Might it be better to think of belief as an explanation of behaviour? Therefore, that the individual holds the (stated) belief is an explanation of the tendency to act. — Luke

Yes. I think somewhere in all this most of the disparate opinions seem to still have a locus around the idea that a belief is related to a tendency to act, so referring to it as the explanation of that tendency seems like it might be uncontroversial.

For me, I prefer to use belief in the same way as say 'injury'. Having an 'injury' consists of the actual physical damage, not the description of it. In the terms you outlined above, having an injury might also explain some tendency to behave a certain way (limping, for example though of course one does not 'have an injury that..' ), but I can also locate the injury, I could even cut out the injury and take it somewhere, it's definitely a physical thing despite also being an explanation. This is how I see beliefs, they are physical structures, I could cut one out and remove it in the same way as an injury.

The reason for this is because in my academic work I had to take account of things like the effect of lesions on behaviour and talking about them affecting beliefs enabled this. We could theoretically create, modify or remove a belief by physical interference with the brain.

I understand, however, that such a definition is not going to be useful everywhere. What I object are efforts to somehow rule it out as incoherent or just wrong (not that I'm suggesting you're making such an argument, I'm just explaining my position).

we wouldn't say a tree believes it should grow toward the sun. — frank

Indeed. I think to capture the use of the term you have to limit it to features of (or linguistic representations of features of) a mind. Ramsey expresses beliefs as probabilities and I think that is essential. Probability requires prediction, which a tree can't do (I don't think they can anyway).

↪Sam26
I found jamalrob to be quite clear:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement.
— jamalrob

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else? — Luke

Ya, that statement is clear.

All he is saying, is that he believes, beliefs are statements. I'm saying, as you know, that beliefs can be reflected in non-linguistic ways. We don't need language to show what we believe, at least in terms of these very basic beliefs. Can you tell me how opening a door doesn't reflect a belief about doors, regardless of any statement. There are millions of things we do that reflect our beliefs apart from language. How does language even start without basic beliefs about the world around us?

Well I didn't say that every orientation is a belief.

Well I didn't say that every orientation is a belief. — jamalrob

What is special about the orientations that qualify as beliefs? What do they have that tree orientation doesn't?

You tell me, Socrates. If you're interested, have a think about it and let me know what you come up with. I reckon it could be an interesting avenue.

You tell me, Socrates. If you're interested, have a think about it and let me know what you come up with. I reckon it could be an interesting avenue. — jamalrob

Right.

Indeed. I think to capture the use of the term you have to limit it to features of (or linguistic representations of features of) a mind. Ramsey expresses beliefs as probabilities and I think that is essential. Probability requires prediction, which a tree can't do (I don't think they can anyway). — Isaac

Would this also work for unconscious beliefs?

Would this also work for unconscious beliefs? — frank

I think so, but it's difficult to prove. Experiments with conflicting sensory inputs seem to show that subconscious adjustments are still made on the basis of prediction (the actual experiment is quite complex so you might be best reading the paper directly if you don't want to just take my word for it). I don't think they're in any way conclusive, but together with some very successful models based on heirachical prediction, I think it's reasonable to assume that subconscious prediction is possible.

The problem is, if subconscious prediction is possible then computers can have beliefs, and some people don't like that.

We have to render both into statements to talk about them, but neither actually consist of the statement.

You seem to be saying that beliefs are necessarily a different kind of thing where the fact that we have to render them into statements carries some additional burden not applicable to physical laws or features. It's this step that I'm not understanding. — Isaac

This critique is spot on.

Elemental constituency is what matters here. Belief existed in it's entirety prior to being talked about. Prior to language. Thus... such belief cannot consist of language use. Being amenable to language use would bridge the gap and offer some sort of evolutionary explanation...

Correlations between different things is the best bridge I've been able to come up with.

Taking something to be the case...

The something is always a statement.

@Luke, @Isaac, and excellent discussion.

What I'm trying to draw a parallel between is the idea that a belief can actually be a certain arrangement of neural connections in the same way that a physical law or feature can actually be some arrangement of matter. We have to render both into statements to talk about them, but neither actually consist of the statement. — Isaac

"...can..." - my bolding.

It seems to me that in your neurological musings you want to make use of the word "belief" in such a way that it refers to a neural network and the activity it performs - or something like that.

Now that's fine, so long as it is clear that this is not the same as using it to refer to the way we take things to be - the folk definition of "belief", if you will.

That is, you can use "cow" to mean brick, but you can't build a house out of cows.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I would agree with saying your cat took that to be the case long ago, and am more than happy to expand upon that line of thought. The correlations were drawn at the time between it's own mental ongoings and the noticeable change in the surface; going from wobbly to solid.

Testing for a wobbly surface after being on one doesn't continue on for a very long time after the steadiness of the surface returns to normal(after the change back to solid). One does not check for a wobbly surface while learning how to walk. Testing for a wobbly surface always follows first being on one. One gains stability while traveling on foot while traveling on foot. When one suddenly realizes that the ground has moved, one begins an involuntary balancing act. Uncertainty and discontent make up part of it. We humans do balancing acts intentionally. We create the conditions necessary for performing one. Cats do not.

Cats draw correlations between the moving ground and it's effect/affect upon them. That effect/affect is completely involuntary. Cats draw connections between the uncertainty and fear and the wobbly ground. They test. Only when the ground stops moving under their feet, can they go on their way and no longer think about it.

Hence, I would agree with saying that your cat may have taken that to be the case long ago...

This time however...

The cat did not approach the surface about to be walked upon with a clearly recognizable and undeniable apprehension regarding the trustworthiness of the floor. The cat did not test the surface for sturdiness. The cat did not use a single front paw in a manner which undeniably shows it's own apprehension/reservedness/hesitance/caution/distrust/discontent regarding the steadiness, dependability, reliability, sturdiness, and/or wobbliness of the floor. The cat showed no signs whatsoever that it was paying attention to the floor.

What sense does it then make for us to say that the cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, while the cat's not even paying attention to the floor? That is to say that it is taking something to be the case while not paying it any attention.

Add a timeline, and there's no problem I can see aside from saying that the cat's belief is statable. That I'm still mulling over...

Hence... my agreement proposal at the beginning of this post.

Now that's fine, so long as it is clear that this is not the same as using it to refer to the way we take things to be - the folk definition of "belief", if you will. — Banno

OK, but aren't we (the rest if us here) discussing exactly what is meant by 'belief'? Doesn't that very discussion undermine the idea of some clear folk definition from which any other use of the term would be an aberration? I think you perhaps ask too much of language in expecting there to be some use of 'belief' which is a) consistent and b) coherent between uses.

All the term has to do is get the listener to act in the way using it was supposed to do. If I say "I believe you're lying" I expect you to either take offence, admit it, perhaps be less confident about your proposition...some collection of possibilities like that. So long as something like that happens I've used the word successfully. It doesn't have to refer to anything, unless I wanted to you attend to some object by my using it.

So analysis what a term refers to but sticking religiously to all folk uses seems like a search for unicorns.

Nonetheless, I get that a definition such as the one I might use in some specific sub-section of academic work will not be applicable to a sentence like "I have a belief that...". You can't say "I have a [neurological architecture] that..." because what follows is a linguistic statement (describing the state of affairs one act as if were the case), not the actual tendency to act as if. We'd have to say "I have a neurological architecture which causes me to act as if..." before the same statement can follow, which does not have quite the same meaning.

So I understand what you mean when you say that a belief is the (imagined) state of affairs one takes to be the case. But to a physicalist, that definition falls short because we then want to know where such a thing is. Without positing a domain of thought (and I sincerely hope you're not suggesting we do that), we need to know where such a state of affairs is, what does and imagined state of affairs consist of, physically. It's not in the real world outside of our minds - it's not the actual arrangement of such, otherwise beliefs could not be wrong. So what are we physically talking about when we say "an imagined state of affairs"? My answer is a particular arrangement of neural connections, hence that's what a belief is, physically. A belief is 'the imagined state of affairs one acts as if were the case' and all 'imagined states of affairs' are particular neural arrangements in a capable brain. The alternative is dualism.

So to

you can use "cow" to mean brick, but you can't build a house out of cows. — Banno

Really? This is the most important point. I understand the rhetorical flourish, but are we really talking about cows and bricks here? In what cases does referring to beliefs as the physical neural architecture cause anything more than a trivial grammatical stumble compared to talking about them as states of affairs? I think this really comes down to the comments you made which are far more objectionable to me than the insistence on the actual referent for the word 'belief'. Your assertion that there is not even a neurological correlate for beliefs. That the taking of some state of affairs to be the case does not have a neurological correlate at all. If you really believe that then I can see how you think we might be talking about cows and bricks, but if you really believe that then you are either manifestly wrong or your fundamental view of the world is so non-physicalist that we will struggle to communicate, you might as well be talking about fairy dust.

All behaviour is initiated by neurological signals (not necessarily in the brain, mind), for all behaviour which has an expectation (acting as if...) that expectation has to modulate behaviour and the only way that can be done is by other neurological signals. thus any expectation that is actually modulating behaviour is coded somehow in neurological signals.

It's this, I think that best answers @Sam26's question, which is why I brought it up in the first place. If one takes a belief to simply be the state of affairs one acts as if were the case then one's ontology (am I using that right?) becomes overwhelmed with every negative belief. I'm currently acting as if a nuclear bomb is not about to drop on my head, so is that a belief of mine? Do I really have, as a belief, the negation of every single possible state of affairs (except the one I take to be the case) because I'm acting as if they were not the case? That seems inordinately messy to me. Looked at neurologically, however, the problem dissolves. The things I have as a belief are those which do, in reality, modulate my behaviour. any state of affairs which is not physically modulating my behaviour is not a belief I have. adding in the reality of what is happening in the brain (or at least our best guess - it's not an exact science) is the only robust way I can see of pruning the otherwise infinite set of things I apparently 'believe' by negation.

Cats draw correlations between the moving ground and it's effect/affect upon them. That effect/affect is completely involuntary. Cats draw connections between the uncertainty and fear and the wobbly ground. They test. Only when the ground stops moving under their feet, can they go on their way and no longer think about it. — creativesoul

And here is a good example (skip to 0:52 or when the treadmill is turned or 1:08 when the cat starts testing the moving surface with its paw). We see the cat adjust to the treadmill over several attempts. A DL network would require a huge training set.



And then around 3:55, the cat jumps onto the control panel and pulls the plug on the treadmill, after which it jumps down and lays on the treadmill while licking itself.

So I understand what you mean when you say that a belief is the (imagined) state of affairs one takes to be the case. But to a physicalist, that definition falls short because we then want to know where such a thing is. Without positing a domain of thought (and I sincerely hope you're not suggesting we do that), we need to know where such a state of affairs is, what does and imagined state of affairs consist of, physically. It's not in the real world outside of our minds - it's not the actual arrangement of such, otherwise beliefs could not be wrong. So what are we physically talking about when we say "an imagined state of affairs"? My answer is a particular arrangement of neural connections, hence that's what a belief is, physically. A belief is 'the imagined state of affairs one acts as if were the case' and all 'imagined states of affairs' are particular neural arrangements in a capable brain. The alternative is dualism. — Isaac

That's not the only alternative.

The correlations were drawn at the time between it's own mental ongoings and the noticeable change in the surface; going from wobbly to solid. — creativesoul

What correlations do you mean here - are they important to your point?

What sense does it then make for us to say that the cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, while the cat's not even paying attention to the floor? That is to say that it is taking something to be the case while not paying it any attention. — creativesoul

You seem to think this is an important point, but I don't see how. The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor.

Are you now suggesting some extra rule for belief that involves attention? If so, set it out. I suspect such an approach would be fraught with issues.

I'm happy for you to use "belief" in any way you like. I'm just pointing out that using it to mean what is take as true is not the same as using it to mean a neural network and the activity it performs.

Nor would I want to argue against physicalism. Further I do not see any incompatibility between what I have said and physicalism. If you are able to link neural events to certain beliefs, then good for you.

But I still think beliefs are not neural events.

The cow/brick metaphor doesn't work for you - perhaps cows and bricks are too similar. Let's try cows and assets. You have a cow that is an asset. I'm pointing out that not all cows are assets, and not all assets are cows.

So for some purposes it does make perfect sense to talk of cows using the term "asset". But not for all.

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

Indeed. And such a person would be forced to admit that taking something to be the case does not always require thinking about what is being taken to be the case.

You are ok with that?

:brow:

What correlations do you mean here - are they important to your point? — Banno

I'm not so much as making a point at this time... I'm more involved with trying to understand what each participant here has been saying.

Yep.

Are you assuring me that you are ok with the consequences I've just set out?

I thought that could easily have counted as a reductio ad absurdum. I'm surprised. I will be even more so if you are still ok with those consequences tomorrow.

Hope you are well... beyond the procedure.

:smile:

Apparently I'm suffering a hangover from the anaesthetic, 'cause I don't see a reductio there...

:rofl:

An individual can take it to be the case that the floor is solid without thinking about the floor.

That follows from your claims.

Are you ok with that?

Since it seems that you're advocating a physicalist account of belief.

What role does the tree play in an individual's belief about the tree? The tree is an irrevocable elemental constituent of all belief about trees according to the position I'm advocating for/from. It's one of the elements within the correlation itself. Trees are one part of the correlations drawn between them and other things. Without trees, there can be no belief about them.

For example, belief that a tree has green leaves requires nothing more, and nothing less, than learning how to pick out trees by name, and learning how to pick out the detectable light reflected into our eyes - from trees - also by learning conventional naming and descriptive practices. We pick trees out as well as their color by virtue of learning how to talk about trees and their color, and in doing so, we take it to be the case that trees are green.

That last bit's just for you

Maybe this helps???

One cannot take it to be the case that leaves are green without thinking about the color of the leaves.

Yet, it seems your position forces any and all adherents to admit/assent to such. Lest, we would arrive at self-contradiction, incoherence, or an equivocation of terms.

Right?

:brow:

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

That's what I'm attempted to unpack... or targeting.

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

The cat does not pay attention to what it's taking to be the case.

That's a problem, isn't it?

Taking it to be the case that the floor is solid requires paying attention to the floor.