We really should move all this off @Sam26's thread.

What might be philosophically interesting is the extent to which a belief must be held positively... perhaps a new thread. — Banno

Why new?

You've already done the work.

:wink:

Which, see.

We really should move all this off Sam26's thread. — Banno

Sam is one of the most patient and kind people I have come across while on forums such as this one. He's interested in basic bedrock belief, of both the linguistic and non linguistic variety. If we tie it in we'll be fine.

:smile:

Bedrock belief of the linguistic variety are those which somehow offer ground for others. These can be well reasoned or not. Some of these need no justification because they are the very pieces needed in order to play the language game.

I'm still struggling to understand what motivated Witt to advocate the idea that all knowledge needed to be dubitable.

"This is a hand" is a perfect example of a bedrock belief capable of lending support to each and every subsequent claim about hands. If you doubt that that claim is true, it is only because you do not know the language. For everyone and anyone who speaks the language, there can be no doubt. Each and every proposition about hands rests it's laurels upon it. Each and every subsequent assertion about hands hinges upon knowing what hands are called.

Moore knows/knew that what he was showing is/was a hand. He also knew that "this is a hand" - when accompanied with his gesturing - was true. He was showing someone how to teach another how to talk about hands(what the word "hand" can refer to). He was stating the obvious for those of us who know how to talk about our hands.

If @creativesoul and @Sam26 said "unexpressed" instead of "prelinguistic", I'd be quieted.

284. People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bones etc.etc . for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not. By this I naturally do not want to say that men should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.

285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.

I just do not see that these support the invention of a special category of beliefs that would be entitled to the label "prelinguistic" or "nonlinguistic".

:ok:

I'm still struggling to understand what motivated Witt to advocate the idea that all knowledge needed to be dubitable. — creativesoul

Justified true belief.

285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.

I just do not see that these support the invention of a special category of beliefs that would be entitled to the label "prelinguistic" or "nonlinguistic" — Banno

I'm inclined to agree. I think Sam would be ok with that as well. He's already expressed as much. Earlier he mentioned not following Witt's reasoning about everything.

So...

Grant his consideration about language users...

Apply it to language less creatures...

Can we say the same thing about a language less creature's belief that we say about our own, when looking for something?

I'm still struggling to understand what motivated Witt to advocate the idea that all knowledge needed to be dubitable.
— creativesoul

Justified true belief. — Banno

Touching fire causes pain. Touching fire provides the strongest possible justificatory ground for believing the fire caused the pain.

No one who has ever been burnt by flame could possibly doubt that touching fire causes pain or that "touching fire causes pain" is true aside from all those creatures capable of touching fire and drawing a correlation between the act and the ensuing pain, but utterly incapable of talking about it.

Unexpressed...

Non linguistic...

Not propositional in content...

The attribution/recognition of causality does not require language. It does count as belief.

, @Isaac, @Sam26 See, what has happened is that a language game developed in which we differentiated between what is the case and what we thought was the case - a game that perhaps came from our noticing on occasions that these were not always the same, that we were sometimes mistaken.

We differentiated between it being true that such-and-such and it being believed that such-and-such.

Time passed, folk talked about beliefs as if they were things we had - Sam's belief that such-and-such. We talk about how a belief is passed on, groundbreaking, novel. We reified them.

Then Ludwig notices that if someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there, without saying so.

And Sam and Creo start to talk about them being nonlinguistic.

And Isaac says not only are they nonlinguistic, they are all of them just neural networks of some sort.

And Banno says don't come the raw prawn with me.

It's the drive for evolutionary amenability!

:wink:

Tired. Hungry.

Shoots!

Compare and contrast Belief with true


But see were-o- and leubh-

One desires one's beliefs to be verified...

I mentioned before that there seems to me that there is something a bit unfair in sugesting that I ought produce empirical evidence. Look at what you just quoted - and flip it to what you might be arguing - is it that you wish to argue that every belief can be thought of as equivalent to some neural architecture?

Because that's a hair's breadth away from the all-and-some proposition that for every belief there is some equivalent neural architecture.

In virtue of their logical structure, such propositions are neither provable nor disprovable. — Banno

I'm not well versed in things like logical structure, you might have to explain this in a bit more depth. As far as I can tell if you supplied a belief for which I could not provide you with a neurological pathway that is the equivalent of it (produces the same behaviour), wouldn't that be proof? So far you've talked about cats and object solidity and I've outlined (very briefly) the neurological architecture which is the equivalent of this belief. Is there some particular belief you have in mind that you're thinking doesn't have a neurological correspondence?

What I am objecting to is your calling that neurological explanation, in every case, a belief. — Banno

Yep, I hear you. I think we can perhaps shelve that particular part of the disagreement. You think there is a value in distinguishing some neurological architectures which facilitate certain behaviour as corresponding to (some) beliefs, but other neurological structures which (to me) seem to do the same thing, you think are not best thought of as corresponding to a belief. This seems really about the utility of the label which, I'm sure we can both agree, is context dependant. Let's focus on the meat of the disagreement which is that some beliefs do not have neurological equivalents. The opposite (that some neurological behaviour-related pathways might not be called 'beliefs') seems trivial by comparison - unless you think it important that they're literally never referred to that way.

So if there were beliefs that did not directly influence behaviour...? — Banno

What would be an example of such a belief? This may well hinge upon what we each mean by belief. I take it to mean 'a tendency to act as if...'. I have a belief that the pub is at the end of the road means I have a tendency to act as if the pub were at the end of the road. My cat believes the floor is solid mean my cat has a tendency to act as if the floor were solid. By this definition, there could not be a belief which did not influence behaviour. You've used the term 'taking something to be the case', which seems to me basically the roughly same idea, but perhaps yours includes expectation in a way mine doesn't, is that it? Are you saying we can expect things to be the case without ever yet behaving as if they were? If so we've got a whole other are of cognitive processes to go into if you want to find me an example of a belief (in this sense) which doesn't have a neurological equivalent.

If you are going to appeal to an authority you had best reference it. — Banno

You're right, but I'm afraid it's a paper copy only (not a free journal). It's in 'Experimental Brain Research' 1988 vol71 p491-507 and was conducted by Giacomo Rizzolatti.

Has he lost his belief that this surface is solid, or has he lost his belief that any surface is solid? OR have you just "deleted" the concept of solidity....? — Banno

As I said to CS, this is speculative, so there's no hard and fast answer, I just dislike it when things are dismissed summarily as being or not being the case when diligent and painstaking work is actually being undertaken to try and find out. With regards the experimental data I'm aware of (by no means all there is), it is that they have lost the connection between the identification of the object and the motor movements they believe (my definition) are appropriate in response to that object. I don't know that I'm doing a very good job of explaining it, but I'm trying not to turn every post into a cognitive psychology textbook. Yet you, quite reasonably, want firm evidence, so it's difficult. In a few words - there are two pathways visual perception takes, one deals with (among other things) object recognition, the other deals with (among other things) sensorimotor responses. There's a crucial communication between the two as the bit dealing with sensorimotor responses doesn't distinguish objects in memory and so can't predict or manipulate them in 3D in the mind. When you disrupt either pathway the relevant skill is lost, if you disrupt the connection, the wrong sensorimotor responses are applied to the object of perception. To me, that parses as the fact that the monkey has lost it's belief that this object (the one recognised by the ventral pathway), has this physical response (can support my weight - is solid, for example). The monkey has lost it's belief that this floor (the one it's currently looking at and recognising as a floor) is solid (can be walked on in an normal manner).

But, poor monkey! — Banno

Indeed. There is also a study of a poor woman who had part of this happen to her naturally as a consequence of brain lesions!

I suspect that you believe that my house has a front door, and yet had not given that belief any consideration until just now. — Banno

Then in what way would I have such a belief? Are you perhaps saying that because I would picture your house with a front door, I have that belief, even though I haven't yet actually pictured it thus (until you mentioned it)? Doesn't this turn the ascribing of beliefs into a sort of guessing game?

Notwithstanding that issue, even if we were to accept this future-possible behaviour as indication of a belief, isn't that tendency still caused by the state of my neural architecture? Isn't the belief that your house has a front door simply subsumed in the belief that all houses (without prior evidence to the contrary) have front doors. As things stand {Banno's House} is just an example from {all houses without any prior evidence of front-door-lessness}. It seems strange to say I have a belief about your house in favour of saying I would have a belief about your house if I thought about it.

Isn't all this just recognising that words are used in language games? The original doesn't have any greater claim to authenticity does it?

'Believe' in some language games means 'as opposed to know', but in others it means, 'has a tendency to act as if'.

This is usually well within our grasp to handle (by which I mean 'grasp' as in 'attainable', and 'handle' as in 'deal competently with'. Not 'grasp' as in 'hold with the hand' and 'handle' as in 'thing that allows the opening of a door'.)

Would you agree with the idea that all we have to work with is our perception of reality... our perception(representation, if you like) of the tree. That seems to be underwriting your position.

Am I mistaken about that? — creativesoul

Not if I've understood you correctly, no. That is basically what I take to be the case. But if discussion of the neurological correlates of belief might be off-topic, then discussion of different approaches to realism certainly is. All this has been laid out in other threads and whilst I don't mind repeating it at all (you never know when something new might turn up) I really don't think here is the right place to do so.

you might have to explain this in a bit more depth. — Isaac

I wonder if we might also go over some related objections - Davidson, as well as Watkins. Perhaps until Sam raises an objection to our being off topic...

John Watkins addresses all-and-some; I think it's in Science and Skepticism, characterising them as an existential quantification inside a universal quantification.

An existential statement can be verified: "There is at least one black cat" is verified by presenting a black cat. But it cannot be falsified - my not having a cat to hand does not show that there are no black cats.

A universal statement on the other hand can be falsified, but not verified. "All cats are black" is shown false by presenting a non-black cat; but looking around and not finding a non-black cat does not mean that there are none, unless you look everywhere.

Now if you put one in the scope of the other, you get something that is neither provable nor disprovable. So "for every mad cat lady there is at least one black cat" - You can't falsify this, because there might always be a black cat somewhere you haven't looked. And you can't prove it either - there might always be a mad cat lady somewhere unknown to you, for whom there is no black cat.

Not good examples, and plenty more could be said. They are oft found in the company of conspiracies.

But to our case, the assertion that for every belief there exists some neural equivalent is in that class. If you say "here is a belief for which there is no neural equivalent", I might reply that there is, it's just that we haven't found it yet. So the proposal is not falsifiable. And yet it is also not provable, because one cannot provide an exhaustive list of beliefs.

All of this, just to make the point that it is unfair to ask that I provide empirical examples of beliefs for which there are no neural equivalent.

I doubt it was worth it.

So if there were beliefs that did not directly influence behaviour...?
— Banno

What would be an example of such a belief? This may well hinge upon what we each mean by belief. I take it to mean 'a tendency to act as if...'. — Isaac

...while for others, myself included, it is "To take it as true that...".

Ant there's the rub. And in the end if you are going to use the word one way, you can't come back and tell those who use it differently that they are wrong. That is one can't come back and say that one's neurological version of belief captures all there is to do with belief, if one is first restricting "belief" only to neurology.


Edit:

Isn't all this just recognising that words are used in language games? The original doesn't have any greater claim to authenticity does it? — Isaac

Well, yes. With an remonstration to be clear about which game you are playing.

But to our case, the assertion that for every belief there exists some neural equivalent is in that class. If you say "here is a belief for which there is no neural equivalent", I might reply that there is, it's just that we haven't found it yet. So the proposal is not falsifiable. And yet it is also not provable, because one cannot provide an exhaustive list of beliefs. — Banno

I'm sorry if I'm being slow, but I'm still not following you.

"If you say "here is a belief for which there is no neural equivalent", I might reply that there is, it's just that we haven't found it yet "

- True, but not what's happening here. I'm not trying to argue simply that there might be neurological architecture corresponding to certain beliefs, I'm trying to understand what has made you so convinced that there isn't (remember you didn't say any of what you said conditionally, yours were absolute statements about what could and could not be the case).

if you are going to use the word one way, you can't come back and tell those who use it differently that they are wrong. — Banno

This is quite disingenuous. Look back over our exchange...

I think it goes without saying - despite my having to say it - that there is no particular neural network that in some sense corresponds to or represents my cat's taking it that the floor is solid. — Banno

...is where I first objected. Before that, the most I had said was that a belief can be thought of as a neural network. I didn't declare that beliefs should be thought of as neural networks and then tell anyone using it differently that they are wrong.

Now look at the nature of the statements I've been responding to...

That he takes it to be the case that the floor is solid is not something that is represented in a part of my cat's brain. — Banno

A belief is not an item of mental furniture. — Banno

No! A belief is not a mental state. — Banno

I'm struggling to see me saying that beliefs can be thought of as neural networks (and arguing against statements that they cannot) as being "us[ing] the word one way, [and] come[ing] back and tell those who use it differently that they are wrong.". Yet somehow to read your comments above as being examples of some different approach which I should try to emulate.

How are you not doing exactly what you said shouldn't be done? You're using 'belief a certain way (where it does not have neural correlates) and telling everyone who uses it differently (or more specifically just those who use it the way I do) that they're wrong.

Maybe tomorrow.

You can keep using this thread, I really don't have much more to say.

if you are going to use the word one way, you can't come back and tell those who use it differently that they are wrong.
— Banno

This is quite disingenuous. Look back over our exchange... — Isaac

I do not think that that was a veiled charge towards you... personally. "You" was a hypothetical. Replace "you" with "one"...

Banno is right to bring this to light. You, I, and he are all using "belief" in our own respective ways.

He has been consistent. The quotes you focused upon show that. He also clearly acknowledged and 'granted' your use... which is different than his and mine, without saying you or your use was wrong...

I am much more prone to say that about both of your notions of belief... but haven't here!

:wink:

Cheers.

I'm now unsure of your understanding of nonlinguistic beliefs - and since you are my go-to person with regard to Ludwig, I'd value your opinion.

Maybe.

I really don't know how to make it any more clear than I already have. Nonlinguistic beliefs are simply those beliefs shown in our actions. This is closely related to Witt's idea of showing vs saying.

Time passed, folk talked about beliefs as if they were things we had... — Banno

What does it mean to say that all belief has propositional content?

The only evidence brought to bear in support of that claim are reports about your cat's belief.

That distinction between the report and what is being reported upon matters.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's claim while remaining consistent?

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about?

This is a hand. Here is another. These are hands.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's knowledge claim while remaining consistent? — creativesoul

Witt was sympathetic to Moore's propositional claims, but I don't think he was trying to make sense of Moorean propositions. On Certainty shows throughout the book that the grammar of Moore's propositions is just incorrect, so no, I don't think Witt is trying to make sense of Moorean propositions.

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about? — creativesoul

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about.