founded on anything else because nothing is below a first principle; but we can explain how it came about: The purpose of reason is to find truth, and we observe that when we reason about a topic, we always demand an explanation that is sufficient to defend the claim, and we reject the claim when the explanation is found to be insufficient (ie failing to fulfill the burden of proof). Thus inductively, the PoSR is the generalization of this observation. I'm pretty sure the LNC came about in a similar way, for it cannot be demonstrated either. Leibniz says the LNC and the PoSR are the two pillars of our reasoning about reality, where the former is for identity, and the latter for causality.

Well, what about my reasonable doubt... the possibility that WFC is real? — InPitzotl

The scientific method is based on reason, which uses both the LNC and the PoSR. E.g. "Assume a claim is false until given a sufficient reason to be true", or Occam's Razor which is "pick the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data", etc. So a scientific claim which refutes either the LNC or the PoSR would be sawing off the branch it is sitting on. That said, the WFC may be compatible with the PoSR if we posit non-observable causes. I just don't know enough about that theory.

It's not even related to the that claim [...] — InPitzotl

I'm not sure what your point is in this last paragraph.

I'll do this first, because this is too important to leave at the bottom.

I'm not sure what your point is in this last paragraph. — Samuel Lacrampe

Within the domain of math, per your definition, I read "sufficient reason" as being equivalent to proof.

Here's some notation I'll be using:
Qualifiers: ∀=for all, ∃=there exists, ∄=there does not exist
Operators: A⊢P=A is a proof of P, ⋀=and, :=such that

Your statement: ∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P
But per Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem: ∃P : P ⋀ ∄ O : O⊢P
...namely, the Godel statement G that says that G cannot be proved within a system would be such a P. I would posit that if you extend your system, you just get another system.

In terms of math, when you say "X can be justified" appeals to your phrasing of the PoSR, given "proof"=sufficient reason, then you're literally saying that "O⊢P" appeals to "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P", which is ridiculous on the face of it.

Greater in terms of "causal power" or "ability". — Samuel Lacrampe

That doesn't sound generic to me, though it sounds a bit trivial. If we agree that A causes B, we could say that A has "resulting in B" as its causal power, which I see as simply a fancy way of saying that A can cause B. I don't get where "greater" comes in though. Wavefunction collapse causes the photon to go left. Okay, and?

Indeed if talking about energy events, then the energy from the effect cannot be greater than the energy from the causes — Samuel Lacrampe

That implies that the total amount of energy in the universe can remain the same, or decrease, but cannot increase. But that conflicts with the fact that the total amount of energy in the universe is increasing (due to dark energy). So, what gives?

I assume "randomness" here means that sometimes we observe event A and sometimes event B, with no apparent causes to explain that change. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I mean that state Φ sometimes evolves into state A and sometimes evolves into state B, and we can demonstrate that there exists no hidden variable that can explain the evolution of state A from state Φ as opposed to state B from state Φ. Being able to demonstrate that there are no HVT's is strikingly different than merely not seeing an apparent sufficient cause. Quantum indeterminacy is not based on pattern matching events; it's based on an evidence supported no-go theorem (Bell's Theorem).

The purpose of reason is to find truth, and we observe that when we reason about a topic, we always demand an explanation that is sufficient to defend the claim, and we reject the claim when the explanation is found to be insufficient (ie failing to fulfill the burden of proof). — Samuel Lacrampe

That does not imply∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P; all it implies is that we don't commit to P until we find an O such that O⊢P (with a much weaker sense of ⊢... an outright falsifiable sense... since we're dealing with induction most of the time).

The scientific method is based on reason, which uses both the LNC and the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

Reason doesn't rely on PoSR. You're making that up. There is no "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P" in "O⊢P".

In terms of math, when you say "X can be justified" appeals to your phrasing of the PoSR, given "proof"=sufficient reason, then you're literally saying that "O⊢P" appeals to "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P", which is ridiculous on the face of it. — InPitzotl

First, bear with me when using symbolic logic, because I am not familiar with these.
Now the term "proof" is too strict. A reason that yields reasonableness instead of certainty is also acceptable for the PoSR. Of course, first principles cannot be proven to be true, by definition, but sufficient reasons nevertheless are given to make them reasonable, such as induction.

I don't get where "greater" comes in though. Wavefunction collapse causes the photon to go left. Okay, and? — InPitzotl

"Greater" may not always apply, as per your example. But it does in some cases: If a shelf can support a 10 kg weight but can also support more, then the being that is the cause has greater power (supporting power) than the effect (the supporting of the 10 kg weight).

But that conflicts with the fact that the total amount of energy in the universe is increasing (due to dark energy). — InPitzotl

Dark Energy... sounds ominous. I don't know what that is, but doesn't it conflict with the first law of thermodynamics, that the total energy of an isolated system is constant; energy can be transformed from one form to another but can be neither created nor destroyed?

Being able to demonstrate that there are no HVT's is strikingly different than merely not seeing an apparent sufficient cause. — InPitzotl

The domain of the empirical sciences (what we refer to as science for short) is limited to the empirical. But reality is not necessarily limited to the empirical. So while science may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes, it cannot make claims about possible non-empirical causes.

That does not imply∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P; all it implies is that we don't commit to P until we find an O such that O⊢P (with a much weaker sense of ⊢... an outright falsifiable sense... since we're dealing with induction most of the time). — InPitzotl

But we don't commit to P, precisely because there is an insufficient explanation to claim that P is true.

Reason doesn't rely on PoSR. — InPitzotl

It sure does. The three types of reasoning are deductive, inductive, and abductive. Abductive is "inference to the best explanation"; and this implies a sufficient explanation.

Now the term "proof" is too strict — Samuel Lacrampe

Not in the realm of mathematics; proof is generally the level we're looking for. What weaker sufficient reason would you apply to mathematics?

Of course, first principles cannot be proven to be true, by definition, but sufficient reasons nevertheless are given to make them reasonable, such as induction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Could you explain that a bit more?

"Greater" may not always apply, as per your example. — Samuel Lacrampe

But this is your burden... to show randomness is impossible. Quantum Indeterminacy comes from application of Born Rule, which is the rule that you apply when you get classical states from the wavefunction collapsing. If greater doesn't apply here, then there's no argument against randomness in this.

doesn't it conflict with the first law of thermodynamics, that the total energy of an isolated system is constant — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes. This is an analog to Newton's Laws we were discussing earlier. Conservation of energy is a really great law, and it's "almost" true; it is, in fact, so close to being true that we may as well just say that it is. But we can derive conservation of energy from more fundamental laws; in accordance with Noether's Theorem, conservation of energy is a result of time translation symmetry. Dark energy introduces a time translation asymmetry, and dominates the universe at cosmic scales.

You were telling me a couple of posts ago something about greater... but when I tried to directly apply that to randomness, which you're ruling out, you're saying it doesn't apply there... and the one example you gave me of greater is actually false? Now regarding this "can support 10kg" stuff, sure, that seems to have a greater concept in it somewhere, but I don't really see one for three justifying any general rule. More importantly, if the one thing you're trying to rule out by the rule doesn't apply, then why are we discussing "greater"?

The domain of the empirical sciences (what we refer to as science for short) is limited to the empirical. But reality is not necessarily limited to the empirical. So while science may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes, it cannot make claims about possible non-empirical causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

This paragraph is meaningless to me. Based on my understanding of what the word "empirical" means, it's a bunch of babble, and straight out false... it's tantamount to saying that there's no such thing as a no-go theorem in science, which is quite silly given Bell's Theorem is such a thing. But based on what I understand the word "empirical" to mean, some of these phrases are outright nonsense; for example, what is this supposed to mean?: "may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes"

But we don't commit to P, precisely because there is an insufficient explanation to claim that P is true. — Samuel Lacrampe

What are you talking about? P=an english speaker is engaging me in a conversation. O=this thread. O⊢P. Are you failing to abstract? You're talking about a principle that supposedly applies to all true things.

Not in the realm of mathematics; proof is generally the level we're looking for. What weaker sufficient reason would you apply to mathematics? — InPitzotl

Probability. Reasonableness is equivalent to probability in mathematics without being quantitative. Note however, that the PoSR applies first and foremost to causality, and secondarily to knowledge, as an extension.

Could you explain that a bit more? — InPitzotl

Take the LNC as a first principle for example. It cannot be proven to be true, for a logical proof presupposes the LNC. But through induction, by observing that there exist no contradictory facts, and that we cannot even imagine contradictory images, then it is reasonable to believe the LNC to be true, both as an epistemic and a metaphysical principle.

But this is your burden... to show randomness is impossible. Quantum Indeterminacy comes from application of Born Rule, which is the rule that you apply when you get classical states from the wavefunction collapsing. If greater doesn't apply here, then there's no argument against randomness in this. — InPitzotl

There is a misunderstanding somewhere here. I thought you were just asking if along with being greater, the cause can sometimes just be equal, and I meant to say that it can; that it just cannot be less. If that's not what you meant, then what was your original objection?

Dark energy introduces a time translation asymmetry, and dominates the universe at cosmic scales. — InPitzotl

I wish laws would stop being broken. :shade:
This should still be okay with the PoSR. This "time translation asymmetry" as you say could provide a sufficient cause for the added energy to a system. There is also the possibility of turning mass into energy with relativity if I understand it correctly.

what is this supposed to mean?: "may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes" — InPitzotl

That science may be able to show in some cases that it has accounted for all the causes that science can account for: observable, detectable causes. E.g. there may exist things which are typically judged to be non-physical such as the soul, free will, and objective values. As non-physical things, they might fall outside the realm of empirical sciences, and are part of the realm of philosophy (which nowadays means "non-empirical or rational sciences"). As possibly real things, they would be part of the causal chain of events alongside with physical things.

P=an english speaker is engaging me in a conversation. O=this thread. O⊢P. — InPitzotl

So this translates to "this thread is a proof that an engligh speaker is engaging me in a conversation". So far so good; no conflict with the PoSR that I see. But then what is your point?

Probability. Reasonableness is equivalent to probability in mathematics without being quantitative. Note however, that the PoSR applies first and foremost to causality, and secondarily to knowledge, as an extension. — Samuel Lacrampe

You seem to be losing the ability to understand what you're quoting. Mathematical conjectures are not judged based on the probability that they are true; they are judged based on whether they can be proven or disproven.

But through induction, by observing that there exist no contradictory facts, and that we cannot even imagine contradictory images, then it is reasonable to believe the LNC to be true, both as an epistemic and a metaphysical principle. — Samuel Lacrampe

But if you're appealing to induction, then induction is in play; in that case, we can appeal to quantum indeterminacy as a reason to doubt PoSR.

There is a misunderstanding somewhere here. — Samuel Lacrampe

Indeed there is. You said this, here:

To confirm, in the statement about the PoSR "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs", "sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

...and I got two concrete examples from you; one was support-ability of a beam by weight... the other was conservation of energy. The weight thing sounds fine, but hardly universal; I can think of several other principles where "lesser" amounts of some total are required for some thing, but PoSR must apply to all things not just certain classes of things, else there's no such rule. The conservation of energy thing plain fails, but:

This should still be okay with the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

...and that seems to be a curious exception. You gave this as an example of PoSR applying; turns out it flunks. But now you're backtracking. I'll allow this, but, there's a cost. So maybe PoSR is fine with energy increasing after all; you can pin that on time translation asymmetry. But if you can be wrong about this because energy can indeed increase due to time translation asymmetry, then how can we be sure you cannot be wrong about quantum indeterminacy because events can indeed be stochastic due to wavefunction collapse, in the same manner in which you allow indeterministic free will because events can be caused by original causes who are free agents?

If I were cynical, I would say that "greater" and therefore "sufficient" don't mean anything at all, because you just retrofit them to whatever is there post hoc. If energy is conserved, greater fits; if not, well, that's okay too. PoSR by this theory is meaningless, and lacks the ability to rule out randomness. But apparently the whole point of PoSR was to rule out randomness so you could use this proof of souls. So, come on, give me something meaningful enough to do the job you want to do; something that doesn't sound like special pleading.

That science may be able to show in some cases that it has accounted for all the causes that science can account for: observable, detectable causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

The word "empirical" refers to something you actually observe though; so phrases like ruling out empirical causes literally mean that you're ruling out causes that you observe, which is kind of nonsensical. In like fashion your previous rant about empirical science being science and what not is a bunch of meaningless babble that should just be ignored. As for the above statement, that's a bit more meaningful, but it shows lack of imagination and a complete ignorance of what a no-go theorem is. Bell's Theorem does not require the causes be observable or detectable; it merely requires that there be some sort of fact of the matter of the classical system that leads to the result.

E.g. there may exist things which are typically judged to be non-physical such as the soul, free will, and objective values. — Samuel Lacrampe

And now we're full circle? The photon goes left because it has a soul, free will, and objective values?

So this translates to "this thread is a proof that an engligh speaker is engaging me in a conversation". So far so good; no conflict with the PoSR that I see. But then what is your point? — Samuel Lacrampe

You have a talent for not following the discussion. You posited that by using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) that I'm appealing to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). I'm saying that just using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) does not require an appeal to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). Think of ⊢ mathematically as meaning proof; outside of math, as simply being a metaphor for justifies. But you're still trying to cargo cult some sort of ridiculous foundational dependency of (O⊢P) to (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P).

Apart from what has been brought forward against P1, your argument reminds me of the Kantian notion with regard to the possibility of freedom. In short, he asserts the possibility of freedom on grounds of his distinction between the object (in our case the action of someone as the objectification of their "soul") in sensory perception, which, by necessity, is either subject to physical laws and thus determined or possesses some negative freedom (other comments have elaborated on that), which, indeed, is unlike the positive freedom that an autonomous individual should possess, and the thing-in-itself, which is fully disclosed from sensory perception and, thus, not necessarily subject to any determination, rendering the coexistence of the seemingly determined action (as it is perceived by, say, other beings) and a cause (the soul as an imperceptible thing-in-itself) that possesses some form of positive freedom uncontradicted. (naturally, this is a simplification of the argument!)
In that sense I would associate the non-physical nature of this freely acting facility (insofar as, given that it's undetermined, it cannot be the object of an appreciation without contradiction) with your argument.
Cheers!

The whole idea of a soul is a religious, or fairytale idea.We are all Stardust.We are chemical beings, we interact with everything chemically. If you don’t understand that you don’t understand anything

Mathematical conjectures are not judged based on the probability that they are true; they are judged based on whether they can be proven or disproven. — InPitzotl

Pure mathematics is in the domain of identity, not causality. E.g. 2+2=4 means that 2+2 is identical to 4, not that 2+2 causes 4. PoSR is in the domain of causality. Regardless, why bring up maths?

But if you're appealing to induction, then induction is in play; in that case, we can appeal to quantum indeterminacy as a reason to doubt PoSR. — InPitzotl

So, come on, give me something meaningful enough to do the job you want to do; something that doesn't sound like special pleading. — InPitzotl

As previously stated, the PoSR is part of reasoning (at least abductive) which is part of the scientific method which is used for that QI theory. You cannot remove the PoSR from scientific topics. It would be like showing through science that some facts about reality are contradictory, thereby concluding that the LNC sometimes fails, and this would be acceptable because the LNC was also obtained through induction. We judge scientific theories based on their agreement with principles of reason, and not the opposite way around.

The conservation of energy thing plain fails — InPitzotl

You misunderstand. My position is in defence of the PoSR, not the laws of thermodynamics. So this time-translation-asymmetry thing is what explains an exception in the law of thermodynamics. Great. It's a blow for the laws of thermo, but it perfectly agrees with the PoSR. Your example would only go against the PoSR if it wasn't explained by something like the time-translation-asymmetry.

PoSR by this theory is meaningless, and lacks the ability to rule out randomness. — InPitzotl

No. PoSR states that all changes have a sufficient cause. Randomness means that nothing causes the change between scenarios 1 and 2, where in scenario 1, Cause A results in Effect B, and in scenario 2, Cause A results in Effect C. Randomness fails the PoSR.

the whole point of PoSR was to rule out randomness so you could use this proof of souls. — InPitzotl

Let's get one thing out of the way. The whole objection about those quantum theories doesn't actually harm the original argument in the OP. All I need to do is to revamp it a bit as per below. This is to clarify that my position on the PoSR is not driven by my position on the soul.

Premise P1: Everything in the non-quantum scale that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, thereby making them not fully determined in the non-quantum scale.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.

The word "empirical" refers to something you actually observe though; so phrases like ruling out empirical causes literally mean that you're ruling out causes that you observe, which is kind of nonsensical. — InPitzotl

It means that science cannot rule out non-empirical causes.

And now we're full circle? The photon goes left because it has a soul, free will, and objective values? — InPitzotl

I would say another non-physical cause; but yes. But now are you claiming that you know for a fact that non-physical things don't exist? Because it seems this would be needed to invalidate the PoSR.

I'm saying that just using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) does not require an appeal to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). — InPitzotl

Can you find an example of a claim that is widely accepted as true and also has no justification for it? If not, then it is an indication of the universal appeal to the PoSR.

Hello.
An opinion does not count as an argument or a refutation.

Pure mathematics is in the domain of identity, not causality. — Samuel Lacrampe

Mathematics includes many fields, not just equations with equals signs on them. But provability is not just an analog of justification, but an example of it. And it was justification that you claimed appeals to PoSR.

We judge scientific theories based on their agreement with principles of reason, and not the opposite way around. — Samuel Lacrampe

Who is this "we"? The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not. So if there's a PoSR that science relies on that does rule this out, somebody forgot to inform scientists about it.

Your example would only go against the PoSR if it wasn't explained by something like the time-translation-asymmetry. — Samuel Lacrampe

Quantum indeterminism is explained by something like wavefunction collapse, backed by the Born Rule. Let me label this so you can follow:

(a) Can you find an example of a claim that is widely accepted as true and also has no justification for it? — Samuel Lacrampe

(b) Randomness means that nothing causes the change between scenarios 1 and 2, where in scenario 1, Cause A results in Effect B, and in scenario 2, Cause A results in Effect C. Randomness fails the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

(b) first off is more nonsense. Randomness has nothing to do with changing a scenario to a different one. Quantum mechanics (per ordinary CI) involves a state A (namely, the state of a wavefunction) sometimes leading to Effect B (a particular classical state) and sometimes to Effect C (a distinct classical state). Quantum indeterminacy treats this collapse of quantum states to classical ones as real. Bell's Theorem rules out that there's a classical fact of the matter that leads to Effect B as opposed to Effect C in conditions where the former happens, by demonstrating that if there were, you would wind up with constraints in probability distinct from the Born Rule probabilities, and showing by experiment that you actually get the BR ones. So QI in this sense is justified by induction and reasoning (which is not the condition of a, but still conflicts with b). You're trying to rule out that reasoning, by saying that by reasoning we appeal to some foundational principle of reason that rules it out. But there is no such thing in the reasoning that leads to QI. The entire argument is nothing but sophistry. If there were any meat to it, and any actual scientific consensus (such as the one you pretend to appeal to), then the scientific community would rule out quantum indeterminacy based on such principles.

It means that science cannot rule out non-empirical causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, that's nonsensical. I drop a rubber ball in a dark room. I hear it bounce off of the floor, then bounce again, and again. The time distance between each bounce is faster. I can infer that the ball is falling, bouncing, and going back up; each time, it's losing energy to heat and sound, causing it not to return to the original height, causing it to fall back down faster. I don't have a thermometer, and I don't see the ball. The ball bouncing in this case is theoretical, as is the explanation of what I hear; it's not empirical because it's not observed. The causes I attribute are theoretical and not empirical. There is a non-empirical cause inferred by the evidence supported theory, and that is an application of science. We can rule out the non-empirical cause of the sounds we hear that energy is just being lost, based on appeal to the scientific theory. This is proper use of the term "empirical". Your usage is kind of an abuse.

But now are you claiming that you know for a fact that non-physical things don't exist? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're lost again (and just flirting with the fallacy fallacy). Bell's Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out HVT's. You replied to this by some nonsense about how science cannot rule out "non-empirical causes" like it actually does in the simple example above. In your response you give "examples" of "non-empirical causes" like souls, free will, an objective values. So naturally, in context (were you not lost), you would be proposing that Bell's Theorem fails to rule out HVT's involving souls, free will, and objective values. But of course, you are indeed lost. Your fault, not mine; follow the threads back.

The whole objection about those quantum theories doesn't actually harm the original argument in the OP. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that's the entire basis of my objection. If you stop trying to wring blood out of this stone, I have the right to revise my entire stance, up to and including having no particular objections. However, this particular rephrasing of your premises is a bit weak. You seem to be saying now that everything deterministic is physical, unless it's at quantum scales, in which case it gets to be physical and not be deterministic. That... seems a bit fuzzy. It's a strange, contextual sense of physical, which doesn't quite seem like that's enough to save your argument. Pardon me, but out of curiosity, why exactly do you need the soul to be non-physical in the first place? What's wrong with a physical soul?

Mathematics includes many fields, not just equations with equals signs on them. But provability is not just an analog of justification, but an example of it. And it was justification that you claimed appeals to PoSR. — InPitzotl

Sure, provability is an example of justification; but not the only one. And one field of mathematics that is relevant to causality is statistics, which uses probability as a justification. In fact, most scientific hypotheses are validated with a probability (such as rejecting the null hypothesis), not a certainty.

The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not. So if there's a PoSR that science relies on that does rule this out, somebody forgot to inform scientists about it. — InPitzotl

If there were any meat to it, and any actual scientific consensus (such as the one you pretend to appeal to), then the scientific community would rule out quantum indeterminacy based on such principles. — InPitzotl

My understanding is that the reason why the QI theory is not universally accepted, and deemed incomplete by some, is precisely because the theory fails to satisfy our demand for a sufficient explanation. E.g. "God does not play dice", etc.

I drop a rubber ball in a dark room. [...] — InPitzotl

A requirement for empirical science is that the hypothesis brought forth must be empirically verifiable. Your hypothesis falls under this science because we can empirically verify it by turning on the light, or by using a night-vision camera, etc. On the other hand, if the hypothesis was not empirically verifiable, e.g. illusion caused by brain-in-a-vat, then it would not be considered scientific, but philosophical.

I can infer that the ball is falling, bouncing, and going back up; each time, it's losing energy to heat and sound, causing it not to return to the original height, causing it to fall back down faster. — InPitzotl

Let's examine this line of reasoning some more. You are here making an inference to the best explanation, aka abduction, which brings forth the simplest hypothesis that sufficiently explains all the data. This is correct scientific reasoning founded on the PoSR. If on the other hand, we dropped the PoSR and allowed the possibility that nothing causes the phenomenon observed, then this "no cause" hypothesis would be the simplest and thus most reasonable one to begin with; which would be absurd.

and just flirting with the fallacy fallacy — InPitzotl

To clarify, I am not claiming we should believe that non-physical things exist until given a reason to believe otherwise. But likewise, we shouldn't believe they don't exist as default. And if we remain agnostic on non-physical things but allow the possibility for their existence, then the absence of a physical cause in an event is not an effective argument against the PoSR.

Bell's Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out HVT's. — InPitzotl

Based on what I've read, the HVT is in reference to local hidden variables, which implies entities with a location property. And all entities that have a location property are physical, because physical properties such as location don't apply to non-physical entities.

Another similar reason is that measuring instruments, equipped with physical sensors, can only detect physical properties.

Pardon me, but out of curiosity, why exactly do you need the soul to be non-physical in the first place? What's wrong with a physical soul? — InPitzotl

Traditionally, what is referred to as the "soul" is that non-physical entity that survives the body after death. It is immortal because the passage of death is a physical event. If one were to prove the existence of a new physical thing and call it a soul, it would not match with what is traditionally referred to as the soul.

sounds like a mixture of one of the forms of pan-psychism and also to some extent scientific determinism. I don't have enough evidence for me to say your'e partial rejection of scientific determinism (~fate) is wrong.

Thats interesting.

This is why some New age people say all people have a chance to become gods. I don't believe thats true, however pan-psychism isn't entirely unbiblical. Spinoza and Plato both believe in Pan-psychism. Spinoza went against his Jewish faith when he accepted it. Jews i believe do accept pan-psychism to some extent.