"Taking to be the case" does not seem to me to need include "giving one's attention to"...

The question at hand, then, is does "A believes p" imply "A has given some attention to p".

Off you go...

Add the timeline first suggested and all remains well.

Either a language less creature's belief does not have propositional content or propositions somehow exist prior to language use.

I chose the former long ago.

Language less belief is chock full of meaning, and yet devoid of all propositional content.

Or...

Not all belief is meaningful and/or propositional content exists in it's entirety prior to language use.

"Taking to be the case" does not seem to me to need include "giving one's attention to"... — Banno

An elucidation upon the earlier "off you go" comment...



I thought we were taking account of your cat's belief; what your cat takes to be the case regarding the solidity of the floor. That does not include language use... that's for sure. Yet that's your focus?

I'm stumped and tired...

:meh:

My apologies if needed.

The cow/brick metaphor doesn't work for you - perhaps cows and bricks are too similar. Let's try cows and assets. You have a cow that is an asset. I'm pointing out that not all cows are assets, and not all assets are cows.

So for some purposes it does make perfect sense to talk of cows using the term "asset". But not for all. — Banno

No, you're asserting that not all cows are assets. I'm asking you for some evidence or line of reasoning to back up that assertion. You're saying that not all beliefs can be thought of as their equivalent neural architecture (not all cows can be thought of as assets). This is true of cows and assets because there are some cows which are not owned by anyone and as such cannot represent an asset, which must be owned in some sense. Now I want a similar argument for beliefs and neural architecture. Why (and how) can some beliefs exist, but be impossible to think of in terms of neural architecture?

How does the cat (a biological entity - if we're being physicalist) 'take the floor to be solid' without doing so using it's brain in some representative way? I'm not seeing what route you'd like to take here.

If you want to say the solidity of the floor is not represented in its brain you are just flat out wrong about that. Models of the solidity, consistency and constancy of objects are not only located in the brain but we've a very good idea exactly where they are and how they work.

If you want to say the cat applies some general model but does not have a neural representation of this exact bit of floor then again you are just factually wrong about that. We know from scans of savant memory vs normal memory that individuation of environmental models does occur (it's just that non-savants filter it out early on). The cat certainly registers and models that exact piece of floor, even if it's not looking at it.

To continue with your metaphor - I can see, and entirely agree, that it sometimes makes sense to talk of a cow as an asset and sometimes it doesn't, the accountant wants to hear of it as an asset, the veterinarian doesn't. But there the similarity with beliefs and neural architecture ends. For what is true of cows and assets (that some cows aren't assets at all, in any sense) is not true of beliefs and neural architecture. All beliefs which directly influence behaviour can be talked about in terms of their neural architecture, there aren't any exceptions.

The only way out I can see is to include, in the set of beliefs, all negative beliefs. That because I walk without a crash helmet, home from work, I must therefore 'believe' that I am not in the path of a flying object, that I'm not going to be mind-melded by aliens using their remote mind-intervention rays, that I'm not going to be targeted by psychic attack from Russian agents trained in telepathy...

If you seriously want to make the claim that I 'believe' all these things, then I agree that these beliefs do not have neural correlates (they have the absence of neural architecture to that effect). But if so then I cannot see where you're going with such a model.

you're asserting that not all cows are assets. I'm asking you for some evidence or line of reasoning to back up that assertion. — Isaac

Mad cows...

If you want to say the solidity of the floor is not represented in its brain you are just flat out wrong about that. — Isaac

I would say that. Does the above hold true regardless?

Stolen cows...

What role does the tree play in an individual's belief about the tree? The tree is an irrevocable elemental constituent of all belief about trees according to the position I'm advocating for/from. It's one of the elements within the correlation itself. Trees are one part of the correlations drawn between them and other things. Without trees, there can be no belief about them. — creativesoul

The tree is itself a belief about the unity of branches, roots leaves and the disunity of insects, pathogens, bacteria soils, water, gases, nutrients etc (without which the 'tree' would cease to exist). It is a unit that has been created by a belief about how the world is structured. Why are the cells constituting the Xylem part of 'the tree', but the water they carry not? Why, when we look closely at the microscopic fibres of the roots which meet soil water at a molecular scale do we decide the tree ends and the soil water begins. Why are the Mycorrhiza inextricably fused to the cells of the tree's roots not part of the tree, but the fungal cells fused to the algae are part of the Lichen?

I don't know if that's the sort of thing you were asking, but the role 'the tree' plays is as a placeholder of sets of beliefs, but it's no less a belief itself than those which are 'about it'.

The tree is itself a belief... — Isaac

I'm done here. Thanks.

:kiss:

I would say that. Does the above hold true regardless? — creativesoul

Well, within the F5 region of the motor sensory area in the cerebral cortex there are 85 neural clusters which code for hands and feet responding in different ways to different shapes and densities of the surface they are about to contact with. Disrupting these areas causes the hands (or feet) of monkeys to treat the surface they are about to interact with as if it were of uncertain shape or density. With these regions acting normally, the hands or feet responded to the surface as if it were the shape and density it actually was.

In another study, the visual pathways feeding these areas were tested for attentional variation (to make sure that something different was not going on related to variability in attention) They found that in both 2D and 3D object representations, there was no statistically significant variance in signal between attentional and non-attentional conditions (though slightly more difference in the 2D experiments, which may show 2D images have less significance to the motor regions).

Either way, if you wanted to present an argument that the tendency to treat the floor as if it were solid was not represented somehow in the brain of the animal, you'd have to provide an alternative explanation for the effect of changes to the F5 region in treatment of object shape and density.

This is highly speculative stuff, none of this is set in stone so I think most neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists are open to suggestions. What I'm not sure is so helpful are bare assertions which don't address the evidence we have spent decades painstakingly acquiring.

Our language is made up of many kinds of beliefs that can be called foundational or even bedrock, but not all foundational beliefs have the same structural significance. For example, what's foundational to a chess game (the pieces, the board, and the rules) doesn't have the same significance in our life as the bedrock belief "This is my hand." In terms of structure (as in a building) "This is my hand," is a bedrock belief/proposition, i.e., it's structurally more significant than what's foundational to a game of chess — Sam26

I may be completely off the mark here but you seem to be surprised by how "foundational" beliefs differ with domain and that some of them are, in your words, "structurally more significant". Could it be, is it possible, that you're under the spell of, in a Wittgensteinian sense bewitched by, language?

I may be completely off the mark here but you seem to be surprised by how "foundational" beliefs differ with domain and that some of them are, in your words, "structurally more significant". Could it be, is it possible, that you're under the spell of, in a Wittgensteinian sense bewitched by, language? — TheMadFool

Well, if it is the case, then one would have to show how it is the case. Many things are possible, but that does not give us reason to suppose they are true. If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar.

I do think I am correct about my hypothesis, but of course I could be completely off the rails. I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on.

Perhaps the cause of your fascination is just a case of loose terminology in the sense that what you think are "foundational" are in fact not.

if you wanted to present an argument that the tendency to treat the floor as if it were solid was not represented somehow in the brain of the animal, you'd have to provide an alternative explanation for the effect of changes to the F5 region in treatment of object shape and density. — Isaac

There is no doubt to me that there are certain physiological structures, including but not limited to brain parts, that are required in order for the ability for certain thought and belief to form. However, I'm not at all fond of the underlying suppositions that seem to ground your explanations...

To be clear...

It seems that what you've offered here works from the basic assumption that we cannot directly perceive stuff... to put it roughly. Would you agree with the idea that all we have to work with is our perception of reality... our perception(representation, if you like) of the tree. That seems to be underwriting your position.

Am I mistaken about that?

I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on. — Sam26

Indeed, you are not.

If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar. — Sam26

Hey Sam! Sorry about temporarily hijacking your thread, my friend. Hope this finds you well.

:smile:

It seems to me that you may be glossing over something that is of utmost importance. You talk about the nature of belief, but then go on to focus upon the different senses of the term.

The classic roadblock ending in comments about definitions, and being true by definition, etc. A rabbithole most of the time. However, if we are judicious about decision regarding how to use the term, we must realize that we are picking something out of this world that exists in it's entirety prior to language. That has to be kept in mind. I find it most helpful to do a bit of philosophical reasoning and/or critical thinking here, and let that guide the methodological approach.

Some common sense...

If there is such a thing as prelinguistic belief then it exists in it's entirety prior to language use. That which exists in it's entirety prior to language use, is not existentially dependent upon language in any way shape or form whatsoever. Whatever such belief consists of, we can be absolutely certain that language is not a part of it's elemental constituency. Such belief cannot have propositional content unless propositional content also exists in it's entirety prior to language use(unless propositions are not existentially dependent upon language). That would be to claim that propositions exist prior to language use... somehow.

For some reason, there are a number(the majority perhaps???) of professional philosophers who take that to be the case. I've seen it asserted that propositions somehow carry meaning... meaning transcends the user via propositions, or some such. That's not too far off, but it is far enough to be wrong.

It shows that an inherent misconception and/or gross misunderstanding of how meaning emerges onto the world stage is at work. That's no surprise to me though, the historical discourse about meaning is fraught, to say the least. That continues to this day. One of a few banes of philosophy.

So, if non linguistic belief does not consist of propositions or statements what could it possibly consist of that would allow it's evolution over time to include predication, statements, and/or propositions?

This combination of things must somehow provide the creature the ability to presuppose correspondence with what's happening/happened and it must be meaningful to the believing creature.

All that without the need for the creature to be a language user.

Does this make sense to you?

It requires that meaning exist in it's entirety prior to language.As it stands, the only notion I'm aware of is one that conflates meaning and causality. They are closely related, particularly in the context of both being imperative for pre linguistic belief. One of the most rudimentary beliefs I can think of is the attribution/recognition of causality. The fire example.

Anyway...

Can we get somewhere new this time around? I've found a bridge, sort of, between Banno's position and my own. But I'm not sure if he's going to agree with the suggestion about adding a timeline to his report of his cat taking it to be the case that the floor is solid.

We'll see.

:wink:

You're saying that not all beliefs can be thought of as their equivalent neural architecture — Isaac

I mentioned before that there seems to me that there is something a bit unfair in sugesting that I ought produce empirical evidence. Look at what you just quoted - and flip it to what you might be arguing - is it that you wish to argue that every belief can be thought of as equivalent to some neural architecture?

Because that's a hair's breadth away from the all-and-some proposition that for every belief there is some equivalent neural architecture.

In virtue of their logical structure, such propositions are neither provable nor disprovable.

How does the cat (a biological entity - if we're being physicalist) 'take the floor to be solid' without doing so using it's brain in some representative way? I'm not seeing what route you'd like to take here. — Isaac

Again, that's unfair. Of course there is some neurological explanation for the cat's behaviour. What I am objecting to is your calling that neurological explanation, in every case, a belief.

edit:

All beliefs which directly influence behaviour can be talked about in terms of their neural architecture, there aren't any exceptions. — Isaac

We should note the new caveat "which directly influence behaviour". So if there were beliefs that did not directly influence behaviour...? Then, there would be beliefs that are not the equivalent of some neurological architecture... which was to be proved.

If you want to say the solidity of the floor is not represented in its brain you are just flat out wrong about that. Models of the solidity, consistency and constancy of objects are not only located in the brain but we've a very good idea exactly where they are and how they work. — Isaac

If you are going to appeal to an authority you had best reference it. My suspicion is that the solidity, consistency and constancy of objects is in their manipulation, which fits nicely with what I have said.


Edit:

Well, within the F5 region of the motor sensory area in the cerebral cortex there are 85 neural clusters which code for hands and feet responding in different ways to different shapes and densities of the surface they are about to contact with. Disrupting these areas causes the hands (or feet) of monkeys to treat the surface they are about to interact with as if it were of uncertain shape or density. With these regions acting normally, the hands or feet responded to the surface as if it were the shape and density it actually was. — Isaac

Ah, is that it? Yes, the monkey treats the surface uncertainly - he appears to have lost his belief in solidity! Has he lost his belief that this surface is solid, or has he lost his belief that any surface is solid? OR have you just "deleted" the concept of solidity....? There's a bit more to be done until you can lay claim to these particular neurones being the very belief that this ball is solid! But this is impressive stuff; no need to overstate your case so!

But, poor monkey!

I'm impressed how you're arguing for the idea that all belief has propositional content without using the terms... until you invoked logical accounting practices and "p"....

The only way out I can see is to include, in the set of beliefs, all negative beliefs. That because I walk without a crash helmet, home from work, I must therefore 'believe' that I am not in the path of a flying object, that I'm not going to be mind-melded by aliens using their remote mind-intervention rays, that I'm not going to be targeted by psychic attack from Russian agents trained in telepathy... — Isaac

No need to go to such extremes. I suspect that you believe that my house has a front door, and yet had not given that belief any consideration until just now. Your belief concerning my front door would be based on certain considerations from your previous experience, and indeed, one would consider it odd, and perhaps in some need of explanation, for a house not to have a front door.

Now you might be tempted to argue that such a claim is not a belief; that beliefs need to be somehow given attention (@creativesoul seems to have something like this in the back of his mind...) or that all beliefs must relate to behaviour. I'd read this as an ad hoc repair to a broken explanation, and draw your attention to the book that is our main text in this thread.

all belief has propositional content — creativesoul

IF you doubt this, you should be able to give an example of a belief that is not a belief that such-and-such is the case.

@Isaac, it seems to me that our differences are small. You seem to think that what I have argued somehow contradicts the excellent work done in recent years in neuroscience. I don't agree that it does anything of the sort. If belief plays some central role in neuroscience, then so be it; its just that the word is being used differently in neuroscience to how it is being used in, say, On Certainty.

What might be philosophically interesting is the extent to which a belief must be held positively... perhaps a new thread.

Yeah, there seems to be an incipient idealism in some of what @Isaac says.

IF you doubt this(all belief has propositional content), you should be able to give an example of a belief that is not a belief that such-and-such is the case. — Banno

All language less belief is not.

I'm taking it to be the case that I understand you. However, according to you, I need not pay attention to your words in order to do so.

Now do you see the problem?

...there seems to be an incipient idealism in some of what Isaac says. — Banno

I'm reminded of apo... but noticeably nicer. Brainpharte comes to mind as well.